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October 6, 2010

The Failure of Song Airlines Vol. 1, Issue 1, Page 1 Product

Founded: April 2003 Terminated: April 2006 Fleet Size: 47 planes Destinations: 17 American & Caribbean cities Parent Company: Delta Air Lines, Inc. Flysong.com

McCown Bridges Dr. Augie Grant Principles of Marketing Management MKTG 701 October 6, 2010 Failure Paper

Song Airlines was developed by Delta Air Lines, Inc. as a low-cost airline. By October 2003, Delta planned to have 144 single-class flights operated by Song daily, using Boeing 757 airplanes (Delta Airlines Annual Report, 2003). Song’s objectives were to “raise brand awareness, increase awareness of what makes Song unique (the choices and fun), increase load factors (percentage of seats filled) in new and existing markets, increase online bookings through flysong.com” (Osterman, 2007). Landor Associates in New York created the brand name and the design of the planes’ interiors and airport environments. Song Airlines was comprised of 47 Boeing 757, which held 199 seats each. The outside of each plane was painted with lime-green designs and the Song logo. One plane was painted with pink designs to support the BCRF Organization. Song Airlines incorporated satellite television as onboard entertainment, a first for Delta Air Lines, Inc. Video games, MP3 programming and pay-per-view movies were also offered as entertainment (“Delta’s Song to Add Video Games to Flight,” 2005). Song was a leader in innovative entertainment and offered services that, in that time, were not standard on flights but went above and beyond standard airline amenities. Flight attendant uniforms were designed by Kate Spade. Customer experiences include positive feedback from the friendly crew, which Song did not interview but rather auditioned (The Persuaders, 2004). The flight safety video was also humorous and the entire flight, from bright green décor to the Kate Spade uniforms of the flight attendants and better entertainment, endeavored to give flyers a break from the dreary, dull flight experiences of their past. Through Song, Delta embarked on their mission to recreate air travel with low-cost alternatives, directly competing with carriers such as JetBlue and Southwest (The Persuaders, 2004).

Positioning Song had 17 destinations in the United States and the Caribbean, mostly catering to vacationers going south to Florida or the Caribbean. Song wanted to create an emotional bond with customers, and “Delta broke off a team of their best marketers and told them to start from scratch. Delta is old-fashioned air travel and Song is their way of persuading us that they can compete with hip low-cost carriers like Jet Blue” (The Persuaders, 2004). Song tickets were only available on the website, flysong.com.

The Failure of Song Airlines Vol. 1, Issue 1, Page 2

October 6, 2010

Map of 17 Song destinations

Price Song had a cost per seat-mile of eight cents, which was an average cost for low-cost carriers, but 20 percent less than Delta’s cost (Beals, Tucker and Vick, 2003). Low-cost was supposed to be the key point of the airline, but Song did not advertise it as its primary attribute.

In fact, the pricing section on the airline’s website was vague. It explained that, “Pretty much, the earlier you purchase your ticket, the less you’re going to pay.” The laid-back language told potential customers that flexible travel dates could help them save money and that Webonly fares were sometimes cheaper, which encouraged customers to buy their tickets from flysong.com. However, the pricing section of the website didn’t promise the lowest fares like all other low-fare websites, but instead again advertised “The Song Experience: Relax. Watch TV. Play games. The choice is always yours” (flysong.com, Internet Archives).

While Song was able to compete with Jet Blue and Southwest along price margins, Song failed in their attempt to make a profit comparable to the other low-cost carriers because of its choice of aircraft. Song used Boeing 757, which was much larger than the 737s used by JetBlue. Song decided that they could make more money using the 757 if all of its seats were filled. However, when the seats were not filled to capacity, Song could not make as much profit as the carriers flying 737s. Also, because the planes were bigger, it took longer to turn the planes around, which contributed to Song’s not reaching its potential profitability (“This Bird Won’t Fly!,” 2002).

October 6, 2010

The Failure of Song AirlinesVol. 1, Issue 1, Page 3 Promotion

Song introduced creative marketing to the airline industry, but even creative marketing sometimes isn’t enough – especially when consumers aren’t sure what is being sold. Andy Spade, co-founder of successful Kate Spade was hired to create advertisements for Song. His idea was to create a culture for the airlines, not just a commercial. He wanted to express a whimsical nature with which the target audience could connect. The problem was that these creative commercials didn’t feature planes or even travelers, and the commercials consumed one-third of Song’s $12 million advertising budget (The Persuaders, 2004). Although some Song employee’s did argue that Song should focus its advertising on the key point of low fares, Spade insisted on advertising for the emotion, the culture, the experience (The Persuaders, 2004): Song’s food commercial advertised its use of organic food on every flight: http://vimeo.com/5722003 (Yurshansky, 2009). Another Song promotional video says, “The revolution begins now,” and discusses revolutionizing the airline industry. It tells its listeners that they can all say that they were a part of the airline revolution: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJYPvBnhz8A (“Song Airlines Promotional Video”). Another commercial shows Song agents marketing consumers through unusual means: consumers board a bus that takes them around a city (San Francisco or New York) and teaches them about Song Airlines: http://vimeo.com/6726572 (“Guerrilla marketing, Premium Distribution”). “A combination of air travel and lifestyle brand, Song advertisements emphasized style, health and entertainment… If we didn’t already know that everyday low-fares refer to the cost of airline tickets, we’d have no way of knowing we’d just seen an advertisement for an airline.” (Deming, 2007). The choice to target emotions instead of the practical low-fare point is risky. Bob Garfield, columnist at Advertising Age, said, “Someone once wrote a book called Advertising for Myself. That’s what advertising is: it’s advertising for the guys who are creating it far more than it is for the guys who are paying for it. They’re trying to win awards, they’re trying to make more money… they’re trying to make up for the fact that they’re in advertising and not directing films or doing stand-up comedy or not painting paintings or doing whatever they’d prefer to be doing, I guarantee you. And the consequence is a lot of advertising is very extravagant in its look or very clever and entertaining and funny, but which doesn’t do the thing that advertising is supposed to which is make you want to buy the good or service that is being advertised” (The Persuaders, 2004).

Garfield added, “Most of the people who’ve tried to make emotional connections with consumers over the years have failed…have gone down in flames” (The Persuaders, 2004). Another creative idea to market Song was the pop-up store; in 2003, “Song in the City” was opened in New York for nine weeks to feature the food, entertainment and atmosphere found in Song flights (“Song in the City, 9-Week Lifespan Store”). Another Song concept store was opened in Boston, but visitors weren’t sure if the store was a travel agency or an airline, and if the concept is blurry, visitors walk away with no persuasion to use the product (The Persuaders, 2004). Song was also promoted on the television show, The Apprentice (“Song Brings Unique In-Air Experience to NYC with SoHo Concept Store”), and print, radio, billboard and television ads all were designed to direct consumers to the website, flysong.com (Osterman, 2007). The Song culture, intended to create brand identity, encouraged people to say, “That’s so Song” instead of “That’s so cool.” Advertisements for Song included phrases that read, “Founded by optimists, built by believers” and “We are not an airline, we are Song.” Men dressed in green full-body suits walked through the streets of Boston carrying Song TVs, creating confusion (The Persuaders, 2004). Song did succeed in creating a solid brand identity: 35 percent of those sampled recognized Song’s advertisements, but only 15 percent knew that the advertisements were for Song, a low-fare airlines (The Persuaders, 2004). Song was creative and perhaps they did break through the clutter of American advertisements, but the problem with the marketing of Song was that most consumers did not know what was being advertised. Confusion abounded in the advertisements for Song, as no airline or traveler was mentioned or seen through most of the advertising. Spade wanted to appeal to emotions, and perhaps he succeeded, but the goal of obtaining customers wasn’t reached because the commercials, though leaving a mark on one’s emotions, didn’t reach the consumer in a way that persuaded him to use Song as an airlines.

October 6, 2010

The Failure of Song AirlinesVol. 1, Issue 1, Page 4 Packaging

Song had similar problems with its packaging as it did with its promotion. Just as consumers weren’t sure what the green group walking through the streets of Boston meant, people weren’t sure what the logo “Song” with the swish meant either. Song hardly ever put “Airlines” after its name and expected consumers to know it was an airline, which wasn’t the case. Song packaged itself beautifully, but didn’t successfully relay the message of what exactly it was. The website, flysong.com (http://web.archive.org/web/20040616053936/www.flysong. com/home/index.jsp) allowed a visitor to choose departure and arrival dates, with a little girl and a star wand encouraging the visitor to “Let yourself fly.” The website goes along with the idea of culture and wishful dreaming, mentioning the Song Experience (“individuality – wrapped in joy” [Osterman, 2007]) and encouraging the visitor to think of the Song airplane as “your living room, just 30,000 feet in the air.” The website also boasted about the style of the flight and the taste of the food. Only in one place did it mention the lowcost, and even then it’s not very noticeable or direct. “In an industry where long lines, delays and bad food have become the norm for the travel experience, consumer research showed that most people find the experience of flying impersonal and akin to riding in a cattle car.” Song endeavored to make the customer experience more exciting and whimsical: “From ticket jackets to menu cards, even to onboard games for the kids…[Song] creat[ed] new products and branded merchandise to completely surround passengers with Song’s joyful experiences” (Osterman, 2007). Song decided to begin with a focus group and improve on the things mentioned in the meetings such as food and entertainment (The Persuaders, 2004). “The service itself was unique among airlines. It boasted terrific in-flight entertainment system, offered organic meals…and comfortable leather seats. The airline even developed a pink martini, with 20 percent of the proceeds going to the Avon Breast Cancer Crusade” (Deming, 2007).

Consumers “The story of Song Airlines is a good example of focusing too heavily on a core customer” (Deming, 2007). Song targeted a small group of consumers: a very specific group of women. “The ‘discount diva’ was an upwardly mobile, professional woman between the ages of 35 and 54, who makes the majority of travel decisions and arrangements in her family. What she wanted was a return to style in travel, but at an affordable price and with family-friendly amenities” (Deming, 2007). Song’s target woman, who they named Carrie, had three children, a husband, an SUV and sports car, shop[ed] at Target and like[d] People magazine” (The Persuaders, 2004). Song wanted to form a connection with women that they felt other airlines lacked. Although this seems like a great target audience and specific enough to get their attention, targeting such a small group of people is leaving out the majority of consumers. Even with specifically targeting that demographic, not all women who fit that description would be interested in Song, so their target market is cut even more. Song should have focused on a broader target market, perhaps including businessmen who had to fly often for their jobs.

“Let Yourself Fly”

The Failure of Song Airlines October 6, 2010

Vol. 1, Issue 1, Page 5

Competition Song’s major competition were the other low-fare carriers, Jet Blue, Southwest and AirTran. In some ways, Song was successful in competing, but in other ways it was a tremendous failure. In many ways, Song and Jet Blue resembled each other enormously. “Both used nontraditional brand and marketing approaches to attract customers. Both buil[t] much of their in-flight customer experiences around advanced seat-back entertainment systems. Both boast[ed] novel cleaning and turnaround processes that get their planes back in the air much faster” (Davenport, Leibold and Voelpel, 2006). Song was successful when it placed a chauffer in the baggage claim area of Jet Blue’s New York to Los Angeles route, holding a sign saying, “If you’d flown on Song, you’d be in LA by now.” It seemed to work: Song quickly caught up with Jet Blue and they excelled their goal of reaching 70 percent brand awareness and attained 80 percent, with a 37 percent increase in online bookings (Osterman, 2007). However, the marketing of Jet Blue eventually overcame Song’s marketing schemes. Jet Blue bought the front cover of the newspaper Boston Herald and created an ad that looked like front page news. Many people thought that Jet Blue must be successful because it had made headlines, when, in fact, it was only an ad (The Persuaders, 2004). Song wasn’t able to withstand marketing competition from Jet Blue because it couldn’t compete dollar for dollar against the low-fare carrier giant. Instead of succeeding through its use of guerrilla marketing, Song eventually wasn’t able to compete at all with the other low-fare carriers.

Song Stopped Singing Song flew its last flight on April 30, 2006 from Las Vegas, Nev. to Orlando, Fla. Delta’s chief executive, Gerald Grinstein, said, "It was a great learning experience and it gave us the chance to test ideas and to bring them over" (Maynard, 2005). In the end, Song just wasn’t strong enough to withstand the competition from other low-fare carriers such as Jet Blue. The marketing strategies weren’t capable of appealing to enough consumers to maintain a profit in the three years that Song was in the air. “Why did Song stop singing? Song could never deliver on its brand promise. The food, entertainment and overall service were all good, but its core customer was not a real person; it was a marketing Frankenstein, an amalgamation of market research” (Deming, 2007). Perhaps if Song had tried another marketing approach, one that highlighted the low-fares instead of the organic food and entertainment offerings, Song would have been more successful and could have continued to merrily chirp, “Let Yourself Fly.” Farewell Song: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9norz4Um5k

Bibliography Beals, Todd; Tucker, Matt; Vick, Mary, “A Case Study of Delta Airlines,” Creative Media Services. December 2, 2003, http://costkiller.net/tribune/TribuPDF/DELTA-AIRLINES-Operational-Cost-Saving-Strategies.pdf Davenport, Thomas H., Marius Leibold and Sven Voelpel, Strategic Management in the Innovative Economy: Strategy Approaches and Tools for Dynamic Innovative Capabilities, (Germany: Publicis Kommunikations Agentur GmbH, 2006), 346. “Delta Air Lines, Inc. Annual Report.” 2003. SEC Filings. http://secfilings.com/searchresultswide.aspx?TabIndex=2&FilingID=2222338&ty pe=convpdf&companyid=7551&ppu=%2fdefault.aspx%3fticker%3dDAL%26am p%3bauth%3d1 “Delta’s Song to Add Video Games to Flight,” March 16, 2005. http://www.lunabean.com/news/001082.php Deming, Scott, The Brand Who Cried Wolf (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007). “Guerrilla marketing, Premium Distribution.” http://vimeo.com/6726572 Maynard, Micheline. “Delta to Discontinue Its Low-Fare Song Airline,” The New York Times. Oct. 28, 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/28/business/28cndair.html Osterman, Jim. Excellence in Brand Advertising (New York: Visual Reference Publications, Inc., 2007), 174. The Persuaders. Frontline, PBS Online. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/view/. “Song.” Internet Archives. http://web.archive.org/web/20050211025605/www.flysong.com/create_a_trip/ho w_we_price/index.jsp “Song Airlines Promotional Video.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJYPvBnhz8A “Song Brings Unique In-Air Experience to NYC with SoHo Concept Store: Innovative Low-Fare Service Displays Exclusive Amenities in High Design SoHo Storefront,” http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-3282879/Song-Brings-UniqueIn-Air.htmlhttp://directmag.com/opinions-columnists/marketing_not/ “Song in the City, 9-Week Lifespan Store.” CultCase: Popping-Up: 6 Remarkable Guerrilla Retail Projects, http://www.cultcase.com/2008/02/popping-up-6remarkable-guerrilla.html.

“This Bird Won’t Fly!” The Travel Insider, http://thetravelinsider.info/2002/1122.htm Yurshansky, Lorraine. “Song Airlines – Food.” http://vimeo.com/5722003