comparative genocide and humanitarian

GENOCIDE PREVENTION: The Role of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur Studium Generale, Maastricht University, 16 October 2012 Fred Grünfeld 1

• University of Maastricht, Faculty of Law, Department International Law, Maastricht Centre of Human Rights and University College Maastricht. • University of Utrecht, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for Conflict Studies, School of Human Rights Research. • Chair of Pioom, Interdisciplinary Projects for the Study of Root Causes of Human Rights Violations, on the Causes of Gross Human Rights Violations • Financially supported by the Horstman Foundation, Leader in the Dutch Resistance movement during the Second World War. 2

OUTLINE • 1. What is Genocide ? • 2. What/who is the Bystander ? • 3. Failure of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur. • 4. Faces of Genocide – Survivors (Film 20 minutes) • 5. Conclusions: Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, Syria. 3

Levels of GHRV Scale 1: no political repression, rule of law

Scale 2: some political activists face imprisonment (few affected)

Scale 3: detention without trial takes place, arbitrary arrests, political imprisonment and murders

Scale 4: severe repression by murder, torture and disappearances for political opponents, but violence still mainly against political opinion

Scale 5: whole population faces the most severe repression, no limits on the means to pursue personal/ideological goals

Conflict Intensity High-Intensity Conflict: armed conflict causing more than 1000 deaths per year

Low-Intensity Conflict: armed conflict causing between 100-1000 deaths per year

Violent Political Conflict: armed conflict causing less than 100 deaths per year

Gross Human Rights Violations • • • • • • •

Genocide Crimes against Humanity War Crimes (IHL) Disappearances Torture Ethnic Cleansing Widespread and systematic rape (now recognized as a ‘weapon of war’; also punishable as Genocide following decisions at the ICTR)

Legal Distinctions Genocide: …any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: • Killing; • Causing serious bodily or mental harm; • Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction; • Imposing measures intended to prevent births; • Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Article 6 Rome Statute)

Destruction • Genocide is the deliberate destruction of a specific group • Destruction because of their birth, their existence, their being • Not because of their views, opinions or actions 9

Raphael Lemkin 1900-1959 • GENOS means in Greek ‘race’ or ‘tribe’ • CIDE means in Latin ‘killing’ • Churchill: Crimes without a name • Crime of all Crimes, the most serious 10

Deliberate annihilation • Genocide is the deliberate, planned and systematic annihilation of a specific group of people: – SPECIFIC GROUP – BY THE STATE – WITH INTENT

Politicide refers to political opponents (democide both but excluding war) 11

definitions of genocide •

"a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator." Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn

• "the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings ... under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims." Israel Charny • "sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim." Helen Fein • "the promotion and execution of policies by a state or its agents which result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a group ...[when] the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics, i.e., ethnicity, religion or nationality." Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr •

“Genocide is not extreme war or conflict; it is extreme exclusion. Exclusion may start with name-calling, but may end with a group of people being excluded from a society to the point where they are destroyed.” James M. Smith

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GENOCIDE CONVENTION • • • • •

Article 3: The following acts shall be punishable: ( a ) Genocide; ( b ) Conspiracy to commit genocide; ( c ) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; • ( d ) Attempt to commit genocide; • ( e ) Complicity in genocide. 13

Five stages of Repression by Hilberg 1. Shutting off the supply of information for all outsiders 2. Restricting participation to those with knowledge 3. Prohibiting criticism by outsiders 4. Absence of public talk of process of repression and destruction 5. Killings but using euphimism (final solution, auf Transport nach Osten) 14

Seven stages by Lecomte • • • • • • • •

1. definition of the target group 2. registration of the victims 3. designation of the victims 4. confiscation of goods 5. exclusion from working activities 6. systematic isolation 7. mass extermination All stages in the Holocaust and in Rwanda 15

Holocaust Studies and Genocide Studies • • • • • •

Un-precendented and Total Exterminalist anti-semitism As paradigme Repeated but also in part War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Victim oriented or perspective of perpetrator and bystander included of societal transformation (Weimar, 30s) 16

Eight Stages of Genocide by Stanton 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Classification – us and them Symbolization – yellow star of David Dehumanization – hate radio Organization – special army units Polarization – silencing the moderate Preparation – separation of the victims Extermination – mass killing, genocide Denial – cover up evidence 17

Denial of Genocide • Armenian Genocide • Nowadays Politics • More than 90 years ago

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Genocides in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur Why did the international bystanders fail to act to prevent or to stop the genocides in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur? In what way would the international bystander have been able to act with the available instruments? Why were all the warnings not translated into action or, more precisely, what are the reasons for non-action or the ineffectiveness of the action that was undertaken? 19

The Atrocity Triangle C Bystanders

A Perpetrators

B Victims 20

Each case • 1. WARNINGS • 2. INSTRUMENTS • 3. DECISION-MAKING

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Rwanda Deaths 800000

700000 Res. 918

Res. 929

600000

casualties

500000

400000

300000

Res. 912 200000

100000

1000-5000

0

6 April '94

21 April '94

13 April '94

17 May '94

22 June '94

22

Srebrenica Deaths 9000 end of Genocide

8000 Dutchbat leaves Srebrenica

7000

Deaths

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

Start of attack on Srebrenica

1000

0 6 July 1995

Start of Genocide

Fall of Srebrenica

12 July 1995 11 July 1995

17 July 1995

21 July 1995

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24

25

26

27

Darfur deaths

250000

Late march '04 Res. 1591 (sanctions) Res. 1593 (ICC)

150000

100000

30 July '04 Res. 1556

15 Nov '04 Res. 1574

50000 11 June '04 Res. 1547

18 Sept '04 Res. 1564

time

5

c05 de

t-0 ok

g05 au

05 ju n-

r-0 5 ap

-0 5 fe b

4

c04 de

t-0 ok

g04 au

04 ju n-

r-0 4 ap

-0 4 fe b

3

c03 de

t-0 ok

g03 au

03 ju n-

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casualties

200000

28

DARFUR Darfur Deaths 350000

300000 Res. 1706 UNMIS Res. 1672 Targeted sanctions

Deaths

250000

Res. 1769 UNAMID

200000

150000

100000

50000

0 February 2003

Res. 1778 MINURCAT EUFORTCHAD/RCA

Res. 1591 commission to prepare sanctions Res. 1593 ICC Res. 1556 arms embargo non state actors Res. 1547 condemnation

2004

Res. 1574 No more sanctions Res. 1564 Com.Inq.

2005 11 June late March 30 July 15 Nov 18 Sept

2006 25 April

2007 31 August

2008 25 sept. 31 July

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DEATH TOLL • Rwanda 1994 800,000 in 100 days = 8,000 a day • Srebrenica 1995 8,000 in 5 days = 1,600 a day • Darfur 2003-2010 300,000 in 2555 days = 117 a day 30

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1: Before

Prevent

2: During

React

3: After

Rebuild

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EARLY WARNING

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NEVER AGAIN • EARLY WARNING DOES NOT LEAD AUTOMATICALLY TO EARLY ACTION OR ANY ACTION • AT THE MOMENT WHEN DECISIONS ARE MADE, PREVIOUS NEVER AGAINS ARE FORGOTTEN

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WARNINGS + INSTRUMENTS IN RWANDA, SREBRENICA AND IN DARFUR: • WARMINGS WERE AVAILABLE • INSTRUMENTS WERE AVAILABLE • THIRD PARTIES (BYSTANDERS) COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE GENOCIDE 34

The Atrocity Triangle C Bystanders

A Perpetrators

B Victims 35

The bystander:the third party that will not act or that will not attempt to act in solidarity with the victims of gross human rights violations. AFTERWARD FOUR ROLES: PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS

COLLABORATORS AND RESCUERS IN THE END

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DVD • The Faces of Genocide 20 minutes

MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON Warning IN RWANDA 1. • HATE PROPAGANDA PRIOR TO GENOCIDE PUNISHED AS INCENTIVE TO GENOCIDE • WEAKER MANDATE UNAMIR THAN NEEDED BECAUSE OF FEASABILITY • OUTSPOKEN RELIABLE EARLY WARNINGS NOT FORWARDED TO SC • ANY DECISION-MAKING BY SC WAS PRECLUDED ‘the withholding of this information from the members of the security council by the un bureaucracy precluded any security council decision in this field’.

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AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN RWANDA 2. • THE OPTION TO LINK THE EVACUATION FORCE WITH UNAMIR WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN ANY WESTERN CAPITAL OR AT THE UN.

• RIZA – UN TOP OFFICIAL - WAS NOT PREPARED ON APRIL 14 TO PROPOSE AN ENFORCEMENT POWER TO SC (DUTCH ARCHIVES). • SC VOTED UNANIMOUSLY FOR FORCE REDUCTION TO 270 PERSONS ON April 21. 39

CONTINUING MAIN CONCLUSIONS 3. • DOMINATING TRUST IN PRESIDENT AND PEACE PROCESS • SHIFT IN PERCECEPTION NEEDED • FROM PROMOTING PEACE TO EMERGING GENOCIDE 40

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON WARNING IN SREBRENICA 1. • In May 2005 SC Members and UN Officials knew about intended Serbian Attack but they did not share this information with the Dutch. • A preventative military enforcement attack was excluded by the UN and the major powers

• No SC debate on maintaining safe area Srebrenica 42

AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN SREBRENICA 2. • NORDIC peacekeepers successful with tanks to deter Serbian aggressor in safe area at Tuzla. • DUTCH peacekeepers not only missed military enforcement power but they did not try in any way to deter or resist Serbian aggression.

• NATO AIR support was available but not used at the moment of the attack on Srebrenica. 43

LESSONS LEARNED • RECOGNITION OF ANNAN OF MISTAKES IN PERCEPTION IN 2004 (CHANGING MINDS) • CHAPTER VII MEASURES (USE OF FORCE AUTHORIZED) WHEN ‘national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide’ sept.05 • INVOLVEMENT OF SC WITH GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS HAS INCREASED TREMENDOUSLY 44

R2P • Sovereignty (STATE SOVEREIGNTY NOT AS A BARRIER BUT AS A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ITS PEOPLE):

• 1.PROTECT OWN POPULATION • 2.HELP GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT OWN POPULATION

• 3.COLLECTIVE ACTION, EXTREEM NEED AND LACK OF WILL (RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, CHAPTER VII DECISIONS) 45

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 26 February 2007 CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA v. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

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Obligations to prevent • it is clear that the obligation to prevent is one of conduct and not one of result. The obligation of States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. • A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide.(430) 47

Prevention – awareness of danger • a State may be found to have violated its obligation to prevent even though it had no certainty, at the time when it should have acted, but failed to do so, that genocide was about to be committed or was under way; • it is enough that the State was aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be committed.(432) 48

Duty to act • a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.(431) (see art. 8 for UN)

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50

51

DARFUR, CONFLICT CHARACTERISTICS PRIORITY FOR NORT-SOUTH CONFLICT SUDAN GENOCIDE OR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY STRONG PUBLIC OPINION 52

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WARNINGS FROM THE START 1. • UN RAPPORTEUR, KAPILA’S ROLE • UN HEAD HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS • NGOs

• USA INQUIRY, LABELING GENOCIDE, SEPTEMBER 2004 54

INSTRUMENTS DARFUR 2. • DIPLOMACY CEASE FIRE • ARMS EMBARGO • AFRICAN PEACE KEEPERS, EU FORCE in CHAD, UN PEACE KEEPERS • NO NO-FLY ZONE, NO SEIZURE OF WEAPONS • ECONOMIC SANCTIONS • PROSECUTION, BASHIR TRAVELS 55

MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON DARFUR 3 • CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION IN SC BUT NO ACTION AT THE START – PREVENTION FAILED - AND WEAK DECISIONS LATER • INCREASING CONFUSING SITUATION, good versus bad, international conflict Chad and CAR • STRONG INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF SUDAN, China 80% oil, Russia weapons, US intelligence • SMART LEADERS, giving impression of cooperation but in fact doing the opposite, strong power position. 56

DARFUR Darfur Deaths 350000

300000 Res. 1706 UNMIS Res. 1672 Targeted sanctions

Deaths

250000

Res. 1769 UNAMID

200000

150000

100000

50000

0 February 2003

Res. 1778 MINURCAT EUFORTCHAD/RCA

Res. 1591 commission to prepare sanctions Res. 1593 ICC Res. 1556 arms embargo non state actors Res. 1547 condemnation

2004

Res. 1574 No more sanctions Res. 1564 Com.Inq.

2005 11 June late March 30 July 15 Nov 18 Sept

2006 25 April

2007 31 August

2008 25 sept. 31 July

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ALL CASES • We did not Know. No, because Information was clear, reliable and available. Enough Early and later Warnings. • We were not able to act. No, because Instruments in soldiers and equipment were available to prevent or stop. • Failures. Perhaps decision-making, political power, indifference?

CONCLUDING QUOTE The bystanders at the state level and at the international level did not act in solidarity with the victims. They did not attempt to rescue.

Evaluating afterwards, we may conclude that these bystanders turned into collaborators who facilitated the genocidaires by not acting against continuing atrocities. Nowadays Ivory Coast, Lybia, Egypt, Syria ? 59