Demographic Challenges for the 21st Century

IMMIGRATION INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION IN EUROPE Conference on trends in immigration and approaches to the integration of immigrants in Europe. Prague, Thursday, 16 February 2012.

Demographic Challenges for the 21st Century – Europe in global context.

D.A. Coleman Oxford Centre for Population Research

Challenges for Europe in the era of ‘demographic maturity’ Population ageing Population decline Marginalisation on the world stage Fragmentation of family Immigration and ethnic diversity

The future of population-what we think we know All population projections are always wrong. What matters is how wrong. Some good bets for the future: World population will increase by about 3 billion. Almost all that will be in the urban third world. Almost all birth rates will stay low or decline. Almost all populations are getting older. Europe will decline demographically Europe will become less ‘European’. The 21st century has two problems at once: rapid increase in poorest countries; rapid ageing and (?) decline in Europe and other rich countries.

The longer-term future of population: what we know we don’t know. Effects of global warming on population. Why does anyone ever have any children? What are the limits to lifespan, if any?

World population projections 2010 - 2100 and estimates 1950-2010 (thousands). Source: UN variant projections 2010-based.

30000

25000 Medium variant High variant

20000

Low variant Constant rates

15000

10000

5000

2100

2094

2088

2082

2076

2070

2064

2058

2052

2046

2040

2034

2028

2022

2016

2010

2004

1998

1992

1986

1980

1974

1968

1962

1956

0 1950

population (millions)

Variant world population projections, 2010based (millions). Source: United Nations 2011.

Forecast distribution of world population (a ‘probabilistic’ projection) Source: Lutz, 2009

Who inherits the Earth? Population projections 2010-2100 and estimates 1950-2010, selected major regions and countries (millions). Source: UN 2010-based projections.

3500

3000 Sub-Saharan Africa India China Europe Pakistan Brazil Japan USA

2000

1500

1000

500

2100

2094

2088

2082

2076

2070

2064

2058

2052

2046

2040

2034

2028

2022

2016

2010

2004

1998

1992

1986

1980

1974

1968

1962

1956

0 1950

Population (millions)

2500

No such thing as ‘Europe’? Population estimates and projections, European regions and USA 1950 – 2010. Source UN 2010-based projections.

500

Population estimates and projections, European regions and USA 1950 - 2100 (millions). Source: United Nations 2010-based projections

450

USA Eastern Europe Western Europe Southern Europe Northern Europe

400 350

OXPOP

300 250 200 150 100 50

Estimates

Projections 2097

2090

2083

2076

2069

2062

2055

2048

2041

2034

2027

2020

2013

2006

1999

1992

1985

1978

1971

1964

1957

1950

0

A closer view – selected Southern and Western European populations 1950-2050 Projection, total population, major European countries 1950 - 2050 (thousands), Source: UN 2008 World Population Prospects (pre-publication data)

90,000

80,000

Estimate

70,000

Projection

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

Germany

Italy

France

United Kingdom

Spain

2050

2045

2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2015

2010

2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

1970

1965

1960

1955

1950

20,000

Population estimates and projections, Central and Eastern Europe 1950 – 2100. Source: United Nations 2010.

45 Population estimates and projections, Central and Eastern Europe 1950 - 2100 (millions).

40

OXPOP 35

Poland Czech Republic Belarus Bulgaria

30

Romania Hungary Slovakia

25 20 15 10 5 Estimates

Projections

2097

2090

2083

2076

2069

2062

2055

2048

2041

2034

2027

2020

2013

2006

1999

1992

1985

1978

1971

1964

1957

1950

0

Fertility rates – the basic driver of population ageing and its international divergence. TFR trends Major Regions 1950 - 2009

3.5

unweighted means. Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical offices

CEE unweighted mean Southern unweighted mean FSU unweighted mean (excluding Moldova) Northern Europe Western Europe USA

3.0

2.5

2.0

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

1970

1968

1966

1964

1962

1960

1958

1956

1954

1952

1.0

1950

1.5

Birth rates can go up as well as down Total Fertility trends, industrial higher-fertility countries 1945-2010

4.5

Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat and national statistical yearbooks

4.0

Denmark France

3.5

NZ USA

3.0

Norway United Kingdom

2.5 2.0 1.5

2008

2005

2002

1999

1996

1993

1990

1987

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

1963

1960

1957

1954

1951

1948

1945

1.0

Total fertility, Central and Eastern Europe 1945 – 2010. Source; Council of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical offices.

4.0

Total fertility, Central and Eastern Europe, 1945 - 2010. Source: Ceouncil of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical offices.

3.5

Belarus Bulgaria Czech Republic East Germany Hungary Poland Romania Russia Slovak Republic Ukraine

3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0

OXPOP 2008

2005

2002

1999

1996

1993

1990

1987

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

1963

1960

1957

1954

1951

1948

1945

0.5

Things aren’t as bad as they seem… Comparison of actual (2008) and adjusted (2005-7) TFR, selected countries. Arranged by order of adjusted TFR. Adjustment by Bongaarts-Feeney method

2.5 Actual total fertility Adjusted total fertility

OXPOP

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

Japan

Italy

Greece

Germany

Hungary

Slovakia

Austria

Bulgaria

Czech Republic

Finland

Denmark

UK

France

0.0

Longer lives and good health – for some Current Western demographic trends mostly very favourable, including ‘oldest-old’ (e.g France 2009 e0m = 78; e0f = 85). Divergent trends in CEE, former Soviet Union. Education important for healthy old age. No upper limit evident in life expectancy. Biological views less optimistic, and new threats (e.g. obesity).

Male expectation of life at birth, trends 1945-2010, selected European countries. 80

Switzerland

Source: Eurostat and national statistical offices.

Expectation of life at birth, males, selected European countries 1945 - 2010

United Kingdom France Poland

75

Hungary Czech Republic Belarus

70

Russia Ukraine

65

60

OXPOP 2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1983

1981

1979

1977

1975

1973

1971

1969

1967

1965

1963

1961

1959

1957

1955

1953

1951

1949

1947

1945

55

Expectation of life at birth , males, Europe 2008. Quintiles. Source: WHO

Life expectancy at birth, in years, male

Upper 4-th 3-rd 2-nd European Region 72.07

2008

Lower No data Min = 61.91

Evolution of age-structure through the demographic transition: an example. Austria – from 19th c. Christmas tree to 21st c. coffin. 1: 1869, 1910, 1934. Source: Demografische Informationen 1995/6 page 109.

Evolution of age-structure in Austria 2: effects of the catastrophic early 20th century and the post-war ‘baby boom’ 1951, 1971, 1995.

Evolution of age-structure in Austria - the projected effects of continued sub-replacement fertility. Further ageing, decline, and the extinction of the ‘boom’ generations. 2015, 2030, 2050.

Population change in selected European countries 2008 - 2055, percent, with and without migration. Source: Eurostat 2007 30 Percent projected population change with migration Percent projected population change without migration

20

10

-20

-30

Germany

Italy

Netherlands

Finland

Denmark

France

Spain

UK

Sweden

-10

Norway

0

Problematic aspects of population ageing Lower birth and death rates increase the aged dependency ratio, only partly relieved by lighter youth dependency ratio. Generally adverse effects on economic production / consumption balance; lower economic growth than previously. Specific problems: labour shortage, possible inflation, care arrangements for elderly, adequacy of pension provisions, possibly a less creative older workforce. Population growth does not stop population ageing.

Projections of changing balance between (notionally) productive and non-productive age-groups of the population Aged potential support ratios 2010, 2060 assuming constant nominal working age 20-64. Source: calculated from UN 2010.

9.0 8.0 7.0 Aged potential support ratio

Potential Support Ratio 2010

6.0 Potential Support Ratio 2060

5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 Japan

Italy

Germany

France

UK

Norway

Poland

Russia

South Korea

China

Lower birth rates bring more severe ageing. Total fertility rate in 2010 and projected aged potential support ratio in 2060, selected developed countries. Source; data from UN 2010. Total fertility rate 2010 and potential support ratio 2060. 4 USA 3.5 R2 = 0.6403

Belgium Netherlands

support ratio 2060

3 Czech Republic Russia

2.5

UK

Norway France

Switzerland China

Germany

2

Poland

Italy

South Korea Japan

1.5

1 1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6 1.7 1.8 Total fertility rate 2010

1.9

2

2.1

2.2

A worst case scenario : from ‘bonus’ to ‘onus’. Taiwan 2010, 2060. Source: Basten 2011 and Taiwan national statistical office. 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

2060

2060

2010

2010

females

males

250

200

150

100

50

0 50 population, '000s

100

150

200

250

Can higher fertility ‘solve’ population ageing? Replacement TFR (2.05) without migration would eventually maintain population size and keep PSR to about 2.0. If no net migration, no long-term population growth. But TFR would need to rise to about 3.5 to restore PSR to about 4 even by 2071, and to 5.5 to restore PSR by mid-century. That would generate unsustainable population growth.

UK 2001-2100. Can immigration protect us from ageing? Population size consequent upon ‘replacement migration’ to preserve UK current support ratio of 4.1. Source: GAD. UK population size (millions) implied by levels of migration required to maintain given levels of potential aged support ratio (PSR), 1998 - 2100. Source: unpublished projections by GAD - see Coleman (2002b)

350 PSR = 3.0 PSR = 3.5 PSR = 4.2

250 200 150 100

2100

2090

2080

2070

2060

2050

2040

2030

2025

2020

2015

2010

2005

0

2000

50

1998

population (millions)

300

Demography isn’t everything Ageing Vulnerability Index 2003 Overall Index Rank

Australia UK US Canada Sweden Japan Germany Netherlands Belgium France Italy Spain

Score

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Public

Fiscal

Benefit

Elder

Burden

Room

Dependence

Affluence

Rank

Rank

Rank

Rank

-1 7 18 42 48 50 52 62 63 81 84 93 weight

Source: Jackson and Howe 2003, Figure 18

2 1 3 6 4 9 7 8 5 10 11 12 1/3

2 1 4 6 3 9 5 7 8 10 11 12 1/3

4 6 3 5 8 1 11 9 10 12 2 7 1/6

6 11 1 2 10 3 5 4 9 8 12 7 1/6

Migration flows to European Union and USA Net immigation to EU-15, EU27 and gross inflow to the USA, 1960 - 2008 (thousands)

2500

Net immigration to EU-15 Persons accepted for permanent residence, USA (gross inflow)

2000

Net immigration to EU27 1500

1000

500

0

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

1970

1968

1966

1964

1962

1960

-500

Gross migration flow to France 2005, by reason for admission (%). France 2005. Immigration (gross inflow) according to reason for admission (percent). Student Worker Family Other EEA 3 37 10 50 Non-Europe 26 5 50 19 All 21 11 42 25

All 100 100 100

Source: INED Note: 'Other' includes inactive, retired, refugee. Percent by purpose excludes minors (about 8% of total). Switzerland and Turkey omitted. 12% of total; mostly Turkey, 39% for family reasons.

Percent by area 21 79 100

Net migration per thousand population, Czech Republic and selected European countries. Source: Eurostat Net immigration per thousand population, selected European countries 1990 - 2009. Source: Eurostat.

20

Switzerland United Kingdom Netherlands Germany Czech Republic

10

5

-10

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

-5

1991

0 1990

Net immigration per thousand population

15

Comparison of live births, natural increase and net

immigration, selected Western countries 2008. sources: Eurostat, national statistical offices. Population

Live

Natural

Net

1st Jan 08

births

increase

immigration

Immigrants as percent of births

data in thousands 44475

488

107

702

7509

74

13

69

59131

563

-7

494

Norway

4681

58

17

40

Belgium

10585

121

20

62

Austria

8299

76

2

31

Greece

11172

110

2

41

5447

64

8

20

UK

60817

771

195

175

France mét

61538

784

268

70

Germany

82315

683

-141

48

144 93 88 69 51 41 37 31 23 9 7

Euro total

355968

3792

483

1752

46

Australia

21015

285

145

213

Canada

33311

357

127

204

New Zealand

4263

64

35

4

United States

298363

4217

1840

844

75 57 6 20

Spain Switzerland Italy

Denmark

Ethnic change – the USA in the lead projected 2010-2050

Population projections of the United States by race and Hispanic origin, 2010 - 50 (percent). Source: US Census Bureau 2008. Note - persons with more than one origin not included (3% in 2050).

70

non-Hispanic White All minority groups primarily immigrant-origin minorities Black Indigenous

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Comparison of projections of foreign-origin populations in Europe (percent of total population 2000 – 2050). Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as percent of total population. 35

30

Germany medium variant USA medium variant (excludes black population) Netherlands base scenario Denmark 2002- based medium variant Sweden foreign background 2004 based Austria 'Compensating' scenario, no naturalisation.

percent

25

20

15

10

5 2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Current unions outside own group, Great Britain 199196, 1997-02 (percent). 40 35 30

percent

25 20 15 10 5 0

BlackCaribbean

Black-African

Women 1991-1996

Indian

Women 1997-2002

Pakistani

Bangladeshi

Men 1991-1996

Chinese

Men 1997-2002

The faces of the future?

An end to ‘ethnic’ categories? The rise of mixed populations. Probabilistic projections of the UK 2001- 2100, average outcome for major groups (percent). UK Version 2 probabilistic projection: mean of percent of each major ethnic group in the total population, 2001 - 2100. 100 90 80 70 60

White

50

Black Asian

40

Mixed 30 20 10 2100

2095

2090

2085

2080

2075

2070

2065

2060

2055

2050

2045

2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2015

2010

2005

2001

0

Concluding points Population ageing inevitable, and relative decline of ‘1st world’: Major demographic losers (Germany, Russia, Ukraine, Japan), and winners (Asia, Africa, USA). In long run economic, military and strategic rank should follow population size (cf. India and China), as in the past. Fastest growth in the poorest countries risks serious security and environmental problems, which may affect Europe. Population of UK and NW Europe growing substantially. Population ageing manageable, but much more difficult when birth rates are low, as in Central / Eastern Europe. Migration pressure on Western countries will persist for decades, may lead to ethnic transformation. Climate change on a collision course with population growth. In the long run, equilibrium position of birth and death rates (if any) is unknown. World population may decline after about 2070.