Encryption AFF Updates - University of Michigan Debate Camp Wiki
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Encryption AFF Updates
A2 CP – HUMINT REFORM
2ac deficits Dependency – doesn’t end overreliance on techint – causes intelligence failures Gabriel Margolis ’13 – Program Assistant at The Department of Public and International Affairs which offers a semi-distance, multi-disciplinary graduate program in Conflict Management and Resolution (CMR) for professionals, practitioners and students who wish to gain a greater understanding of conflict in both domestic and international settings, at University of North Carolina Wilmington The United States has accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological advances of the 20th century. Numerous methods of collection have been employed in clandestine operations around the world including those that focus on human, signals, geospatial, and measurements and signals intelligence. An infatuation with technological methods of intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence organizations, often leaving the age old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on technical methods, some of the worst
intelligence failures of the 20th century can be attributed to an absence of human intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances in technology have allowed UAVs to become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering platform; however human intelligence is still being neglected. The increasing reliance on UAVs will make the United States susceptible to intelligence failures unless human intelligence can be properly integrated. In the near future UAVs may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before classical espionage is a thing of the past.
Source protection – removing backdoors is key to informant willingness to cooperate Patrick Tucker ‘14, science and technology editor for Defense One, “White House Push To Allow FBI Phone Hacks Could Hurt Intelligence Gathering,” 11-23-2014, http://www.defenseone.com/voices/patrick-tucker/8219/ Two former Navy SEALs say that the White House and FBI push against encryption will hurt troops, intelligence gathering. Through public speeches and secret meetings, FBI Director James Comey has been pushing to stop companies like Apple and Google from encrypting users’ phone data. Two former Navy SEALs say that the policy that the FBI and the Justice Department are pursuing would hurt men and women in uniform and possibly even our allies by forcing them to use insecure devices and services for communication. Here’s how the fight over encryption took form. In September, Apple announced that its most recent operating system update for the iPhone, the iOS 8, would encrypt phone data. “On devices running iOS 8, your personal data such as photos, messages (including attachments), email, contacts, call history, iTunes content, notes and reminders is placed under the protection of your passcode….Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore cannot access this data… So it’s not technically feasible for us to respond to government warrants,” Apple says in a notice on the privacy portion of its website. Google followed, announcing an encryption update for its Android 5.0 Lollipop operating system. As Yahoo Tech’s Rob Pegoraro reports, that will affect the Nexus 6 first and other phones soon after. Upon news of the announcement, Comey responded by condemning encryption, first speaking out at a Brookings Institution event, saying that Apple and Google’s decision was going to take the country to a “very dark place” where law enforcement “misses out” on crucial evidence to stop terrorists and gather evidence against criminals. Comey approached the president and, along with representatives from the Justice Department, briefed members of the House in a classified session. Legislatively, the lawmakers could easily block Apple and Google from offering encryption by updating the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, which mandates that telephone companies like AT&T and Verizon build backdoors into their networks to allow taping. But the 1994 law doesn’t apply to companies like Google and Apple or other newer networks, so an update to the law could force the companies to allow law enforcement easier access to user data. At a moment when the United States is conducting a military campaign to disrupt, dismantle and defeat ISIL, now is not the time to be considering legislation that takes away the exact tools we need to combat ISIL. How do lawmakers feel about that? Despite widespread public concern about government electronic spying on the public, on Nov. 18 the Senate effectively killed the only NSA reform measure to come out of the Snowden scandal, the so-called Freedom Act. Incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky. even said that the fight against the Islamic State means that the U.S. can’t consider reforming the way the government collects bulk meta data and that’s via phone. “At a moment when the United States is conducting a military campaign to disrupt, dismantle and defeat ISIL, now is not the time to be considering legislation that takes away the exact tools we need to combat ISIL.” All of that suggests that some lawmakers are more open to Comey’s arguments now that the midterm elections are over. Vic Hyder and Mike Janke, two former Navy SEALs with the company Silent Circle, say that the FBI’s plan to block phone makers and service providers from offering phone encryption would make it significantly more difficult for deployed people to communicate back home and even for members of the intelligence community to communicate with sources. Importantly, Hyder and Janke aren’t exactly unbiased in this fight. Silent Circle, the company that Janke launched in 2012 with computer scientist Philip Zimmermann, sells encryption services—and devices—to the public. They offer different encryption apps that they sell through the App store and through Google Play that allow users to encrypt their phone calls contacts and tests. They also sell encryption calling plans to members. Hyder is the company’s chief strategy officer. In June, the company debuted a smart phone called the Blackphone. They already have customers within the U.S. military. While they acknowledge that their opposition is borne out of self-interest, they say that blocking encryption would also hurt their customers, which includes a lot of men and women on the front lines. “If Director Comey’s efforts actually
resulted in legislative change to halt the sale of encryption or encryption services, he would only be hurting the American people, businesses, government entities who Silent Circle’s encrypted communication services are currently protecting,” Janke told Defense One. The intelligence community today is a great deal larger and more diverse than it was 50 years ago. Getting good sources to talk becomes more difficult if secure communication is the sole right of a small handful of people. Janke started the company as a way to actually meet a military need—not so much as a replacement for tactical communications (many which have their own security problems), but rather to enable troops to stay better connect with family on the other side of the world without giving away data to potential adversaries or hackers. “Where this comes in to play is when [troops] are calling home and they pop up on their mobile phones and use Skype. It’s hackable, not secure and not approved for government use. We wanted something for those mobile phones to give privacy back. The company started for the purpose of helping deployed troops and human rights advocates speaking out against their governments,” Hyder told Defense One. “Comey’s telling the guys they can’t communicate back home without an Iridium phone,” he said, referring to a pricy satellite phone that can run into thousands of dollars and offers no smartphone functionality. Zimmermann
elaborated on the threat to soldiers posed by communication over insecure networks and platforms like Skype, but the growing need to stay-connected, especially over frequent and long deployments, makes less secure communication back home from the front lines inevitable. “Suppose a U.S. soldier is
talking to his family back home and he’s using a tool that doesn’t encrypt things,” said Zimmermann, “there will be leakage of information… things he talks about with his family. That’s just the place where the military intersects their civilian lives. You can’t have backdoors in this stuff because those backdoors will be exploited… Look at how the Chinese government exploited the back doors in Google services that Google built in for law enforcement.” The FBI’s nascent war on encryption is all too familiar to Zimmermann, who is also the creator of Pretty Good Privacy or PGP, one of the most used e-mail encryption software packages in the world. Since Zimmermann first published it for free on the Internet in 1991, PGP has helped thousands of people around the world communicate more securely, including people the intelligence and the military community. But some in government saw the act of publishing PGP as a potential violation of U.S. export arms restrictions (cryptographic software, according to this line of thinking, constitutes a weapon). Zimmermann spent three years under criminal investigation. The world now relies on software like PGP and encryption in general. “I would like to point out that the legislative environment today is different from the 1990s.” Back then, he said, “You had to justify your use of crypto,” and attempting to send messages in secret suggested, perhaps reasonably, that you had something to hide that might be of value to the national security community. Today cyber-security is rising as a consumer, business and national security concern—and encryption is a key part of making networks, devices and data more secure.. “If you are a doctor and your hospital doesn’t encrypt records, you’re in violation of HIPAA Law,” said Zimmermann, referring to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. A world without encryption is one where hackers in China and Russia can much more easily commit financial and even military espionage, of the sort that has garnered attention recently from the press and from lawmakers. One example of that is the recent cyber attacks from China aimed at U.S. Transportation Command. You can’t have backdoors in this stuff because those backdoors will be exploited. The governments of Mexico, Brazil, Ukraine, Trinidad and Tobago, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Singapore and Germany are all using Silent Circle’s services for secure communication. “I was told the Queen of England was notified of the baby’s birth last year via Silent Phone due to the law requiring secure communication methods used to inform her first,” said Hyder. The company says that legislation making encryption unavailable to the public could also hurt intelligence collection. The intelligence community today is a great deal larger and more diverse than it was 50 years ago. Potential sources of information in places like northern Iraq or China may be much less likely to provide actionable intel if they can’t communicate over a secure medium with U.S. agents, contractors, journalists or intermediaries. Getting good sources to talk becomes more difficult if secure communication is the sole right of a small handful of people. “As [human intelligence] assets report on
current activities to journalists or government agents from hotbeds around the world, they can do so knowing they are protected from prying ears who would imprison or kill them for the information they are providing. Silent Circle’s encryption not only increases the flow
and quality of information that can be used to target criminal elements but also protect those who are in the fray assigned to collect and report,” Janke said. It’s a sales pitch, of course, but Janke’s claim is backed up, at least a bit, by the sorts of clients they service. “A lot of the guys I’ve worked with over the years [primarily in military intelligence] have come in asking about the Blackphone and have purchased in small numbers,” said Hyden. The concern among these spies was the safety of their sources, people with whom they needed to communicate but who wouldn’t be safe carrying around U.S. military equipment. The
vulnerability of conventional phone and text communication could even affect the intelligence environment in Iraq and Syria, where the rapid rise of the Islamic State resulted, according to some, from a lack of U.S. human intelligence on the ground. “I heard about a journalist in Damascus who was calling her editor to report what was going on in a cell phone. It caught the attention of the Syrian Regime. They intercepted that and there was a banging on her hotel room door not long after. She had to escape out the back. She got Blackphone and that solved the problem,” Zimmermann said. In working to block Google, Apple and potentially Silent Circle,
from offering encryption, Comey is being shortsighted, Zimmermann said. “The FBI is enjoying the golden age of surveillance. Some of this comes form pervasive cameras, facial recognition, optical reading tech and transaction data. Comey is talking about a few pixels. He has an enormously lucrative environment for surveillance today that he never had before.” Bottom line for Zimmermann—encryption is now a tool that can make the world more secure. Despite Comey’s dire warnings about how allowing everyone to talk more securely would make law enforcement harder, agents in the field understand its value. For evidence of that refer to a talk Zimmermann gave at this years DefCon event in Law Vegas in August, long before Comey’s recent moves. “The FBI visited us at our office,” Zimmermann recalled. “They said ‘We’re here to ask about pricing.’”
Focus – HUMINT will be ignored as long as TECHINT is coming in Volz and Snowden ’14 –Dustin Volz is a staff correspondent for National Journal covering tech policy. His work has previously appeared in The Washington Post, The Center for Public Integrity, and The Arizona Republic. Dustin is a graduate of Arizona State University and a publisher of Downtown Devil, a hyper-local news site serving the downtown Phoenix community. Before arriving at National Journal, Dustin spent nine months teaching English at a high school in Indonesia through a Fulbright scholarship. "We didn't really watch these guys and the question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is because we do have finite resources and the question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on mass-surveillance programs of the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means of traditional [targeting]?" Anti-spying activists have frequently argued that bulk data collection has no record of successfully thwarting a terrorist attack, a line of argument some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their legal reviews of the activities. Snowden's
suggestion—that such mass surveillance has not only failed to directly stop a threat, but actually makes the U.S. less safe by distracting resource-strapped intelligence officials from performing their jobs—takes his criticism of spy programs to a new level. "We're watching everybody that we have no reason to be watching simply because it may have value, at the expense of being able to watch specific people for which we have a specific cause for investigating, and that's something that we need to look carefully at how to balance," Snowden said. Snowden's appearance is his second in as many weeks. He spoke with journalist Jane Mayer earlier via video at the New Yorker festival earlier this month, where he cautioned that Apple and Google's new encryption protections are not impenetrable from spies and law-enforcement officials—a warning he echoed on Monday. "Systems are fundamentally insecure," Snowden said. "Even heavily protected, heavily encrypted messages are vulnerable."
A2 DA – CHINA
2ac econ turn Chinese backdoors wreck their economy – turns the disad Timm 2015 (Trevor Timm, a Guardian US columnist and executive director of the Freedom of the Press Foundation, a nonprofit that supports and defends journalism dedicated to transparency and accountability. “Building backdoors into encryption isn't only bad for China, Mr President” The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/04/backdoorsencryption-china-apple-google-nsa. March 4, 2015)\\mwang want to know why forcing tech companies to build backdoors into encryption is a terrible idea? Look no further than President Obama’s
stark criticism of China’s plan to do exactly that on Tuesday. If only he would tell the FBI and NSA the same thing. In a stunningly short-sighted move, the FBI and more recently the NSA - have been pushing for a new US law that would force tech companies like Apple and Google to hand over the encryption keys or build backdoors into their products and tools so the government would always have access to our communications. It
China wasted no time in demanding the same from tech companies a few weeks ago . As President Obama himself described to Reuters, China has proposed an expansive new “anti-terrorism” bill that “would essentially force all foreign companies, including US companies, to turn over to the Chinese government mechanisms where they can snoop and keep track of all the users of those services.” Obama continued: “Those kinds of restrictive practices I think would ironically hurt the Chinese economy over the long term because I don’t think there is any US or European firm, any international firm, that could credibly get away with that wholesale turning over of data, personal data, over to a government.” Bravo! Of course these are the exact arguments for why it would be a disaster for US government to force tech companies to do the same. (Somehow Obama left that part out.) As Yahoo’s top security executive Alex Stamos told NSA director Mike Rogers in a public confrontation last week, building backdoors into encryption is like “drilling a hole into a windshield.” Even if it’s technically possible to produce the flaw - and we, for some reason, trust the US government never to abuse it - other countries will inevitably demand access for themselves. Companies will no longer be in a position to say no, and even if they did, intelligence services would find the backdoor unilaterally - or just steal the keys outright. For an example on how this works, look no further than last week’s Snowden revelation that the UK’s intelligence service and the NSA stole the encryption keys for millions of Sim cards used by many of the world’s most popular cell phone providers. It’s happened many times before too. Security expert Bruce Schneier has documented with numerous examples, “Back-door access built for the good guys is routinely used by the bad guys.” Stamos repeatedly (and commendably) pushed the NSA director for an answer on what happens when China or Russia also demand backdoors from tech companies, but Rogers didn’t have an answer prepared at all. He just kept repeating “I think we can work through this”. As Stamos insinuated, maybe Rogers should ask his own staff why we actually can’t work through this, because virtually every technologist agrees backdoors just cannot be secure in practice. (If you want to further understand the details behind the encryption vs. backdoor was only a matter of time before other governments jumped on the bandwagon, and
debate and how what the NSA director is asking for is quite literally impossible, read this excellent piece by surveillance expert Julian Sanchez.) It’s downright bizarre that the US government has been warning of the grave cybersecurity risks the country faces while, at the very same time, arguing that we should pass a law that would weaken cybersecurity and put every single citizen at more risk of having their private information stolen by criminals, foreign governments, and our own. Forcing backdoors will also be disastrous for the US economy as it would be for China’s. US tech companies - which already have suffered billions of dollars of losses overseas because of consumer distrust over their relationships with the NSA - would lose all credibility with users around the world if the FBI and NSA succeed with their plan. The White House is supposedly coming out with an official policy on encryption sometime this month, according to the New York Times – but the President can save himself a lot of time and just apply his comments about China tothe US government. If he knows backdoors in
encryption are bad for cybersecurity, privacy, and the economy, why is there even a debate?
Economic growth controls their internal link – solves the impact Economist 11 (The Economist offers authoritative insight and opinion on international news, politics, business, finance, science, technology and the connections between them. “How real is China’s Growth?” The Economist http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/05/chinas_economy_1 June 1, 2011)\\mwang I'M NOW back from China, and I'm going to resist the temptation to draw grand, sweeping conclusions based on two weeks jaunting around the country. I will tell you some of my impressions, however. And I'll start with the primary question on my mind as I left to visit China: how real is its economic growth? I came away from China a bit less worried about property issues than I'd been going in. Don't get me wrong, China is building an enormous amount of new housing, and quite a lot of that new housing is standing empty, even as prices rise. But this isn't necessarily the problem many people suspect, for a few reasons. For one thing, the flow of new demand for housing seems sure. Millions of Chinese remain underhoused while real incomes are soaring. In some cases, the Chinese government is coordinating the construction of several years' worth of demand for new homes all at once, justifiably confident that new units will ultimately be occupied. In other cases, Chinese workers are buying up new units as investment vehicles—but are using savings, rather than debt, to fund the purchases. It's not impossible, or even that unlikely, that prices in the main cities may fall, but it would be wrong to assume that China's property markets operate in the way American markets do and share the same vulnerabilities. Tightening restrictions on household purchases, and tightening credit, designed to rein in booming private construction, may produce a squeeze in some segments of the real estate market, leading to pain for some on the development and transactional side of the market. But a slowdown in private construction is unlikely to gut the broader economy, thanks to a massive government push for affordable housing construction that will keep workers and suppliers busy. And the government has the will and the ability to make sure any broader loan troubles are contained. I won't begin to argue that there aren't huge inefficiencies and costs to this system, but it doesn't look like the
kind of structure that's likely to collapse, bringing the economy down with it. It's clear where the risk ultimately lies—with the government—and it's clear that the government can handle it. What little I saw of China's manufacturing sector reinforced my sense that it's an impressive and productive part of the economy. China's manufacturing also spans the value-added chain. In the large coastal cities, deindustrialisation is already a reality; labour-intensive factories have already left for cheaper markets, leaving high-tech manufacturing and a growing service sector behind. In the poorer west, by contrast, the scope for movement up the value chain remains significant. Much of what rapid growth China has left will be powered, in no small, part, by the convergence of western provinces toward coastal development levels, and this process is well underway. What's China's manufacturing isn't is labour-intensive, even at the fairly low-tech enterprises. As large and strong as China's manufacturing firms are, they're not able to absorb all that much of China's enormous labour force. China seems to compensate for this by absorbing huge numbers of workers in a growing service sector. Productivity levels in many service industries must be ming-bogglingly low. Hotels seemed to have as many employees as guests, teams of workers with hand tools maintained roadside greenery, and buildings of all sorts are staffed with large groups of greeters and security personnel. Cheap labour may make some of this sort of employment worthwhile, but officials also indicated that, in the past at least, the government used public service employment to help absorb workers displaced when hundreds of thousands of textile and electronic manufacturing jobs were lost to cheaper locales. This may be costly and inefficient, but one wonders if it isn't less costly and inefficient than America's habit of letting displaced workers linger in long-term unemployment, on disability roles, or out of the labour force entirely. Chinese officials were quick to play down the country's dependence on foreign demand, pointing to progress in the country's trade surplus. There may be less to this than they indicate; Michael Pettis writes here, for instance, about financial chicanery in the country's copper trade that may have artificially boosted import totals early in 2011. China is also cultivating export markets in fast growing countries across central and southeast Asia . But candid Chinese professionals admitted that trouble in the US and European economies represented a big potential threat to the economy. That threat will slowly ebb as Chinese consumers become more active. Government officials repeatedly reported eye-popping real income growth figures. But more than one of the people I spoke with likened the Chinese economy to a large ship that can't turn on a dime. No amount of movement in exchange rates or wages or policies will move the Chinese economy to a more normal rate of domestic consumption overnight. What seemed clear, however, was that the fundamentals in the Chinese economy are stronger than many Americans suspect. For this reason, a collapse looks unlikely, and the government has the will and the
means to fight off a short-term crisis. The government cites stability as its source of legitimacy, and it draws a tight connection between stability and economic growth . Stability, and therefore growth, will be especially important given the looming handover of party and national leadership from Hu Jintao to (it seems certain) Xi Jinping. The present policy strategy is muddied somewhat by the rise in inflation, which is a big source of concern among the masses. China will trade off a little growth for control of its prices. Officials will try extremely hard to ensure that the landing is a soft one, however. (For more on the progress here, read this week's economics Lead note. Markets seem to be overreacting to signs of a Chinese slowdown.)
--xt econ turn Chinese anti-terror bill increases U.S.-China tensions and hurts China econ Chen 15 - Senior Manager, Insight Analyst at MarketShare, University of Manitoba: Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ecnometrics and Agricultural Economics, Research Analyst at Manitoba. (“China anti-terror law worries foreign tech firms”, Qin Chen, April 22, 2015, MarketWatch, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-anti-terror-law-worries-foreign-tech-firms-2015-04-02?page=2)//chiragjain
BEIJING — The drafting of China’s
first anti-terror law has received great attention from overseas because aspects related to cyber-security issues are expected to have a big impact on foreign tech firms’ operations in the country. A draft version published on the website of the country’s legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), shows that the proposed law include articles that require telecom and Internet companies to hand over encryption keys and install back doors to their software to aid counter-terror investigations. These requirements have touched a nerve at Western tech firms because they would grant the Chinese government access to the companies’ most sensitive data. U.S. President Barack Obama indicated this was unacceptable to his government, telling reporters in early March: “This is something they are going to have to change if they are to do business with the United States.” In response, the spokesman of the NPC,
Fu Ying, said at a new conference that the requirements in the draft were in accordance with China’s laws and in line with international practices. Fu also said countries such as the U.S. and U.K. have also required tech companies to disclose security-related data in recent years. The draft of the anti-terrorism law has undergone two readings, one in October and another February. A third review is required for the law to be approved. However, at this year’s annual legislative meeting, which ran from March 5 to 15, the draft was not submitted to the NPC for its deliberation. This could mean China is changing its approach, said Douglas Paal, a former director of Asian affairs for the U.S. National Security Council and the current vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The NPC did not act on the legislation for this measure, so Beijing may be reshaping or reconsidering its demands,” he said. Paal said the draft law sought software source codes and assured back-door entry to software for government observation, which amounts to asking companies to give away their commercial property
without compensation, likely meaning the loss of the code to competitors in China. A
number of U.S. Internet experts that Caixin spoke to said the U.S. government requires companies to provide related information to meet law-enforcement needs, but it does not ask firms to install back doors in their software. Robert Atkinson, the president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a public-policy think tank based in Washington, said foreign companies are concerned that the Chinese government will be able to access to all of their information without going through any legal reviews. “Governments don’t need the keys,” he said. “They just need to be able to require firms in China to turn over information.” Atkinson, who is also a tech-policy advisor to the White House, said the draft anti-terror law might worsen trade tensions between China and the
U.S. Many Internet experts also worry that installing back doors in software system may weaken system security and create openings for hackers. Foreign tech firms have big eyes for the Chinese market. A recent report by the market-research group International Data Corp. predicted China’s spending on information and communication tech products will reach $465 billion in 2015. The country could account for 43% of the growth in the global market. Paal said that if the draft of the anti-terror law were enacted as is, foreign firms would have three choices: exit the China market; find a Chinese partner to share some but not all of the codes and tech access; or comply with the government demands. He predicted that the first two choices are most likely. James
Zimmerman, chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce, said the law and other regulatory hurdles may hinder foreign tech firms from entering China, thus cutting the country’s access to the most advanced technologies. More controls Meanwhile, regulators are also pushing domestic financial institutions to switch their core computer systems to homegrown brands, another move that many see as an attempt to tighten cyber-security policies. In September, the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) told domestic banks to improve their network and information security by increasing investment in “secure and controllable technologies.” The guidelines required banks’ network suppliers to do their research and development in China and hand their source code to the CBRC. Banks were asked to have new plans for network equipment in place by April 1. Some see the CBRC’s move as encouraging domestic financial institutions to scrap network solutions provided by foreign suppliers. The movement is sometimes called “De-IOE” because it seems to take special aim at three big American companies: IBM Corp. IBM, -1.22% Oracle Corp. ORCL, +0.00% and EMC Corp. EMC, -1.35% a powerhouse trio with deep roots in corporate IT departments across
the country. Germany’s ambassador to China, Michael Clauss, said the new tech requirements for banks put Chinese suppliers at an advantage. He also expressed concern that the new cyber-security policies “could make
market access for foreign companies in China much more difficult.” The central government’s
procurement documents show that one-third fewer foreign tech products were bought last year than in 2012. Cisco Systems CSCO, +1.39% which provided 60 types of products to the central government in 2012, sold nothing in 2014. Jing de Jong-Chen, government security director at Microsoft MSFT, -0.37% recently wrote in an article that China has led the way in setting tech standards in many aspects, but one problem is that some international standards do not comply with its security requirements. For foreign companies, this gap means big costs to commercialize products, so they follow Chinese standards, she said. Cyber fighting Friction between China and the U.S. related to cyber-security issues has increased in recent years, especially after former U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden disclosed U.S. cyber surveillance in 2013. One of Snowden’s many charges was that U.S. intelligence agencies launched 231 cyber attacks in 2011, and three-quarters of them were targeted at China and Russia, including Chinese telecom companies like Huawei Technologies Co. 002502, +0.68% Early in 2012, the U.S. government banned Huawei from any investment and acquisitions in the country, citing national-security concerns. The Sino-
U.S. relationship in information and cyber-security issues has been thorny since 2011, with criticism going in both directions. In June 2013, in a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Obama, efforts to improve mutual understanding in cyber issues were high on the agenda. A month later, the two sides set up a joint cyber-security team that held its first meeting in Washington. Then in May last year, after the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five Chinese military officers on charges of hacking U.S. companies, China ended the team’s work. Fred Cate, a cyber-security law professor at Indiana University, said that if the current tensions
escalate, the U.S. may adopt trade measures to restrict technology-product exports to China, while the Chinese may fight back with similar measures. Microsoft’s Jing said China and the U.S. should set up a dialogue mechanism for handling cyber-security issues in order to solve problems and seek mutually beneficial solutions.
Chinese counter-terrorism key to US-China relations Bernstein and Ratner 14 – Bernstein: He received his B.A. from the University of Connecticut and then spent five years in a Ph.D. program at Harvard in history and East Asian Languages. In 1973, Bernstein became a staff writer at Time magazine, which sent him first to Hong Kong as a correspondent covering China and Southeast Asia, then to China where he opened the magazine’s bureau in Beijing. He moved to The New York Times in 1982 and served as the paper’s bureau chief at the United Nations, in Paris, and in Berlin. Ratner: He received his B.A. from the University of Connecticut and then spent five years in a Ph.D. program at Harvard in history and East Asian Languages. In 1973, Bernstein became a staff writer at Time magazine, which sent him first to Hong Kong as a correspondent covering China and Southeast Asia, then to China where he opened the magazine’s bureau in Beijing. He moved to The New York Times in 1982 and served as the paper’s bureau chief at the United Nations, in Paris, and in Berlin. (“Should the U.S. Cooperate with China on Terrorism?”, Richard Bernstein and Ely Ratner, September 26, 2014, China File, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/should-us-cooperate-china-terrorism)//chiragjain Richard Bernstein: Of course, they should. But can they? Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 in the United States, China has defined almost any dissent from its policies there as examples of international terrorism. It has also consistently tried to win western acquiescence in its suppression of the Uighurs by claiming that all Uighur protests, whether peaceful or violent, against Chinas harsh rule in Xinjiang amount to terrorism. For well over a decade,
China’s propaganda has identified a group it calls the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, or ETIM, as a main instigator of Uighur violence in China, saying that ETIM has training camps in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan and is closely linked to alQaeda. Given the absence of peaceful avenues of protest and the mounting frustrations of many Uighurs, it is certainly possible that some Uighurs have joined extremist Muslim groups, and perhaps have instigated some of the Uighur violence . Still, China has been able to produce no persuasive evidence that any Uighurs at all, much less a significant number of them, have actually joined the international jihad. Still less has it demonstrated that Uighur violence in China is anything other than local rage at China’s various methods of control, rather than part of the international jihadist movement. Given this troubling circumstance, could China make a useful contribution in the newest anti-terrorist
battleground, against ISIS in Syria and Iraq? In general, China’s participation in international anti-terrorism efforts has so far been limited to support for UN Security Council resolutions. In the past day or so, for example, China supported a resolution, sponsored by the United States, demanding that countries take action to stop the flow of foreign jihadists to Syria and Iraq . The online Chinese daily Global Times reports that China has also promised to “strengthen our cooperation with various parties in intelligence sharing and personnel training.” This could be a positive step. If China chooses to make a real contribution against real, as opposed to imaginary, terrorists, that would, of course, be welcome. But so far, the indication is that that China will attempt to use the new situation, as it did
the attacks on 9/11, to divert attention from its repression of peaceful and lawful dissent in Xinjiang, illustrated most recently and most starkly by the life sentence meted out to the peaceful Uighur scholar-dissident Ilhan Tothi. If the rest of the world allows this “cooperation” to take place, it will not be
so much gaining Chinese help in the real anti-terrorism fight as it will be collaborating in China’s ongoing violations of the rights of its Uighur
citizens. Responses Friday, September 26, 2014 - 9:04am Ely Ratner The question of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation is particularly salient in the context of National Security Advisor Susan Rice’s recent trip to Beijing, during which she reportedly urged China to join the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This came on the heels of President Obama’s comments to The New York Times a month prior that the Chinese have been “free riders for the last 30 years.” Referring to instability in the Middle East, he added with a mixture of derision and envy that: “Nobody ever seems to expect them to do anything when this stuff comes up.” However unappreciated in Beijing, these comments reflect the commonly heard sentiment that
China, given its decades of remarkable economic growth and robust military modernization, is surely at the point now where it could make more substantive contributions to the international community. And while Beijing is quick to highlight its economic and humanitarian assistance to the Middle East, these are obviously no substitute for participating in more costly, risky and difficult overseas military operations. There’s some logic to the notion that counterterrorism might just be the area for China to step up and cooperate with the United States. After all, Beijing is now struggling with a burgeoning domestic terrorism problem characterized both by a recent spate of attacks at home and the reported arrest of ISIS-inspired Chinese nationals traveling to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the constraints are likely to overwhelm any such incentives. Beijing appears happy to continue allowing the United States to bear the financial and reputational cost of being on the front lines in the Middle East, wary of making itself a bigger target for Islamic extremists. China’s support for the Assad regime in Syria and its allergy to American military intervention only complicate matters further. Moreover, Washington is reluctant to engage in cooperative efforts that would help China develop additional capabilities to oppress its own people, fully aware that Beijing engages in overseas military activities for training and intelligence purposes. Although there is no question that innocent Chinese civilians have been killed in terrorist attacks, the sentencing this week of a Uighur scholar to life in prison was exemplary of the thin line Beijing tends to draw between moderate Muslims and Islamic separatists. A Washington Post headline last week put it this way: “China’s war on terror becomes allout attack on Islam in Xinjiang.” Limited counterterror cooperation between the United States and China is always possible, and may in fact already be happening. Leading officials from the two countries certainly discuss the Middle East and it’s not impossible, for example, to imagine Beijing sharing the names of persons of concern or relaying information and messages from Tehran and Damascus. That said, regardless of overlapping interests, it is unlikely under the current circumstances that China will make a significant contribution to counterterror operations in Iraq and Syria.
2ac cyberwar turn Backdoors empower Chinese offensive cyber-ops Goldman 15 (Jeff Goldman, writer for esecurity planet, worked for Edgell’s communications magazine, Mobile Enterprise Magazine, Northwestern University, Bachelor or Science. “China to Require Backdoors in Foreign Hardware, Software. eSecurity Planet January 30, 2015)\\mwang The Chinese government recently implemented new rules requiring foreign companies that sell computer equipment to Chinese banks to disclose source code, submit to audits and build backdoors into both hardware and software, according to the New York Times. BBC News reports that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other groups have responded with a letter calling the rules intrusive and stating, "An overly broad, opaque, discriminatory approach to cyber security policy that restricts global Internet and ICT products and services would ultimately isolate Chinese ICT firms from the global marketplace and weaken cyber security, thereby harming China's economic growth and development and restricting customer choice." Tim Erlin, director of IT security and risk strategy at Tripwire, told eSecurity Planet by email that this latest move is just one part of a complex, far-reaching issue tied to economics, encryption and assurance. "While the likes of Microsoft and Google aren't willing to simply cede the Chinese market, there can be little doubt that a path that involves sharing source code ends with piracy and ultimately enhances China's ability to copy what they currently buy," he said. China would of course prefer not to rely on foreign vendors at all, Erlin said, but they don't have sufficient capabilities domestically at this point to do so -- and as a massive market, they do have leverage with leading vendors. "Market issues aside, there are national security implications to China having open access to
source code for software used by other governments, including the U.S.," he said. "China's offensive cyber capabilities would be greatly enhanced with the 'inside knowledge' afforded by such access." "It's unlikely that the U.S. would stand idly by while China developed an arsenal of zero days behind the guise of source code audits," Erlin added. Tripwire security analyst Ken Westin said by email that this kind of demand for backdoor access is ultimately a sign that many companies are doing a better job of securing customer data. "The problem is that this is all happening in public, and the bad guys are fully aware of where their communications can be intercepted and have already moved to more clandestine technologies and forms of communication," he said. "The end result of all of this is that legitimate uses of encryption, and other security protections, suffer and the backdoors only work to subvert security, making everyone less safe," Westin added. Back in 2012, security researchers came across several backdoors in routers made by Huawei that could provide the Chinese government with access to those routers. Huawei responded by denying that the backdoors were intentional and offering unrestricted access to its source code. In U.S. congressional hearings at the time, Huawei senior vice president Charles Ding said, "It would be immensely foolish for Huawei to risk involvement in national security or economic espionage," adding, "There are no backdoors in any of Huawei's equipment."
That escalates cyber arms racing Swaine 13 (Micheal D. Swaine, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Chinese views on cybersecurity in Foreign relations.” Carnegie Endowment http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM42MS.pdf page 1-2 September 24, 2013)\\mwang During the past few years, cybersecurity has become a major concern among many countries, as a result of the continued rapid expansion and deepening technological sophistication of the Internet, alongside the growing reliance of governments and societies on cyberbased systems for everything from communications and information storage to military operations and commercial activities.1 In recent months, this issue has become a major source of both tension and potential cooperation for the U.S.-China relationship in particular. Stemming from a Western (and especially U.S.) assessment that a growing number of destructive cyberattacks on commercial enterprises and government institutions originate not only from Chinese individuals, but also most likely from Chinese government (and especially military) sources, Washington has greatly intensified its expression of concern to Beijing.2 Beijing has repeatedly denied carrying out cyberattacks against any other country, while calling for both bilateral and multilateral cooperation, free from accusations, to formulate agreed-upon norms for the operation of the global Internet as well as place its oversight in the hands of a broadly representative international structure. The United States has resisted the latter proposal. These developments have
elevated the issue of cybersecurity to a top priority within the overall bilateral relationship . In response to the importance and urgency of the issue, Washington and Beijing recently agreed to form a Cyber Working Group (CWG) as part of the bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED),3 with the first Bilateral Cybersecurity Working Group Dialogue held in Washington D.C. on 8 July. Thus far, however,
little progress has occurred in reducing suspicion and developing cooperation in this area . To the contrary, the United States and presumably China are strengthening their capacity to engage in both defensive and offensive cyber actions against each other, presenting the prospect of a cyber arms race while potentially intensifying the already high level of distrust between the two countries .5 To understand the challenges and opportunities presented to the Sino-U.S. relationship by the cybersecurity issue, it is important to examine in some detail the views, beliefs, and apparent assumptions of Chinese observers toward the subject. This article addresses Chinese thinking on four basic aspects of the issue: The Definition of Cybersecurity and the Challenge It Presents The Cybersecurity Threat Posed by the United States and Other Countries The Origins and Motives behind Foreign Cybersecurity Threats Chinese Preferences for Mitigating Cybersecurity Threats As they have in several previous editions of CLM, our examination of Chinese views on these topics will distinguish between three basic types of Chinese sources: authoritative; quasi-authoritative; and nonauthoritative.6 For each area, particular attention is given to: a) the authoritative PRC government viewpoint (if publicly available); b) views toward the United
States in particular; and c) any variations that might exist among Chinese commentators, in both substance and tone. The article addresses several specific questions: to what extent and in what manner do Chinese definitions of cybersecurity and Chinese views on the cybersecurity threat differ from those of the United States and other countries? How do Chinese sources respond to U.S. and Western accusations against China? In all these areas, can one discern any significant differences: among authoritative Chinese sources, between military and civilian sources (of all types), and among authoritative, quasi-authoritative, and nonauthoritative sources in general? The article concludes with a summary and some implications for the future
That goes nuclear due to command and control hacking, crisis instability, and fracturing nuclear agreements Austin 13 [Director of Policy Innovation at the EastWest Institute, “Costs of American Cyber Superiority,” 8/6, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/costs-of-american-cyber-superiority/] //khirn The United States is racing for the technological frontier in military and intelligence uses of cyber space. It is ahead of all others, and has mobilized massive non-military assets and private contractors in that effort. This constellation of private sector opportunity and deliberate government policy has been aptly labeled in recent months and years by so many credible observers (in The Economist, The Financial Times and the MIT Technology Review) as the cyber industrial complex. The United States is now in the unusual situation where the head of a spy agency (NSA) also runs a major military unified command (Cyber Command). This is probably an unprecedented alignment of Praetorian political power in any major democracy in modern political history. This allocation of such political weight to one military commander is of course for the United States to decide and is a legitimate course of action . But it has consequences. The Snowden case hints at some of the blow-back effects now visible in public. But there are others, less visible. The NSA Prism program exists because it is technologically possible and there have been no effective restraints on its international targeting. This lack of restraint is especially
important because the command and control of strategic nuclear weapons is a potential target both of cyber espionage and offensive cyber operations . The argument here is not to suggest a similarity between the weapons themselves, but to identify correctly the very close relationship between cyber operations and nuclear weapons planning. Thus the lack of restraint in cyber weapons might arguably affect (destabilize) pre-existing agreements that constrain nuclear weapons deployment and possible use. The cyber superiority of the United States, while legal and understandable, is now a cause of strategic instability between nuclear armed powers. This is similar to the situation that persisted with nuclear weapons themselves until 1969 when the USSR first proposed an end of the race for the technological frontier of potential planetary devastation. After achieving initial capability, the U.S. nuclear missile build up was not a rational military response to each step increase in Soviet military capability. It was a race for the technological frontier – by both sides – with insufficient recognition of the consequences. This conclusion was borne out by a remarkable Top Secret study commissioned in 1974 by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Dr James Schlesinger. By the time it was completed and submitted in 1981, it assessed that the nuclear arms build-up by both sides was driven – not by a supposed tit for tat escalation in capability of deployed military systems – but rather by an unconstrained race for the technological limits of each side’s military potential and by its own military doctrinal preferences. The decisions of each side were not for the most part, according to this now declassified study, a direct response to particular systems that the other side was building. In 1969, the USSR acted first to propose an end to the race for the technological frontier of nuclear weapons because it knew it was losing the contest and because it knew there was political sentiment in the United States and in its Allied countries that supported limitations on the unbridled nuclear fetish. As we ponder the American cyber industrial complex of today, we see
a similar constellation of opposition to its power emerging. This constellation includes not just the political rivals who see they are losing in cyber space (China and Russia), but nervous allies who see themselves as the likely biggest victims of the American race for cyber superiority, and loyal American military commanders who can see the risks and dangers of that quest. It is time for the United States to take stock of the collateral damage that its quest for cyber military power, including its understandable quest for intelligence superiority over the terrorist enemy, has caused amongst its allies. The loss has not yet been seen at the high political level among allies, in spite of several pro forma requests for information from countries such as Germany. The loss of U.S. credibility has happened more at the popular level. Around the world, once loyal supporters of the United States in its war on terrorism had a reasonable expectation to be treated as faithful allies. They had the expectation, perhaps naïve, that privacy was a value the Americans shared with them. They did not expect to be subject to such a crude distinction (“you are all non-Americans now”). They did not want to know that their entire personal lives in cyber space are now recoverable – should someone so decide – by the running of a bit of software in the NSA. After the Prism revelations, so many of these foreign citizens with an internationalist persuasion and solidarity for the United States now feel a little betrayed. Yet, in the long run, the most influential voice to end the American quest for cyber military superiority may come from its own armed forces. There are military figures in the United States who have had responsibility for nuclear weapons command and control systems and who, in private, counsel caution. They advocate the need to abandon the quest for cyber dominance and pursue a strategy of “mutual security” in cyber space – though that has yet to be defined. They cite military exercises where the Blue team gets little or no warning of Red team disruptive cyber attack on systems that might affect critical nuclear command and control or wider war mobilization functions. Strategic nuclear stability may be at risk because of uncertainty about innovations in cyber attack capability. This question is worth much more attention. U.S. national security strategy in cyber space needs to be brought under stronger civilian oversight and subject to more rigorous public scrutiny. The focus on Chinese cyber espionage has totally preempted proper debate about American cyber military power. Most in the United States Congress have lined up to condemn Snowden. That is understandable. But where are the critical voices looking at the bigger picture of strategic instability in cyberspace that existed before Snowden and has now been aggravated because of him? The Russian and Chinese rejections of reasonable U.S. demands for Snowden’s extradition may be every bit as reasonable given their anxiety about unconstrained American cyber superiority.
Independently risks miscalc --- hair-trigger status causes nuclear war Japan Times 15 [May 1, 2015, “U.S., Russian ‘hair-trigger’ nuclear alert urged ended, especially in age of cyberattack,” http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/01/world/u-s-russian-hair-trigger-nuclear-alert-urged-ended-especially-agecyberattack/#.VZIjlflVikp] //khirn
WASHINGTON – Former U.S. and Russian commanders Thursday called for scrapping “ hair-trigger ” alerts on nuclear weapons
that carry grave risks of a potential atomic disaster — especially in an age of cyberattacks .Retired military officers from the United States, Russia and other nuclear powers issued a report warning of the mounting dangers of the short fuses that allow hundreds of atomic weapons to be launched within minutes.The high alert status is a legacy of outdated Cold War doctrine, when U.S. and Soviet leaders feared a devastating first strike that could “decapitate” an entire nuclear force, according to the report sponsored by the disarmament group Global Zero.“Hundreds of missiles carrying nearly 1,800 warheads are ready to fly at a moment’s notice ,” said the report. “These legacy postures of the Cold War are anachronisms but they remain fully operational.”The hair-trigger alert, which applies to half of the U.S. and Russian arsenals, is particularly dangerous in an era when “warning and decision timelines are getting shorter , and consequently the potential for fateful human error in nuclear control systems is growing larger.”The growing threat of
cyberassault also exacerbates the risks of the alert status, opening the way for false alarms or even a hijacking of the control systems for the weapons, it said.“Vulnerability to cyber attack . . . is a new wild card in the deck,” it said.The report calls for the United States and Russia to renounce the prompt-alert arrangements and to require 24 to 72 hours before a nuclear weapon could be launched. And it also urges forging a binding agreement among all countries to refrain from putting their nuclear forces on high alert.“There are a set of vulnerabilities particularly for the U.S. and Russia in these systems that were built in the fifties, sixties, seventies and eighties,” said James Cartwright, the retired four-star general who once was in charge of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.“Many
of these old systems are subject to false alarms ,” Cartwright said at a news conference.
--xt no collapse No collapse – 500 protests per day disprove – and protesters want to work within the system, not topple it Fisher 12 (Max Fisher, former writer and editor of The Atlantic, writer at the Washington Post, “How China Stays Stable Despite 500 Protests Every Day” The Atlantic http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/how-china-stays-stabledespite-500-protests-every-day/250940/ Jan 5, 2012)\\mwang About a week after protesters in the southeastern Chinese village of Wukan forced out all police and political officials, establishing a brief independence from Beijing, they taped a sign to the wall of the makeshift press center where foreign reporters congregated. It instructed journalists, in English and in Chinese, not to call their movement an uprising. "We are not a revolt. We support the Communist Party. We love our country," it read. Wukan's movement in December was not as unusual as it might have seemed. China saw 180,000 protests, riots, and mass demonstrations in 2010 alone -- on average about 500 every day -- a number that has likely since increased. The villagers' complaints were common ones: local officials exploiting land sales for personal gain and violently repressing dissent (a village advocate had died while in police custody). That the protesters won some real concessions from the authorities was also not unheard of, although the one-sidedness of their victory was rare, as was the international media attention they garnered (that media attention likely secured the victory, for now). But what is perhaps most remarkable, and remarkably typical, of the Wukan movement was the protesters' insistence on declaring fealty to the Chinese Communist Party. Though China's 2011 could have possibly seen more mass demonstrations than the entire Arab world, this is one reason that China probably remains far away from an Arab Spring-style revolutionary movement. Popular movements here seem to express relatively narrow complaints, want to work within the system rather than topple it, and treat the Communist Party as legitimate. Protests appear to be part of the system, not a challenge to it -- a sort of release valve for popular anger that, if anything, could have actually strengthened the Party by giving them a way to address that anger while maintaining autocratic rule. In the absence of real democracy, this give-and-take between state and society could actually help maintain political stability in China -- for now. That tradition goes back at least a decade, to a climax of labor movement protests in spring 2002. In the steel city of Liaoyang that May, thousands of workers massed in protest. Corrupt local officials had siphoned small fortunes out of the town's factories, forcing many of them to shut down and send their workers home without their pensions, which the officials had also plundered. Liaoyang's problems then, like Wukan's today, were not atypical: the national movement toward privatization had given party officials special access, allowing them to get rich overnight as part of a new and burgeoning crony capitalist class while powerless workers went hungry. As in Wukan last month, Liaoyang's 2002 protest was exceptional for its size -- tens of thousands marched over several days, shutting down the city and forcing senior Communist Party officials to respond -- but its leaders deliberately stopped short, even after being attacked by security forces, of publicly questioning the Communist Party's total rule. They wrote letters to senior officials, whom they addressed as "respected elder" or "beloved," emphasizing that the protesters were loyal to the Communist Party and asking only for those officials to enforce preexisting laws against corruption. Philip Pan, a former Washington Post Beijing bureau chief, reported in his 2008 book Out of Mao's Shadow that the protest leaders privately agreed that single-party rule was the underlying cause of Liaoyang's problems, but were afraid to publicly criticize it or call for democracy and ultimately decided to appeal to senior Party leaders rather than challenge them. As long as the political system remained unchanged, they agreed, those with positions of power could always abuse it, and workers could hope only for marginal improvements in their lives. For real progress, they thought democratic reform was necessary, and they believed that most workers supported such a goal. But they also knew that persuading workers to participate in a protest advocating democratic change would be all but impossible. The workers had internalized the lessons of the Tiananmen massacre. Everybody knew that the party would quickly crush a direct challenge to its authority, and nobody wanted to go to prison. People were too afraid. The memory of Tiananmen has faded in the decade since 2002. But the dynamic of China's hundreds of daily demonstrations has remained the same. So has the Party's uncanny ability to keep dissent both "within-system" and small-scale, almost never revolutionary in nature or even publicly critical of the autocracy inherent in Communist Party rule. Officials are too smart to believe their own rhetoric about the benevolence or necessary permanence of single-party rule -- the CPP is not Bashar al-Assad, and they know better than to meet every dissenter with a bullet. But so are Chinese, whether activists or workers, aware of the Party's sensitivity to popular anger. So, over time, an informal but well-honed process has developed. And though it allows protesters to often come away unscathed and sometimes with real concessions, just like in Las Vegas, the house always wins. Again, from Out of Mao's Shadow:
No CCP collapse-empirics prove adaptation Li 13 (Eric X. Li, writer for Foreign Affairs, venture capitalist and political scientist at Shanghai, Henry Crown Fellow at the Aspen Institute. “The life of the party: the post-democratic future begins in China” Foreign Affairs https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-12-03/life-partyJanuary/February 2013 issue.)\\mwang In November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 18th National Congress, setting in motion a once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. As expected, Xi Jinping took over as general secretary and will become the president of the People's Republic this March. The turnover was a smooth and well-orchestrated demonstration by a confidently rising superpower. That didn't stop international media and even some Chinese intellectuals, however, from portraying it as a moment of crisis. In an issue that was published before the beginning of the congress, for example, The Economist quoted unnamed scholars at a recent conference as saying that China is "unstable at the grass roots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top." To be sure, months before the handover, the scandal surrounding Bo Xilai, the former party boss of the Chongqing municipality, had shattered the CCP's long-held facade of unity, which had underwritten domestic political stability since the Tiananmen Square upheavals in 1989. To make matters worse, the Chinese economy, which had sustained double-digit GDP growth for two decades, slowed, decelerating for seven straight quarters. China's economic model of rapid industrialization, labor-intensive manufacturing, large-scale government investments in infrastructure, and export growth seemed to have nearly run its course. Some in China and the West have gone so far as to predict the demise of the one-party state, which they allege cannot survive if leading politicians stop delivering economic miracles. Such pessimism, however, is misplaced. There is no doubt that daunting
challenges await Xi. But those who suggest that the CCP will not be able to deal with them fundamentally misread China's politics and the resilience of its governing institutions. Beijing will be able to meet the country's ills with dynamism and resilience, thanks to the CCP's adaptability, system of meritocracy, and legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the next decade, China will continue to rise, not fade. The country's leaders will consolidate the one party model and, in the process, challenge the West's conventional wisdom
about political development and the inevitable march toward electoral democracy. In the capital of the Middle Kingdom, the world might witness the birth of a post-democratic future. ON-THE-JOB LEARNING The assertion that one-party rule is inherently incapable of self-correction does not reflect the historical record. During its 63 years in power, the CCP has shown extraordinary adaptability. Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic has pursued a broad range of economic policies. First, the CCP initiated radical land collectivization in the early 1950s. This was followed by the policies of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s to mid-1970s. After them came the quasi-privatization of farmland in the early 1960s, Deng Xiaoping's market reforms in the late 1970s, and Jiang Zemin's opening up of the CCP's membership to private businesspeople in the 1990s. The underlying goal has always been economic health, and when a policy did not work-for example, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural RevolutionChina was able to find something that did: for example, Deng's reforms, which catapulted the Chinese economy into the position of second largest in the world. On the institutional front as well, the CCP has not shied away from reform. One example is the introduction in the 1980s and 1990s of term limits for most political positions (and even of age limits, of 68–70, for the party's most senior leadership). Before this, political leaders had been able to use their positions to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao Zedong was a case in point. He had ended the civil wars that had plagued China and repelled foreign invasions to become the father of modern China. Yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes, such as the Cultural Revolution. Now, it is nearly impossible for the few at the top to consolidate long-term power. Upward mobility within the party has also increased. In terms of foreign policy, China has also changed course many times to achieve national greatness. It moved from a close alliance with Moscow in the 1950s to a virtual alliance with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s as it sought to contain the Soviet Union. Today, its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy has once more put it at odds with the United States. But in its ongoing quest for greatness, China is seeking to defy recent historical precedents and rise peacefully, avoiding the militarism that plagued Germany and Japan in the first half of the last century. As China undergoes its ten-year transition, calls at home and abroad for another round of political reform have increased. One radical camp in China and abroad is urging the party to allow multiparty elections or at least accept formal intraparty factions. In this view, only full-scale adversarial politics can ensure that China gets the leadership it needs. However sincere, these demands all miss a basic fact:
the CCP has arguably been one of the most self-
reforming political organizations in recent world history . There is no doubt that China's new leaders face a different world than Hu Jintao did when he took over in 2002, but chances are good that Xi's CCP will be able to adapt to and meet whatever new challenges the rapidly changing domestic and international environments pose. In part, that is because the CCP is heavily meritocratic and promotes those with proven experience and capabilities.
CCP won’t collapse-empirics prove they’re more hype French 15 (Howard French, Associate Professor, Columbia Journalism School. “When will China’s government collapse?” Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downfall/ March 13, 2015)\\mwang Perhaps the next most important point to be made — and it has not been heard enough in this discussion — is that no one knows where China (or the world) is heading 20, or even 10, years down the road. Mao oversaw rapprochement with the United States in order to counter the Soviet Union, and this can be said to have brought capitalism to his country, which was clearly not his aim. Former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping embraced capitalism, and that can be said to have led to a near existential crisis for the party around the issue of democratization. The United States embraced China also in order to balance the Soviet Union, as well as, a bit later, to seek markets. This ended
up creating what now appears ever more like a peer rival, after a brief period of unipolarity. Unintended, even undesirable consequences are the name of the game in matters of state and in international affairs, and however assertive and determined Xi may appear to us in the early phases of his rule, it is a safe bet that his drive to realize a Chinese dream will produce many things he could never have dreamed of—or desired. It is also at least plausible that Xi’s remarkable apparent confidence is a kind of compensation for deep anxiety at the top in China: a recognition that the country is walking a tightrope. I defer to others on the specifics of China’s known challenges, but a few points seem fairly obvious. The early, and one might say easy, phase of China’s takeoff is over. The early, and one might say easy, phase of China’s takeoff is over. That period consisted in large measure of stopping doing
stupid things and inflicting damage on oneself. Moving forward now from here becomes exponentially more difficult. This means finding a way to sustain relatively high growth rates, when almost everything points to a natural, secular slowdown. It means coping with environmental challenges on a scale never seen before. It means dealing with the emergence of a middle class, and everything that political science suggests about the difficulties that this poses for authoritarian regimes. It means finding a way through the middle-income trap. It means restraining corruption that is, if anything, even worse, meaning more systemic, than commonly recognized. It means coping with the accelerating balancing of nervous neighbors. It means coping with issues of ethnic and regional tensions and stark inequality. It means drastic and mostly unfavorable changes in demography. And it means doing all of these things, and facing any number of other serious challenges that space doesn’t allow one to detail here, without the benefit of a coherent or appealing ideology other than nationalism and, tentatively, budding personality cult-style leadership. We don’t know how this is going to turn out. For every success one can point to involving China, it is easy to point to at least one stark and serious problem, or potential failing. I don’t share Shambaugh’s confidence in predicting the demise of the party, but it does not strike this reader as a reckless prediction. It should not surprise us, and neither should its opposite, China’s continued relative success. Such is the degree of uncertainty we must all live with.
Tons of alt causes, and even if CCP is on the brink, won’t collapse Zhao 15 (Suisheng Zhao, Professor, University of Denver. “When will China’s government collapse?” Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downfall/ March 13, 2015)\\mwang Yes, the CCP regime is in crisis. But it has muddled through one crisis after another, including the catastrophes of the chaotic, decade-long Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, by tackling its symptoms. It is too difficult to predict the arrival of the cracking up moment now. This current crisis comes after more than three decades of market-oriented economic reform under one-party
rule, which has produced a corruptive brand of state capitalism in which power and money ally. The government officials and senior managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have formed strong and exclusive interest groups to pursue economic gains. China ranks among the countries of the highest income inequality in the world at a time when China has dismantled its social welfare state, leaving hundreds of millions of citizens without any or adequate provision of healthcare, unemployment insurance, and a variety of other social services. Meanwhile, China has become one of the world’s most polluted countries. The crisis has worsened as China’s economic growth is slowing. As the worsening economic, social, and
environmental problems cause deep discontent across society and lead many people to take to the streets in protest, China has entered a period of deepening social tensions. Apparently, Beijing is frightened and has relied more and more on coercive forces. The cracking up
moment could come when economic growth has significantly slowed, and Beijing is unable to sustain the regime’s legitimacy with its economic performance. While scholars such as Shambaugh are warning of this cracking up, President Xi Jinping is likely aware of the danger of possible collapse and has been trying to prevent it from happening. Opposite from the prescription by liberal scholars and Western leaders, Xi has seen that the key to keeping the CCP in power is to further empower the authoritarian state led by the Communist Party, reflecting the long struggle of the Chinese political elites in building and maintaining a powerful state to lead China’s modernization. China scholar Lucian Pye famously observed that China suffered a “crisis of authority” — a deep craving for the decisive power of effective authority ever since the 19th-century collapse of the Chinese empire. Chinese elite attributed China’s modern decline partially to the weakening of the state authority. The authority crisis called for the creation of an authoritarian state through revolution and nationalism. The authority crisis called for the creation of an authoritarian state through revolution and nationalism. The Chinese communist revolution was a collective assertion for the new form of authority and a strong state to build a prosperous Chinese nation . The very essence of CCP legitimacy was partly based upon its ability to establish a powerful state as an organizing and mobilizing force to defend the national independence and launch modernization programs.
No CCP collapse—economy, and people accept the system Kroeber 15 (Arthur Kroeber, Editor, China Economic Quarterly: Focuses on China’s political economy and its engagement with global economic institutions. He is managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics, an independent global economic research firm. “When will China’s government collapse?” Foreign Policy March 13, 2015)\\mwang Neither China nor its Communist Party is cracking up . I have three reasons for this judgment. First, none of the factors Shambaugh cites strongly supports the crackup case. Second, the balance of evidence suggests that Xi’s government is not weak and desperate, but forceful and adaptable. Third, the forces that might push for systemic political change are far weaker than the party. Shambaugh thinks the system is on its last legs because rich people are moving assets abroad, Xi is cracking down on the media and academia, officials look bored in meetings, corruption is rife, and the economy is at an impasse. This is not a persuasive case. True, many rich Chinese are moving money abroad,
both to find safe havens and to diversify their portfolios as China’s growth slows. But in aggregate, capital outflows are modest, and plenty of rich Chinese are still investing in their own economy. Following an easing of rules, new private business registrations rose 45 percent in 2014 — scarcely a sign that the entrepreneurial class has given up hope. The crackdown on free expression and civil society is deeply distressing, but not necessarily a sign of weakness. It could equally be seen as an assertion of confidence in the success of China’s authoritarian-capitalist model , and a rejection of the idea that China needs to make concessions to liberal-democratic ideas to keep on going. It is also related to the crackdown on corruption, which Shambaugh wrongly dismisses as a cynical power play. Corruption at the end of the era of Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao had got out of control, and posed a real risk of bringing down the regime. A relentless drive to limit corruption was essential to stabilize the system, and this is precisely what Xi has delivered. A relentless drive to limit corruption was essential to stabilize the system, and this is precisely what Xi has delivered. It cannot work unless Xi can demonstrate complete control over all aspects of the political system, including ideology. As for the economy and the reform program, it is first worth pointing out that despite its severe slowdown, China’s economy continues to grow faster than that of any other major country in the world. And claims that the reform program
is sputtering simply do not square with the facts. 2014 saw the start of a crucial program to revamp the fiscal system, which led to the start of restructuring local government debt; first steps to liberalize the one-child policy and the hukou, or household registration system (discussed for years but never achieved by previous governments); important changes in energy pricing; and linkage of the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets. News reports suggest that we will soon see a program to reorganize big SOEs under Temasek-like holding companies that will focus on improving their flagging financial returns. These are all material achievements and compare favorably to, for instance, the utter failure of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to progress on any of the reform agenda he outlined for his country two years ago. Finally, there is
no evidence that the biggest and most important political constituency in China — the rising urban bourgeoisie — has much interest in changing the system . In my conversations with members of this class, I hear many complaints, but more generally a satisfaction with the material progress China has made in the last two decades. Except for a tiny group of brave dissidents, this group in general displays little interest in political reform and none in democracy . One reason may be that they find uninspiring the record of democratic governance in other big Asian countries, such as India. More important is probably the fear that in a representative system, the interests of the urban bourgeoisie (at most 25 percent of the population) would lose out to those of the rural masses. The party
may well be somewhat insecure, but the only force that might plausibly unseat it is more insecure still. Predictions of Chinese political collapse have a long and futile history. Their persistent failure stems from a basic conceptual fault. Instead of facing the Chinese system on its own terms and understanding why it works — which could create insights into why it might stop working — critics judge the system against what they would like it to be, and find it wanting. This embeds an assumption of fragility that makes every societal problem look like an existential crisis. As a long-term resident of China, I would love the government to become more open, pluralistic and tolerant of creativity. That it refuses to do so is disappointing to me and many others, but offers no grounds for a judgment of its weakness. Seven years ago, in his excellent book China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, Shambaugh described the Party as “a reasonably strong and resilient institution… . To be sure, it has its problems and challenges, but none present the real possibility of systemic collapse.” That was a good judgment then, and it remains a good
--xt resilient Regime is resilient – physical repression will suffice Pei, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/12/09 (Minxin Pei, senior associate in the china program at the Carnegie endowment for international peace, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2009-03-12/will-chinese-communist-party-survive-crisis) // RL The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.
Chinese legitimacy not in danger-legitimacy comes from welfare, meritocracy, nationalism Bell 12 (Daniel A. Bell, a professor of comparative political philosophy at Tsinghua University in Beijing and the author of China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society. “Why China won’t collapse” The Christian Science Monitor http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-a-bell/chinese-government-legitimacy_b_1658006.html July 11, 2012)\\mwang The purge of Chongqing’s party chief, Bo Xilai, is China’s most serious political crisis in recent decades. What seemed like a relatively stable system of political transition – two five-year terms for top leaders – has been thrown into chaos. Or so we are told. Such predictions about the collapse of China’s political system have been constantly repeated since the suppression of the prodemocracy uprisings in 1989. But the system didn’t collapse then, and it won’t collapse now. The key reason such dire predictions are taken seriously – especially in the West – is that non-democratic regimes are seen to lack legitimacy. A political regime that is morally justified in the eyes of the people must be chosen by the people. In the case of China, the political leadership is a self-selected elite. Such mode of rule is fragile, as the Arab Spring has shown. But this view assumes the people are dissatisfied with the regime. In fact, the large majority of Chinese people support the single-party state structure. Since the 1990s, scholars in the West and China have carried out many large-scale surveys into the
legitimacy of Chinese political power, and by now they have virtually arrived at a consensus: The degree of legitimacy of the Chinese political system is very high. Surveys have been modified to prevent people from telling lies, and the results are always the same. To the extent there is dissatisfaction, it is largely directed at the lower levels of government. The central government is viewed as the most legitimate part of the Chinese political apparatus. How can it be that the Chinese government managed to achieve a high level of political legitimacy without adopting free and fair competitive elections for the country’s leaders? However paradoxical it may sound to Westerners,
the Chinese government has succeeded by
drawing upon sources of non-democratic legitimacy. The first source of non-democratic legitimacy can be termed performance legitimacy, meaning that the government’s first priority should be the material well-being of the people. This idea has deep roots in China – Confucius himself said the government should make the people prosperous – and the Chinese Communist Party has also put poverty alleviation at the top of its political agenda. Hence, the government derives much, if not most, of its legitimacy from its ability to provide for the material welfare of Chinese citizens. It has substantially increased the life expectancy of Chinese people, and the reform era has seen perhaps the most impressive poverty alleviation achievement in history , with several hundred million people being lifted out of poverty. The second
source of non-democratic legitimacy can be termed political meritocracy: the idea that political leaders should have aboveaverage ability to make morally informed political judgments. It too has deep historical roots. In Imperial China, scholar-officials proved their ability in a fair and open examination system, and consequently they were granted uncommon (by Western standards) amounts of respect, authority, and legitimacy. Political surveys have shown that Chinese still endorse the view that it is more important to have high-quality politicians who care about the people’s needs than to worry about procedural arrangements ensuring people’s rights to choose their leaders. In recent decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has increased its legitimacy by transforming itself into a more meritocratic political organization, with renewed emphasis on examinations and education as criteria for political leadership. The third source of non-democratic legitimacy is nationalism. An important part of legitimacy can be termed “ideological legitimacy”: The regime seeks to be seen as morally justified in the eyes of the people by virtue of certain ideas that it expresses in its educational system, political speeches, and public policies. The CCP was, of course, founded on Marxist principles, but the problem is that few believe in the communist ideal anymore. Hence, the regime has increasingly turned to nationalism to secure “ideological legitimacy.” Nationalism has more recent roots in China: In imperial China, the political elites tended to view their “country” as the center of the world. But this vision collapsed when China was subject to the incursions of Western colonial powers in the mid-19th century, leading to a “century of humiliation” at hands of foreign powers. The CCP put a symbolic end to abuse and bullying by foreign powers with the establishment of a relatively secure state in 1949, and it constantly reminds Chinese of its function as protector of the Chinese nation. In short, it should
not be surprising that the CCP is widely seen to be legitimate in the eyes of the people, and barring unforeseen events there is no reason to expect imminent collapse of the regime. But the key word is “imminent.” In the absence of substantial political reform, China’s non-democratic sources of political legitimacy may not be sustainable in the long term.
--xt collapse inevitable CCP will collapse anyway-empirics show fundamental flaws in autocracy Pei 12 (Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US. “The collapse of CCP inevitable.” Tapei Times. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2012/12/18/2003550403/2. December 18, 2012) \\mwang
One question that should have been asked about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) just-completed leadership transition is whether the entire elaborately choreographed exercise was akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. The installation of a new leadership may matter little if the end of CCP rule is both foreseeable and highly probable. Many observers would find this assertion shocking. They insist the CPP has proved its resilience since the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 and the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991. Why should predictions of the collapse of CCP rule be taken seriously now? While the future of China is unpredictable, the durability of its post-totalitarian regime can be estimated with some confidence. China may be unique in many ways, but its one-party rule is hardly exceptional. Its political order suffers from the same self-
destructive dynamics that have sent countless autocratic regimes to their graves . Among many of the systemic flaws of autocracy, degeneration at the top, epitomized by ever-weaker leaders, is progressive and incurable. The exclusive and closed nature of autocracy bars many talented individuals from rising to senior government positions, owing to a pattern of succession that rewards political loyalty over capabilities. Savvy autocratic rulers favor less talented successors, because they are easier to groom and control. Leadership degeneration accelerates as the autocratic regime ages and grows more bureaucratic. As individuals in such regimes ascend the hierarchy, patronage and risk aversion become the most critical factors in determining their chances for promotion. Consequently, such regimes grow increasingly sclerotic as they select leaders with stellar resumes, but mediocre records. The most lethal strain of leadership degeneration is escalating predation among the ruling elites. The most visible symptom is corruption, but the cause is intrinsic to autocratic rule. Typically, first-generation revolutionaries have a strong emotional and ideological attachment to certain ideals, however misguided. The post-revolutionary elites are ideologically cynical and opportunistic. They view their work for the regime merely as a form of investment and so seek ever-higher returns. As each preceding generation of rulers cashes in its illicit gains from holding power, the successors are motivated by both the desire to loot more and the fear that there may not be much left by the time they get their turn. This is the underlying dynamic driving corruption in China today. The consequences of leadership degeneration are easy to see: faltering economic dynamism and growth, rising social tensions and loss of government credibility. The puzzle is why neither the compelling selfdestructive logic of autocratic rule nor the mounting evidence of deteriorating regime performance in China has persuaded even some of the most knowledgeable observers that the end of CCP rule is now a distinct possibility. An obvious explanation is the power of conventional thinking. Long-ruling regimes — like the
Soviet Communist Party –– are typically considered invulnerable, even just
before they collapse. However, those who believe that the CCP can defy both the internal degenerative dynamics of autocracy and the historical record of failed one-party regimes might benefit from reading Russian theorist Leon Trotsky. Dictatorships are regarded as indestructible before they fall, Trotsky reminds us, but their demise is viewed as inevitable once they are toppled. Another explanation is fear of contemplating the unknown. CCP rule may not last, but the alternative — state failure and civil chaos — could be far worse than the “status quo.” However, the record of democratic transitions since 1974 suggests that regime change in China is unlikely to be calamitous. The decisive factor will be whether it is initiated and managed by the ruling elites, as in Taiwan, Mexico, Brazil and Spain. Managed transitions produce more stable democracies. Should this
occur in China, the CCP could transform itself into a major political party competing with others for power, as formerly autocratic parties have done in Mexico and Taiwan. Even a disorderly regime transition, however traumatic and chaotic in the short term, could yield a system that, on balance, is an improvement over a stagnant, repressive and corrupt autocracy. Indonesia’s new democracy may be imperfect, but has thrived despite its initial poor prospects. If there is one lesson to be learned from the remarkable history of the democratic transitions of the past 38 years, it is that when elites and the public reject authoritarian rule, they do their best to make the new system work. Should such a transition occur in China, there is no reason to think that the process and the outcome will be fundamentally different.
No violent collapse and no nuclear war-CCP would fear retaliation Gilley 4 (Bruce Gilley, Professor of International Affairs @ New School University and Former Contributing Editor @ the Far Eastern Economic Review, “China’s Democratic Future,” Published March 2004 research done by mss)\\mwang, who found this card on cross-x More ominous as a piece of "last ditchism" would be an attack on Taiwan. U.S. officials and many overseas democrats believe that there is a significant chance of an attack on Taiwan if the CCP is embattled at home. Indeed, China's strategic journals make frequent reference to this contingency: "The need for military preparations against Taiwan is all the more pressing in light of China's growing social tensions and unstable factors which some people, including the U.S. might take advantage of under the flag of 'humanism' to paralyze the Chinese government," one wrote. Such a move would allow the government to impose martial law on the country as part of war preparations, making the crushing of protest easier. It would also offer the possibility, if successful, of CCP survival through enhanced nationalist legitimacy. Yet
the risks, even to a dying regime, may be too high . An unprovoked attack
on Taiwan would almost certainly bring the U.S. and its allies to the island's rescue. Those forces would not stop at Taiwan but might march on Beijing and oust the CCP, or attempt to do so through stiff sanctions, calling it a threat to regional and world peace. Such an attack might also face the opposition of the peoples of Fujian, who would be expected to provide logistical support and possibly bear the worst burdens of war. They, like much of coastal China, look to Taiwan for investment and culture and have a close affinity with the island. As a
result, there are doubts about whether such a plan could be put into action. A failed war would prompt a Taiwan declaration of independence and a further backlash against the CCP at home, just as the May Fourth students of 1919 berated the Republican government for weakness in the face of foreign powers.
Failed wars brought down authoritarian regimes in Greece and Portugal in 1974 and in Argentina in 1983. Even if CCP leaders wanted war, it is unlikely that the PLA would oblige . Top officers would see the disastrous implications of attacking Taiwan. Military caution would also guard against the even wilder scenario of the use of nuclear weapons against Japan or the U. S. At the height of the Tiananmen protests it appears there was consideration given to the use of nuclear weapons in case the battle to suppress the protestors drew in outside Countries .41 But even then, the threats did not appear to gain even minimal support. In an atmosphere in which the military is thinking about its future, the resort to nuclear confrontation would not make sense.
--xt random biopower / cap link to disad Chinese internet restrictions are panopticon and capitalist Jiang and Okomoto 14 (Min Jiang and Kristen Okomoto, Jiang: Communication and Media, Qualitative Social Research, Quantitative Social Research, Okomoto is University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, North Carolina, United State. “National Identity, State Ideological Apparatus, or Panopticon? A Case Study of Chinese National Search Engine Jike” Research Gate Page 7-9. March 2014)\\mwang Borrowing Foucault’s (1975) concept of the panopticon and Lessig’s theory “code is law” (1999), we argue that Jike’s significance should also be understood in terms of the panoptic power it desires to achieve and the technological architecture that could enable it . If widely adopted, a state search engine could become the government’s eyes and ears to the extent that “[the] Party is like God. He is everywhere. You just can’t see him” (McGregor 2010, p. 1). In the following, we briefly trace the theorization of the panopticon, followed by a discussion of how search engines could track user data and desires, and the complexity of business and state surveillance through search, in light of the recent NSA scandal. The idea of the panopticon was introduced by Bentham (1995) in 1791 to describe a type of institution (such as a prison) where a guard could watch all inmates without them being able to tell whether or not they are being observed. Extending the metaphor to such institutions as hospitals and schools, Foucault (1975) sees modern society as “disciplinary,” its “inspecting gaze” directed at the subject. Drawing on Foucault’s work, Lyon (1994) shows the pervasiveness of the panopticon within a “surveillance society” where technology is extensively and routinely used to track and record human activities. In Foucault in Cyberspace, Boyle (1997, p. 204) extends the notion of the panopticon to cyberspace, cautioning that information freedom often entails “an intensification of the mechanisms of surveillance, public and private, to which we are currently subjected.” Lessig’s idea that “code is law” (1999) further argues that software and hardware, the architecture of the Internet, can constrain and enable certain types of individual behaviors. An architecture that allows for the tracking of user behavior patterns, which are then utilized or monetized by those who own the technologies that capture the data, essentially sanctions cyber surveillance. As crucial information gateways to the Internet, search engines are one of the most pervasive forms of panopticon, second only perhaps to social networking sites. “The perfect search engine,” as Google’s co-founder Sergey Brin puts it, “would be like the mind of God” (quoted in Ferguson, 2007). To achieve such perfection, search engines have to collect as much information and user data as possible to deliver the most relevant results (Zimmer, 2008). While firms like Google and Baidu sell user data for advertising dollars, Jike embodies
both authoritarian and capitalistic impulses . Prior to Jike, state online surveillance had been carried out through both centralized and decentralized means. Centralized systems include large-scale state projects such as the Great Firewall and the second-generation national ID card widely used in Chinese people’s everyday lives from transportation to health (Brown, 2008). On the other hand, the state also outsources surveillance to Internet firms through licensing and legal regulations so that “harmful” content cannot be found in the first place. Jiang/Okamoto: A Case Study of Chinese National Search Engine Jike 99 A successful national search engine could further centralize data surveillance by providing authorities with easy access to user behaviors in real time. Although Jike failed in the market, it did not fail because of user rejection of its surveillance potentials, but largely because of its technological inferiority, poor user experience, inadequate market strategies, management deficiency, and over-reliance on state funding (Hu, 2013). Average Chinese users, who may distrust Party media, are largely unaware of how surveillance via search is accomplished. Some even suggest that Jike should exist to balance the market abuse exhibited by Baidu’s monopoly (ChinaZ.com, 2011). Further, Chinese users are disadvantaged by the limited privacy protection afforded in a legal system that routinely places state “security” above individual rights (Lv, 2005). Corporate collection of personal data initially dominated privacy concerns in liberal democracies, while the specter of the state looms large in authoritarian countries like China (Tsui, 2003). Snowden’s revelations demonstrated, however, that state surveillance is not confined to authoritarian societies. The U.S. and European Union countries in fact had a long history of extensive data surveillance through programs like Echelon and ENFOPOL (Bannister, 2005). However, the press and legal systems in these countries are such that state and corporate excesses can be exposed and recourse of sorts, however limited, is possible through public pressure and court resolutions. 6 China’s censorship rules, however, are state-sanctioned prerequisites. Without legal protection for free press and expressions, it is much harder to challenge state surveillance in authoritarian countries. Thus, one can surmise that Chinese state search engine will adopt technologies similar to commercial firms’ to track user data. On its website, Jike states that it collects user information such as uniform resource locator (URL), Internet Protocol (IP) address, browser type, visit date and time, but provides no explanation of how such data may be used. What personally identifiable information will be retained and for how long? How extensively will user information be shared with third parities including government agencies? What legal protection is in place for users, especially during data leaks? Jike’s vague policies protect its own interests, not those of users. Discussion Instead of succumbing to the digital revolution and losing its grip on power, the Chinese state has adapted. From e-government efforts (Jiang & Xu, 2009) to the development of Web applications (e.g., online forums and microblogging) and state digital enterprises, the Party has invested in technological
capabilities, emulated commercial operations and adopted a form of bureaucratic capitalism to ensure the dominance of the “main melody,” or official ideology, in an age of information abundance. In this sense, Jike is a new material manifestation of the desire of the Chinese authorities to control information, enhance legitimacy and achieve cyber power through both technological regulation and creation. This case study expands the research on national search.
Encryption NEG Updates
CP – CNCI
--xt solves econ Also solves their tech industry and economy internal links Corbin 14 - Kenneth Corbin is a Washington, D.C.-based writer who covers government and regulatory issues for CIO.com. (“Tech Industry Praises Cybersecurity Framework From White House”, Kenneth Corbin, February 18, 2014, CIO, http://www.cio.com/article/2378671/cybercrime/tech-industry-praisescybersecurity-framework-from-white-house.html)//chiragjain
Members of the tech industry heralded the White House's announcement of a set of voluntary guidelines for businesses to improve their cybersecurity posture, suggesting that the document could spur private-sector operators of critical infrastructure to prioritize the issue within their firms. The administration's cybersecurity framework offers a far-ranging template for businesses in various sectors of the economy, including core functions such as threat identification and response, assessment tools and guidance for aligning security with a company's business objectives. The blueprint grew out of an executive order on cybersecurity that President Barack Obama issued last February and came as a welcome step forward for members of the tech community who have been advocating for the government to do more to encourage the private sector to improve its digital defenses. "We believe they produced something that's very positive, that actually is a good framework for looking at cybersecurity," says Tim Molino, director of government relations at BSA, a trade group representing software and hardware companies. 'Flexible' Framework Offers Broad Guidelines It remains to be seen the extent to which businesses will incorporate the voluntary framework into their internal cybersecurity operations, but some industry officials praise the administrationKenneth Corbin is a Washington, D.C.-based writer who covers government and regulatory issues for CIO.com for avoiding technical prescriptions and instead producing broader guidelines that can be tailored to fit in organizations across the 16 sectors of the economy that the government has designated as critical infrastructure. "The
framework is an inherently flexible, adaptable document, and because of that we believe that just about any organization can benefit from it — no matter its size or level of sophistication," says Jeff Greene, senior policy counsel at the security software vendor Symantec. "We are using it internally, and we think it likely that it will be a part of many organizations' overall security program in the coming years." The government is actively encouraging businesses to adopt the framework, an effort led by the Department of Homeland Security, which has set up the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community (C3) Voluntary Program to
support that effort. Through that program, DHS offers companies resources and support staff to help implement the framework. The department says it's committed to forging stronger partnerships with private-sector firms and will support efforts to develop industry-specific guidance where appropriate. Several tech groups praised the framework's focus on risk management, rather than pushing out a mandate for industry adoption that could simply create another compliance burden without advancing real security. "The emphasis on voluntary standards provides the greatest likelihood that the framework will be broadly adopted," Mike Hettinger, senior vice president of the public sector division of the trade group TechAmerica, said in a statement. Cybersecurity Framework Just Preliminary, 'Foundational' Step Some security experts would have liked to see the administration go further. One is Tom Kellermann, managing director with the professional services firm Alvarez & Marsal, who served on the Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency. Kellermann lauds the intent of the framework, though he describes it as "foundational," an important step, but a preliminary one. He points to the report produced by the advisory group on which he served — noting that, of the 25 recommendations it made for the incoming administration in December 2008, more than two-thirds have yet to be implemented. Kellermann would have preferred for the cybersecurity framework to carry more of a mandate, though he credits the administration with raising the profile of the issue with a White House endorsement and for emphasizing that security must be entwined with business objectives. "It
elevates the issue to the board level, and proactive CIOs should be pleased with this, because they're going to get more resources," Kellermann says. "For too, long there's been this argument that security had no ROI." He suggests that adoption of the framework will be uneven across the private sector. Early adopters will likely include companies that have suffered serious security breaches, as well as firms in sectors such as healthcare, financial services and government contracting . Bottom of Form Over
time, Kellermann hopes market conditions will evolve to a point where security becomes a chief differentiator in the eyes of customers, with firms that continue with a lax approach losing share. "I think it's in their best interest from a competitive advantage perspective and a risk management perspective to embrace this." The BSA's Molino suggests that many
IT companies — among the 16 designated critical infrastructure sectors — commonly have an advanced security apparatus in place that generally comports with the new framework. But tech vendors could find the document useful when working with customers in other sectors that have weaker security operations. "It's a way for us to then talk to our customers about how to build up their cybersecurity." Even Security-savvy Firms
Can Learn From Framework Even for businesses that have devoted considerable resources to digital security, the administration's blueprint could still prove valuable. Asked about the extent to which the cybersecurity framework will reshape the way businesses approach security, Symantec's Greene says it should be approached on a case-by-case basis. Organizations
without a cybersecurity program in place now have a good framework for building a program that suits their needs, he says. Organizations that already have a sophisticated program can
use the framework to examine the programs they have in place and challenge their existing assumptions about how to do security. "For all organizations," Green concludes, "the framework creates a relatively simple, common language that organizations can use to communicate about security internally and with each other." The
National Institute of Standards and Technology, the division of the Commerce Department that drafted the blueprint, has provided a roadmap for advancing the framework, calling it a "living document." The agency says
it will continue to reach out to industry — with which it worked extensively in developing the framework — to help business leaders understand and adopt the guidance. In that role, NIST will collaborate with DHS in the voluntary adoption program. For its part, DHS emphasizes the voluntary nature of the framework; it's unclear how it might incentivize industry adoption, though, or if it will develop a formal certification process for companies that implement the guidance. In Congress, where lawmakers have unsuccessfully floated various bills to improve cybersecurity, debate has focused on what role the government should play — if any — in setting industry standards. To incentivize adoption of the cybersecurity framework, the government could offer tax benefits or certain legal immunities to companies that have implemented it. But DHS can't take either of those steps on its own. "It would take an act of Congress — otherwise known as an act of God," Kellermann says. After midterm elections, he says, DHS could start making more noise about concrete steps to drive adoption of the framework. Without the aid of Congress, the government could be expected to use its market power as the largest single purchaser of IT to drive security — but that alone can't be expected to bring a voluntary framework into universal adoption. "The next step is a very hard one," Molino says. "The
next step is just trying to implement it and getting companies to rally around it and adopt it. How that rollout happens is another challenge."
DA – CHINA
1nc china da China will likely require encryption backdoors now to assuage fears of rising internal unrest – BUT it’s uncertain – citing U.S. hypocrisy is key to resist pressure Iasiello 15 (Emilio Iasiello, over 12 years’ experience as a strategic cyber intelligence analyst, supporting US government civilian and military intelligence organizations, published extensively in peer-reviewed journals, “China’s Anti-Terror Law May Be Bargaining Chip in Cyber Game,” 4-29-2015, http://darkmatters.norsecorp.com/2015/04/29/chinas-anti-terror-law-may-bebargaining-chip-in-cyber-game/) In March 2015, China’s Foreign Ministry said that deliberation on a controversial Chinese anti-terrorism law is
going on and will be formulated based on national security needs,[i] refuting a senior U.S. official’s suggestion that the legislation was on hold . [ii] While this law has incurred significant criticism from the U.S. and other Western interests, China may try to use it to leverage bigger gains for itself in cyberspace discussions with Western interests. The New Law – for National Security, IP Exploitation, or Both? At the crux of the debate of the draft law is a requirement that would compel technology firms supplying technology to Chinese banks to install “backdoors” in products or relinquish sensitive information such as encryption keys to the government. The initial draft of the law, published by the National People’s Congress (NPC) late last year, requires companies to also keep servers and user data within China, supply law enforcement authorities with communications records and censor terrorism-related Internet content .[iii] The proposed law has received substantial criticism from Western countries to include Japan, the United States, and the European Union (EU) who have since engaged in collaboration to project a unified front against this draft law.[iv] According to a European Commission spokesperson, the EU is concerned by the lack of transparency in the development of these measures and by the potential impact on EU companies.[v] China has gone on the offensive to reduce the perception of any potential impropriety, addressing concerns publicly, and reiterating its stance that such legal actions are necessary antiterrorism measures to protect its national security interests. According to China, the law is
ultimately justified in asking that technology companies make telecommunications and Internet ports accessible to the government for investigations,[vi] a sentiment similar to one that F ederal B ureau of I nvestigation Director Comey expressed in 2014 when he said that government access to mobile devices may be needed in extreme circumstances, such as in the event of a terror attack.[vii] While fears of China being able to have access and exploit the intellectual property of IT companies, and possibly exploiting it for nefarious purposes is based on espionage activities attributed to Beijing, at least one leading U.S. company has agreed to submit to China’s restrictions,[viii] suggesting that gaining a foothold into a valuable marketplace may trump any security concerns. New Restrictions May Prove Win-Win for China Notably, China’s push for this law’s enactment comes at a time when China has received negative reactions to alleged cyber espionage allegations, to include the indictment of five of its
N ational S ecurity A gency documents leaked by Edward Snowden have provided China with ammunition to accuse the United States of similar, if not more sophisticated and global, activities. As a result, dialogue between the two governments has hit an impasse ; the cybersecurity working group established in 2013 by the two governments has since been suspended by China with no indication of when discussions will continue. It remains uncertain if China will repeal or at least temper these restrictions, although as of March 31, they had agreed to suspend its rollout.[ix] Nevertheless, China has long desired to reduce its reliance on foreign technology, a long term science and technology plan that has been in effect since 2006.[x] If China goes forth with the cyber restrictions, forcing foreign technology companies to accede to its new security demands may prove a win-win deal for China. If companies do agree to its conditions, China will have access to proprietary code and customer information it may not have had as easy access to before. If the new restrictions end up deterring foreign technology from entering the Chinese IT market, Chinese companies will be able to assume a bigger role in supplying technology for its domestic customers . While these products may not be as advanced as Western counterparts, it will reduce the China’s own fears over the potential compromised technology produced by U.S. companies. Conclusion China may use the potential tweaking of this legislation before it’s enacted into law as a bargaining chip for military officers by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2014. Conversely, alleged
other considerations it deems more pressing to its interests. Prior to this controversy, the U.S. had begun to review new trade agreements that limited the restrictions that can be put on the free flow of data across borders.[xi] The U.S. is currently negotiating with the EU and 20 other countries on a new agreement on services to guarantee the free flow of data across borders, a negotiation that China has been blocked from joining. [xii] Amending the wording on the current
China a seat at this table and allow it to influence this outcome, particularly as it views information control as an essential component for preserving political stability and keeping the regime in power .
anti-terror law may provide
The plan reinvigorates U.S. pressure on China – prevents backdoors and independently empowers dissidents Bankston 15 (Kevin S. Bankston, Policy Director of the Open Technology Institute and Co-Director of Cybersecurity Initiative, New America, Security Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, serves on the board of the First Amendment Coalition, former Senior Counsel and the Director of the Free Expression Project at the Center for Democracy & Technology, former nonresidential fellow with the Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet & Society, former Senior Staff Attorney and Equal Justice
Works/Bruce J. Ennis First Amendment Fellow at Electronic Frontier Foundation, former Justice William Brennan First Amendment Fellow, litigated Internet-related free speech cases at the American Civil Liberties Union, J.D. University of Southern California Law School, B.A. University of Texas at Austin, statement before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on “Encryption Technology and Possible U.S. Policy Responses,” 4-29-2015, http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/4-29-2015-ITSubcommittee-Hearing-on-Encryption-Bankston.pdf) However, the free speech impact of a mandate against unbreakable encryption and in favor of backdoors for government would reach far beyond just the communication of encryption code, and chill a wide variety of online expression. When individuals believe that they may be under surveillance, there is a “chilling effect” that can curb free speech and the free flow of information online.59 If individuals must assume that their online communications are not secure but may instead be acquired by the U.S. government or by anyone else who might exploit an encryption backdoor, they will be much less willing to communicate freely.
By contrast, encouraging the availability of strong encryption free of surveillance backdoors can enable free expression both in the United States and around the world , 60 including by stymieing the censorship and surveillance efforts of governments with less respect for human rights than our own. 8. It would encourage countries with poor human rights records to demand backdoor access of their own . The governments of countries like China , 61 India, 62 and the United Arab Emirates63 have proposed a variety of measures that would require companies to implement key escrow systems or other forms of backdoors or stop doing business in those countries, proposals that the United States government has criticized.64 Yet how can the U nited S tates credibly criticize , for example, the Chinese government for proposing an anti-terrorism bill that would require U.S. companies to hand over their encryption keys, if we impose a similar requirement here at home? And how are U.S. companies to argue that they cannot implement such requirements and hand over the keys to foreign governments—even those with a history of human rights abuses—if they have already had to do so for the U.S. government? As Marc Zwillinger has pointed out, if the U.S. mandates backdoor access to encrypted
data, “multinational companies will not be able to refuse foreign governments that demand [the same] access. Governments could threaten financial sanctions, asset seizures, imprisonment of employees and prohibition against a company’s services in their countries. Consider China, where U.S. companies must comply with government demands in order to do business.” 65 Such a result would be particularly ironic considering the U.S.’s foreign policy goal of promoting Internet Freedom worldwide and in China especially, including the promotion of encryption-based tools to protect privacy and evade censorship.66 Internet Freedom begins at home, and a failure by the United States to protect Americans’ ability to encrypt their data will undermine the right to encrypt and therefore human rights around the world. 67 The U.S. government supports the use of strong encryption abroad as part of our foreign policy objectives, and it should support the same for Americans here in the United States. This is especially true considering that…
Fear of unrest causes lashout and extinction Renxing 5 (San Renxing, writer for the free republic, Epoch Times international, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death,” 8-32005, http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html) Since the Party’s life is “above all else ,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of bio logical, chem ical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life . The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives .
--a2 no brink CCP legitimacy at tipping point—organized protests topples the regime Ong 15 (Lynette H. Ong Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, jointly appointed by the Department of Political Science and the Asian Institute, Munk School of Global Affairs, and China Specialist at the University of Toronto. Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. “Chinese Regime stability: sustaining or collapsing?” Asia Pacific Foundation. https://www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda/chinas-regime-stability-sustaining-orcollapsing, June 2, 2015)\\mwang
Attacks outside the party: "Stability preservation" Shortly after Xi assumed the presidency in 2012, he shifted the locus of power to the newly created National Security Commission, which is tasked with overseeing both foreign affairs and domestic security. Xi chairs this powerful commission himself, which allowed him to concentrate his control over internal security resources and of removing any potential powerful contender within the upper echelons of the party in charge of this portfolio. The result has been an increase in the scope, targets and intensity of political repression of society . The party's coercive apparatus, or "stability preservation" (weiwen), to use the official rhetoric, expanded significantly under Hu Jintao, though its origins date back to the post-1989 crackdown. But the scope of the coercive apparatus has widened even further to include Internet monitoring and censorship, the Public Security Bureau, the policy and state intelligence agencies, the People's Armed Police, the paramilitary forces, local "stability-maintenance units," and urban patrols or chengguan. In addition, Xi inherited a budget for "stability preservation" that reportedly increased more than five-fold between 2002 and 2012, from 132.8 billion yuan (US$16.2 billion) to 702 billion yuan ($111 billion), exceeding the officially published military budget. A recent Freedom House report notes that a wide range of groups have experienced an increase in repression since 2013, including grassroots rights activists, online opinion leaders, internet users, business people, party cadres, labour leaders, scholars and professors, print and television journalists, Christians, Tibetans and Uighurs. And Document No. 9, issued by the Central Committee in 2013, ordered all relevant institutions to stem any endorsement of universal "Western" values, such as media freedom, civil society and judicial independence. Reaching a turning point? The harsh crackdown has also been applied to commercial media and social media. The Central Internet Security and Informational Leading Group was set up in 2014 to coordinate work on cyber security and internet censoring. Internet censoring used to be largely outsourced to Internet companies that keep an eye on their users. This new leading group, also headed by Xi, indicates that information control is a high priority. The filtering and management of content is now increasingly centrally controlled and coordinated. The once-fiery Southern Weekly, which had served as the leading example of commercialized media pushing the envelope of press freedom, has largely lost its luster. Online opinion leaders, such as blogger Murong Xuecun, who had millions of followers on social media, saw their freedom of speech significantly curtailed. Sina Weibo, the equivalent of Twitter in China, which was once a platform for raucous discussion of social issues, has also quieted down. Ordinary Internet users across the areas of businesses, academia, and journalism have lamented that the Internet in China has largely become an Intranet. Yet, the intensified Internet censorship and crackdown on social media have not intimidated the Chinese netizens. An increasing number of Internet users in China are using Virtual Private Networks and other circumvention tools to scale the "Great Firewall." Xiao Qiang of the China Digital Times at the University of California at Berkeley argues that the crackdown has emboldened Internet users to seek alternative ways to express their opinions, rather than injecting fear among them. The crackdown has also increased resentment against the censorship apparatus. Freedom House has observed civil society resilience amid the crackdowns. Some civil society organizations might have been pushed underground, but they are not giving up the fight for their causes. Repression has strained state-society relations and led to declining regime legitimacy. Although citizens may not have the resources or mobilizing structures to organize large-scale collective action, it is nonetheless significant that the grievances that motivate them to do so are now stronger than ever before. After the Tiananmen incident in 1989, there was an implicit social contract in which citizens agreed to political acquiescence in exchange for the regime's delivery of economic prosperity. So far, the regime has largely held up its end of the deal: Real income for the urban middle class has been rising, though housing affordability is a major concern, and wages of migrant workers have risen sharply in the last decade, making them significantly better off than a generation ago. However, with slower economic growth, the regime's ability to maintain performance legitimacy now comes under increased scrutiny.
This scrutiny, coupled with the falling regime legitimacy from the intensified crackdown, seems to be bringing the populace closer to the breaking point than any period after 1989. In essence, Xi is implementing harsh repression within as well as outside the system. Thus far, he seems to have the support of the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of the party's power. But, the anti-corruption campaign is having chilling effects on bureaucrats, party rank-and-file and leaders across all levels. They constantly live in fear under the current political climate. The fact that some of them have become disenfranchised with the party leadership was not unforeseeable. Yet, they are also the very implementers of Xi's repressive actions on those outside the system. This makes the simultaneous timing of both repressive measures unwise, at least from the perspective of party preservation. If there is a common cause or interest around which those within and outside the system could
cooperate, threats to the regime will mount. Freedom House's interviews with activists suggest some security agents have decided not to enforce their superior's instructions strictly out of sympathy or conscience.
--a2 no lashout Chinese Instability escalates to CCP lashout Shirk, expert on Chinese politics, 2007 (Susan L. Shirk, expert on Chinese politics and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, also in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California in San Diego, “China Fragile Superpower” published by Oxford University Press, Chapter 3, page 69.) // RL As China’s leaders well know, the greatest political risk lying ahead of them is the possibility of an economic crash that throws millions of workers out of their jobs or sends millions of depositors to withdraw their savings from the shaky banking system. A massive environmental or public health disaster also could trigger regime collapse, especially if people’s lives are endangered by a media cover-up imposed by Party authorities. Nationwide rebellion becomes a real possibility when large numbers of people are upset about the same issue at the same time. Another dangerous scenario is a domestic or international crisis in which the CCP leaders feel compelled to lash out against Japan, Taiwan, or the United States because from their point of view not lashing out might endanger Party rule.
CCP postpones collapse using wmds Renxing 05 (San Renxing, writer for the free republic, Epoch Times international. “The CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death (Part I)” The Free Republic http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1456316/posts August 3, 2005)\\mwang In a show of strength to save itself from demise, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rolled out its sinister plan prepared for years, a plan in which the Party makes an insane gamble from its deathbed. It did so in the form of a “speech” posted on the Internet (see Boxun.com of April 23, 2005). The “speech” consists of two parts: “The War Is Approaching Us” and “The War Is Not Far from Us and Is the Midwife of the Chinese Century.” The two, judging from their echoing contexts and consistent theme, are indeed sister articles. The “speech” describes in a comprehensive, systematic, and detailed way nearly 20 years of the CCP’s fear and helplessness over its doomed fate and its desperate fight to stave off death. In particular, the “speech” uncharacteristically lays bare what is really on the CCP’s mind and hides nothing from the public—a rare confession from the CCP that could help people understand its evil nature. If one truly understands what is said in this confession, the CCP’s thinking is plainly visible to the naked eye. In short, the “speech” is worth reading and a comment. 1. When the rogue gambles with the world as his stake, people’s lives in the global village become worthless What, then, is the gist of this sinister plan of insane gambling on the deathbed? It can be summarized as “a beast at bay is fighting humanity for survival.” To reinforce your belief, please read the following excerpts from the “speech.” 1) “We must prepare ourselves for two scenarios. If our biological weapons succeed in the surprise attack (on the US), the Chinese people will be able to keep their loss at a minimum in the fight against the U.S. If, however, the attack fails and triggers a nuclear retaliation from the U.S., China would perhaps suffer a catastrophe in which more than half of its population would perish. That is why we need to be ready with air defense systems for our big and medium-sized cities. Whatever the case may be, we can only move forward fearlessly for the sake of our Party and state and our nation’s future, regardless of the hardships we have to face and the sacrifices we have to make. The population, even if more than half dies, can be reproduced. But if the Party falls, everything is gone, and forever gone! ” 2) “In any event, we, the CCP, will never
step down from the stage of history! We’d rather have the whole world, or even the entire globe, share life and death with us than step down from the stage of history!!! Isn’t there a ‘nuclear bondage’ theory? It means that since the nuclear weapons have bound the security of the entire world, all will die together if death is inevitable. In my view, there is another kind of bondage, and that is, the fate our Party is tied up with that of the whole world. If we, the CCP, are over, China will be over, and the world will be over.” 3) “It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter, as, for us,
it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party . That is because, after all, we are
Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party’s life has always been above all else!” Since the Party’s life is “above all
else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.
CCP collapse means nuclear war-refugees spill over Yee and Storey 02 (Herbert Lee and Ian Storey, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hong Kong Baptist University and Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Book: The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality. p. 5, published 2002)\\mwang The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented
exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario — nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords .12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.
CCP collapse turns the economy and causes Taiwan and civil war Lewis 08 (Dan Lewis is Research Director of the Economic Research Council, “The nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse” World Finance http://www.worldfinance.com/home/final-bell/the-nightmare-of-a-chinese-economic-collapse May 13, 2008.)\\mwang In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller “The Coming Collapse of China.” To suggest that the world’s largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned “China Hands” rejected Chang’s thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. China’s expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of Euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment – the minimum growth rate is 7.2
percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war . In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend. Today, people are looking at Chang’s book again. Contrary to popular belief, foreign investment has actually deferred political reform in the world’s oldest nation. China today is now far further from democracy than at any time since the Tianneman Square massacres in 1989. Chang’s pessimistic forecast for China was probably wrong. But my fear is there is at least a chance he was just early
--a2 collapse inevitable China legitimacy high now Jacques 12 (Martin Jacques is an economist and author of When China Rules the World. BBC news. “A Point Of View: Is China more legitimate than the West?” http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20178655 November 12, 2012)\\mwang China and the United States are about to choose new leaders via very different methods. But is a candidate voted for by millions a more legitimate choice than one anointed by a select few, asks Martin Jacques. This week will witness an extraordinary juxtaposition of events. On Tuesday the next American president will be elected. Two days later, the 18th congress of the Chinese Communist Party will select the new Chinese president and prime minister. The contrast could hardly be greater. Americans in their tens of millions will turn out to vote. In China the process of selection will take place behind closed doors and involve only a relative handful of people. You are probably thinking, "Ah, America at its best, China at its worst - the absence of democracy. China's Achilles heel is its governance. This will be China's downfall." I want to argue quite the contrary. You probably think that the legitimacy and authority
of the state, or government, is overwhelmingly a function of democracy, Western-style. But democracy is only one factor. Nor does democracy in itself guarantee legitimacy. A Point of View broadcasts on BBC Radio 4 on Fridays at 20:50 GMT and repeated on Sunday at 08:50 GMT Think of Italy. It is always voting, but the enduring problem of Italian governance is that its state lacks legitimacy. Half the population don't really believe in it. Now let me shock you: the Chinese state enjoys greater legitimacy than any Western state . How come? In China's case the source of the state's legitimacy lies entirely outside the history or experience of Western societies. In my first talk I explained that China is not primarily a nationstate but a civilisation-state. For the Chinese, what matters is civilisation. For Westerners it is nation. The most important political value in China is the integrity and unity of the civilisation-state. Given the sheer size and diversity of the country, this is hugely problematic. Between the 1840s and 1949, China was occupied by the colonial powers, divided and fragmented. The Chinese refer to it as their century of humiliation. They see the state as the embodiment and guardian of Chinese civilisation. Its most important responsibility - bar none - is maintaining the unity of the country. A government that fails to ensure this will fall. There have been many examples in history. The legitimacy of the Chinese state lies, above all, in its relationship with Chinese civilisation. But does the Chinese state, you may well ask, really enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of its people? Take the findings of Tony Saich at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. In a series of surveys he found that between 80 and 95% of Chinese people were either
relatively or extremely satisfied with central government. Chinese people say they are happy with their government's economic record Or take the highly respected Pew Global Attitudes surveys which found in 2010, for example, that 91% of Chinese respondents thought that the government's handling of the economy was good (the UK figure, incidentally was 45%). Such high levels of satisfaction do not mean that China is conflict-free. On the contrary, there are countless examples of protest action, such as the wave of strikes in Guangdong province for higher wages in 2010 and 2011, and the 150,000 or more so-called mass incidents that take place every year - generally protests by farmers against what they see as the illegal seizure of their land by local authorities in cahoots with property developers. But these actions do not imply any fundamental dissatisfaction with central government. If the Chinese state enjoys such support, then why does it display such signs of paranoia? The controls on the press and the internet, the periodic arrest of dissidents, and the rest of it. Good point. Actually, all Chinese governments have displayed these same symptoms. Why? Because the country is huge and governance is extremely difficult. They are always anxious, always fearing the unforeseen. Anticipating sources of instability has long been regarded as a fundamental attribute of good governance. Not surprisingly, the Chinese have a quite different attitude towards government to that universal in the West. True, our attitude depends in part on where we stand on the political spectrum. If you are on the right, you are likely to believe in less government and more market. If you are on the left, you are likely to be more favourably disposed to the state. But both left and right share certain basic assumptions. The role of the state should be codified in law, there should be clear limits to its powers, and there are many areas in which the state should not be involved. We believe the state is necessary - but only up to a point. The Chinese idea of the state could hardly be more different. The Chinese see the state as a member of the family - the head of the family, in fact They do not view it from a narrowly utilitarian standpoint, in terms of what it can deliver, let alone as the devil incarnate in the manner of the American Tea Party. They see the state as an intimate, or, to be more precise, as a member of the family - the head of the family, in fact. The Chinese regard the family as the template for the state. What's more, they perceive the state not as external to themselves but as an extension or representation of themselves. The fact that the Chinese state enjoys such an exalted position in society lends it enormous authority, a remarkable ubiquity and great competence. Take the economy. China's economic rise - an annual
growth rate of 10% for more than 30 years - has been masterminded by the Chinese state . It is the most remarkable economic transformation the world has seen since the modern era began with Britain's industrial revolution in the late 18th Century. Even though China is still a poor developing country, its state, I would argue, is the most competent in the world. Take infrastructure - the importance of which is belatedly now being recognised in the West. Here, China has no peers. Its high speed rail network is the world's largest and will soon be greater than the rest of the world's put together. And the state's ubiquity - a large majority of China's most competitive companies, to this day, are state-owned. Or consider the one-child policy, which still commands great support amongst the population. The competence of the state is little talked about or really valued in the West, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. Indeed, since the early 80s, the debate about the state in Britain has largely been conducted in terms either of what bits should be privatised or how it can be made to mimic the market. Now, however, we are in a new ball game. With the Western economies in a profound mess and with China's startling rise, the competence of the state can no longer be ignored. Our model is in crisis. Theirs has been delivering the goods. As China's dramatic ascent continues - which it surely will - then China's strengths will become a growing subject of interest in the West. We will realise that our relationship with them can no longer consist of telling them how they should be like us. A little humility is in order. One of the most dramatic illustrations of this will be the state. We think of it as their greatest weakness but we will come to realise that it is one of their greatest strengths. Beyond a point it would be quite impossible for a Western state to be like China's. It is the product of a different history and a different relationship between state and society. You could never transplant their state into a Western country, and vice versa. But this does not mean that we cannot learn from the Chinese state, just as they have learnt much from us. China's rise will have a profound effect on Western debate. The Chinese economy is set to overtake the US in 2018 In about six years hence, the Chinese economy will overtake the US economy in size. By 2030 it will be very
much larger. The world is increasingly being shaped by China, and if it has looked west for the last two centuries, in future it will look east. Welcome, then, to the
new Chinese paradigm - one that combines a highly competitive, indeed often ferocious market, with a ubiquitous and competent state. For us in the West this is an entirely new phenomenon. And it will shape our future.
--a2 no collapse China is close, but won’t collapse now: legitimacy high Tao 15 (Xie Tao,professor of political science at the School of English and International Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University. He holds a PhD in political science from Northwestern. “Why do people keep predicting China’s Collapse?” The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-do-people-keep-predicting-chinas-collapse/ March 2015)\\mwang
The temptation to make predictions about China is probably irresistible, because it is arguably the most important contemporary case in international relations. Thus, a few Western observers have risked their professional reputations by acting as prophets. Perhaps the most (in)famous is Gordon Chang, who published The Coming Collapse of China in 2001. “The end of the modern Chinese state is near,” he asserted. “The People’s Republic has five years, perhaps ten, before it falls,” China didn’t collapse, as we all know. “So, yes, my prediction was wrong,” he admitted in an article (“The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition”). But he remained convinced about the imminence of a Chinese apocalypse and offered a new timeline: “Instead of 2011, the mighty Communist Party of China will fall in 2012. Bet on it.” Gordon Chang may be dismissed as an opportunist who tries to make a fortune — political and/or economic — out of sensational rhetoric about China. But not so with David Shambaugh, a well-respected China scholar at George Washington University who heretofore has been rather cautious in his assessment of China. In a March 6 Wall Street Journal article, he portrayed the Chinese party-state as struggling for its last breath. “The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe, and it has progressed further than many think,” he wrote. “We cannot predict when Chinese communism will collapse, but it is hard not to conclude that we are witnessing its final phase.” Shambaugh’s article was nothing less than a supersize bombshell in the China field, especially in light of the fact that the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s leadership seems to be revitalizing itself through a
the anti-corruption campaign and the drive for the rule of law — appear to have significantly bolstered popular support for the new leadership. Shambaugh actually published a book in 2008 that
series of important measures. And these measures — particularly
offers a rather favorable assessment of the party-state’s abilities to adapt to new challenges in the first decade of the 21st century. It is unclear what caused Shambaugh’s sudden about-face. Some speculate that he was merely trying to get a foreign policy position in the post-Barack Obama administration. Others contend that he is the Chinese version of a “mugged” liberal converted to a conservative, that Shambaugh is deeply upset by Chinese leaders’ intransigence on fundamental reforms. Whatever the motives behind Shambaugh’s nirvana, there is no denying that China is facing myriad daunting challenges.
China is sick — but so is every other country in the world, though each country is sick with different symptoms , for different reasons, and of different degrees. Take the United State as an example. The world’s oldest democracy may also strike one as terminally ill: appalling inequality, dilapidated infrastructure, declining public education, astronomical deficits, rising political apathy, and a government that can hardly get anything done. In his bestseller Political Order and Political Decay, Francis Fukuyama described the American body politic as being repatrimonialized, ruled by courts and political parties, and gridlocked by too many veto points. Across the Atlantic, many European democracies are facing similar problems, particularly financial insolvency. Yet nobody has declared the coming collapse of American democracy or European democracy. Why? Because many Western analysts (dating back at least to as long as political institutions are viewed as legitimate, a crisis in effectiveness does not pose fatal threat to a regime. Thus even in the darkest days of the Great Depression, according to this view, America’s democratic institutions remained unchallenged. By contrast, if a regime is already deficient in political legitimacy, a crisis of effectiveness (such as an economic slowdown, rising inequality, or rampant corruption) would only exacerbate the legitimacy crisis . China is widely believed to be a prominent case that fits into this line argument. China might be facing a performance crisis, but whether it is also facing a legitimacy crisis is debatable. Beauty is in the eyes of beholder; so is legitimacy. If the Chinese party-state could survive the riotous years of the Cultural Revolution and the existential crisis of 1989, why couldn’t it manage to survival another crisis? In fact, a more important question for Western observers is why the Chinese Communist Party has managed to stay in power for so long and to produce an indisputably Seymour Martin Lipset) subscribe to the view that (e.g., economic performance)
impressive record of economic development.
China on the brink of collapse-plan kills Mattis 15 (Peter Mattis, University of Cambridge, Jamestown foundation, National Bureau of Asian Research, Georgetown University. “Doomsday: Preparing for China’s Collapse.” The National Interest http://nationalinterest.org/feature/doomsdaypreparing-chinas-collapse-12343 March 2, 2015)\\mwang China could be on the brink of collapse. Here's how Washington can leverage that to its advantage. A couple of weeks ago, AEI scholar Michael Auslin published a column for the Wall Street Journal about a quiet dinner in Washington where a senior China scholar declared the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had reached the final stage before collapse. The political collapse of the world’s second-largest economy and a nuclear power is no small thing . What should Washington do? Go outside the Fourth Ring Road (a Chinese reference akin to saying go outside the Beltway), forge links to marginalized Chinese and speak out about Chinese human rights to show the Chinese people that the United States has “a moral stake in China’s development.” Even if the CCP’s collapse does not occur for years, these measures will help U.S. policy makers be “on the right side of history.” Such measures appear trivial in the face of a problem the size of China’s potential political instability and the collapse of its governing structure. By Auslin’s telling, this anonymous China scholar and those nodding in approval think that these first steps constitute a genuine signal to the Chinese people that Washington stands and will stand by them. Rhetorical support, however, will not grace the United States in the eyes of the Chinese people if their discontent demolishes the CCP. Actions, rather than words, in the heat of another crisis at least on the scale of nationwide protests in 1989 will be the measure of Washington’s moral interest in China’s future. Being prepared for a political crisis with the potential to bring down the CCP requires a much more serious effort that involves both research and planning. Before that day of crisis comes, the mindset for dealing with China must include the ability to imagine a China without the CCP and how that outcome might develop. The tens of thousands of demonstrations serve as a reminder that, despite China’s rise to
international prominence, the country still has political fault lines capable of causing an earthquake. With this kind of warning, the moral failing would be to ignore the potential for regime-changing unrest or any other political crisis that might threaten the regime, and what Beijing might do to prevent that from happening. The purpose of these tasks is to reduce the uncertainty faced by policy makers as a Chinese crisis emerges and cascades across the country, as well as to identify ways and decision points where Washington can influence the CCP’s choices. If an effort is not made to reduce the uncertainty, then fear of the unknown is likely to drive U.S. policy makers to a decision about whether to support the Chinese government out of ignorance, rather than informed calculation.
--a2 resilient CCP control is fragile – unrest escalates Lee 13 – (Ann, senior fellow at Demos, is the author of "What the U.S. Can Learn From China.", New York Times, “Civil Unrest in China Would be Devastating for the World Economy”, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/11/have-the-bric-nationslost-their-momentum/civil-unrest-in-china-would-be-devastating-for-the-world-economy)//MP The complexity and fragility of China’s political system is something that is often underappreciated by Western observers. The scandal and rapid downfall of Bo Xilai, a top Chinese government official of Chongqing who was once widely considered for the Standing Committee, was a rare glimpse of the deep political divisions that exist within the Chinese central government. Although these power struggles have usually been shielded from the public, the political battles within the party are no less fierce than in multiparty systems in democratic societies. And while some China observers believe that the ousting of Bo Xilai is a watershed moment for the reformists to continue their development goals unhindered, the reality is that the Maoists
could potentially unite and strike back when everyone least expects such an event to happen. If they are successful in harnessing the disgruntled farmers and unemployed factory workers in China to rally behind them, it is remote but not impossible for the civil unrest to turn into another civil war. In such a scenario, China’s miraculous growth would grind to a halt. A halt to China’s growth would spell instant and devastating inflation for the rest of the world. All the major economies -- the United States, Japan and Europe -- have been printing money with abandon because China’s productivity exported deflation to the world . However, if China’s cheap labor force disappears because of civil war, all the cheap goods that they produced and exported would suddenly be scarce. The manufacturing in China would not be relocated easily anywhere else in the world for lack of a knowledge base and supply chain network that even comes close to matching China’s base . As a result, hyperinflation of the kind that has given the Germans nightmares would come back with a vengeance. The rest that can follow we already know from history.
--turns relations Chinese protests cause backlash against the west--empirics Topping 08 (Alexandra Topping, a news reporter for the Guardian. The Guardian, “Chinese Ambassador warns of backlash.” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/14/olympicgames2008.china 14, April 2008)\\mwang The western media's "demonisation" of China could lead to a backlash against the west, the Chinese ambassador to London warned yesterday. Fu Ying said that "violent attacks on the torch" in London eight days ago, when thousands of people protested, had convinced Chinese Olympic athletes that people in Britain "were against them". Writing in the Sunday Telegraph, Fu said: "One girl remarked she couldn't believe this land nourished Shakespeare and Dickens. Another asked: where is the 'gentlemenship'?" The ambassador warned that negative media coverage and the
protests that have dogged the Olympic torch relay were damaging the west's image in China. "Many who had romantic views of the west are very disappointed at the media's attempt to demonise China. We all know demonisation feeds a counter-reaction," she said. "Many complain about China not allowing enough access to the media. In China, the view is that the western media need to earn respect." Many people who protested did not understand the situation in Tibet, said Fu. "For the Chinese people, Tibet is a loved land and information about it is ample ... There may be complicated problems of religion mixing with politics, but people are well-fed, well-clothed and well-housed," she said. Violent protests in some cities, particularly an incident in Paris in which one protester tried to grab the Olympic torch from Chinese para-Olympian Jin Jing, ran the risk of feeding the paranoia of some Chinese Communist party hardliners , agreed Anne Holmes, acting director of Free Tibet. "For some in China this confirms their belief that China has already opened too much," she said. But the ambassador's comments revealed a lack of understanding about democracy and a free press in the UK, she added. "Being polite is considered very important in Asian countries. The British also value good manners, but unlike in China, we also have the right to peacefully protest." Increased economic prosperity masks religious and cultural oppression in Tibet which effectively amounts to cultural genocide, Holmes said. "Contrary to the rosy picture she is giving, Tibet is an occupied country. The Chinese government does not understand that Tibetans don't think they are Chinese and don't want to be Chinese . People are not
just going to roll over and say thanks for invading our country." Fu's claim that journalists coming to China to report bad stories "may not be welcomed but would not be stopped" was ludicrous, she added. A Foreign Office spokesman said the government supported the right to peaceful protest and would continue to push for free access to Tibet: "If the Chinese government perceives there is a problem in how China is presented in the international media, one way of addressing that is to allow journalists access to Tibet." Margaret Hodge, the sports minister, will attend the opening of the Beijing Olympics, with the prime minister present for the closing ceremony, as a government boycott of the games could backfire, the spokesman added. "We are encouraged by the progress that China has made in recent years, although we of course want to see further advances. But backing China into a corner is not a productive way of promoting respect for human rights in Darfur, Burma or Tibet - it would be counterproductive," he said. Protests are likely to continue along the Olympic torch's route to Beijing, which arrives in Muscat, Oman, today, said Holmes. Protests were to be expected if the planned parading of the torch went ahead in Tibet's capital, Lhasa. "People are prepared to go to prison, people are prepared to be shot and people are prepared to die. The Chinese government thinks that with enough intimidation they can cow people into submission, but they are wrong," she said.
--turns terror / crime Internet freedom turns crime and terror Li 13 (Christina Xin Li, University of Victoria Graduate Darlene Fischer published academia.edu, “The Reason Why Censorship of the Internet is Necessary” academia.edu. https://www.academia.edu/8984657/The_Reason_Why_Censorship_of_the_Internet_is_Necessary November 21, 2013)\\mwang The internet was first available in 1969 in the United States. At that time, the internet was utilized to protect the military system in the U.S.A . No one could have imaged how deeply the internet could change people's lives. In 2001, the International Telecommunication Union calculated that, approximately 2.3 billion people had internet access at the end of that year. Since then, the percentage of people using the internet around the world has continued to grow. "As its applications have multiplied, the internet is having enormous impacts across the globe" (Warf, 2010). Even so, there are more than 20 countries that still surveil the internet, like China, Burma, North Korea and Cuba, the government maintains strict control of what citizens can access on the internet. Although there are many opposing voices, the governments still implements censorship of the internet to protect young people who are easily influenced by negative information. A proportion of people believe that censorship of the internet reduces opportunities for people
to communicate with the outside world. Without free communication and cooperation, the country's economy may not develop as well. For example, in the 18th century, the Qing dynasty in China closed all its borders to prevent the Eight- Power Allied Forces from attacking the country. Unfortunately, the closed door policy not only did not cease the war, but also closed people's vision and their thoughts. This resulted in the Qing dynasty dying out eventually. Today the same situation exists with the closed door policy, where people are afraid of the internet censorship causing the country to lag behind. Being Chinese, I totally understand the attraction people have to the internet, but I also understand why the government implements the internet censorship. Saunders (2003) pointed that "children need to be protected from some material, such as violent or sexual media content" (P.12-22). I believe that for children's personal safety and their bright future, it is very necessary for governments to control the internet. An official data report also showed that, Police reported over 3,800 incidents of sexual violations against children in 2001. The rate rose 3% between 2010 and 2011, making it one of the few categories of violent offenses to increase in 2011. Among the specific offences included in this category, the rate of invitation to sexual touching (+8%) and luring children via a computer (+10%) increased. (UCRS, 2012) The figure indicated clearly that the internet is a convenient way for criminals who want to approach and hurt those naive children. The increasing incidents warned the society that the internet censorship is very important. If State stops the way
that criminals can connect with children or adolescents, the rate of children abuse might be decreased in the future. Secondly, a portion of experts regard the censorship of communication as centralization of state power, such as the North Korea and the Burmese government. North Korea is one of the most isolated countries in the world and the government has very strict rules to limited people from communicating with the outside world. For instance, the North Korea government turned off the internet and television connection when their football team failed behind in the 2010 world cup competition. The people in that country even did not know the result of the game, because their leader thought losing was very humiliating. Indeed, this level of control of the internet by the government is very horrible, but the society would be more terrifying without censorship. Like child pornography rocketed steeply in recent years." Despite the advances in internet security technology, the problem of criminal activity on the internet has only become worse" (Baker, 2007). Teenagers watch the pornographic and violent videos, and then follow the example of those videos. For example, two American teenagers shot an Australian baseball player because they were bored; or the adolescent from Pittsburgh high school shot three classmates because it is cool in some violent movies. The reason for these kinds of tragedies happening is the openness of the internet. Teenagers still do not have strong judgment to distinct good or bad, so they are easily influenced to follow improper activities from online sources. This proves again that government censorship of the internet is very necessary. Finally, some people use "human rights" to contradict censorship of the internet. Human rights organizations pointed out that government censors mass internet mandatorily is a criminal action. Individual has rights to speech, choice and make own decision. Burmese proposition politician Aung San Suu Kyi who fights for human rights, her documentary was blocked in some countries by cleaned up on the internet. People are very disappointed about the government's action, and it is true that states should not deprive people's right to watch the movie. Nevertheless, governments have their own reasons to do that. For instance, The Chinese government censored the internet because some terrorists are trying to split their land by using internet to spread untrue information. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicated that " The use of the internet for terrorist purposes is a rapidly growing phenomenon" (2012, para.1), such as the Dalai Lama wants to separate Tibet from China, so he used the internet to spread widely many fake news about the Chinese government to shake the minority's views. Because of his nasty action, there was a terrible riot that happened in Xinjiang province three years ago, and led to the deaths of over one hundred people. In addition, the U.S.A lawmaker enhances law enforcement's power after September 11th 2001 (Szumski, 2005, P.103). To protect the country's land and the continuous of the happiness of lives of citizens, censorship of the internet is very needed. The internet has influenced both sides of the evolution of people since it was availed in 1969. It transformed the people had lived for thousands of years. Users of the internet have continuously increased. Scientists explore space by using the internet; Soldiers utilize the internet to protect the country; mass use of the internet to enrich their entertainment. On the other hand, a portion of people also utilize the internet to do bad things. For example, criminals
who want to hurt teenagers by using the internet to approach them; video makers who create violent or pornographic movies spread on the internet to affect young generation, and terrorists who try to spread fake information on internet to attack the country. When people cannot control their actions while utilizing the internet in a good way, I highly recommend that the governments from every country should implement the internet censorship to protect citizens from horrible, fake and unhealthy information.
--turns chinese terror Chinese encryption backdoors key to stopping Chinese terror
Livingston 15 - Scott D. Livingston is an American attorney specializing in Chinese trade and investment law, with a particular focus on technology. He has written numerous articles on China's economic reforms and emergent data privacy framework, and contributed to several comprehensive reports analyzing China's treatment of foreign investors. Livingston was formerly an Associate in Covington & Burling's Beijing office, and now resides in California. He is a graduate of the University of Texas School of Law and an alumni of the International Chinese Language Program (ICLP) of National Taiwan University.(“Will China’s New Anti-Terrorism Law Mean the End of Privacy?”, Scott D. Livingston, April 22, 2015, China File, http://www.chinafile.com/reportingopinion/viewpoint/will-chinas-new-anti-terrorism-law-mean-end-privacy)//chiragjain
The draft of the anti-terrorism law reflects the Party’s concern with two recent developments seen as threatening China’s domestic security. First, terrorist groups centered in China’s far-west Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region have carried out a series of attacks against government and civilian interests over the last two years, including mass knifing attacks at train stations in Kunming and Urumqi and the crashing of a Jeep into a group of pedestrians in Tiananmen Square. Attacks by China’s minority Uighur population on government authorities and ethnic Han Chinese have increased, though specific details of these attacks are generally unattainable given restrictions on the media in Xinjiang. China’s draft anti-terrorism law is a response to these recent violent events. From a Chinese point of view, the law is necessary to ensure the safety and security of its citizens, and to prevent any form of social instability that may pose a threat to continued economic development or Party rule. Second, the draft law’s focus on technology reflects the Party’s increased attention to cyber-security following Edward Snowden’s allegations of global U.S. government surveillance. This concern—the idea that the U.S. government has similar data-monitoring practices in one form or another—is a difficult presumption to rebut. China has defended the draft law vociferously at recent press conferences, indicating that the
a Chinese official made a veiled reference to an “other country’s” recent hack of private encryption keys, a not-so-subtle reference to recently published allegations that U.S. and British intelligence had hacked into a private company and obtained the encryption keys to millions of SIM cards used around the world. In a world of such threats, China believes it is justified in seeking clear legal mechanisms to protect and safeguard its national security. The Draft Law’s Effect on Global Technology Although it is unclear what shape the draft law will take in its final form, its current provisions are instructive for understanding the direction of China’s Internet policy. If passed, the law would have three major effects on global technology: CyberSovereignty may further wall-off the Chinese Internet. The government’s access rights, data localization requirements, and a strengthened firewall, all found in the draft law, point to a future Chinese Internet heavily monitored by the Party and further splintered from international norms. Along with recent actions by Russia and law’s technology requirements are a reasonable response to the current international situation. At one press conference,
Iran, such actions portend an Internet balkanized along national lines. International companies will see increased opportunity, but at a high cost. Although China boasts the greatest number of Internet users and mobile device subscribers of any nation on earth, international Internet companies long have faced difficulties providing their services within the P.R.C. As noted above, China’s new approach to Internet management suggests a scheme by which overseas content is increasingly censored while international technology companies are permitted (and likely encouraged) to locate their servers domestically, thereby falling under Chinese jurisdiction. This could mean increased opportunity for global technology companies to offer their products and services within China, provided they agree to follow Chinese law, tantamount, in some cases, to exercising strict self-censorship. Though the conditions under which this access is granted may prove too burdensome for many global technology companies, we should remember that international companies in other sectors have put up with other arguably onerous requirements in exchange for access to China’s large consumer market. These concessions are not the companies’ preference but are deemed a cost of doing business in China. Diminished international markets for Chinese technology companies. Along with the international success of the Chinese Internet giants Tencent and Alibaba, China currently boasts a vibrant startup scene still largely overlooked in the West. As this industry matures, Chinese technology firms looking to grow their international market may find themselves stymied by international consumers or governments unwilling to adopt their products because of security concerns related to P.R.C. government access. This could prove to be a major blow to one of the true bright spots in China’s slowing economy, frustrating efforts by Chinese policymakers to pursue innovation-led development and a “go global” economic development strategy.
--turns cybersecurity Internet security key to cybersecurity Swaine 13 (Micheal D. Swaine, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Chinese views on cybersecurity in Foreign relations.” Carnegie Endowment http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM42MS.pdf page 2-4 September 24, 2013)\\mwang Nonetheless, such general statements, combined with the more detailed discussion of such issues appearing in non-authoritative sources, suggest that most Chinese conceive of cybersecurity in a similar manner to observers in other countries. That is, it involves the protection of the Internet against harmful activities directed against or having the effect of undermining national security or commercial, social, and individual interests. Such interests include the capacity of the state to defend itself and society, the ability to compete fairly and productively in the national and global economic order, the preservation of social norms, and the privacy and security of the individual citizen. Most Chinese have the same concerns as much of the rest of the world about harmful cyberactivities, including: efforts to crash, slow, or paralyze vital cyberbased infrastructure; the promulgation of information or images
harmful to the polity, society, or the economy (such as pornography, false or misleading commercial
information, and the advocacy of violent political revolution); espionage; the theft of proprietary commercial data or information; and specific
actions designed to weaken the capacity of the state to defend itself through military and other means.8 Thus, both authoritative and other Chinese observers believe that “cyber security is an international . . . issue and hacker attack is a common challenge facing the whole world.”9 The Chinese also seem to agree with observers in other countries that cybersecurity is a particularly challenging issue because of the technical characteristics of the Internet and the growing presence of cybercrimes and other forms of dangerous behavior. As Zhong Sheng states: “[the Internet is] transnational and anonymous; it involves multiple fields and multiple agencies; there is a coexistence of hardware and software; there is an overlap of the virtual world and reality.”10 Both Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense officials repeatedly state that “China is a major victim of hacker attacks.”11 Various Chinese sources provide data on the scope of the cyber problem confronting China, but the Chinese military in particular has cited statistics on the number of cyberattacks on its systems, in large part to rebut foreign (and especially U.S.) accusations that the PLA is conducting huge numbers of attacks on others (see below).12 In response to such threats, and the overall security challenge presented by cyberactivities, authoritative Chinese sources repeatedly declare: The Chinese Government always opposes and strictly prohibits any illegal criminal activity by hackers. The Chinese law stipulates unequivocally that those who commit cyber crimes should undertake criminal liability in accordance with the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China.13 Beyond such general concerns, the PRC regime, and many interested Chinese observers, places a particularly strong emphasis on the challenges posed by cyberactivities that threaten existing domestic social and political norms or values (such as the dissemination of false rumors) as well as the sovereignty of the nation-state. In particular, many nonauthoritative sources, both civilian and especially military, introduce the concept of Swaine, China Leadership Monitor, no. 42 4 sovereign “virtual territory” on the Internet (termed “cyber sovereignty” by some Chinese sources),14 and advocate the need for a government to identify the boundaries of such territory and protect it against cyberbased threats.15
--turns econ Unchecked movements would escalate and lead to global economic collapse Lee 13 – (Ann, senior fellow at Demos, is the author of "What the U.S. Can Learn From China.", New York Times, “Civil Unrest in China Would be Devastating for the World Economy”, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/11/have-the-bric-nationslost-their-momentum/civil-unrest-in-china-would-be-devastating-for-the-world-economy)//MP The complexity and fragility of China’s political system is something that is often underappreciated by Western observers. The scandal and rapid downfall of Bo Xilai, a top Chinese government official of Chongqing who was once widely considered for the Standing Committee, was a rare glimpse of the deep political divisions that exist within the Chinese central government. Although these power struggles have usually been shielded from the public, the political battles within the party are no less fierce than in multiparty systems in democratic societies. And while some China observers believe that the ousting of Bo Xilai is a watershed moment for the reformists to continue their development goals unhindered, the reality is that the Maoists
could potentially unite and strike back when everyone least expects such an event to happen. If they are successful in harnessing the disgruntled farmers and unemployed factory workers in China to rally behind them, it is remote but not impossible for the civil unrest to turn into another civil war. In such a scenario, China’s miraculous growth would grind to a halt. A halt to China’s growth would spell instant and devastating inflation for the rest of the world. All the major economies -- the United States, Japan and Europe -- have been printing money with abandon because China’s productivity exported deflation to the world . However, if China’s cheap labor force disappears because of civil war, all the cheap goods that they produced and exported would suddenly be scarce. The manufacturing in China would not be relocated easily anywhere else in the world for lack of a knowledge base and supply chain network that even comes close to matching China’s base. As a result, hyperinflation of the kind that has given the Germans nightmares would come back with a vengeance. The rest that can follow we already know from history.
--a2 china econ solves China’s economy not key to legitimacy-CCP adapts the source of legitimacy McKay 06 (Evan McKay, a graduate student in the International Studies Program at DePaul University in Chicago, Illinois. He is pursuing a Masters of Arts in International Studies. His thesis will examine how Chinese political institutions are shaped by economic development and governance reform. “GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN CHINA: THE GLOBALIZATION DILEMMA” http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/conferences/2006/McKay-Governance_and_Legitimacy_in_China.pdf July 7, 2006)\\mwang
risks that any reforms, even implemented as remedies, could trigger a revolution.” 59 These polarized visions of the future of the CCP illustrate the complexity of the governance crisis for China, but they also may ignore a more plausible option. Both Yang and Pei accept that the CCP’s legitimacy is now tied to prosperity, and their scenarios largely depend on the way they view China’s prospects for prosperity in the future. Yang suggests that China will continue to grow and that prosperity may be enough to stabilize the political realm. 60 Pei calls into question the common assumption that China can sustain its current growth and argues that a slowing economy may trigger revolution. 61 I suggest that there is an easier and more likely way for the CCP to escape this legitimacy trap: redefining its legitimacy. If Party legitimacy is tied to something other than quantitative economic indicators, the CCP will be more likely to survive any economic slowdown. Indeed, I argue that China’s first response to economic struggles
would not be a reform package (as Pei suggests), but an attempt to redefine legitimacy based on either a return to ideology or on a populist brand of nationalism. It is difficult to see the Chinese society welcoming back communist ideology, especially since the Deng-era reforms did so much to distance the state from Maoism. Yet, as Lagerqvist and others have shown, nationalism has growing appeal in Chinese society – especially among the 14 youth.62 The CCP could seek to capitalize on Chinese nationalism and blame its problems on the outside world (particularly the United States). This redefined legitimacy would help the party retain power, but it would not escape all of the dilemmas of globalization. In fact, as the stateorchestrated antiJapanese protests in 2004 demonstrate, the problem with releasing bottled up Chinese nationalism is that it is not always very easy to control. By redefining legitimacy, however, the CCP would be able to relieve short-term pressures on the political elites, even if it risks long-term social instability
Brink of collapse-China’s economy will not save them now-(only legitimacy will) Hung, 15 (Ho-fung Hung, Associate Professor of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University. “When will China’s government collapse?” Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downfall March 13, 2015)\\mwang The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun,” influential China scholar David Shambaugh wrote in a March 7 article in the Wall Street Journal. “And it has progressed further than many think.” Is the ruling China’s Communist Party (CCP) on the brink of collapse? We asked several China hands for their take: Ho-fung Hung, Associate Professor of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University: I agree with Shambaugh that there are serious cracks in the CCP regime, not only because of his arguments and evidence but also because of his deep knowledge about and long-time access to the party’s elite. Whether these cracks will lead to the end of CCP rule, nevertheless, is difficult to predict. The prediction about a CCP endgame this time might end up like the many unrealized predictions before. It may also be like the story of boy crying wolf: The wolf didn’t come the first two times, but it finally came when nobody believed it would come. The bottom line is, the CCP is facing very tough challenges. Whether and how it can weather them is uncertain. Xi is a leader who came to power with very few sources of legitimacy. Mao and Deng were among the founding fathers of the People’s Republic of China. Deng handpicked his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao — both of whom got the backing of party elders when they came to power. Xi, despite his princeling background, is the first leader chosen out of a delicate compromise among party factions. Amidst Xi’s rise to power, the mysterious Wang Lijun incident occurred, followed by the unusual downfalls of former top leaders Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang. What Wang actually told the American diplomats during his sleepover in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, and what sensitive information he eventually conveyed to Beijing is still unknown. But the rumor that he revealed a plot by other princelings to get rid of Xi through a coup does not sound too crazy. If this is true, then Xi’s frenetic purge of other factions in his anti-corruption campaign makes sense as a desperate move to whip the disrespectful elite to submission through creating a culture of terror within the Party. Xi’s purges surely make new enemies and make most of the Party elite feel deeply anxious about their fortunes. It won’t be so surprising if some of those anxious elite conspire to depose Xi. Such internal coup against unpopular leaders is not alien to the CCP — it happened with the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976, and former party chairman Hua Guofeng a few years later. Second, the party’s internal rift is unfolding at the worst possible time, as far as the economy is concerned. Yes, a 7.4 percent annual growth rate is an enviable number to many other emerging economies. But with the soaring indebtedness of the Chinese economy and the ever aggravating unemployment problem, the Chinese economy needs higherspeed growth to stay above water. The debt hangover of the 2008-09 stimulus is worrying. China’s debt to GDP ratio jumped from 147 percent in 2008 to 282 percent now, and is still growing. It is at a dangerously high level compared to other emerging economies. The economic slowdown will lead to profit decline for companies and revenue shortfall for local governments , increasing their difficulty in servicing and repaying debts. A vicious cycle of defaults and further growth deceleration could turn a slowdown into something uglier.A vicious cycle of defaults and further growth deceleration could turn a slowdown into something uglier. It is possible that the CCP elite, no matter how much they dislike Xi and his anti-corruption campaign, will still prefer not to rock the boat. They are aware that they are nobody without the protection of the party-state, and their privileges will be under far greater threat in the wake of a regime collapse. It is also possible that in the years of pacification and domestication following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, China’s civil society and dissidents have become so timid and cornered that they are incapable of taking advantage of any cracks in the regime. Is Xi successfully increasing his grip of power through the anti-corruption campaign, or does his rule still suffer from inadequate legitimacy behind the mask of invincibility? Only time can tell. But besides the endgame of CCP rule, we should also ponder another possible scenario: the rise of a hysteric and suffocating
dictatorial regime which maintains its draconian control over a society gradually losing its dynamism. Perhaps we can call this hypothetical regime North Korea lite.
The economy is not what drives CCP legitimacy Panda 15 (Ankit Panda, foreign affairs analyst, writer, and editor with expertise in international relations, political economy, international security, and crisis diplomacy. He has been an editor at The Diplomat since 2013., Widely Cited by Wall Street Journal. “Where Does the CCP's Legitimacy Come From? (Hint: It's Not Economic Performance)” The Diplomat. June 18, 2015)\\mwang There’s a pernicious and persistent piece of conventional wisdom in conversations about China’s political stability that is often presented as a truism: the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy stems from its ability to deliver high economic growth ; if economic growth disappears, so will its legitimacy; this in turn will lead to the beginning of the end of the CCP. The a priori appeal is evident since the
reason stands the test of common sense. After all, assuming a broad definition of “legitimacy,” it would make sense that keeping citizens happy through high economic growth would prevent social unrest or calls for a new form of government. How do you keep citizens happy? Well, you can expand the economic pie, ensuring that everyone gets a larger slice—more per capita GDP leads to more per capita happiness leads to less revolution and upheaval. For CCP elites, mass upheaval over economic outcomes is best avoided by keeping China’s year-on-year growth rates as high as possible. New research challenges this conventional wisdom with evidence. A new Global Working Paper (PDF warning) from the Brookings Institution inverts the reasoning I outlined above. Measuring “legitimacy” is of course a tricky endeavor, so the paper instead measures well-being—roughly how happy citizens are—against China’s economic performance (the word “legitimacy” does not appear in the paper). The paper additionally looks at the prevalence of mental health disorders in China. The finding of interest, distilled in a Brookings blog post, is as follows: We find that the standard determinants of well-being are the same for China as they are for most countries around the world. At the same time, China stands out in that unhappiness and reported mental health problems are highest among the cohorts who either have or are positioned to benefit from the transition and related growth— a
clear progress paradox . These are urban residents, the more educated, those who work in the private sector, and those who report to have insufficient leisure time and rest. The paper’s finding has already drawn intelligent commentary from a few commentators (political scientist Jay Ulfelder and blogger T. Greer have posted important reactions). The finding that well-being, particularly among Chinese economic “elites,” is decoupled—and even inversely correlated—with China’s overall economic growth would suggest that the CCP’s survival might be independent of China’s overall economic performance . Thus, the CCP thrives not because it makes Chinese elites happy, but despite Chinese elites’ unhappiness. As Ulfelder summarizes: These survey results contradict the “performance legitimacy” story that many observers use to explain how the Chinese Communist Party has managed to avoid significant revolutionary threats since 1989 (see here, for example). In that story, Chinese citizens choose not to demand political liberalization because they are satisfied with the government’s economic performance. In effect, they accept material gains in lieu of political voice. The decline in overall well-being among elites does present a serious challenge to the conventional explanation of the CCP’s legitimacy . The authors of the Brookings report also highlight previous studies of well-being and life satisfaction in China that measured a large decline in happiness among “the lowest-income and least-educated segments of the population.” In previous studies, China’s “upper socioeconomic strata” exhibited a rise in happiness, somewhat confirming the conventional wisdom explanation. Additionally, the authors note numerous independent variables that affect happiness, including rural/urban status, internal migration status (urban households and migrant households report lower happiness levels than their rural, non-migrant counterparts). Where does the CCP’s legitimacy come from then? As Greer notes, maybe looking at the per capita distribution of wealth in China has been the wrong measure all along—it’s unnecessarily reductive and dismissive of the opinions of actual Chinese people. Instead, Chinese people would attribute the legitimacy of the CCP to specific policy initiatives (i.e., fighting corruption, delivering justice to wrong-doers within the country’s power apparatus) as well as more diffuse, nation-level factors (i.e., the CCP’s “role in helping China, as a country and a nation, become wealthy, powerful, and respected on the international stage”). The long-term survival of the CCP may be the most consequential question for China in the 21st century, both for external observers watching China’s rise and for internal stakeholders. It’s undoubtedly important thus to understand how Chinese citizens relate to their government and experience life as China continues to grow. Still, it’s best to update our beliefs on how the CCP sustains its political legitimacy when presented The often-repeated economic performance explanation of the CCP’s legitimacy is not only outmoded —it appears to have never really been based in reality. with new data.
--a2 censorship doesn’t solve Internet censorship solves – dissent is not tolerated and crackdowns are effective Toyama 13 – (Kentaro, W.K. Kellogg Chair Associate Professor at the University of Michigan School of Information, The Atlantic, “How Internet Censorship Actually Works in China”, http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how-internet-censorship-actually-works-in-china/280188/)//MP Two points stand out among their findings. First, China’s censorship infrastructure is incredibly efficient: Objectionable posts are removed with a near-perfect elimination rate and typically within 24 hours of their posting. The authors write, “This is a remarkable organizational accomplishment, requiring large scale military-like precision.” Second, King and his team found that Chinese censors focus on posts that refer to, instigate, or are otherwise linked to grassroots collective action such as protests, demonstrations, and even apolitical mass activities, and that the regime seems comparatively more comfortable with criticism of the government. For example, this passage was not censored: The Chinese Communist Party made a promise of democratic, constitutional government at the beginning of the war of resistance against Japan. But after 60 years that promise has yet to be honored. China today lacks integrity, and accountability should be traced to Mao. [...] intra-party democracy espoused today is just an excuse to perpetuate one-party rule. Meanwhile this sentence, which refers to a suicide bomber whose homes were demolished, was nixed: Even if we can verify what Qian Mingqi said on Weibo that the building demolition caused a great deal of personal damage, we should still condemn his extreme act of retribution....The government has continually put forth measures and laws to protect the interests of citizens in building demolition. This isn’t to say that the Communist Party is happy with criticism. Chinese people can still be punished for publishing dissent, especially if it gains traction: For example, a man in Shaanxi Province was recently detained for being retweeted 500 times on Sina Weibo. But to the extent that criticism is expressed in small ways, it is secondary to writing that might incite collective action. King suggests at least two reasons for this. First, allowing some criticism might mollify citizens who want to blow off some steam, thereby keeping them from expressing these feelings more violentl y. Second, this relative leniency is a useful way for the central government to learn about problems that require attention. King cites the political scientist Martin Dimitrov, who argues that “regimes collapse when its people stop bringing grievances to the state”—because they no longer see the state as legitimate. Calls to collective action, however, are regarded as dangerous and are not tolerated at all—even when they have little to do with politics.
--a2 censorship not key Chinese internet security key to state stability Swaine 13 (Micheal D. Swaine, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Chinese views on cybersecurity in Foreign relations.” Carnegie Endowment http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM42MS.pdf page 3-5 September 24, 2013)\\mwang To support their contention that the Internet poses a major threat to the sovereign authority of nation-states, non-authoritative Chinese sources frequently cite the disruptive impact on Middle Eastern governments of social networking websites such as Twitter, as well as various blogging websites. The supposedly negative impact of such activities in the aftermath of the Iranian presidential elections is often offered as a specific example.16 Such a viewpoint leads to a more state-centric orientation toward cybersecurity than is the case in Western democratic nations. As an article in People’s Daily states: “It is a crucial test for countries around the world to bring the use of internet into line with state administration, timely and effectively collect and analyze online diplomatic data as well as make diplomatic decisions with consideration to cyber opinions.”17 Another observer asserts that “[i]t has become a consensus worldwide that government should play the role of the Internet ‘administrator’ and set examples in Internet governance because it possesses the most management resources and management tools.”18 This viewpoint
reflects to a great extent the long-standing and strong Chinese concern with social disorder, along with the related need for a strong, supervisory state to uphold societal norms and preserve social harmony .19 It also undoubtedly reflects the acute sensitivity of the PRC regime to the potential threats posed by any “unregulated” activity. Both authoritative and nonauthoritative Chinese sources (and military sources in particular) thus identify cyberspace as a non-traditional yet critical national security interest. For example, one Academy of Military Science (AMS) researcher states: “The strategic significance of the Internet lies in the fact that it has become an effective tool that breaks national boundaries, communicates information worldwide, and influences international and domestic affairs.”20 While stating opposition to cyberattacks and highlighting the defense of sovereign “virtual territory,” many non-authoritative civilian and military Chinese sources acknowledge that China’s cyberinfrastructure and internet laws are vulnerable and weak compared to those of other countries, and that it is difficult to identify the boundaries that require protection.21 Moreover, non-authoritative sources repeatedly assert that China is highly vulnerable to cyberattacks because it relies primarily on developed countries—and especially the United States—for core network technologies.22 In response to largely Western criticisms that a state-centric approach to Internet administration will lead to efforts to curtail freedom of speech and other individual liberties, a non-authoritative Chinese observer argues that: The government management of the Internet mainly aims to monitor harmful information, crack down on cyber crimes, maintain order in the cyber world as well as fill the network gap, lift information use efficiency Swaine, China Leadership Monitor, no. 42 5 and bring more people the convenience of the Internet.23 At the same time, the same source, along with many other Chinese sources, authoritative and otherwise, also asserts that “freedom on the internet is . . . subject to laws and morality.”24 Although largely unobjectionable as a general standard for Internet behavior, for many Chinese, and especially for authoritative and quasi-authoritative observers, such a notion involves a more direct, activist, and ideological role for government than most Western observers would countenance. As one observer in the Liberation Army Daily (LAD) opined, “raising the ideological and moral standard of the citizens [is] a basic standard for achieving the unification of cyber freedom and cyber self-discipline.” 25 For these Chinese observers, the “ideological” dimension of cybersecurity usually refers to the defense and expansion of “socialist ideology and culture.” Both civilian and
to protect China’s sovereignty and the authority of the PRC government , the Internet in China must reflect socialist “cyber culture” and resist “ideological infiltration and political instigation.” 26 Authoritative military officials and observers assert that
Chinese sources do not present such a clear and detailed description of the ideological and regime-oriented dimensions of Internet supervision. For example, while declaring that China supports freedom of speech and the free exchange of information on the Internet, former Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi points out that “there are different social systems in the world,” and that Beijing needs to “do regulatory work according to law and according to what is in the best interest of China.”27 Although Yang did not give specifics, it is highly likely that such “regulatory work” includes the type of ideological defense and advocacy as presented in the non-authoritative sources above.
CPP’s internet security used to suppress protests Toyama 13 (Kentaro Toyama. the W.K. Kellogg Chair Associate Professor at the University of Michigan School of Information. He is the author of Geek Heresy: Rescuing Social Change from the Cult of Technology, “How Internet Censorship Actually Works in China.” The Atlantic http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how-internet-censorship-actually-works-inchina/280188/ October 2, 2013)\\mwang The first week of October brings the National Day holiday in China, marking the anniversary of Mao Zedong’s founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. It’s a day of government-organized celebrations with military parades, musical concerts, and fireworks. But even though it’s a major holiday in a country called the People’s Republic, there’s one thing that will almost certainly not happen in the country: big events organized by the people themselves. It’s no secret that the Chinese government dislikes mass protests. But a fascinating pair of studies led by political scientist Gary
King uses rigorously observed patterns of censorship on Chinese social media to show just how systematically the Communist Party works to avoid grassroots gatherings of any kind. King believes Internet censorship in China is the “most extensive effort to selectively censor human expression ever implemented .” The government’s Internet police force employs an estimated 50,000 people who collaborate with an additional 300,000 Communist Party members—and that’s not counting the employees that private firms must hire to review the content on their own sites. Over the phone, King told me that the effort is so large that “it’s like an elephant walking through a room.” Together with colleagues Jennifer Pan and Margaret Roberts, King was able to track and measure its footprints, gaining new insights into the Chinese Leviathan.
The Democracy Report In the first study, the team built a network of computers that closely watched 1,382 Chinese websites, tracking new posts about a variety of topics over periodic intervals to see if and when they were censored. 11 million posts covering 85 topic areas, ranging in political sensitivity from popular video games to the dissident artist Ai Weiwei, were chosen for investigation alongside online chatter resulting from realworld events. In the second study, King and his team went undercover. They created fake accounts on over 100 social media sites, submitted posts to see which ones were censored, and even set up their own social media site in China. Two points stand out among their findings. First,
infrastructure is incredibly efficient : Objectionable posts are removed with a near-perfect elimination rate and typically within 24 hours of their posting. The authors write, “This is a remarkable organizational accomplishment, requiring large scale military-like precision.” Second, King and his team found that Chinese censors focus on posts that refer to, instigate, or are otherwise linked to
collective action such as protests, demonstrations, and even apolitical mass activities , and that the regime seems comparatively more comfortable with criticism of the government. For example, this passage was not censored: The Chinese Communist Party made a promise of democratic, constitutional government at the beginning of the war of resistance against Japan. But after 60 years that promise has yet to be honored. China today lacks integrity, and accountability should be traced to Mao. [...] intra-party democracy espoused today is just an excuse to perpetuate one-party rule. Meanwhile this sentence, which refers to a suicide bomber whose homes were demolished, was nixed: Even if we can verify what Qian Mingqi said on Weibo that the building demolition caused a great deal of personal damage, we should still condemn his extreme act of retribution....The government has continually put forth measures and laws to protect the interests of citizens in building demolition. This isn’t to say that the Communist Party is happy with criticism. Chinese people can still be punished for publishing dissent, especially if it gains traction: For example, a man in Shaanxi Province was recently detained for being retweeted 500 times on Sina Weibo. But to the extent that criticism is expressed in small ways, it is secondary to writing that might incite collective action. King suggests at least two reasons for this. First, allowing some criticism might mollify citizens who want to blow off some steam, thereby keeping them from expressing these feelings more violently. Second, this relative leniency is a useful way for the central government to learn about problems that require attention. King cites the political scientist Martin Dimitrov, who argues that “regimes collapse when its people stop bringing grievances to the state”— because they no longer see the state as legitimate. Calls to collective action, however, are regarded as dangerous and are not tolerated at all—even when they have little to do with politics. In all, these studies provide further evidence of technology’s basic amorality: Rather than being a net positive or negative, it merely amplifies underlying human forces. Says King, “Political actors in any country use whatever means of communication they have to advance their goals. If technology allows them to do it faster, they’ll use technology.” “In some ways, it’s the same in America,” he continues. Large technology companies in the United States are required by law to monitor and censor illegal content such as child pornography, and, as recent revelations about NSA spying reveal, Washington has the ability to pressure businesses to get information it wants. But the nature of government control of the Internet between the two countries is still different. King gave a recent example: A few days ago, the singer/actor Justin Timberlake tweeted that the first 150 people to join him at a nightclub would get in free. Hundreds of people lined up within minutes. King says, “That could never happen in China.”
Protest decks CCP legitimacy-means violent revolt McGinnis 11 (Anne McGinnis, a student at the George Washington University. In May 2011 she will receive a degree in Political Science and Fine Arts, focusing on Comparative Politics in East Asia “Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Maintaining the Legitimacy of an Authoritarian State” http://students.washington.edu/nupsa/Docs/Volume5/McGinnis.pdf Pages 5-11 February 10, 2011.)\\mwang Legitimacy and the CPP The first criterion, conformity to rules, means that a regime must acquire and exercise its power in accordance with established rules, both formal and informal. Legitimacy stems from the Latin word Legitimus, meaning lawful, and thus law and rules are essential to both the institution and maintenance of power. More than any other criteria, a lack of conformity to the rules is toxic to a regime‘s stability and can lead to a state of illegitimacy that will destabilize a regime, regardless of how fully the other two criteria are met.10 Conformity to the rules as a requirement for legitimate government has an important place in historical China. Until the 1900s, China‘s dynastic government was highly centralized with no formal limits on the leader‘s powers. Rather, governments were constrained by a Confucian belief, called The Mandate of Heaven, that unless a ruler behaved by strict moral and ethical standards they would lose their divine right to rule and could be legally overthrown by the people. All officials were intellectual elites who spent decades studying the Confucian teachings on good governance and morality, leading to both a highly developed ethic of rule and an expectation on the behalf of the public that their officials would hold themselves to the highest standards of decorum.11 Although China has long since abandoned traditional dynastic rule, a solid belief that leaders should hold themselves to superior standards of ethical behavior continues to underpin Chinese Society. In recent years, this belief has played a major role in both the destruction of the legitimacy of CCP, as well as in its rebirth. In 1989, student protests swept Beijing into a fury of opposition towards the government, culminating in the June 4 Tiananmen Square massacre. Though the protestors were unhappy with many aspects of the CCP‘s rule, one of their major complaints centered on the rampant corruption that perforated the regime during the 1980s.12
The violent repression of the
protestors on June 4 created a crisis of legitimacy for the Chinese government. Once martial law halted active dissonance, the government rushed to reclaim legitimacy before the costs of maintaining power by force became overwhelming . One way in which the Chinese government sought to regain legitimacy was to return to the Confucian emphasis on good governance. Top Chinese officials began making frequent speeches condemning corruption and actively linking anticorruption measures to state legitimacy . It introduced the
Confucian slogan Rule of Virtue (De Zhi) into state propaganda and instituted numerous regulations and bureaucratic censorship mechanisms (about 1,200 laws, rules, and directives in total).13 The regime increased the number of corruption prosecutions to about 150,000 convictions each year,14 with the most egregious offenders receiving the death penalty. These trials were and continue to be highly publicized, all as part of the government‘s ―war on corruption.‖15 All of these changes are part of an extensive and ongoing campaign to convince the populous that the regime is truly making efforts to conform to the rules. Government‘s conformity to the rules, however, has no effect if the population does not believe those rules are legitimate to begin with. Thus, a normative justification of the rules in terms of shared beliefs (the second criterion), forms the heart of a regime‘s legitimacy. This criterion has two aspects: a base justification of the leaders‘ authority to rule, and a definition of good exercise of power. For a ruler and his actions to be considered legitimate, he must first claim
that his dominance is derived from what the population believes is a valid source of authority (god-given, hereditary tradition, democratic constitutionalism, popularity, performance, etc.). When the basis that the ruler uses as a justification for his/her authority does not match with the populations‘ beliefs, the population will withdraw its consent to be ruled. The CCP has historically justified its rule on the basis of performance, either ideological performance framed through a popular belief in communism, or on moral and economic performance as it does now.16 Unlike authority derived from a higher order, the CCP ties its right to rule directly to its ability to promote what the public sees as the common interest.
This foundation of authority is much shakier than authority derived from divine or hereditary roots. With authority based on performance, the regime must be able to show continuous evidence that its policies are in fact making progress towards the popularly defined common interest. A legitimacy deficit emerges if beliefs or circumstances defining the common interest change, depriving the rules of their basis of support, or rendering existing justifications implausible.17 The CCP achieved dominance in 1949 by portraying itself as the vanguard party in pursuit of the proletarian interest, a class-less society under communism. Mao‘s personal charisma and active ideological engagement of the masses in every village instilled a quasireligious belief in the pursuit of the communist paradise. Thus, the CCP‘s legitimacy as the ruling party rested on progress toward the ultimate goal of communism, legitimacy through ideological performance.18 When Mao died the CCP lost its greatest asset: a charismatic leader that could convince the population of Communism‘s imminent achievement. To save a crashing economy, Deng Xiaoping introduced trade reforms that exposed many urbanites to the luxuries of western capitalist life. Knowledge of the high quality of life outside China made it more difficult to justify the sacrifices citizens endured during the Cultural Revolution because of China‘s communist ideology.19 From Mao‘s death in 1976 until the Tiananmen Square Massacre on June 4, 1989, popular disillusion toward the CCP‘s claim of authority on the basis of ideology grew. With communist ideological performance discredited as a valid source of authority, the civically active began to stress moral and economic performance as important aspects of state legitimacy, two criteria that the CCP lacked.20 As
protests grew into a bloody confrontation between Beijing residents and the Chinese army, it became clear that unless the government changed its legitimizing values to better match the changing beliefs of the population, destabilization would soon ensue. To address this problem, after Tiananmen Square the CCP initiated a series of market-oriented reforms and redefined the national interest as the pursuit of economic dominance. This shift in the basis of authority instigated rapid growth that, within 15 years, turned China from a backward economy with high levels of severe poverty into the third largest economy in the world. The CCP launched numerous patriotic campaigns on university campuses and in metropolitan areas to convince the youth and urban populations to see the government as the vanguard of the newly defined national interest. It also opened party membership to private business owners to appeal to the increasingly powerful middle and upper classes. In 2001, the CCP radically redefined the basis of the government‘s source of authority. This new definition, called the ―three representatives,‖ states that in order to be accepted by the people, ―the CCP must always represent the development of China‘s advanced forces of production, the orientation of China‘s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese.‖21 The three representatives is an official endorsement of private business over the state-owned industries Mao emphasized. This demonstrates, above all, that the CCP decided that abandoning its ideology was better than abandoning its power. Despite the shift away from Maoist Communist ideology, the CCP remains loyal to the proletariat. To avoid losing the critical support of rural masses, the CCP introduced the ―Harmonious Society,‖ in 2005, a set of new social and economic policies aimed at creating ―societal balance and harmony‖ by improving the lives of the lower and middle classes. The ―Harmonious Society‖ includes policies such as an abolition of all agricultural taxes, farming subsidies, prohibitions on local governments selling peasant‘s land, and popular elections for village governments. In 2005 the CCP also announced an ambitious national health care service (for rural areas) and other welfare policies aimed at securing the allegiance of those whose lives do not improve with capitalism.22 Finally, the CCP has taken action to increase legitimization through demonstrable expression of consent (Beetham‘s third criterion). Expressed consent involves the regular active demonstration of consent on the part of the masses (through the swearing of allegiance, participation in consultations, attendance of ceremonies and campaigns, etc.). Actions of expressive consent introduce a moral component and a sense of normative commitment into the citizen‘s relationship with the state and confer legitimacy upon the government. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao relied on mass mobilization as an alternative to popular elections, and the cohesive nation-wide push towards communist goals during the Cultural Revolution conferred enormous legitimacy on his rule. In the 1990s, the CCP‘s campaigns to instill nationalism helped quell unrest on university campuses.23 In preparation for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the CCP launched a massive propaganda effort featuring the slogan ―I Participate, I Contribute, and I am Happy‖ to mobilize the public and emphasize social unity and cohesion.24 The greatest effects of expressed consent, however, are often seen in the negative expression of dissent. Withdrawal of consent through acts of public dissidence, as seen in June 1989, can be fatal to an authoritarian regime. The ―Harmonious Society‖ policy initiatives aimed at calming rural Chinese who protested, sometimes violently, because of the widening gap between rich and poor.25 The CCP maintains tight control on what information is publicized and the way in which is framed. Even
the Internet is monitored and restricted , as are text messages and other new media outlets. Media coverage of protests and other overt actions of dissent is heavily censored in order to prevent the dissenting ideas from spreading among the population. Overall, the CCP spends significant time and money restricting both the occurrence and visibility of public protes t, because in an authoritarian regime with no mechanism for the peaceful transition of power, mass de-legitimization is automatically followed by either violent repression or a revolution .26
China needs regulations on the internet for their own interest and ideological defense Swaine, expert in China and East Asian Security Studies, 9/24/13 (Micheal D. Swaine, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Chinese views on cybersecurity in Foreign relations.” Carnegie Endowment http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM42MS.pdf page 5) // RL Authoritative Chinese sources do not present such a clear and detailed description of the ideological and regime-oriented dimensions of Internet supervision. For example, while declaring that China supports freedom of speech and the free exchange of information on the Internet, former Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi points out that “there are different social systems in the world,” and that Beijing needs to “do regulatory work according to law and according to what is in the best interest of China.”27 Although Yang did not give specifics, it is highly likely that such “regulatory work” includes the type of ideological defense and advocacy as presented in the non-authoritative sources above.
--a2 backdoors not key Backdoors needed for China cybersecurity Kan 15 (Micheal Kan, covers IT, telecommunications, and the Internet in China for the IDG News Service, Beijing Correspondent. “China Defends Cybersecurity back door demands as Obama protests.” PC world, IGD News Service. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2892052/china-defends-cybersecurity-demands-amid-complaints-from-us.html March 3, 2015)\\mwang President Barack Obama isn’t happy with new rules from China that would require U.S. tech companies to abide by strict cybersecurity measures, but on Tuesday the country was quick to defend the proposed regulations. “All countries are paying attention to and taking measures to safeguard their own information security. This is beyond reproach,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying in a news briefing. She made the statement after Obama criticized a proposed anti-terror law that he said could stifle U.S. tech business in China. The legislation would require companies to hand over encryption keys to the country’s government, and create “back doors” into their systems to give the Chinese government surveillance access. “This is something that I’ve raised directly with President Xi,” Obama said in an interview with Reuters on Monday. “We have made it very clear to them that this is something they are going to have to change if they are to do business with the United States.” A fight over intellectual property U.S. trade groups are also against another set of proposed regulations that would require vendors selling to China’s telecommunication and banking sector to hand over sensitive intellectual property to the country’s government. Although China hasn’t approved the proposed regulations, the country has made cybersecurity a national priority over the past year. This came after leaks from U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden alleged that the U.S. had been secretly spying on Chinese companies and schools through cyber surveillance. On Tuesday, China signaled that there was a clear need to protect the country from cyber espionage. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua pointed to recent reports alleging that the U.S. and the U.K. had hacked into a SIM card maker for surveillance purposes as an example. “I would like to point out that China has consistently opposed using one’s superiority in information technology, or using IT products to support cyber surveillance, ” she said, adding that the anti-terror legislation relates to the country’s domestic affairs. China already imposes tough regulations on U.S. tech businesses through its strict online censorship that has blocked websites such as Facebook and Twitter. But last May, the country announced it was developing a new “cybersecurity vetting system” meant to weed out secret spying activities. Companies that failed to pass the vetting would be blocked from the market.
Internet censorship specifically targeted at protests Brown 14 (Andrew Brown, writes on religion. His most recent book, Fishing in Utopia, is a memoir about his life in Sweden. It won the 2009 Orwell prize. Writer for the guardian. “How the Chinese regime uses web censorship to strengthen the state” The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/10/chinese-regime-web-censorship-state-china September 10, 2014)\\mwang The Great Firewall of China is one of the wonders of the modern world. Hundreds of thousands of censors are employed to ensure that as little as possible is published on the internet that might inconvenience or threaten the government . The tendency among western
liberals and pro-democracy types is to suppose that this must make the state less efficient. But suppose the censorship is so fine-tuned that it actually strengthens the repressive apparatus by making it cleverer, rather than simply squelching all opposition? The classic argument has always been that, compared with democracies, totalitarian states have always been less efficient and prone to making much larger mistakes, because in a society where the truth is dangerous, even the rulers find themselves operating in a fog of lies. The Chinese government may have found a way around this. In a remarkable study published in Science, a group of researchers studied the Chinese censorship regime from the inside by setting up a social media website inside China, buying approved software, and asking the censorship authorities how they should operate it. As it drily reports: “The ‘interviews’ we conducted this way were unusually informative because the job of our sources was in fact to answer the questions posed.” As well as this site, they also posted in various ways on 100 Chinese social media sites (and the two largest have more than half a billion users each) to see which messages got through. The result, which confirms earlier results, is that you can say pretty much anything you like on Chinese media, providing that it does not lead to any kind of action. “Chinese people can write the most vitriolic blogposts about even the top Chinese leaders
if they write in support of, or [even] in opposition to an ongoing protest – or even about a rally in favour of a popular policy or leader – they will be censored. ” Even more subtly, the volume of protests is used to gauge
without fear of censorship, but
whether any given leader is sufficiently unpopular that his removal will make things go more smoothly. In this way the information signalling part of a market economy is co-opted to the service of an authoritarian state. It turns out that you can say what you like – and this includes all the kinds of hashtag activism. All you may not do is influence events away from the keyboard, or even refer to them. If there is a news story that
suggests there might be a role for protest in the physical world, all comments referring to it are removed, whichever side they take. This study ought to be the final nail in the coffin of techno-libertarianism. Over the past few months there have been plenty of stories to remind us how loathsome the internet can be to women or anyone else singled out for bullying. But even when it empowers nasty people, this is forgiven or at least defended on the grounds that it empowers good people too. The Chinese example shows that it empowers nasty regimes as well as nasty people, providing they are subtle and intelligent enough. It is also a blow at the idea of artificial intelligence and algorithmic censorship. If the internet is to capture information of use to the ruling party, it has to be operated by human censors. There are lists of keywords that will get a post blocked or at least reviewed, but these are very crude and easy to circumvent. There is an improbable precedent for all this, from another ruthless imperial power that was setting out to impose itself on the world: the England of Elizabeth I. She also had a vast apparatus of spies
and censors, although they were concerned with religious heresy rather than democracy. When she said that she “would not make windows into men’s souls” it seemed to be a great statement of tolerance, but it was in fact exactly the same as the Chinese policy: think what you like, providing you never dare act on it. This is future George Orwell never saw: a jackboot poised above a human face – and the face talks on and on about kitten pictures.
--a2 no modeling / spillover US backdoors in encryption spill-over to Chinese backdoors Mason, white house correspondent, quoting president Obama, 3/2/15 (Jeff Mason, lead white house correspondent for Obama’s 2012 campaign and posted in Washington since 2008, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/02/us-usa-obama-china-idUSKBN0LY2H520150302) // RL President Barack Obama on Monday sharply criticized China's plans for new rules on U.S. tech companies, urging Beijing to change the policy if it wants to do business with the United States and saying he had raised it with President Xi Jinping. In an interview with Reuters, Obama said he was concerned about Beijing's plans for a far-reaching counterterrorism law that would require technology firms to hand over encryption keys, the
passcodes that help protect data, and install security "backdoors" in their systems to give Chinese authorities surveillance access. "This is something that I’ve raised directly with President Xi," Obama said. "We have made it very clear to them that this is something they are going to have to change if they are to do business with the United States." The Chinese government sees the rules as crucial to protect state and business secrets. Western companies say they reinforce increasingly onerous terms of doing business in the world's second-largest economy and heighten mistrust over cybersecurity between Washington and Beijing. A Chinese parliamentary body read a second draft of the country's first anti-terrorism law last week and is expected to adopt the legislation in the coming weeks or months. The initial draft, published by the National People's Congress late last year, requires companies to also keep servers and user data within China, supply law enforcement authorities with communications records and censor terrorism-related Internet content. The laws "would essentially force all foreign companies, including U.S. companies, to turn over to the Chinese government mechanisms where they can snoop and keep track of all the users of those services," Obama said. "As you might imagine tech companies are not going to be willing to do that," he said. The scope of the rules reaches far beyond a recently adopted set of financial industry regulations that pushed Chinese banks to purchase from domestic technology vendors. The implications for Silicon Valley companies, ranging from Microsoft Corp (MSFT.O) toApple Inc (AAPL.O), have set the stage for yet another confrontation over cybersecurity and technology policy, a major irritant in U.S.-China relations. Obama said the rules could also backfire on China. "Those kinds of restrictive practices I think would ironically hurt the Chinese economy over the long term because I don’t think there is any U.S. or
European firm, any international firm, that could credibly get away with that wholesale turning over of data, personal data, over to a government," he said. A U.S. official told Reuters last week that the Obama administration has conveyed its concerns about the anti-terrorism draft law to China. REGULATORY PRESSURE Although the counterterrorism provisions would apply to both domestic and foreign technologies , officials in Washington and Western business lobbies argue the law, combined with the new banking rules and a slew of anti-trust investigations, amount to unfair regulatory pressure targeting foreign companies. To be sure, Western governments, including in the United States and Britain, have for years requested tech firms to disclose encryption methods, with varying degrees of success. Officials including FBI director James Comey and National Security Agency (NSA) director Mike Rogers publicly warned Internet companies including Apple and Google late last year against using encryption that law enforcement cannot break. Beijing has argued the need to quickly ratchet up its cybersecurity measures in the wake of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden's revelations of sophisticated U.S. spying techniques. China is drafting the anti-terrorism law at a time when Chinese leaders say the country faces a serious threat from religious extremists and separatists. Hundreds of people have been killed over the past two years in the far-western region of Xinjiang in unrest the government has blamed on Islamists who want to establish a separate state called East Turkestan.
Sustaining encryption backdoors spills over – hurts China Timm 15 - Co-founder and the executive director of the Freedom of the Press Foundation. He is a journalist, activist, and lawyer who writes a twice weekly column for The Guardian on privacy, free speech, and national security. He has contributed to The Atlantic, Al Jazeera, Foreign Policy, Harvard Law and Policy Review, PBS MediaShift, and Politico. J.D. from New York Law School. (“Building backdoors into encryption isn't only bad for China, Mr President”, Trevor Timm, The Guardian, March 4, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/04/backdoors-encryption-china-apple-google-nsa)//chiragjain Want to know why forcing tech companies to build backdoors into encryption is a terrible idea? Look
no further than President Obama’s stark criticism of China’s plan to do exactly that on Tuesday. If only he would tell the FBI and NSA the same thing. In a stunningly short-sighted move, the FBI - and more recently the NSA - have been pushing for a new US law that would force tech companies like Apple and Google to hand over the encryption keys or build backdoors into their products and tools so the government would always have access to our communications. It was only a matter of time before other
governments jumped on the bandwagon, and China wasted no time in demanding the same from tech companies a few weeks ago. As President Obama himself described to Reuters, China
has proposed an expansive new “anti-terrorism” bill that “would essentially force all foreign companies, including US companies, to turn over to the Chinese government mechanisms where they can snoop and keep track of all the users of those services.” Obama continued: “Those kinds of restrictive practices I think would ironically hurt the Chinese economy over the long term because I don’t think there is any US or European firm, any international firm, that could credibly get away with that wholesale turning over of data, personal data,
over to a government.” Bravo! Of course these are the exact arguments for why it would be a disaster for US government to force tech companies to do the same. (Somehow Obama left that part out.) As Yahoo’s top security executive Alex Stamos told NSA director Mike Rogers in a public confrontation last week, building backdoors into encryption is like “drilling a hole into a windshield.” Even if it’s technically possible to produce the flaw - and we, for some reason, trust the
US government never to abuse it - other
countries will inevitably demand access for themselves. Companies will no longer be in a position to say no, and even if they did, intelligence services would find the backdoor unilaterally - or just steal the keys outright. For an example on how this works, look no further than last week’s Snowden revelation that the UK’s intelligence service and the NSA stole the encryption keys for millions of Sim cards used by many of the world’s most popular cell phone providers. It’s happened many times before too. Security expert Bruce Schneier has documented with numerous examples, “Back-door access built for the good guys is routinely used by the bad guys.” Stamos repeatedly (and commendably) pushed the NSA director for an answer on what happens when China or Russia also demand backdoors from tech companies, but Rogers didn’t have an answer prepared at all. He just kept repeating “I think we can work through this”. As Stamos insinuated, maybe Rogers should ask his own staff why we actually can’t work through this, because virtually every technologist agrees backdoors
cannot be secure in practice. (If you want to further understand the details behind the encryption vs. backdoor debate and how what the NSA director is asking for is quite literally impossible, read this excellent piece by surveillance expert Julian Sanchez.) It’s downright bizarre that the US government has been warning of the grave cybersecurity risks the country faces while, at the very same time, arguing that we should pass a law that would weaken cybersecurity and put every single citizen at more risk of having their private information stolen by criminals, foreign governments, and our own. Forcing backdoors will also be disastrous for the US economy as it would be for China’s. US tech companies - which already have suffered billions of dollars of losses overseas because of consumer distrust over their relationships with the NSA - would lose all credibility with users around the world if the FBI and NSA succeed with their plan. The White House is supposedly coming out with an official policy on encryption sometime this month, according to the New York Times – but the President can save himself a lot of time and just apply his comments about China to the US government. If he knows backdoors in encryption are bad for cybersecurity, privacy, and the economy, why is there even a debate?
U.S. encryption backdoors spill over – Chinese regulations Mills 15 – Contributing Editor at Gawking Media, Freelance Journalist, Staff Writer at Future Publishing. McGill University – Bachelor’s Economics, Minchester College, King’s College School Wimbledon. (“The U.S. Doesn't Like It When China Wants To Build Encryption Backdoors”, Chris Mills, February 28, 2015, http://gizmodo.com/the-u-s-doesnt-like-it-when-china-wants-to-build-encry-1688651385)//chiragjain The NSA
and U.S. tech giants have come to blows over government backdoors in encryption products lately, with the government arguing that backdoors are vital to national security, and the likes of Yahoo claiming it will make encryption pointless. Well, it looks the party line on backdoors changes pretty sharpish when China is involved. As Reuters reports, China is considering a counterterrorism law that would require technology firms to surrender encryption keys and install backdoors for security services — something that's not exactly dissimilar to the NSA activities revealed by Edward Snowden. But in an impressive piece of hypocrisy, the US is throwing up a fit over the proposed Chinese law. Michael Froman, the US trade representative, claims that "the rules aren't about security — they are about protectionism and favoring Chinese companies...the administration is aggressively working to have China walk back from these troubling regulations." But it's difficult to ignore the fact that the U.S.
has undertaken nearly identical actions in the past — the PRISM program forces major tech companies to hand over access to their servers to the NSA , via a 'specially constructed backdoor', and in a well-publicized case, even forced secure email provider Lavabit to hand over encryption keys and SSL keys. The proposed Chinese
regulations would make things easier for the Chinese government — encryption keys would be handed over as a matter of form, rather than on request — but the end result is basically identical. Something about chickens coming home to roost would be appropriate about now. [Reuters]
--a2 won’t pass China encryption backdoors coming now Mozer 15 (Paul Mozer, Reporter at Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones Newswires Dongcheng District, Beijing, China, and for New York times “New rules in China The New York Times January 28, 2015)\\mwang HONG KONG — The Chinese government has adopted new regulations requiring companies that sell computer equipment to Chinese banks to turn over secret source code, submit to invasive audits and build so-called back doors into hardware and software, according to a copy of the rules obtained by foreign technology companies that do billions of dollars’ worth of business in China. The new rules, laid out in a 22-page document approved at the end of last year, are the first in a series of policies expected to be unveiled in the coming months that Beijing says are intended to strengthen cybersecurity in critical Chinese industries. As copies have spread in the past month, the
regulations have heightened concern among foreign companies that the authorities are trying to force them out of one of the largest and fastest-growing markets. In a letter sent Wednesday to a top-level Communist Party committee on cybersecurity, led by President Xi Jinping, foreign business groups objected to the new policies and complained that they amounted to protectionism. The Chinese prime minister, Li Keqiang, with Tamara Lundgren and Thomas Donohue from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce before a meeting last July in Beijing. The chamber is seeking urgent talks over new rules. Credit Pool photo by Ng Han Guan The groups, which include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, called for “urgent discussion and dialogue” about what they said was a “growing trend” toward policies that cite cybersecurity in requiring companies to use only technology products and services that are developed and controlled by Chinese companies. The letter is the latest salvo in an intensifying tit-for-tat between China and the United States over online security and technology policy. While
the United States has accused Chinese military personnel of hacking and stealing from American companies, China has pointed to recent disclosures of United States snooping in foreign countries as a reason to get rid of American technology as quickly as possible.
Will pass now, and will be effective Goldman 15 (Jeff Goldman, writer for esecurity planet, worked for Edgell’s communications magazine, Mobile Enterprise Magazine, Northwestern University, Bachelor or Science. “China to Require Backdoors in Foreign Hardware, Software. eSecurity Planet January 30, 2015)\\mwang The Chinese government recently implemented new rules requiring foreign companies that sell computer equipment to Chinese banks to disclose source code, submit to audits and build backdoors into both hardware and software, according to the New York Times. BBC News reports that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other groups have responded with a letter calling the rules intrusive and stating, "An overly broad, opaque, discriminatory approach to cyber security policy that restricts global Internet and ICT products and services would ultimately isolate Chinese ICT firms from the global marketplace and weaken cyber security, thereby harming China's economic growth and development and restricting customer choice." Tim Erlin, director of IT security and risk strategy at Tripwire, told eSecurity Planet by email that this latest move is just one part of a complex, far-reaching issue tied to economics, encryption and assurance. "While the likes of Microsoft and Google aren't willing to simply cede the Chinese market, there can be little doubt that a path that involves sharing source code ends with piracy and ultimately enhances China's ability to copy what they currently buy," he said. China would of course prefer not to rely on foreign vendors at all, Erlin said, but they don't have sufficient capabilities domestically at this point to do so -- and as a massive market, they do have leverage with leading vendors. "Market issues aside, there are national security implications to China having open access to
source code for software used by other governments, including the U.S.," he said. "China's offensive cyber capabilities would be greatly enhanced with the 'inside knowledge' afforded by such access." "It's unlikely that the U.S. would stand idly by while China developed an arsenal of zero days behind the guise of source code audits," Erlin added. Tripwire security analyst Ken Westin said by email that this kind of demand for backdoor access is ultimately a sign that many companies are doing a better job of securing customer data. "The problem is that this is all happening in public, and the bad guys are fully aware of where their communications can be intercepted and have already moved to more clandestine technologies and forms of communication," he said. "The end result of all of this is that legitimate uses of encryption, and other security protections, suffer and the backdoors only work to subvert security, making everyone less safe," Westin added. Back in 2012, security researchers came across several backdoors in routers made by Huawei that could provide the Chinese government with access to those routers. Huawei responded by denying that the backdoors were intentional and offering unrestricted access to its source code. In U.S. congressional hearings at the time, Huawei senior vice president Charles Ding said, "It would be immensely foolish for Huawei to risk involvement in national security or economic espionage," adding, "There are no backdoors in any of Huawei's equipment."
China is backing backdoors now Kan, Beijing Correspondent and IDG News Service, 3/3/15 (Michael Kan, a Beijing Correspondent and with IDG News Service who researches and covers IT, telecommunications, and the internet in China, PCWorld, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2892052/china-defends-cybersecurity-demands-amid-complaintsfrom-us.html) // RL
President Barack Obama isn’t happy with new rules from China that would require U.S. tech companies to abide by strict cybersecurity measures, but on Tuesday the country was quick to defend the proposed regulations. “All countries are paying attention to and taking measures to safeguard their own information security. This is beyond reproach,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying in a news briefing. She made the statement after Obama criticized a proposed anti-terror law that he said could stifle U.S. tech business in China. The legislation would require companies to hand over encryption keys to the country’s government, and create “back doors” into their systems to give the Chinese government surveillance access. “This is something that I’ve raised directly with President Xi,” Obama said in an interview with Reuters on Monday. “We have made it very clear to them that this is something they are going to have to change if they are to do business with the United States.” A fight over intellectual property U.S. trade groups are also against another set of proposed regulations that would require vendors selling to China’s telecommunication and banking sector to hand over sensitive intellectual property to the country’s government. Although China hasn’t approved the proposed regulations, the country has made cybersecurity a national priority over the past year. This came after leaks from U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden alleged that the U.S. had been secretly spying on Chinese companies and schools through cyber surveillance. On Tuesday, China signaled that there was a clear need to protect the country from cyber espionage. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua pointed to recent reports alleging that the U.S. and the U.K. had hacked into a SIM card maker for surveillance purposes as an example. “I would like to point out that China has consistently opposed using one’s superiority in information technology, or using IT products to support cyber surveillance,” she said, adding that the anti-terror legislation relates to the country’s domestic affairs. China already imposes tough regulations on U.S. tech businesses through its strict online censorship that has blocked websites such as Facebook and Twitter. But last May, the country announced it was developing a new “cybersecurity vetting system” meant to weed out secret spying activities. Companies that failed to pass the vetting would be blocked from the market.
China speaks – either give encryption keys or get out of the Chinese market Reuters, one of the largest international news providers, 3/4/15 (Reuters, one of the world’s largest international multimedia providers, reaching more than one billion people per day. Reuters has 2600 journalists in 200 locations around the globe who deliver unparalleled news coverage via professionals, http://fortune.com/2015/03/04/china-tells-u-s-tech-dont-panic-just-hand-over-the-encryption-keys/) // RL China’s proposed anti-terrorism law will not affect the legitimate interests of technology firms, a top Chinese spokeswoman said Wednesday after U.S. President Barack Obama warned of its impact and demanded amendments. China’s proposals, which would require tech firms to provide encryption keys and install backdoors granting law enforcement access for counterterrorism investigations, drew criticism from Obama, who told Reuters in an interview this week China would have to change the draft law if it were “to do business with the United States”. Fu Ying, China’s parliamentary spokeswoman, said many Western governments, including Washington, had made similar requests for encryption keys while Chinese companies operating in the U.S. have long been subject to intense security checks. China’s proposals were “in accordance with
the principles of China’s administrative law as well as international common practices, and won’t affect Internet firms’ reasonable interests,” Fu said. Fu made the remarks during a news conference carried live on state television a day before the start of the National People’s Congress, the largely rubber-stamp parliamentary session held every spring in Beijing. China’s increasingly restrictive cybersecurity policies enacted in the wake of Edward Snowden‘s disclosures of U.S. spying programs have become a source of considerable friction in bilateral relations. Also at issue has been a set of financial sector regulations that pushes China’s state-owned banks to buy technology from domestic vendors. Foreign business lobbies say the rules are unfairly sweeping names like Cisco Systems CSCO 1.39% and Microsoft Corp. MSFT -0.37% out of the world’s second-largest economy, while Chinese officials point to the treatment of Huawei and ZTE Corp, two Chinese telecoms equipment makers that have been effectively locked out of the U.S. market on cybersecurity grounds. The German ambassador to China, Michael Clauss, also expressed concern that the cybersecurity policy “could make market access for foreign companies in China much more difficult.” Fu said China hoped foreign companies would continue to “support, participate and continue to walk forward” with China’s reform efforts. The remarks were more measured than a commentary published by the official Xinhua news agency, which said Obama’s warning to China was evidence of “arrogance and hypocrisy”. “With transparent procedures, China’s anti-terrorism campaign will be different from what the United States has done: letting the
surveillance authorities run amok and turn counterterrorism into paranoid espionage and peeping on its civilians and allies,” Xinhua said. U.S. business lobbies have said the proposed regulation would render secure communications unfeasible in China and handing over such commercially sensitive information would seriously harm their credibility. The head of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Shanghai, Kenneth Jarrett, called for more discussions with the Chinese government. Fu, the parliamentary spokeswoman, said China would continue to amend the counterterrorism law but would not compromise its national security priorities. “We will definitely continue to listen to extensive concerns and all parties’ views, so we can make the law’s formulation more rigorous,” she said. “On the other hand, fundamentally speaking, (the law) will reflect our country’s counter-terrorism interests.”
China passing regulations for encryption backdoors in line with U.S.
BBC 2015 – British Broadcasting Corporation (“China and US clash over software backdoor proposals”, British Broadcasting Company, March 4, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31729305)//chiragjain
Beijing has rejected President Obama's criticism of its plan to make tech companies put backdoors in their software and share their encryption keys if they want to operate in China. On Monday, Mr Obama told the Reuters news agency he had
"made it very clear" China
had to change its policy if it wanted to do business with the US. But Beijing said it needed the powers to combat terrorism and tackle leaks. It also suggested the West was guilty of having double standards. "The legislation is China's domestic affair, and we hope the US side can take a right, sober and objective view towards it," said Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying. "On the
information-security issue, there was a [recent] media revelation that a certain country embedded spying software in the computer system of another country's Sim card maker, for surveillance activities. This is only one out of the recently disclosed cases. "All countries are paying close attention to this and taking measures to safeguard their own information security, an act that is beyond any reproach." The case she was referring to involved allegations that US cyber-spies had hacked a Dutch Sim card manufacturer in order to help decrypt their targets' communications. At another press conference, parliamentary spokeswoman Fu Ying drew attention to the fact that the US government had imposed restrictions on Chinese companies including Huawei and ZTE. And she suggested that Beijing's
proposals were in line with the same kind of access to internet correspondence sought by the US and British governments. "We will definitely continue to listen to extensive concerns and all the
parties' views, so we can make the law's formulation more rigorous," she added. The rules are part of a proposed counter-terrorism law set to be discussed by China's annual parliament session, the National People's Congress (NPC), which opens on Thursday. Backdoor graphic Experts warn that adding backdoors to software could make products vulnerable to hackers 'Paranoid espionage' President Obama's comments had followed the publication of a fresh draft of the proposed law, which was made public last week. It
"would essentially force all foreign companies, including US companies, to turn over to the Chinese government mechanisms where they can snoop and keep track of all the users of those services", the US leader said. "As you might imagine tech companies are not going to be willing to do that ," he added. Microsoft, Cisco, Oracle and IBM are among firms that would potentially be affected. While the comments by Chinese officials were measured, the government's press service, Xinhua, was more critical. It accused the US leader of arrogance and hypocrisy, noting that the FBI had criticised Apple and Google last year for building encryption into their smartphone operating systems, and again drew attention to allegations about the US National Security Agency's activities made public by the whistleblower Edward Snowden. "With
transparent procedures, China's anti-terrorism campaign will be different from what the United States has done: letting the surveillance authorities run amok and turn counter-terrorism into paranoid espionage and peeping on its civilians and allies," Xinhua wrote. "Contrary to the accusations of the United States, China's anti-terror law will put no unfair regulatory pressures on foreign companies, because the provisions will apply to both domestic and foreign firms." Insecure systems The Conservative party has indicated it wants to expand the UK's cyber-spies' surveillance powers it if wins the
May election. Microsoft sign in China US firms, including Microsoft, are hoping to boost profits by selling their services to China "Our manifesto will make clear that we will... use all the legal powers available to us to make sure that, where appropriate, the intelligence and security agencies have the maximum capability to intercept the communications of suspects while making sure that such intrusive techniques are properly overseen," Home Secretary Theresa May told Parliament in January. One expert said it should be no surprise that the West was finding it difficult to prevent China seeking greater cyber-surveillance powers of its own, but added there were good reasons to fear its proposals. "Either behind the scenes or increasingly openly, the US and UK are justifying similar behaviour for their own purposes, but are extremely concerned when China asks for its own capabilities," said Dr Joss Wright, from the Oxford Internet Institute. "But what we don't want to see is a world in which internet-based products and services are riddled with backdoors by every state that says it needs to act against terrorism.
"Backdoors are always a concern because they result in a system that is insecure by default, and which can be exploited. That makes everyone less safe." China is proposing strict protectionist anti-terrorism bill
Leyden 15 – Online Media – The Register, Public Relations and Journalism. (“Obama criticises China's mandatory backdoor tech import rules”, John Leyden, The Register –UK, March 5, 2015, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/03/05/obama_criticises_china_tech_rules_backdoor_terrorism/)//chiragjain As previously reported, proposed
new regulations from the Chinese government would require technology firms to create backdoors and provide source code to the Chinese government before technology sales within China would be authorised. China is also asking that tech companies adopt Chinese encryption algorithms and disclose elements of their intellectual property. The new requirements, laid out in a 22-page document approved late last year, are supposedly geared towards strengthening the cyber security of critical Chinese industries and guarding against terrorism. In an interview with Reuters, Obama said Beijing's farreaching counter-terrorism law would require technology firms to hand over encryption keys as well as installing "backdoors" into systems, thus granting Chinese authorities access in the process. "We have made it very clear that this is something they are going to have to change if they are to do business with the United States," Obama said. "This is something that I’ve raised directly with President Xi." The
proposed laws "would essentially force all foreign companies, including US companies, to turn over to the Chinese government mechanisms where they can snoop and keep track of all the users of those services," Obama added. "As you might imagine, tech companies are not going to be willing to do that," he said. Aside from user privacy concerns, Western business groups such as the US Chamber of Commerce have criticised China's policies as protectionist. The proposed rules extend the scope of recently adopted financial industry regulations that effectively encouraged Chinese banks to buy from domestic technology vendors. The Chinese government is pushing these anti-terrorism rules as vital in protecting state and business secrets. The disagreement marks another cyber security and technology policy difference between US and China, with relations not yet healed from ongoing complaints about Chinese cyber espionage and the Snowden revelations. The Snowden revelations have effectively prevented the US from taking the moral high ground on internet security and technology policy issues. For example, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying referred to the Gemalto hack in a press conference where she was asked about Obama's criticism of China proposed laws. The legislation
is China's domestic affair, and we hope the US side can take a right, sober and objective view towards it. On the
information security issue, there are media revelations that a certain country embedded spying software in the computer system of other country's SIM card maker for surveillance activities. This is only one out of the recently disclosed cases. All countries are paying close attention to this and taking measures to safeguard their own information security The Chinese
counter-terrorism provisions apply to both domestic and foreign technology suppliers. However, US officials argue that the proposed law should be viewed in the context of new banking rules and anti-trust investigations as a raft of measures that make it difficult for foreign technology suppliers to sell into the world's second biggest economy. Obama told Reuters: "Those
kinds of restrictive practices I think would ironically hurt the Chinese economy over the long term because I don’t think there is any US or European firm, any international firm, that could credibly get away with that wholesale turning over of data, personal data, over to a government." Privacy advocates point out that what China is requesting is akin to what the US demands of foreign telcos. Groups like the ACLU are, of course, fiercely opposed to government-mandated backdoors. The failed Clipper Chip key escrow scheme of the 90s even provides a well-known historical precedent. Such key-escrow schemes introduce a weakness that unintended parties (third party intel agencies, criminal hackers etc.) could exploit, technologies and privacy activists argue. ®
China is proposing protectionist policies Mozur 15 – Reporter at Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones Newswires and New York Times. (“New Rules in China Upset Western Tech Companies”, Paul Mozur, New York Times, January 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/technology/in-china-new-cybersecurity-rules-perturb-western-techcompanies.html?_r=0)//chiragjain HONG KONG — The Chinese
government has adopted new regulations requiring companies that sell computer equipment to Chinese banks to turn over secret source code, submit to invasive audits and build so-called back doors into hardware and software, according to a copy of the rules obtained by foreign technology companies that do billions of dollars’ worth of business in China. The new rules, laid out in a 22-page document approved at the end of last year, are the first in a series of policies expected to be unveiled in the coming months that Beijing says are intended to strengthen cybersecurity in critical Chinese industries. As copies have spread in the past month, the regulations have heightened concern among foreign companies that the authorities are trying to force them out of one of the largest and fastest-growing markets. In a letter sent Wednesday to a top-level Communist Party committee on cybersecurity, led by President Xi Jinping, foreign business groups objected to the new policies and complained that they amounted to protectionism. The groups, which include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, called for “urgent discussion and dialogue” about what they said was a “growing trend” toward policies that cite cybersecurity in requiring companies to use only technology products and services that are developed and controlled by Chinese companies. The letter is the latest
salvo in an intensifying tit-for-tat between China and the United States over online security and technology policy. While the United States has accused Chinese military personnel of hacking and stealing from American companies, China has pointed to recent disclosures of United States snooping in foreign countries as a reason to get rid of American technology as quickly as possible. Although it is unclear to what extent the new rules result from security concerns, and to what extent they are cover for building up the Chinese tech industry, the Chinese regulations go far beyond measures taken by most other countries, lending some credibility to industry claims that they are protectionist. Beijing also has long used the Internet to keep tabs on its citizens and ensure the Communist Party’s hold on power. Chinese
companies must also follow the new regulations, though they will find it easier since for most, their core customers are in China. China’s Internet filters have increasingly created a world with two Internets, a Chinese one and a global one. The new policies could further split the tech world, forcing hardware and software makers to sell either to China or the United States, or to create significantly different products for the two countries. While the Obama administration will almost certainly complain that the new rules are protectionist in nature, the Chinese will be able to make a case that they differ only in degree from Washington’s own requirements. The United States has made it virtually impossible for Huawei, a major Chinese maker of computer servers and cellphones, to sell its products in the United States, arguing that its equipment could have “back doors” for the Chinese government. The documents released by Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor, revealed a major effort by the agency to enter Huawei’s systems, both to figure out who controls the company and to create back doors that the United States could exploit. Recent calls by the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, James B. Comey, to assure that the United States has a key to decrypt information stored on iPhones and other devices will doubtless be used by the Chinese to argue that all governments need access to sensitive computer systems. For
multinationals, the Chinese market is simply too big to ignore. China is expected to spend $465 billion in 2015 on information and communications technology,
according to the research firm IDC, which says the expansion of China’s tech market will account for 43 percent of worldwide tech sector growth. Analysts said new Chinese policies like the bank rules and an antiterrorism law that is still in draft form would make doing business increasingly difficult in China for foreign hardware and software companies. “I think they’re obviously targeting foreign vendors that are operating in China,” said Matthew Cheung, a researcher at the analytics firm Gartner. “They are promoting the local technologies so that local providers who have the capabilities to provide systems to these enterprises can get more market share.” For instance, the bank rules say 75 percent of technology products used by Chinese institutions must be classified as “secure and controllable” by 2019. Though analysts say “secure and controllable” — a phrase that peppers several new Chinese technology policies — may be open to interpretation, a chart attached to the banking regulations shows the troubles foreign companies could have in winning that classification for their products. For most computing and networking equipment, the chart says, source code must be turned over to Chinese officials. But many
foreign companies would be unwilling to disclose code because of concerns about intellectual property, security and, in some cases, United States export law. The chart also calls for companies that want to sell to banks to set up research and development centers in China, obtain permits for workers servicing technology equipment and build “ports” to allow Chinese officials to manage and monitor data processed by their
hardware. The draft antiterrorism law pushes even further, calling for companies to store all data related to Chinese users on servers in China, create methods for monitoring content for terror threats and provide keys to encryption to public security authorities. “Banking is the first industry where we are aware a blackandwhite regulatory document was issued,” said Jeffrey Yao, a vice president for enterprise research at IDC. “In some other industries, if you talk to the customers, many of them get the pressure to adopt the local brands, but in most of the cases they are via internal communications from the top officers.”
Some of America’s largest tech companies could be hurt by the rules, including Apple, which is making a big push into the country. Apple has used new encryption methods in the iPhone 6 that are based on a complicated mathematical algorithm tied to a code unique to each phone. Apple says it has no access to the codes, but
under the proposed antiterrorism law, it would be required to provide a key so that the Chinese government could decrypt data stored on iPhones. A growing number of American technology executives have complained about new barriers to access to the Chinese market. John T. Chambers, the chief executive of the network equipment maker Cisco Systems, has raised the issue, as have executives at the chip maker Qualcomm. This week, Microsoft’s chief executive, Satya Nadella, said his company was working through “geopolitical issues” regarding China. In the letter, the Western companies voiced concerns about a broader “cybersecurity review regime” under which the Chinese government would assess the “security and controllability” of hardware, software and technology services sold in China, through audits and other checks. More details about the checks will be sent in February to the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, the committee led by the Chinese president, according to a recent report by Xinhua, the state-run news agency. The committee, which was created after the disclosures by Mr. Snowden, is leading the charge in consolidating and streamlining online security efforts in China. Analysts said it had most likely presided over or given tacit support to the new policies. The leadership committee is said to be also trying to wean the country from its reliance on foreign technology, a longstanding goal that has gained urgency after Mr. Snowden’s revelations. Zuo Xiaodong, vice president of the China Information Security Research Institute, said the new policies and the broader push for indigenous innovation were not intended to eliminate foreign companies from the market. “We’re under the yoke of others. If the others stop services, what do we do?” he said, noting that many Chinese companies and local governments had to scramble when Microsoft discontinued its support of Windows XP. “From a security perspective, that simply wasn’t acceptable. We’re breaking away from these types of circumstances." Even if Beijing wants it to, the banking
industry cannot immediately do away with all foreign hardware makers, Mr. Yao of IDC said. Banks purchase billions of dollars’ worth of hardware and software to manage transactions, and Chinese companies cannot yet produce some of the higher-end servers and mainframes they rely on. Mr. Yao said 90 percent of high-end servers and mainframes in China were still produced by multinationals. Still, Chinese companies are catching up at the lower end. “For all enterprise hardware, local brands represented 21.3 percent revenue share in 2010 in P.R.C. market and we expect in 2014 that number will reach 43.1 percent,” he said, using the abbreviation for the People’s Republic of China. “That’s a huge jump.”
China has backdoors to 80% of telecoms in the world Protalinski, Journalists and researcher of the tech industry, 7/14/12 (Emil Protalinski, freelance journalist who writes for multiple well-known publications on the tech industry quoting former senior security policy analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, http://www.zdnet.com/article/former-pentagon-analyst-china-hasbackdoors-to-80-of-telecoms/) // RL The Chinese government reportedly has "pervasive access" to some 80 percent of the world's communications, thanks to backdoors it has ordered to be installed in devices made by Huawei and ZTE Corporation. That's according to sources cited by Michael Maloof, a former senior security policy analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who now writes for WND: In 2000, Huawei was virtually unknown outside China, but by 2009 it had grown to be one of the largest, second only to Ericsson. As a consequence, sources say that any information traversing "any" Huawei equipped network isn't safe unless it has military encryption. One source warned, "even then, there is no doubt that the Chinese are working very hard to decipher anything encrypted that they intercept." Sources add that most corporate telecommunications networks use "pretty light encryption" on their virtual private networks, or VPNs. I found about Maloof's report via this week's edition of The CyberJungle podcast. Here's my rough transcription of what he says, at about 18 minutes and 30 seconds: The Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army are so much into cyberwarfare now that they have looked at not just Huawei but also ZTE Corporation as providing through the equipment that they install in about 145 countries around in the world, and in 45 of the top 50 telecom centers around the world, the potential for backdooring into data. Proprietary information could be not only spied upon but also could be altered and in some cases could be sabotaged. That's coming from technical experts who know Huawei, they know the company and they know the Chinese. Since that story came out I've done a subsequent one in which sources tell me that it's giving Chinese access to approximately 80 percent of the world telecoms and it's working on the other 20 percent now. Even if you manage to avoid Chinese products (good luck!), your firm still isn't safe. That's because the electronic intrusions are supposedly done remotely through the use of the commercial networks set up by Huawei and ZTE that they have established in numerous countries. For example, companies communicating using VPNs with partner companies in countries where Huawei and ZTE have installed network equipment are potentially compromised, according to Maloof's sources. Not only do Huawei and ZTE power telecom infrastructure all around the world, but they're still growing. The two firms are the main beneficiaries for vtelecommunication projects taking place in Malaysia with DiGi, Globe in the Philippines, Megafon in Russia, Etisalat in the United Arab Emirates, America Movil in a number of countries, Tele Norte in Brazil, and Reliance in India. These deals are being struck because the equipment produced by Huawei and ZTE Corporation is reportedly subsidized by the Chinese government. State-backed Chinese banks supply national telecommunications infrastructure and don't seek payment on any of the equipment for years, according to Maloof's sources. This makes them very attractive since Western companies cannot compete with their prices for domestic and international development projects.
DA – CRIME
--xt uniqueness Crime rates are low in the squo Simpson 14 – Covers Italian equities, focusing on Banks for Reuters. 30 year coverage specialist based in multiple cities and countries. (“ Violent U.S. crime drops again, reaches 1970s level: FBI”, Ian Simpson, Reuters, November 10, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/10/us-usa-crime-fbiidUSKCN0IU1UM20141110)//chiragjain
U.S. violent crimes including murders fell 4.4 percent in 2013 to their lowest number since the 1970s, continuing a decades-long downturn, the FBI said on Monday. The law enforcement agency's annual Crime in the United States report showed the country had an estimated 1.16 million violent crimes last year, the lowest number since 1.09 million were recorded in 1978. All types of violent crimes were lower, with murder and non-negligent manslaughter off 4.4 percent to 14,196, the lowest figure since 1968. Rape was down 6.3 percent and robbery fell 2.8 percent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation data showed. James Alan Fox, a criminologist at Northeastern University in Boston, said there was a variety of factors behind the decline in violent crime in recent decades, including the United States having the highest rate of imprisonment in the world. He said an aging population and improved police tactics also played a role, along with the increased use of security cameras and the pervasive use of phones to take videos. "It's hard for criminals to do anything without being caught on video," Fox said. The violent crime rate last year was 367.9 for each 100,000 in population, down 5.1 percent from 2012. The rate has fallen every year since at least 1994, the earliest year for readily accessible FBI data, and the 2013 figure was about half the 1994 rate. Property crimes fell 4.1 percent to an estimated 8.63 million last year, the 11th straight yearly decline. Losses from property crimes excluding arson were calculated at $16.6 billion, the FBI said. In an analysis, the non-profit Pew Charitable Trusts said the drop in crime coincided with a decline in the prison population, with the number of U.S. prisoners down 6 percent in 2013 from its peak in 2008. Thirty-two of the 50 states have seen a drop in crime rates as the rate of imprisonment fell, Pew said. California notched the largest drop in imprisonment rate over the five-year period, at 15 percent, and crime was down 11 percent.
The state has been under court order to reduce prison overcrowding, and voters last week approved an initiative that reduced sentences for some crimes.
--xt link Crime rates will escalate without encryption backdoors – criminals use encryption Tucker and Gillum 14 – Tucker: Covers Justice Department for Associated Press. Gillum: Reporter at the Associated Press. Been at USA TODAY. Columbia University – Graduate School of Journalism. BSc Santa Clara University – Political Science. (“FBI: cellphone encryption would impede criminal investigations”, Eric Tucker and Jack Gillum, Associated Press – Public Broadcast Station, October 16, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/fbicellphone-encryption-impede-criminal-investigations/)//chiragjain WASHINGTON — FBI
Director James Comey warned in stark terms Thursday against the push by technology companies to encrypt smartphone data and operating systems, arguing that murder cases could be stalled, suspects could walk free and justice could be thwarted by a locked phone or an encrypted hard drive. Privacy advocates and technology experts called the concerns exaggerated and little more than recycled arguments the government has raised against encryption since the early 1990s. Likening encrypted data to a safe that cannot be cracked or a closet door that won’t open, Comey said the move by tech companies to protect user communications in the name of privacy is certain to impede a wide range of criminal investigations. New legislation to allow law enforcement to intercept communications is needed at a time of advancing technology and new forms of communication, he said. “We have the legal authority to intercept and access communications from information pursuant to court order, but we often lack the technical ability to do so,” Comey said in a Brookings Institution speech. Comey cited particular cases in which he said access to cell phone data aided in a criminal investigation. But in a question-and-answer session after the speech, he said he could not cite particular instances in which someone was rescued from danger who wouldn’t have been had law enforcement been blocked from that information. “Logic tells me there are going to be cases like that,” Comey said. The speech, which echoes concerns he and others in law enforcement have previously made, comes soon after announcements by Apple and Google that their new operating systems will be encrypted, or protected with coding by default. Law enforcement officials could still intercept conversations but might not be able to ac cess call data, contacts, photos and email stored on the phone. While the companies’ actions are understandable, Comey said, “the place they are leading us is one we shouldn’t go to without careful thought and debate.” “Encryption
isn’t just a technical feature. It’s a marketing pitch. But it will have very serious consequences for law enforcement and national security agencies at every level, ” Comey said. The government’s concerns may also center in part on the use of Apple’s iMessage platform, which offers end-to-end encrypted text messages that supersede traditional SMS messages. That kind of encryption likely provides access to those messages on users’ iPhones, of which Apple has sold more than 240 million since 2013. He
acknowledged a rise in public mistrust of government in the year since former National Security Agency systems analyst revealed NSA secret intelligence collection programs. But he said the public was wrong to believe that law enforcement can access any and all communications with the flip of a switch. “It may be true in the movies or on TV. It is simply not the case in real life,” he said. Comey also said the FBI
was committed to a “front-door” approach, through court orders and
under strict oversight, to intercepting communications. Privacy advocates have long been concerned that that intercept would create an opening for hackers to exploit. The American Civil Liberties Union said federal law protects the right of companies to add encryption with no backdoors and that the companies should be credited for being “unwilling to weaken security for everyone.” “Whether you call it a ‘front door’ or a ‘back door,’ weakening the security of a system to enable law enforcement access also opens that door to foreign governments and criminals,” said Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist with the ACLU’s Speech, Privacy and Technology Project. Matthew Green, a cryptology professor at Johns Hopkins University, said the debate over personal encryption isn’t new: Back in the 1990s, when personal computers were a novelty, he said most consumers weren’t even aware of encryption. When
a form of email encryption called PGP was released, he said, there was a fear that criminals would use it. “These technologies exist” for consumers to protect their privacy, he said, “and it’s very hard to do anything about it.”
Encryption is used in many different types of transnational organized crime Denning, Wack, Kerins 00 – Denning: American Security Researcher, University of Michigan, Jay Wack – CEO of TecSec, Electronics Career at US
Army, Jim Kerins : Information Technology and Security specialist: (“Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Information Technology”, Dorothy Denning, Jay Wack, Jim Kerins, November 30-December 1, 2000, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, http://traccc.gmu.edu/pdfs/publications/transnational_crime_publications/variou01.pdf)//chiragjain The third panel focused on the critical interactions among transnational crime, corruption, and information technology. Encryption is often held out as
key advantage that criminals have over law enforcement . Law enforcement and the intelligence community are seeking to limit the strength of encryption keys, noting that encryption slows their investigation and could become unbreakable , thus allowing criminals and others to communication without fear of law enforcement listening in. Privacy advocates, on the other hand, support the need to ensure 14 private, legitimate communications and thus argue against limiting the strength of encryption technologies or providing law enforcement with keys that would allow them access to encrypted
panelists , therefore, examined the merits of these arguments in the context of transnational crime and corruption. The first speaker, Dr. Dorothy Denning, addressed how national organized criminals use encryption and associated technologies . Encryption, according Dr. Denning, is being used in many different contexts , various forms of communications, as well as in the storage of data. The evidence for the use and effects of encryption are currently anecdotal. New guidelines on reporting the results communications. The
from wiretaps and the instances where encryption frustrates those wiretaps offer some hope for better data in the future. Turning to criminal activities,
encryption is used in many different types of crimes, ranging from terrorism to narcotics trafficking and other forms of organized crime . One illustration involved a university professor who allegedly engaged in child pornography and the campus police could not do anything with the files on his computer due to strong encryption. Thus, how does one approach cases that involve encryption? Breaking the method of cryptography or getting the key solves many such cases . Since a password often protects the encryption key itself, investigations often focus on acquiring the password and, in turn, the key to decoding the encryption. In many cases, the cryptography is broken not because the algorithms weren’t of sufficient quality or the keys weren’t long enough, but due to the overall weakness of products and the ability of “ brute force” techniques to overcome the encryption— particularly true of most commercial software products until recently. But encryption is not the only issue in this context. Steganography, for example, is related to and yet different from encryption in that encryption is extremely recognizable—one can
With steganography, one can hide files not only in images, but also in sound files, video, text, or even in unused space in a disk . Thus, you can use encryption with steganography for added protection and deception. Another issue is anonymity, where all kinds of services and tools exist to provide anonymous communications. Anonymous remailers, for instance, work with electronic mail to shield the source of electronic communications. Finally, the use of hacker tools, especially those designed to cover the tracks of email and to intercept passwords of user accounts, is a
recognize an encrypted file when one sees it.
topic that one must consider when examining the use of encryption for illicit gains. The next speaker, Jay Wack, sought to provide the private sector’s point of view in the debate between privacy advocates and law enforcement in the encryption field. Focusing on the positive uses for encryption and the fact that privacy
law enforcement, which that would like to know what’s going on all the time . On the other side is the individual, who would like to be able to be anonymous all the time . While this
components require addressing, it is useful to liken the debate to a scale. On one side is
exaggerates the positions of the two sides to illustrate the contrast better, it is important to ask how does one craft an equitable and manageable solution that bridges the gap between the two sides? In order to answer that question, one needs to start with some of the issues that form the engines driving the debate. For one there is issue of privacy itself, or “the right to be left alone.” While simplistic, this statement merely reflects that
privacy is a huge problem to
contend with in this debate—especially in the US. The continued growth of the Internet and, especially, the connections between massive computerized information systems have led some industry captains to note that era of privacy is over . Hence, when we speak of ecommerce, one of the driving influences behind the collection of information, we must speak of security (i.e. the control and safety of information), confidentiality (i.e. the restriction of access to information), and privacy, or what an information collector does with the database after its creation. 15 Many dynamics of American Internet usage are changing affecting the debate. One is that the US no longer serves as the location for the preeminent groups of the Internet. Although the United States does have in excess of 100 million people using the Internet, this number does not represent the majority of Internet users any longer.
policies on encryption will impact the debate we are outlining today. The US has laws pushing and/or forcing us into the electronic environment. For example, Medicaid is a paper-based system that takes 65 days to process, and thus we would like to move to an electronic mechanism
Thus, we now must concern ourselves with the fact that we share the Internet with many nationalities simultaneously, and their
that takes moments to process. An inherent element of the paper process is its privacy, with it the fact that the paper is folded up, put in an envelope, moved through the mail system. It is confidential in that the envelope prevents others from seeing the contents; and many laws protect the privacy of people’s mail. The problem in moving to an electronic schema is that the medical community now has to provide a similar state of confidentiality as the envelope. Compounding this challenge is to ensure privacy in such a way that the information moves across the network and to make sure that a signature is applied in such a way that the person’s actual identity is confirmed. Thus, a conclusion drawn from the engines described above is that one has to have the means of protecting his or her
the encryption industry is trying to develop strong software packages that protect digital information while at the same time maintaining the speed that is drawing more information to the
information on the information highway. From the business side, then,
Internet. In order to accomplish this, one has to have a secure platform and a secure authentication. It starts with who am I? For example, Bruce Snyder recently wrote an article on the issue of the electronic signature law passed in January 2000. Citing defects in the system, one of the solutions he suggested to strengthen security systems was that they should have a hardware device, and
information should not be put on a drive in “soft” form that could
lead to theft and abuse. Another solution to ensure privacy is that smart cards be used to harmonize information systems and hardware. In the end, there are solutions available that accommodate the conflicting personal, organizational, and law enforcement interests with regard to encryption. Confidentiality should be under the control of the individual. The concluding speaker on the panel, Jim Kerins, sought to outline the effects, positive and negative, of regulating the production and use of encryption tools and began by reminding the audience of some of the more relevant statistics from earlier in the day. First, that the US is no longer the dominant population on the Internet in terms of access or e-commerce. Next, regardless of whether commerce is business-to-business, business to consumer or consumer to government, there is a virtual environment that provides anonymity in commercial dealings that fraudsters have taken full advantage of. Thus, analysis of fraud is very useful in understanding the need to understand the crucial elements of the privacy debate. Looking to the dark side of the Internet, it is clear that fraudsters like the Internet. First, it allows them to be more efficient and effective in what they do and creates difficulties for law enforcement in tracing transactions back to specific machines or addresses. Second, there has been a transposition of trust from the real world into the Internet world from consumers. In real terms, this amounts to companies losing 20 to 30 percent to fraud—numbers that can spell the end to companies given the tight margins in e-
commerce. One recent statistic noted that fraud on the Internet represents 1.4 billion USD, or 11 percent of all e-commerce transactions. Thus, the most important engine to e-commerce fraud is that when you move from the real world to the virtual world, you can assume another identity that suits the fraudsters.
--xt impact TOC hurts U.S. economy, competitiveness, and increases corruption in weak countries - $1 trillion every year NSC 11 – National Security Council. (“Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security”, National Security Council, July 25, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime)//chiragjain
Transnational organized crime (TOC) poses a significant and growing threat to national and international security, with dire implications for public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe. Not only are criminal networks expanding, but they also are diversifying their activities, resulting in the convergence of threats that were once distinct and today have explosive and destabilizing effects. This Strategy organizes the United States to combat TOC networks that pose a strategic
Penetration of State Institutions, Corruption, and Threats to Governance. Developing countries with weak rule of law can be particularly susceptible to TOC penetration. TOC penetration of states is deepening, leading to co-option in a few cases and further weakening of governance in many others. The apparent growing nexus in some states among TOC groups and elements of government—includ-ing intelligence services—and high-level business figures represents a significant threat to economic growth and democratic institutions. In countries with weak governance, there are corrupt officials who turn a blind eye to TOC activity. TOC networks insinuate themselves into the political process in a variety of ways. This is often accomplished through direct bribery (but also by having members run for office); setting up shadow economies; infiltrating financial and security sectors through coercion or corruption; and positioning themselves as alternate providers of governance, security, services, and livelihoods. As they expand, TOC networks may threaten stability and undermine free markets as they build alliances with political leaders, financial institutions, threat to Americans and to U.S. interests in key regions.
law enforcement, foreign intelligence, and security agen-cies. TOC penetration of governments is exacerbating corruption and undermining governance, rule of law, judicial systems, free press, democratic institution-building, and transparency. Further, events in Somalia have shown how criminal control of territory and piracy ransoms generate significant sums of illicit revenue and promote the spread of government instability. Threats
to the Economy, U.S. Competitiveness, and Strategic Markets. TOC threatens U.S. economic interests and can cause significant damage to the world financial system through its subversion, exploi-tation, and distortion of legitimate markets and economic activity. U.S. business leaders worry that U.S. firms are being put at a competitive disadvantage by TOC and corruption, particularly in emerging markets where many perceive that rule of law is less reliable. The World Bank estimates about $1 trillion is spent each year to bribe public officials, causing an array of economic distortions and damage to legitimate economic activity. The price of doing business in countries affected by TOC is also rising as companies budget for additional security costs, adversely impacting foreign direct investment in many parts of the world. TOC
activities can lead to disruption of the global supply chain, which in turn dimin-ishes economic competitiveness and impacts the ability of U.S. industry and transportation sectors to be resilient in the face of such disruption. Further, transnational criminal organizations, leveraging their relationships with state-owned entities, industries, or state-allied actors, could gain influence over key commodities markets such as gas, oil, aluminum, and precious metals, along with potential exploitation of the transportation sector. Crime-Terror-Insurgency
Nexus. Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to TOC to gener-ate funding and acquire logistical support to carry out their violent acts. The Department of Justice reports that 29 of the 63 organizations on its FY 2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most significant international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) threatening the United States, were associated with terrorist groups. Involvement in the drug trade by the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is critical to the ability of these groups to fund terrorist activity. We are concerned about Hizballah’s drug and criminal activities, as well as indications of links between al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb and the drug trade. Further, the terrorist organization al-Shabaab has engaged in criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom and extortion, and may derive limited fees from extortion or protection of pirates to generate funding for its operations. While the crime-terror nexus is still mostly opportunistic, this nexus
is critical nonetheless, especially if it were to involve
the successful criminal transfer of WMD material to terrorists or their penetration of human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.
TOC causes drug and human trafficking – corruption and demand NSC 11 – National Security Council. (“Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security”, National Security Council, July 25, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime)//chiragjain
Expansion of Drug Trafficking. Despite demonstrable counterdrug successes in recent years, particu-larly against the cocaine trade, illicit drugs remain a serious threat to the health, safety, security, and financial well-being of Americans. The demand for illicit drugs, both in the United States and abroad, fuels the power, impunity, and violence of criminal organizations around the globe. Mexican DTOs are escalating their violence to consolidate their market share within the Western Hemisphere, protect their operations in Mexico, and expand their reach into the United States. In West
Africa, Latin American cartels are exploiting local criminal organizations to move cocaine to Western Europe and the Middle East. There have also been instances of Afghan DTOs operating with those in West Africa to smuggle heroin to Europe and the United States. Many of the well-established organized criminal groups that had not been involved in drug trafficking—including those in Russia, China, Italy, and the Balkans—are now establishing ties to drug producers to develop their own distribution networks and markets. The expansion of drug trafficking is often accompanied by dramatic increases in local crime and corruption, as the United Nations has detected in regions such as West Africa and Central America. Human Smuggling. Human smuggling is the facilitation, transportation, attempted transportation, or
illegal entry of a person or persons across an international border, in violation of one or more countries’ laws, either clandestinely or through deception, whether with the use of fraudulent documents or through the evasion of legitimate border controls. It is a criminal commercial transaction between willing parties who go their separate ways once they have procured illegal entry into a country. The vast majority of people who are assisted in illegally entering the United States and other countries are smuggled, rather than trafficked. International human smuggling networks are linked to other trans-national crimes including drug trafficking and the corruption of government officials. They can move criminals, fugitives, terrorists, and trafficking victims, as well as economic migrants. They undermine the sovereignty of nations and often endanger the lives of those being smuggled. In its 2010 report The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that the smuggling of persons from Latin America to the United States generated approximately $6.6 billion annually in illicit proceeds for human smuggling networks. Trafficking in Persons. Trafficking in Persons (TIP), or human trafficking, refers
to activities involved when one person obtains or holds another person in compelled service, such as involuntary servitude, slavery, debt bondage, and forced labor. TIP specifically targets the trafficked person as an object of criminal exploitation—often for labor exploitation
or sexual exploitation purposes—and trafficking victims are frequently physically and emotionally abused. Although TIP is generally thought of as an international crime that involves the crossing of borders, TIP victims can also be trafficked within their own countries. Traffickers can move victims between locations within the same country and often sell them to other trafficking organizations. Weapons Trafficking. Criminal networks and illicit arms dealers also play important roles in the black markets from which terrorists and drug traffickers procure some of their weapons. As detailed in the 2010 UNODC report The Globalization of Crime, “The value of the documented global authorized trade in firearms has been estimated at approximately $1.58 billion in 2006, with unrecorded but licit transac-tions making up another $100 million or so. The most commonly cited estimate for the size of the illicit market is 10% 20% of the licit market.” According to the head of UNODC, these “illicit arms fuel the violence that undermines security, development and justice” worldwide. U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies have intercepted large numbers of weapons or related items being smuggled to China, Russia, Mexico, the Philippines, Somalia, Turkmenistan, and Yemen in the last year alone.
TOC causes cybercrime and IP theft – major economic loss NSC 11 – National Security Council. (“Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security”, National Security Council, July 25, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime)//chiragjain
Intellectual Property Theft. TOC networks are engaged in the theft of critical U.S. intellectual property, including through intrusions into corporate and proprietary computer networks. Theft of intellectual property ranges from movies, music, and video games to imitations of popular and trusted brand names, to proprietary designs of high-tech devices and manufacturing processes. This intellectual property theft causes significant business losses, erodes U.S. competitiveness in the world marketplace, and in many cases threatens public health and safety. Between FY 2003 and FY 2010, the yearly domestic value of customs seizures at U.S. port and mail facilities related to intellectual property right (IPR) violations leaped from $94 million to $188 million. Products originating in China accounted for 66% of these IPR seizures in FY 2010. Cybercrime. TOC networks are increasingly involved in cybercrime, which costs consumers billions of dollars annually, threatens sensitive corporate and government computer networks, and under-mines worldwide confidence in the international financial system. Through cybercrime, transnational criminal organizations pose a significant threat to financial and trust systems—banking, stock markets, ecurrency, and value and credit card services—on which the world economy depends. For example, some estimates indicate that online frauds
perpetrated by Central European cybercrime networks have defrauded U.S. citizens or entities of approximately $1 billion in a single year. According to the U.S. Secret Service, which investigates cybercrimes through its 31 Electronic Crimes Task Forces, financial crimes facilitated by anonymous online criminal fora result in billions of dollars in losses to the Nation’s financial infrastructure. The National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), functions as a domestic focal point for 18 federal departments or agencies to coordinate, integrate, and share information related to cyber threat investigations, as well as make the Internet safer by pursuing terrorists, spies, and criminals who seek to exploit U.S. systems. Pervasive criminal activity in cyberspace not only directly affects its victims, but can imperil citizens’ and businesses’ faith in these digital systems, which are critical to our society and economy. Computers and the Internet play a role in most transnational crimes today, either as the target or the weapon used in the crime. The use of the Internet, personal computers, and mobile devices all create a trail of digital evidence. Often the proper investigation of this evidence trail requires highly trained personnel. Crimes can occur more quickly, but investigations proceed more slowly due to the critical shortage of investigators with the knowledge and expertise to analyze ever increasing amounts of potential digital evidence. The Critical Role of Facilitators. Connecting these converging threats are “facilitators,” semi- legitimate players such as accountants, attorneys, notaries, bankers, and real estate brokers, who cross both the licit and illicit worlds and provide services to legitimate customers, criminals, and terrorists alike. The range of licit-illicit relationships is broad. At one end, criminals draw on the public reputations of licit actors to maintain facades of propriety for their operations. At the other end are “specialists” with skills or resources who have been completely subsumed into the criminal networks. For example, TOC networks rely on industry experts, both witting and unwitting, to facilitate corrupt transactions and to create the neces-sary infrastructure to pursue their illicit schemes, such as creating shell corporations, opening offshore bank accounts in the shell corporation’s name, and creating front businesses for their illegal activity and money laundering. Business owners or bankers are enlisted to launder money, and employees of legitimate companies are used to conceal smuggling operations. Human smugglers, human traffick-ers, arms traffickers, drug traffickers, terrorists, and other criminals depend on secure transportation networks and safe locations from which to stage smuggling activity or to store bulk cash or narcotics for transport. They also depend on fraudulently created or fraudulently obtained documents, such as passports and visas, to move themselves or their clients into the United States and illegally reside here. Transnational criminal networks such as organized crime groups, drug traffickers, and weapons dealers at times share convergence points—places, businesses, or people—to “launder” or convert their illicit profits into legitimate funds. Many of these disparate networks also appear to use the same casinos, financial intermediaries, and front companies to plan arms and narcotics deals because they view them as safe intermediaries for doing
business. Cash-intensive and high-volume businesses such as casinos are especially attractive, particularly those in jurisdictions that lack the political will and oversight to regulate casino operations or fail to perform due diligence on casino licensees. Illicit networks similarly abuse some of the same financial intermediaries and front companies in regions where government or law enforcement corruption is prevalent, with officials receiving either revenues from the criminal businesses or ownership stakes in the legitimate-appearing commercial entity.