Assoc Professor Michael Leach (Swinburne University of Technology)

Past, Present and Future: Why History Matters Discussant Paper

Assoc Prof Michael Leach Faculty of Life and Social Sciences Swinburne University of Technology Australia

ANU Timor-Leste Update, 28-29 November 2013

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The Politics of History • History important: corollary is that very centrality of history makes it a powerful source of political legitimacy – And therefore, of conflict – Contests over ‘ownership’ of resistance history; inclusion /exclusion from central narrative of national liberation

• Constitution: focuses heavily on valorisation of the resistance – FALINTIL, Clandestine, Diplomatic Front, Catholic Church

• History and memory important aspect of nation-building – Difficulties drafting national history curriculum post 1974: divisions from 1974-5, 1999, 2006.

• Role of history and memory in democratic consolidation? – O’Donnell (1988): democratic consolidation favoured if negative popular experiences of repression / economic failure under previous regime. – “inverse legitimation”: greater public resistance to attempts to overthrow the democratic regime, reluctance by political elites favouring authoritarianism

The Politics of Recognition • Politics of recognition – Perceived ‘disrespect’ to a group’s identity and values, or perceived ‘misrecognition’ of its contribution to widely shared social goals (such as national independence) may create conditions for political conflict (Honneth 1995). – ‘Struggles for recognition’ to gain acknowledgement of contributions to the common project of Timorese nationalism – Factor in 2006 political-military crisis, intergenerational tensions since independence, intra-elite conflict, political campaigns – Anti-system actors deny recognition of 2002 Constitution e.g. CPD-RDTL

• Constituencies: – making recognition style claims against the state – Veterans; Petitioners; IDPs; Clandestines; Youth; Traditionalists; Catholic Church ; Victims

• Faultlines: – Intergenerational; secular/ religious; modern/ traditional ; Internal/ diaspora ; CNRT v Fretilin ; 1974-5; Urban-Rural ; (East-West)

The Political Economy of Recognition • 37,000 Registered veterans – 67m pensions annual, one-offs 62m (La’o Hamutuk) – Recipients of contracts under Infrastructure, referendum packages: Emergency projects to vets $78m 2010-12, to increase 4% annually – 5.8% of 2013 budget, exceeding security sector, health – Does not include civilian / clandestine list; Petitioners, IDPs – AMP/ BGK introduced other important pensions: Elderly, Single mothers

• Veteran payments important, high level of popular legitimacy – Could a social security policy become political patronage network? – Largest payments distributed June 2012: “…these warriors, genuine heroes of our independence, deserve attention from the state, but we worry when this rectification is used to pay for political party promises.” La’o Hamutuk – "Tinted Windows Veterans" Xanana Gusmao April 2013 – Other groups less deserving than veterans have benefitted from infrastructure contracts – Are there attempts to mimic recognition claims as means of rent-seeking? And more malicious forms, e.g. capacity to cause unrest?

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Source: La’o Hamutuk

Mauk Moruk • Paulino ‘Mauk Moruk’ Gama: – L7’s brother, linked with Sagrada Familia, Abilio Araujo

• Moruk publicly revives split within FALINTIL early 1980s – Gusmao first seeks to restructure FALINTIL as military wing of nonpartisan, pluralist nationalist front, rejected Marxism, move to political rather than military strategy – Moruk among FALINTIL group then operating independently, opposed new direction, Kilik and Moruk demoted

• Raised ‘Hudi Laran reaction’ 1984 – attempted internal coup attempt against XG’s leadership in 1984 – Subsequent death of Kilik in combat with Indonesians, Moruk surrendered – In Holland, returns to Dili, called for ‘revolution’ and claimed taught XG guerrilla warfare, claimed 800 followers

• Widespread relief in Dili as leadership, including FRETILIN backed XG, no return to 2006 – Motivation – veterans money?

Not a failed or failing state… • Political system proving durable – Avoided cycle of internal repression and resistance – even 2006 crisis had constitutional resolution – 2013 has seen rapprochement rather than increased conflict

• No military ‘tutelary role’ qua “guarantors” of the constitution. – Although confusion policing v military roles in law and order – military police commanders, ‘overstepping the mark’

• No “reserved domains” of policy beyond elected government – Some argue aspects of Constitution are in this category – Limited parliamentary oversight of some key budget elements

• No coup, insurrection, separatist politics – Groups challenging authority of state exist, but relatively minor (CPDRDTL), some of these elements incorporated over time (UNDERTIM) – Integrationist minority incorporated into political system – Democracy ‘only game in town’

Democratic Consolidation: Strengths • Leadership – Strong leadership group, competent opposition, increasing signs of rapprochement two major political forces: Xanana Gusmao & FRETILIN – Role of President clear in these developments, moderation of political conflict (O’Donnell 1988, Valenzuela 1990)

• Political System – – – –

Semi-presidential systems working, suits Timor-Leste Voters have decided on independent Presidents Complementary authorities with different functions / types of power reflects diarchic conceptions of authority familiar to Timorese communities, greater capacity for inclusion, no winner-takes-all – Free press, chaotic but unregulated, few limits on party registration, freedom of assembly, relatively active civil society

• Proportional Electoral system 12

– Forces alliance making, inclusion – High level women’s representation 38.5%

Democratic Consolidation: Challenges • How durable will current stability prove – Finite petroleum resources; demographic bulge of young Timorese entering labour market; critical political leadership transition ahead

• Transparency – Current development approach heavily dependent on successful anticorruption & audit measures

• State capacity, government effectiveness outside Dili – Judicial functioning , army role in civilian policing, police reform process incomplete, low levels of institutional performance in public service – Roads, creating a national market and economy

• Avoiding “Institutional Ritualism” (Soares) – inclination to form new agencies rather than address actual problems – Partly encouraged by donors

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Timor-Leste: 2003-2012

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(Leach, Scambary et al 2012)