Formal and Informal Politics in Macau Special Administrative Region

Formal and Informal Politics in Macao Special Administrative Region Elections Politics, marked by Haruhiro Fukui, can be categorized to formal and informal types. The former is defined as the political participation under the “rules and institutions” while the latter is a kind of “conventions and codes behaviour”, such as cronyism and gunxi network, in the political sphere.1 According to Fukui, formal politics is regarded as “the normal and orthodox form of politics,”2 which is governed by various political institutions. Institution is defined as “an internally coherent set of rules applicable to a large but specific and bounded functional area.” 3 Politics involves different kind of political institutions “such as constitutional, legislative, administrative, judicial, electoral, party, interest groups, and so on.”4 The interactions between the various political institutions, which are bounded and guided by rules and regulations, construct the formal pattern of politics. However, politics per se should not merely embrace formal type. Political interactions between institutions and social groups should not only be characterized by rules and regulations. It is a kind of human behaviour that personal interaction is indispensable and inevitable. The scope of political institutions is not large enough and sufficiently controlling all personal relations in political process. Political institutions should not be “the perimeter of an intrinsic entity” for politics.5 Instead, it is the boundary dividing formal and informal politics. The latter is beyond political institutions and involves personal interactions which, sometimes, are “condemned as arbitrary, unfair or corrupt.”6 In a simple sense, formal politics equates with the concept “rule of law” while the informal pattern is a reflection of “rule of man”.7 Distinguishing formal and informal politics, Lowell Dittmer develops a typology embracing the means and the ends in the political process. According to Dittmer, political means can be divided into legitimate and illegitimate kinds while the ends of political process will result in either public or private benefits/interests.8 Formal and informal politics aim to achieving legitimate public ends—power or policy—but they are through various means. The former consists of the use of legitimate means while the latter is through illegitimate one. Illegitimate means may imply “either expedients, Haruhiro Fukui, “Introduction,” in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee (eds), Informal Politics in East Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 2-3. 2 Ibid., p. 4. 3 Ibid., p. 2. 4 Ibid. 5 Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their critics,” American Political Science Review, vol. 85, no. 1, (March 1991), p. 90. 6 Fukui, “Introduction,” in Informal Politics in East Asia, p. 3. 7 Ibid. 8 Lowell Dittmer, “Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective,” in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee (eds), Informal Politics in East Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 292. 1

ranging from the merely shady to the downright nefarious, or relationships, which also vary from mere unofficial channels to criminal connections.”9 It should be noted that illegitimate means may not necessarily be illegal but immoral. Politics, which pursues for private and individual interests and which is, no matter, through legitimate or illegitimate means, is either partisanship or corruption (see Table 1). Table 1: A Typology for Formal and Informal Politics Ends Means Legitimate Illegitimate

Public

Private

Formal Politics Informal Politics

Partisanship Corruption, conspiracy

Source: Lowell Dittmer, “Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective,” in in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee (eds), Informal Politics in East Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 293. In the expense of the concept of formal and informal politics, this paper explores the dynamics between political elite and social groups in Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR). According to Herbert Yee, Macao’s political system is characterized as “social group politics” that social groups are the major entity for political participation.10 This paper aims at understanding the dynamics between social groups and government institutions through investigating the influence and role of social groups in the 2004 Chief Executive (CE) election and 2005 Legislative Assembly elections. Yet, it explores how social groups participate in politics formally and informally. It will argue that the formal and informal interactions between social groups and government institutions are beneficial to the development as well as the reinforcement of the domination of social groups for being the major entity for political participation in Macao polity. It will further argue that formal politics possesses more than window-dressing function to reveal the “normal and orthodox form of politics” while the informal type is the real process for decision making. However, the formal and informal dynamics generated irregularities triggering to money politics. Finally, it will conclude that the dynamics of formal and informal politics did not possess enhancement but corruption of the governability of Macao authorities as well as in forging a democratic MSAR regime. This paper will first discuss the relationships between formal and informal politics in a political system. Second, it will introduce the CE election system in the MSAR and discuss its encouragement to informal politics in election. Third, it will 9 10

Ibid. Herbert Yee, Macao in Transition, (New York: P, 2000), p. 159.

explore how political elite and social groups participated in the 2004 CE election formally and informally. Fourth, the informal politics in the 2005 Legislative Assembly elections would be discussed. Finally, this paper will explain the implication of informal politics on Macao’s democratization and the governability of the MSAR government. Types of Politics: Formal Vs Informal Informal politics holds complementary function to formal politics. As mentioned above, politics should not merely embrace the formal type that concerning the use of rules and regulations.11 Political disputes may not be simply resolved in the political institutions. Particularly, the scope and authority of formal rules and procedures are not sufficient to manage and resolve conflicts in the polity. Informal rules and practices may be essential for resolution so that they “fill in lacunae in the reach of formal politics.”12 At the same time, formal politics is a “temple” for the practice and development of informal politics.13 Formal institutions facilitate office, status and power for which political actors are seeking. Inside political institutions, elite can develop their personal networks as well factional groups through their political authority. These networks and groupings are operating informally and tend to influence the formal institutions for legitimate public policy.14 Although political institutions are governed by legitimate rules and regulations, the dynamics between political elite and their factional networks are being operated informally with less restriction from the institutions. Therefore, the former be regarded as temple which facilitate large space for informal political activities, but in which does not have partition guiding the latter performance. Nevertheless, formal and informal politics can be mutually exclusive.15 When formal leadership exerts heavy hand on the informal politics that extending the scope and authority of political institutions, the political activities of factional networks and social groups will be restricted and even suppressed.16 Contrary, informal political activity intensify when the formal institutions are disrupted.17 Fukui, “Introduction,” in Informal Politics in East Asia, p. 12. Ibid. 13 Lowell Dittmer, “Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective,” in Informal Politics in East Asia, p. 295. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., p. 296. 16 In his study of the North Korean informal politics, Samuel Kim indicates that Kim Il Sung exerted suppression on informal activity in the government as well in the party. Samuel S. Kim, “North Korean Informal Politics,” in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee (eds), Informal Politics in East Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 237-268. 17 Haruhiro Fukui and Shigeko N. Fukai argue that the factional politics in Japanese party system was intensified when the political institutions did not exert sufficient control on informal politics. See 11 12

Dittmer further argues that informal politics would develop into two different directions in response to the change of formal institutions: suppression and marketization.18 In the perspective of suppression, political leaders, who may be under strong public pressure, would impose new rules and regulations to restrict informal networks and groups. As a result, informal politics would be forced to “go underground and operate more discreetly.”19 Under marketization, informal politics transforms to money politics. Political supports to elite and policies would be in terms of money. Election System for MSAR Chief Executive According to the Basic Law of MSAR, the Chief Executive is selected by a 300-member Election Committee. 20 The election collage should consist of representatives from the following sectors: 1) 100 members from the industrial, commercial and financial sectors; 2) 80 members from cultural and educational sectors and other professions; 3) 80 members labour, social services, religious and other sectors; 4) 40 members from the Legislative Assembly, Macao deputies of National People’s Congress (NPC) and Macao representatives of National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (NCCPPCC). The Chief Executive Election Law, which was passed by the Legislative Assembly of MSAR, defines the four sectors in details and divided these sectors into various subsectors as well as their composition (see Table 2). Table 2: Composition of Election Committee for the Selection of Chief Executive Sectors

No. of seats

The First Sector: a) Industrial, commercial and financial

100

The Second Sector: a) Culture subsector b) Education subsector

18 20

c) Specialty subsector d) Sports subsector

30 12

Haruhiro Fukui and Shigeko N. Fukai, “The Informal Politics of Japanese Diet Elections: Cases and Interpretations,” in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee (eds), Informal Politics in East Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 23-41. 18 Lowell Dittmer, “Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective,” in Informal Politics in East Asia, p. 306. 19 Ibid. 20 The Basic Law of Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Annex I, which is available at the The Macao Handover Ceremony Coordination Office web site: “http://www.macau99.org.mo/e_doc_anexo.html”.

The Third Sector: a) Labour subsector b) Social services subsector c) Religion subsector* The Fourth Sector: a) Representative of Legislative Assembly b) Macao deputies to the National People’s Congress c) Representatives of Macao members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative

40 34 6

16 12 12

Conference Note: “*” The seats in religion subsector were distributed to four religions: a) Catholicism (two seats), b) Buddhism (two seats), 3) Christianity (1 seat); 4) Taoism (1 seat). Source: Chief Executive Election Law (Law no: 3/2004), Annex I, which is available at MSAR government web site: “http: Members of Election Committee should be elected by groups and organizations from the corresponding sectors.21 Social groups and organizations, which had been established for three years,22 had legal rights to nominate and vote for Election Committee members in sectors corresponding with the aim and nature of the organizations. Those who would like to be candidates for the Election Committee should be aged twenty-one year or above, and had to receive nomination with over twenty percent of organizations in the subsectors. As the First Sector was not divided into subsectors, candidates are required for getting the support from over twenty percent of groups and organizations in the whole sector. 23 Besides, The Chief Executive Election Law also states that in the religion subsector of the third sector, four religions—Catholicism, Buddhism, Christianity and Taoism—would select their own representatives into the Election Committee without following the rules and procedures imposed in other sectors. Similarly, the Legislative Assembly of MSAR 21

Ibid. Social groups and organizations have to register to the government when they are first established; otherwise they are illegal societies. The three-year period is counted from the date of their registration to the government. The Society Coordination Standing Committee of the Macao SAR government will classify the organizations to particular sectors. It has to note that the Society Coordination Standing Committee may not classify social groups and organizations to any sectors if it considers that they are not representing the interests of these sectors. 23 Chief Executive Election Law (Law no.: 3/2004), Article 20, which is available at MSAR government web site: “http 22

and the Macao members of the NCCPPCC would also select their representatives into the Election Committee themselves. 24 Elections would be held for Election Committee members if the number of candidates was greater than the number of representatives in particular sectors/subsectors. Disregarding to the size of organizations, each social groups would have eleven representatives voting for Election Committee members.25 No election would be conducted when the number of candidates was equal to the number of seats in the sectors/subsectors; and all candidates would autonomically be Election Committee members.26 The 300-member Election Committee is responsible for the selection of the Chief Executive of MSAR. Those who would like to be candidates for the Chief Executive election had to be received nomination by at least fifty Election Committee members.27 According to Chief Executive Election Law, a qualified candidate for Chief Executive election should be:28 1. Being a Chinese citizen and a permanent resident of the MSAR; 2. Not having any right of abode in any foreign country or, when having it, committing to renounce it before taking charge of his or her office; 3. Having reached at least years of age on the date of expiry of the term fo the nomination as a candidate; 4. Having ordinarily resided in Macao for a continuous period of not less than twenty years, completed on the date of expiry of the term for the nomination as a candidate; 5. Upholding the Basic Law and being loyal to the People’s Republic of China and to the Macao Special Administrative Region; 6. Being enrolled in the electoral register and not being in any situation of electoral incapability. Different to the selection of Election Committee, election had to be held no matter there would be only one candidate or more. If there was only one candidate, he/she had to receive the absolute majority support in the election. When there were two or more candidates, the victor had also to receive absolute majority vote. If there were no candidates grasping over fifty percent of vote, there would be another election in which the top two candidates receiving highest share of vote would run and those who

24

Ibid., Article 14. The executive committees of social groups and organizations were responsible for selecting these eleven representatives for the election of Election Committee members. See Ibid., Article 19. 26 Ibid., Article 60. 27 Ibid., Article 41. 28 Ibid., Article 35. 25

gained majority vote would win.29 The Chief Executive election system is favourable for the development of social groups politics. First, the Election Committee for the selection of Chief Executive is mainly composed by social groups and organizations which selected their representatives in it. Ordinary citizens could not participate in the election. Social groups and organizations become the sole channel for Macao citizens taking part in the election of their Chief Executive. These constitutional rights underpinned the domination of social groups for political participation in the MSAR. Second, there are very few restrictions for the formation of social groups and organizations in Macao. The most important criteria for a social organization are patriotism and the support to “One Country Two Systems”. Indeed, these statements have to be listed in organization’s charter. 30 The size as well as nature of organizations is not a big deal. The minimum size of a social organization is three.31 In other words, three citizens can register for an organization to the government. Besides, the nature of organization is arbitrary. The organizers could draft the aims and objectives themselves. At the same time, the government decided organizations to various sectors/subsectors. For example, the Journalist Association belonged to the culture subsector of the second sector in the 2004 Chief Executive election while it was in the labour subsector of the third second sector in the 2001 Legislative Assembly indirect election.32 It has to note that the division of social groups for the Election Committee basically followed the categorization of social organization in the 2001 Legislative Assembly indirect election in which social groups were arranged to different sectors/subsectors for selecting their representatives. Besides, the Macao government would like to shape the law in order to grant voting rights in the selection of Election Committee members to particular organizations. For instance, according to Voter Registration Law, the Macao Law Society did not have the rights participation in the Election Committee election at the beginning because it was mainly funded by the government. 33 Therefore, the government revised the Chief Executive Election Law that the provision would not be effective in the specialty subsector. Then the Law Society could join the Election Committee through that subsector. 29

Ibid., Article 60. One executive committee member of a labour organization told the author that patriotism and the support of “One Country Two System” is the basic principle of all social groups in Macao. Personal interview, 18 January 2005. 31 Personal interview with Leong Kam-chun, an Election Committee member, 22 January 2005. 32 One Journalist told the author. Personal interview, 4 February 2005. 33 According to the Voter Registration Law, any social group which funding was funded by the government over fifty percent was not illegal for participation in public elections including the Legislative Assembly and the Election Committee. As the Law Society was mainly funded by the Macao government, it should not have voting rights. See Journal Va Kio, 21 February 2004, p. 4. 30

Third, every groups and organizations have equal influence in the Election Committee election. As mentioned above, each social organization in particular sector/subsector had eleven votes, regardless of their sizes. Therefore, those, who would like to strengthen their influence in the Election Committee, could set up and sponsor more social groups so that they would have more votes in the election. According Leong Kam-chun, an Election Committee member from the specialty subsector of the third sector, three people could set up three organizations that they could share the chairpersonship of their organizations alternatively. Besides, someone could sponsor other to form organizations which would be under the former control.34 The Macao Daily also reported a case that one citizens set up over ten organizations at once time.35 In fact, the number of social groups has been increasing drastically since the handover of Macao. According to the Macao government, there was about three-time growth for the number of social groups, which had been established for over three and had electoral capability in the Legislative Assembly indirect election as well as the Election Committee for the Chief Executive, from 1999 to 2004 (see Table 3). According informal statistics, the total number of social groups (including those with and without electoral capability in elections) was about six hundreds in 1999 but rose to over two thousands and two hundreds in early 2004.36 At the end of 2004, there were over two thousands and six hundreds. Leong Kam-chun marked that more and more social organizations were formed for their participation in elections.37 Clearly, the electoral system in Macao encouraged the formation and development of social groups which are regarded as the main entity for the political participation. Table 3: Numbers of Social Groups having Electoral Capability Sectors

1999

2001

2002

2003

2004

Employer Labour Specialty Charity

30 50 28 79

53 54 44 148

54 54 45 155

54 54 45 159

69 57 53 164

Culture Education Sports

21 12 56

85 21 220

92 22 223

92 23 223

100 25 235

Total

276

625

645

650

703

Source: Overseas Chinese Daily, 20 April 2004, p. 4. 34 35 36 37

Personal interview with Leong Kam-chun, 22 January 2005. Macao Daily News, 7 April 2004, B1. Journal Va Kio, 21 February 2004, p. 4. Personal interview with Leong Kam-chun, 22 January 2005.

Elections for the Chief Executive and Election Committee The 2004 Chief Executive election could be marked as an uncontestable game. There was only one candidate Edmund Ho Hau-wah running the election. Ho received 296 out of 300 Election Committee members’ support and was re-elected.38 In fact, it widely perceived in the Macao society that Edmund Ho could also be re-elected even there would be universal suffrage election because of his prominent performance in his first term. The uncontestable Chief Executive election was also characterized by the consensus politics for the formation of Election Committee. It is noteworthy that none sectors/subsectors held elections for selecting representatives in the Election Committee, except the specialty subsetor of the third sector. Most social groups tended to avoid having elections for the Election Committee.39 There was consensus that groups and organizations cooperated in various sectors/subsectors and worked out the candidates lists in which the number of candidates was equal to the number of seats.40 It was because they would like to maintain the political harmony in Macao society and they could not control the election result.41 Electoral competition was perceived to harm the cooperation among social groups and bring political instability in the polity.42 Yet, those who received sufficient nomination from social groups would automatically be members of Election Committee. There was comment that the candidate lists made among groups was based on the seniority of political actors in the society. Elite who were relative young for their participation in grassroots activities had less possibility for being nominated and hence becoming Election Committee members. Nevertheless, competition still appeared informally. On the one hand, some actors would like to block the participation of senior elite who were not energetic enough in political and social activities. Iu Veng-ion, an Election Committee member from the labour subsector, indicated that some elder elite were perused to step down and leave more opportunity to younger generation who were enthusiastic to contribute to Macao society.43 The Macao Daily also reported that in order to facilitate more political room for younger generation, some traditional elite did not participate in the Election Committee election.44 On the other hand, competition between young elite seemed to be keen. They competed to pursue leaders from groups and organizations 38

In the Chief Executive election, four Election Committee members abstained. Personal interview with Iu Veng-ion, an Election Committee member from the labour subsector, 21 January 2005. 40 Personal interview with Iu Veng-ion, 21 January 2005. 41 Personal interview with Leong Kim-chun, 22 January 2005. 42 Macao Daily News, 3 May 2004, B3. 43 Personal interview with Iu Veng-ion, 21 January 2005. 44 Macao Daily News, 11 May 2004, A11. 39

and would like to grasp their nomination. Facing keen competition, some actors were suspect to use personal networks as well as money to grasp the support from social groups and organizations. 45 Besides, the political bargaining was inter-sector/subsector. Some would shift to other sectors/subsectors when they had less change for being nominated in particular constituencies. Iu Veng-ion, who was also a labour organization’s leader, noted that groups and organizations had difficulty for making consensus in the nomination process in order to accommodate the various demands from elite and organizations. 46 There was comment that the selection process for Election Committee member should have legitimacy because of the competition for nomination.47 Competition was also observed in the Specialty Subsector of the Third Sector. It was the only subsector in which election was held. In this subsector, there were forty-six social groups and organizations and would have thirty representatives in the Election Committee. Thirty-two candidates got their nomination with the support of sufficient number of organizations.48 At the beginning, similar with their counterparts in other subsectors, most groups and organizations in the specialty subsector tended to avoid to election that they would like to have thirty candidates who got nomination—a number which was equal to the amount of representatives of the subsector. However, some organizations, which were from the young generation, in the subsector were unhappy and dissatisfied to the traditional dominant groups nominating candidate whom was suspect for ethical problem in his/her professional.49 Leong Kim-chun, Election Committee member from the specialty subsector, indicated that election being held in this subsector clearly reflected the dissatisfaction of particular groups and organizations toward individual candidates as well as the traditional dominant groups.50 Therefore, some organizations did not compromise with the traditional groups and successfully nominated Fong Man-tat and Lai I Sun in the subsector.51 Although Fong and Lai were defeated finally in the election,52 their success for nomination marked the possibility as well as actualization for electoral competition in Chief Executive Election. 45

Telephone interview with Fong Man-tat, a candidate who ran election in the specialty subsector for the Election Committee, 26 January 2005. 46 Telephone interview with Iu Veng-ion, 21 January 2005. 47 Journal Va Kio, 19 April 2004, p. 3. 48 There were forty-six organizations in this subsector. Nominee, who received the support of over twenty percent of groups and organizations or the nomination with over ten organizations in the subsector, would gain the candidacy. Personal interview of Fong Man-tat, candidate in the specialty subsector, 26 January 2005. 49 Personal interview with Fong Man-tat, 12 December 2004. 50 Personal interview with Leong Kim-chun, 22 January 2005. 51 Personal interview with Fong Man-tat, 26 January 2005. 52 In that election, there were 393 out of 442 voters casting their ballot. Each of them could choose their candidates on their ballot. Fong and Lai only received 94 and 100 votes respectively. Journal Va Kio, 28 June 2004, p. 1.

The 2004 Chief Executive election demonstrated that the formal institutions of the MSAR were, as Fukui’s mark, the “temple” for the informal politics in the system. On the one hand, the formal institutions do not suppress informal politics. The election system mainly drew the procedures for selecting the Election Committee members as well as the Chief Executive but it did not intend to restrict the informal activities between groups and organizations. The latter enjoyed political space from the formal institutions for their negotiation. On the other hand, the formal politics encourages informal political behavour. As mentioned, the election system encouraged the formation of social groups and organizations. By inaugurating more social organizations, the social and political elite would grasp more political capital in the negotiation and bargain with other. Formal institutions nourish the informal type of politics in Macao. The informal politics of MSAR, to an extent, reflects the political culture of Macao emphasizing harmony and consensus. Dittmer indicated that informal politics is a subset of political culture.53 It reflects attitude and behaviour of political actors as well as citizens in the polity. In the 2004 MSAR Chief Executive election, the political actors tended to avoid open competition in formal election; instead they would like to have negotiation among groups and organizations for mutual interests. Open competition was regarded as undermining the political harmony in Macao society. Referencing the case of Hong Kong, many Macao people considered political competition only triggered to confrontation between groups, and hence, to political instability that would finally jeopardize the economy.54 The non-competitive election reflected the political culture of Macao—political harmony and consensus of politics.55 To an extent that the political negotiation among groups in the 2004 Chief Executive election might have the problem of morality—involving money politics and personal network, the general public showed their acceptance. For instance, although the media commented that the negotiation and bargains of social groups were not transparent and were held in a black box, they balanced the interest of groups and organizations. Furthermore, the negotiation did not necessarily protest the interest of traditional mainstream organizations as well as senior elite in the system. Some senior political actors were pursued not to participate in the Election Committee. The informal politics could generate competition in it and tended to avoid political Lowell Dittmer, “Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective,” in Informal Politics in East Asia, p. 292. 54 In a social gathering, the author met some political elite and Election Committee members. All of them comment on the development of Hong Kong that Hong Kong society was too political and this is good for the development of Hong Kong. In the case of Macao, political harmony was stressed and political actors would like to be cooperative forging the economic betterment of Macao. Personal conversation with some political elite and Election Committee members, 12 December 2004. 55 Journal Va Kio, 19 April 2004, p. 3. 53

monopoly by particular groups and elite. The result deemed to be acceptable to Macao society. The 2005 Legislative Assembly Indirect Elections Similar to its Hong Kong counterpart, the Macao Legislative Assembly elections consist of two elements, namely direct and indirect elections. In Macao, the direct and indirect elections appeared differently. The latter is similar to the selection of Election Committee for the Chief Executive that uncontested or non-competitive election was emphasized while the former possessed fierce competition. Nevertheless, the direct and indirect elections in the 2005 Legislative Assembly elections extensively involved informal politics that turned out to the marketization of informal politics and resulted in money politics in the elections. The 2005 Legislative Assembly indirect elections were uncontested. The indirect elections consisted of ten seats which were divided into four constituents: 1) Employees Interests Constituency, 2) Business Interests Constituency, 3) Professional Interests Constituency, 4) Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituency. Same as the selection of Election Committee for the Chief Executive, social organizations were the dominants in the indirect elections for the Legislative Assembly that they nominated candidates and their representatives voted on behalf of the organizations. The qualification for social organizations participating in the indirect elections was the same as the Election Committee for the Chief Executive that they had been established for three years and were classified to the corresponding constituencies by the Society Coordination Standing Committee.56 Individuals who would like to be candidates in particular constituencies had to receive twenty-five percent of social groups and organizations in the corresponding sectors. 57 Each organization would have eleven representatives voting in the corresponding constituencies. It is noted that elections was still be held even it was uncontested. The Proportional Representative (PR) system with new d’Hondt formula was adopted in Macao Legislative Assembly elections.58 Under this system, candidates formed their 56

In 2005, the Society Coordination Standing Committee received 41 applications (22 from the business sector, 12 from the labour and employee sector and 7 from the professional sector) from social groups and organization for registering as eligible voters in corresponding constituencies of the indirect elections. However, the Committee rejected 3, 2 and 4 applications from the business, employees and professional sectors respectively. See Macao Daily News, 31 May 2005, A04. 57 Legislative Assembly Electoral System and Electoral Law, Article 43 which is available at the MSAR government’s 2005 Legislative Assembly elections homepage: “http://www.el2005.gov.mo/cn/default.asp.” 58 For a discussion of Macao’s d’Hond’t formula, see Sonny Lo Shiu-hing, Political Development of Macau, (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996), pp.81-115 ; also see P.J. Taylor and R.J. Johnston, Geography of Elections, (Middle-sex: Pengium, 1979), p. 461; also see Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp.45-47.

own group and voters cast their ballots to particular candidate lists. Seats would be distributed to candidates in various lists with the new d’Hondt formula. Basically, the political setting in the indirect elections of the Legislative Assembly was similar to the selection of Election Committee for the Chief Executive that resulted in the domination of social organizations in the indirect elections. Table 4: Result of the 2005 Legislative Assembly Indirect Elections Constituents

Candidate Lists and Candidates

Number of Vote Received

Business Interests Constituency

Macao Business Interests Union: Susana Chou*

462

Kou Hoi-in* Cheang Chi-keong* Ho Teng-iat* Employees Interests Constituency

Employees Association Joint Candidates Commission: Lau Chok-va* Lee Chong-cheng*

419

Profession Interests Constituency

Macao Professional Interests Union: Chiu Sai-cheong* Leonel Alberto Alves*

247

Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituency

Excellent Cultural and Sports Union Association: Vitor Cheung Lup-kwan* Chan Chak-mo*

1,449

Note: “*” Candidate was elected Source: MSAR government 2005 Legislative Assembly election homepage which is available at “http://www.el2005.gov.mo/cn/default.asp.” Non-competitive indirect elections was the result for the consensus politics among social groups and organizations. Elite would like to set up and sponsor various organizations. In return, they would get their support in the indirect elections of the Legislative Assembly. Besides, potential candidates would coordinate among themselves to avoid competition that they sought for as much support from groups

and organizations so that other would not receive sufficient number of organizations’ nomination. According to Jeremy Lei Man-chow, who is a pro-democracy labour unionist and ran in the direct elections, the traditional pro-Beijing organizations dominated the Business Interests and Employees Interests Constituencies. 59 For instance, the pro-Beijing Macao Chamber of Commerce (MCC) was the dominant in the Business Interests Constituency that a lot of social organizations in the constituency affiliated with the MCC. The MCC made compromise with its affiliated organizations for the nomination of candidates in the Business Interests Constituency and avoid competition in election.60 Similarly, a lot of labour unions associated to the pro-Beijing labour union Federation of Trade Union (FTU). The FTU coordinated with other labour organizations for the nomination of candidates in the indirect election in the Employees Interests Constituency and rejected any competition in that constituent.61 Jeremy Lei indicated that the leaders of the FTU decided to nominate a young elite Lee Chong-cheng to replace Tong Chi-kin, who ran the indirect election in 2001 but did not participate in 2005.62 Although there were some senior unionists opposing the arrangement, the FTU leaders would like encourage younger generation to participate in Macao politics, and hence, nominating Lee disregarding opposition from some labour groups. It was noted that the MCC and FTU dominated in the Business Interests and Employees Interests Constituencies respectively. Individuals could not receive sufficient support for nomination in the sectors.63 In the Professional Interests, and Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituencies, there was informal competition before and during the nomination period and political elite avoid to have contested elections. Indicated by Jeremy Lei, there was no dominant organization in these constituents. 64 In order to receive sufficient number of organizations for their nominations, individuals would like to “buy” the support of organizations. For instance, David Chow Kam-fai, who is boss of some casinos, would like to run indirect elections in either Professional Interests or Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituencies at the very beginning.65 According to Jeremy Lei, Chow did not have sufficient money to “buy” support of organizations and he finally decided to run the direct election. It is noted that David Chow ran direct election in 2001 and received 10,016 votes. However, in 2005, he only grasped 6,081 votes although he was elected.66 59

Personal interview with Lei, 28 October 2005. Personal interview with Jeremy Lei, 28 October 2005. 61 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei, 28 October 2005. 62 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei, 23 September 2005. 63 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei, 28 October 2005. 64 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei, 28 October 2005. 65 Son Pou, 16 April 2005, p.4. 66 MSAR government 2005 Legislative Assembly elections homepage which is available at “http://www.el2005.gov.mo/cn/default.asp.” 60

In another case, Vitor Cheung Lup-kwan ran direct election in 2001 and participated in indirect election in 2005. Cheung’s migration to the indirect election was because he received support from the Macao Football Association (MFA).67 There were many sports organizations affiliating with the MFA. Individual who gained support from the MFA would have more chance for their victories in the Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituency. It is noted that there was dispute for the election of MFA Executive Committee in 2004. Originally, the pervious leaders were re-elected. However, some affiliated organizations opposed them and raised serious dispute inside the MFA. As a result, the government involved in the dispute and refused to provide facilitates as well as financial support to the MAC activities. 68 Finally, another Executive Committee was selected and Vitor Cheung became the Chairman of the MAC General Meeting. 69 Jeremy Lei marked that Cheung “subverted” the MFA and mobilize many affiliated organizations against the newly elected leadership so as to build up his power base in the MFA.70 There was commentary in newspaper questioning the change of stance of most affiliated organizations.71 At the beginning, there were 42 out of the 63 affiliated organizations supporting the pervious leaders. But after few months, 55 affiliated organizations voted to a new leadership.72 The media predicted that Vitor Cheung participated in the MFA symbolized his intention on the indirect election in 2005.73 Interesting, Fong Chi-keong, who ran indirect election in the Charity, Culture, Education and Sports Interests Constituency in 2001, participated in the direct election in 2005. Fong’s maneuver might reflect his failure seeking support in the constituency. Similar to the selection of Election Committee for the Chief Executive, the electoral system for the Legislative Assembly indirect elections facilitated space for the informal negotiation among groups and organizations. Political elite sought for endorsement from social organizations through financial and political support to the latter. As a result, there was non-competitive indirect elections that only single candidate list was in each constituency. The legislature’s indirect elections nourished the growth of social groups and consolidated their significance as a major entity of political participation in Macao. The 2005 Legislative Assembly Direct Elections Different to indirect elections, the 2005 direct election of Legislative Assembly 67

Personal interview with Jeremy Lei, 28 October 2005. Macao Daily News, 13 November 2004, B05. 69 Journal Va Kio, 20 November 2004, p.34. 70 Personal interview with Jeremy Lei, 28 October 2005. 71 Journal Va Kio, 21 November 2004, p.34. 72 It is noted that the election of leadership in the MFA was by affiliated organizations instead of individual members. See Ibid. 73 Son Pou, 16 April 2004, p.4. 68

marked with fierce competition. Electoral competition resulted in enormous mass participation. There were 220,653 eligible voters cast their ballots and the turnout rate was 58.39 percent.74 Nevertheless, electoral competition in direct elections heavily involved informal politics with participation of social groups and organizations that resulting in the marketization to money politics in electoral campaign. The fierce competition in direct election was mainly due to the participation of candidates from the gaming industry. In the 2001 direct election, there were only ten seats and twelve candidate lists in which only two candidate lists came from the gaming industry. Same as the indirect election, the direct election adopted the PR system with new d’Hond’t formula. In 2005, there were twelve seats from the direct election and eighteen candidate lists in which five of them from the gaming industry (see Table 5). Fierce competition in the 2005 direct election was not only from the increase of number of candidate lists but also from the strong mobilization of candidates from the gaming industry. For instance, during April and May 2005 when the government conducted voter registration campaign, some casinos mobilized their employees as well as their family members registered as voters. As a result, there were over six-hundreds thousands voters increase for eligible voters—38.1 percent increase of 2001 election.75 Furthermore, fierce competition could also be revealed from the tight campaign from the pro-Beijing United Force as well as the Development Union. They distributed leaflets that each of them might not gain two seats and would seek electorates’ support. In the past, both the United Force, which was from the Kaifong Association and Women Association of Macao, and the Development Union, which was from the FTU, enjoyed relatively strong support in elections. Each of them received two directly-elected seats. However, in 2005 elections, they were in difficult situation. In fact, Iong Weng-ian of United Force marginally defeated Chan Wai-chi from the pro-democracy New Democratic Macao Association while five candidates with gaming industry background were elected in the direct election. On the other hand, candidates from gaming industry had tense competition among themselves because they shared similar voter-base, especially those working in the casinos. Therefore, electoral competition was very hot. Table 5: Candidate Lists in the 2005 Legislative Assembly Direct Election Candidate List

74

Major Candidates

Background

Number of Vote Recieved

The figures were from the MSAR government 2005 Legislative Assembly elections homepage: “http://www.el2005.gov.mo/cn/default.asp.” 75 There were only 159,813 eligible voters in 2001 while, in 2005, the number of eligible voters increased 60,840 to 220,653. See MSAR government 2005 Legislative Assembly Election homepage which is available at “http://www.informac.gov.mo/re/estat/nestat1.htm.”

1. For Macao

Jose Luis Sales

Macanese

892

Marques 2. Macao New Power

Fong Man-tat

Pro-democracy

448

3. New Democratic Macao Association

Ng Kuok-cheong* Au Kam-sam* Chan Wai-chi

Pro-democracy

23,489

4. Democratic Activism Association

Lee Kin-yun

Pro-democracy

655

5. Macao New Youth

U Wai-ang

Pro-Beijing

6. Workers Union

Jeremy Lei Man-chow

Pro-democracy

7. United Force

Leong heng-teng* Iong Weng-ian*

Pro-Beijing

11,989

8. Love Macao General Union

Fong Chi-keong*

Gaming Industry

8,529

9. Macao Development Alliance

Angela Leong On-kei* Ambrose So

Gaming Industry

11,642

10. Association for Democracy and Social Well-being for Macao

Wong Cheong-nam

Pro-democracy

4,358

11. Macao Vision

Lok Tak-wah

Pro-Beijing

1,974

12. Union for the General Federation of Gaming Sector Workers

Joao Bosco Hong Lok Cheang

Gaming Industry

921

13. Macao Development Convergence

David Chow Kam-fai*

Gaming Industry

6,081

14. Development Union

Kwan Tsui-hang* Leong Iok-wa*

Pro-Beijing

16,596

15. Close to the People Paul Pun Chi-meng and Community Support Association

Pro-democracy

2,943

16. New Hope

Jose Maria Pereira Cautinho*

Civil Servant

9,974

17. Citizens Rights Association

Cheak Veng-sang

Independent

191

18. Macao United

Chan Meng-kam*

Gaming

3,058 457

Association

20,701

Citizens Association

Ung Choi-kun*

Industry

Note: “*” Candidate was elected Source: MSAR government 2005 Legislative Assembly election homepage which is available at “http://www.el2005.gov.mo/cn/default.asp.” Fierce competition in direct election encouraged informal electoral campaign. For formal activities, the Legislative Assembly Electoral System and Electoral Law defined various activities that candidates could conduct during the campaign period.76 For instance, the government administration fixed some areas where candidates could display their posters and conduct activities promoting themselves.77 Candidates were not allowed to have advertisement on mass media and they could not conduct any campaign activities on the election day.78 On the other hand, the Radio of Macao and Television of Macao conducted forums that inviting candidates expressing their platform as well as questioning among candidates themselves. Although the electoral law as well as guidelines by the government administration limited and restricted activities by candidates as well as social groups and organizations, some of them campaigned in an informal way that possessing problem of morality and violating the restrictions. First, candidates would like to use their personal networks with social organization to promote themselves. For instance, Fong Man-tat, a pro-democracy candidate, indicated that Leong Iok-wa campaigned in some social groups’ gatherings before the official period.79 Angela Leong On Kei, who is the fourth wife of Stanley Ho, campaigned in the gathering of Socidade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau (STDM) staff association. It is noted that the STDM was one of the major gamblers controlled by Stanley Ho. Chan Meng-kam had strong connection with the Fujian clan associations and mobilized the support of Fujianese in Macao. 80 On the election day, the Fujian clan associations provided free transportation to voters and organized them to vote.81 According to Jeremy Lei whose base was at the Northern District, Lok Tak-wah sought support of a church in the Northern District and promoted herself in the church activities. 82 Yet, some candidates were heavily dependent on the political mobilization by groups and

76

Legislative Assembly Electoral System and Electoral Law (Law no.: 3/2001), Article 75, defined the campaign period started from 15 days before the election day and ended on the day before the election day. The law is available at the MSAR government 2005 Legislative Assembly elections homepage: “http://www.el2005.gov.mo/cn/default.asp.” 77 Ibid., Article 80. 78 Ibid., Articles 81 and 158. 79 Personal interview with Fong, 7 September 2005. 80 A citizen working in the Socidade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau (STDM), which is one of the casino operator led by Stanley Ho, told the author, 6 September 2005. 81 The author’s observation on the election day, 25 September 2005. 82 Personal interview with Lei, 23 September 2005.

organizations. Second, schools also involved in the electoral campaign for candidates. According to electoral law, candidates could not display their poster in public area. Some schools hanged particular candidates’ posters in the campus. Although school campus might not regarded as public area, students and their parents as well as pedestrians could easily assign the political information. For instance, the Workers’ Children Secondary School hanged the poster of pro-Beijing Development Union in the campus.83 The Neighborhood School in the Northern District posted the notice by the pro-Beijing United Force. Candidates also mobilized students to campaign for them. Some students from the Hou Kong Middle School complained in discussion groups on the internet that Chan Hang, who was a candidate of the pro-Beijing Macao New Youth and a teacher of the Hou Middle School, forced them to work for the candidate list on the election day.84 Responding the complaints, Chan Hang posted her explanation on discussion groups that she only encouraged students to participate in the elections as a mean of civic education. 85 These implied that candidates, especially from the pro-Beijing forces, would like to mobilize their support through their network with schools in Macao. Third, some business groups campaigned for candidates, especially to those from the gaming industry. Similar to some schools, some shops posted the posters of particulars candidates so that their clients as well as pedestrians could watch the materials easily. For example, some supermarkets hanged the pro-Beijing Development Union’s posters while some property agencies displayed posters of Macao United Citizen Association, led by Chan Meng-kam from the gaming industry. Besides, the STDM group showed its strong support to the Macao Development Alliance led by Angela Leong On-kei. It was noted that the ballot number of Macao Development Alliance was number “9” and sunflower was the campaign logo of the Alliance. On the one hand, most shops affiliated with the STDM changed their decoration with the use of sunflowers. For example, the New Yaohan Department Store as well as the lobby of Hotel Lisboa were decorated with full of sunflowers during the election period.86 The fence of Macao Jockey Club was covered by banner full of sunflower (few hundreds meters length). These were signals reminding voters 83

Observation of author on 23 September 2005. The complaints were circulated in the pro-democracy New Macao Association’s discussion board which is available at: “http://newmacau.org/chatwin/guest.php”, the Macao Forum at the Macao Internet Community which is available at “http://www.qoos.com/bbs/forumdisplay.php?fid=9”, and the Macao Forum at the Cyber CTM website which is available at “http://www.cyberctm.com/eforum_new/forumdisplay.php?f=3”. The author accessed these websites on 21 September 2005. 85 Chan’s reply was posted on the Macao Forum at the Macao internet Community which is available at “http://www.qoos.com/bbs/forumdisplay.php?fid=9”. The author accessed the webpage on 21 September 2005. 86 The observation of author on 23 September 2005. 84

in a subtle way. Besides, the STDM group carried out “Number 9” promotion campaign. For instance, the Mario Cake Shop provided a discount for a pound of cake with only MOP$90. The New Yaohan Department Store had the September Lucky Draw promotion from 18 to 26 September 2005. It is noted that the election day was on 25 September 2005. The campaign emphasized that there would be 999 prizes. There were two first prizes with MOP$99,999 cash dollar, 19 second prizes with MOP$9,999 cash dollar, 189 third prizes with MOP$999 cash dollar, and 789 special prices with MOP$99 consumption coupon in the Department Store. The Seng Heng Bank offered special interests rate of 3.6 a year to employees from gaming industry and medical professional for opening fix deposit account.87 Interestingly, all posters and promotion leaflets by these companies, which have association with the STDM and Stanley Ho, highlighted the number “9” and used sunflowers in the background design. It was generally perceived that they were campaigning for Angela Leong. Ambrose So, director of Seng Heng Bank and candidate of the Macao Development Alliance, marked “Many enterprises have come up with methods to help support our cause. They are just marketing themselves. If they want to support us, there is nothing we can do.” 88 Although the electoral law prohibited campaign by commercial groups,89 the STDM group’s maneuver took advantage in the grey area of the law and campaigned for Angela Leong in a subtle way. On the election day, the STDM organized its employees, grouping them together and transported them to polling station. Interesting, it rented over hundred taxis for the transportation.90 Similar to the Macao Development Alliance, the Macao United Citizens Association, led by Chan Meng-kam, received supported from the Golden Dragon group. Chan is the boss of the Golden Dragon group. The Golden Dragon Electric Appliance campaigned for Chan by displaying the Association’s poster in the shops.91 Besides, workers wore the campaign T-shirt of the Association in the shops. On the election day, some of Golden Dragon Electric Appliance shops were closed and became a working station for the Association mobilizing and organizing voters to polling stations. Although electoral campaign was forbidden on the election day, some groups and organizations campaign for candidates, like the Macao Development 87

South China Morning Post, 25 September 2005, EDT5. South China Morning Post, 25 September 2005, EDT5. 89 Legislative Assembly Electoral System and Electoral Law (Law no.: 3/2001), Article 81, the law is available at the MSAR government 2005 Legislative Assembly elections homepage: “http://www.el2005.gov.mo/cn/default.asp.” 90 On the election day, the author observed that there were a lot of taxis waiting out the Macao Tower which was one of the stations of the Macao Development Alliance. However, these taxis did not serve public and they were organized by some workers. Three taxi divers told the author separately that the STDM paid MOP$1,000 to rent a taxi on the election day. All of them indicated that over hundred taxis were rented. Personal chat with the taxi drivers, 25 September 2005. 91 Observation by the author, 23 September 2005. 88

Alliance and the Macao United Citizens Association, and mobilized voters in an explicative way. Besides, the Golden Dragon Hotel became a station of the Macao United Citizens Association for the mobilization of electorates on the election day. Obviously, some commercial groups heavily involved in the 2005 elections that they campaigned for particular candidate lists with the expense of their resources. Such expense might not be counted in candidate’s electoral expenditure. Fourth, the media might have their intention on supporting particular candidates. Although the Election Commission, which was responsible for the electoral administration, issued guideline to media for fair treatment in reporting candidates’ activities, some newspapers seemed to show their favour to some candidates. For example, the Macao Daily heavily reported the activities by the FTU, the Kaifong Association and the Macao Women Association. It is noted that major candidates of Development Union were from the FTU while candidates of United Force were mainly from the Kaifong Association and the Women Association of Macao. Some of their candidates participated in the activities by the FTU, the Kaifong Association and the Women Association of Macao during the campaign period. The Macao Daily News reported these activities with coverage including these candidates. Although the Macao Daily News tended to balance the coverage of campaign activities of the eighteen candidate lists, it selectively reported candidates’ “non-campaign” activities in various social groups and organizations. In fact, there was complaint in the Macao Radio that the Macao Daily News was biased to the traditional pro-Beijing candidates.92 Besides, the Journal Do Cidadao seemed to have more coverage on Angela Leong’s activities. For example, when the campaign period started on 10 September 2005, the Journal Do Cidadao heavily reported the Macao Development Alliance’s activities and focused on Angela Leong.93 Due to the fierce competition, the informal campaign by candidates was marketized to money politics. First, during the voter registration period in April and May 2005, some candidates paid citizens for their registration as new voters and kept their voter identity card. They would return their cards to these new voters on the election. It is note that electorates had to present their voter identity card in the polling station before collecting the ballots. The collection of voter identity cards could help candidates recording their support and avoid other candidates seeking support from them. However, it was illegal for any individual keeping others’ voter identity cards. The Commission Against Corruption (CCAC) investigated some agents working for candidates that they were suspected to pay citizens for their voter registration and kept their voter identity cards. On 13 September, one audience made the complaint in the Radio of Macao’s phone-in program Macao Forum. 93 See Journal Do Cidadao, 10 September 2005. 92

Second, candidates tended to mobilize voters by providing free meals and gifts. During the campaign period, different social groups and organizations held gatherings for their members that free meals and gifts were provided to participants. At the same time, some candidates would attend these activities and sought for electoral support.94 There was report that Stanley Ho, who controlled the STDM group and husband of Angela Leong, sponsored thousands of free meals campaigning for Leong in the 2005 elections. 95 For example, some organizations distributed moon cakes to their members, such as the STDM staff association, as the Middle Autumn Festival was in the campaign period,.96 Besides, some candidates as well as organizations provided free meal to voters on election day that they could enjoy their food before or after casting their ballots. Some restaurants were reserved by some candidates for serving their supporters on the election day. 97 Furthermore, one citizen told that some restaurants would not charge their clients, and indicated, “the waiter said that the bill had been paid and asked them to go voting.”98 This implied that some sponsored restaurants with providing free meals for electoral mobilization. Third, candidates from gaming industry would like to reward their employees working in casinos with extra payment, bonus as well as salary increase if they would be elected. For instance, the day before the election, Stanley Ho, the Chairman of STDM, openly remarked that Angela Leong reminded him several time to give extra bonus to STDM employees and he would do that at the year end.99 Besides, there was report that STDM employees would have extra pay for their participation in the election and vote to Angela Leong.100 Besides, there was rumor that if David Chow Kam-fai, a casino boss, was elected, his employees would have extra year-end bonus.101 Fourth, vote buying was obvious in the 2005 direct election. There were a lot of rumors in the election market for the price of each vote.102 The CCAC arrested a candidate and other agents who were suspected for vote buying. According to Au Kam-sam, candidate of the pro-democracy New Democratic Macao Association, 94

Personal interview with Fong Man-tat, 7 September 2005. The Standard, 26 September 2005, A11. 96 One STDM employees told the author, 13 September 2005. 97 Author’s observation on the election day, 25 September2005. 98 The author chatted with a citizen on 30 September 2005. 99 Ho’s remark was covered on the News Report of the Television of Macao on 24 September 2005. 100 One STDM employee told the author, 20 September 2005. Besides, this rumor was spread on the internet. For example, there were messages on the discussion board of New Macao Association’s website that the STDM employees gathered at various stations and there would be free transportation to polling station. Employees would have extra pay by the company. See the discussion board of New Macao Association’s website which is available at “http://newmacau.org/chat/guest.php.” The author assigned the web page on 17 September 2005. 101 One employees who worked at Chow’s casino told the author, 22 September 2005. 102 According to some candidates and citizens, the price of each vote ranged from MOP$600 to MOP$3,000. 95

vote-buying activities were mainly from candidates with gaming industry background. 103 Jeremy Lei, candidate of the pro-democracy Workers Union, complained that he was suffered from the vote buying by other candidates.104 At the beginning Lei estimated that he should receive over three thousands votes. However, his list only grasped 457 votes. Many supporters told him that their ballots were “bought” to other candidates. Lei also remarked that due to the fierce competition, some pro-Beijing candidates finally bought votes in the Northern District where was the base of Lei. The marketization of informal politics in the 2005 Legislative Assembly elections, to a great extent, was due to the deficiency of the formal political institution. The formal institution failed to avoid and suppress irregularities as well as vote buying in the elections. Although the CCAC aimed to fighting against irregularities with money politics in the elections, it was incapable to halt vote buying. The inefficient legal system was favourable to candidates who would like to buy votes. For instance, the CCAC received about 800 complaints about vote buying and other relevant irregular activities during May and September 2005 and investigated twelve cases in which some suspects (including one candidate) were arrested.105 However, the inefficiency of court delayed the prosecution process that none of those charges had been managed by the court before the election. It is noteworthy that the authorities could not disclose the names and other details of suspects before the court formally managing a charge. Those suspects could continue the irregular or illegal activities during the campaign period and candidates were not threatened by the authorities. On the other hand, the CCAC lacked of capacity striking against vote buying in elections. Au Kam-sam, a legislator, indicated that the agency was lacking of resource fighting against vote buying activities which were conducted in an organized way and in large scale.106 Moreover, it could not take per-emptive action that arranging spies in groups and organizations, and collecting evidence on irregularities. It was because the court would not accept evidence collected by spies. Therefore, the CCAC found difficulties in their investigation and collecting evidence for the charge. Furthermore, the marketization of informal politics in Macao elections, to an extent, reflected the political culture of Macao people. Although there were criticisms against vote buying in the Macao community,107 some citizens were happy for these irregular and illegal activities. For example, the Macao Daily News quoted from an 103

Personal interview with Au, 27 October 2005. Personal interview with Lei, 28 October 2005. 105 Macao Daily News, 26 September 2006, B08. 106 Personal interview with Au, 27 October 2005. 107 For example, a Macao newspaper Son Pou spent a whole page criticized corruption in the elections. See Son Pou, 8 October 2005, p. 1. 104

electorate: “There are a lot of entertainments today (the election day). I enjoyed a free meal in the morning and then traveled to the polling station by a beautiful car. I also received munificent ‘remuneration’. That would be great if there was election every month.”108 Au Kam-sam interpreted why some citizens accepted to corruption in elections because the legislature could not represent electorates’ interests. 109 He indicated that legislators from the indirect elections and appointed by the Chief Executive110 did not stand for public interests but to the businessmen. To most Macao people, the legislature could not protest their interests. The election was not important to them. On the other hand, they could receive immediate benefits provided by candidates for buying vote. Citizen’s acceptance to vote buying may probably reveal their frustration toward the political institution. Like Herbert Yee’s remark, “most Macau people do not care much, or feel powerless, about politics.”111 Informal Politics, Governance and Democratization Informal politics, to an extent, contributed to the success of Edmund Ho’s first-term ruling in the MSAR. On one hand, Ho’s government successfully revitalized Macao’s economy which has been under recession since 1997. On other hand, Ho could maintain stable community both socially and politically. Instead of going through the formal institutions, Edmund Ho used informal channels and networks to balance the various interests in Macao. For instance, in order to have smooth transition for the liberalization of gaming industry, the MSAR authorities granted one of the three licenses to the existing monopolist STDM led by Stanley Ho. There was wide-spread rumor in the community that, at the beginning, the STDM’s tender proposal was not ranked at the top three. However, considering the transitional period, the government held informal negotiation with Stanley Ho. Finally, it raised the STDM’s ranking and granted a license to it so that the STDM would continue the gaming business in Macao when the other new licensers was planning and building their own casinos. In fact, Stanley Ho openly marked that the STDM had to be guaranteed for a license to continue its gaming business before the government formally notified the tender result. On the other hand, Edmund Ho grasped the support of social groups to stabilize 108

Macao Daily News, 26 September 2005, B1. Personal interview with Au Kam-sam, 27 October 2005. 110 According to the Basic Law, the legislature is composed of members from direct and indirect elections as well as appointed members by the Chief Executive. In the second secession of MSAR legislature, there would be 12 directly-elected, 10 indirectly-elected and 7 appointed seats. See The Basic Law of Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Annex II, which is available at the The Macao Handover Ceremony Coordination Office web site: “http://www.macau99.org.mo/e_doc_anexo.html”. 111 Herbert Yee, “The 2001 Legislative Assembly Elections and Political Development in Macau,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 14, no. 43, (May 2005), p. 245. 109

the society. In 2000, there was riot in Macao by unemployed workers who fought for the government assistance to their lives. In order to please the grievance of unemployed, the MSAR government carried out re-training scheme that they would be subsidized for attending re-training courses. Besides, Edmund Ho mobilized the support of social groups and organizations to unify the society and avoided to confrontation in the community. In his second term, Edmund Ho could still use his informal network governing Macao. For example, he successfully mobilized groups and organizations to support his education policy. In 2005, there was a split in the Macao society for whether the government should extend free education to the post-secondary level or to the kindergarten education. According to Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong, who was a pro-democracy legislator and support the extension of free education to post-secondary school, all candidates in 2001 legislative Assembly elections supported free education in the post-secondary school.112 However, the government tended to provide free kindergarten education. After Ho’s mobilization, most social groups and organizations supported government proposal. Informal politics could be a remedy to the deficiency of formal institution in Macao. The Chief Executive Edmund Ho skillfully resolved the confrontation between the MSAR government and antenna companies with informal politics. In Macao society, there were six antenna companies provided local and international television signals to residents. However, these companies did not receive consent of channel owners and contravened the monopoly franchise of Macau Cable when delivering television channels to residents. In August 2005, the Office for the Development of Telecommunication and Information Technology (GDTTI) of the MSAR government received complaints from the Macau Cable for the contravention of property rights, and hence, requesting the antenna firms halting to transfer unauthorized channels to residents. Responding to the GDTTI’s decision, the antenna companies stopped their service (including free TV channels such as the Television of Macao) to Macao residents on 1 September.113 It has to note that the majority Macao residents relied on these antenna companies’ services for receiving TV channels. The monopoly franchise of Macau Cable was a colonial legacy that the Portuguese colonial government disregarded public interests and granted a single license to the Portuguese-based Macau Cable broadcasting various television channels. 114 During the colonial era, the Macao government did not pressure on the antenna firms cutting off their illegal channels after granting the monopoly to the Macau Cable. The antenna firms’ protest shocked the Macao society that severely undermined public 112 113 114

Personal interview with Ng, 29 July 2005. Macao Daily News, 2 September 2005, A01. Macao Daily News, 1September 2005, A02.

interests to receiving free and public channels. Ho’s administration encountered a dilemma between the law and public interests. Finally, Ho decided not to exert sanction on the antenna companies and marked that this was a complicated issue and the MSAR government would keep discussion with different parties for solution.115 There was no further complaint from the Macau Cable and the antenna companies. The latter continued their services to residents with the consensus of the authorities. Obviously, Ho solved the dispute in an informal “black box” so as to balance the interests of different parties. Yet, as Joseph Fewsmith marked, “informal politics is not wholly negative.”116 Nevertheless, informal politics in Macao is corroding the governability of the MSAR government. To the fact that informal politics helped Edmund Ho ruling the territory, his over-dependence on social groups and organizations is undermining the MSAR government’s capacity to striking against irregularities generated by social groups politics. The rampant irregularities in the 2005 Legislative Assembly elections illustrated the incapability of the MSAR government in dealing with social groups and organizations. It is noteworthy that some criticized the 2005 elections were so corrupted than ever before.117 On one hand, the CCAC as well as the judicial branch could not effectively suppress vote buying activities. For instance, during the voter registration period in the first half year of 2005, the CCAC investigated cases in which some agents paid for voter registration. It arrested suspects for voting buying before the election. These could be perceived as an alarm to groups and organizations from the authorities against corruption in elections. However, vote buying activities were continued with greater scale than ever before. On the other hand, Ho failed to use his informal network to halt or stifle these irregularities. Au Kam-sam, a pro-democracy legislator, indicated most candidates involved in irregular activities were Ho’s good friends while some were so powerful (politically and financially) that they could ignore him. 118 Ho could not halt irregularities through informal mean. Au marked, for example, “When Ng Kuok-cheong and I met the Chief Executive and discussed about dishonest traders who indulged malpractices, and defrauded citizens and tourists, Ho said that he had talked to them but they did not listen to him.”119 The 2005 elections may imply that the MSAR government could not halt irregular and illegal activities through formal and informal means when the vest interests of social groups and organizations were 115

Macao Daily News, 3 September 2005, A01. Joseph Fewsmith, “Formal Structures, Informal Politics, and Political Change in China,” in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee (eds), Informal Politics in East Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 162. 117 Son Pou, 8 October 2005, p.1. 118 Personal interview with Au, 27 October 2005. 119 Personal interview with Au, 27 October2005. 116

involved. To the fact that informal politics smooth Ho’s ruling, the formal institutions are incapable to limit social groups’ informal act so as to balance interests from different classes. Ng Kuok-cheong, a pro-democracy legislator, argued that government policies were biased to businessmen.120 For example, he indicated that the Macao government did not conduct open bidding for selling land but granted the land-use rights to individual developers through “black box” negotiation. Jeremy Lei, a pro-democracy unionist, agreed with Ng and indicated that the labour class was dissatisfied government’s labour policy which was inclined to the businessman.121 The government allowed corporations employed imported labour when there was relatively high unemployment in the lower class. Lei interpreted government’s labour policy was biased to the businessmen that they could lower the salary of local employees through importing labour outside Macao.122 The labour class did not enjoy wage increase with Macao’s high-rising economic growth. He predicted that the discontent of labour class was intensifying and a large-scale confrontation would be expected sooner or later. The MSAR government’s ability and capacity on balancing interests of groups and organizations is questionable. At the very beginning of the 2005 elections, the authorities had anxiety for their ability in dealing with gamblers. The latter strongly mobilized citizens in the voter registration campaigned and spent a lot in elections. Their participation in the legislature may further curtail governments’ capacity to balance interests in the formal institutions.123 It is noteworthy that the Chief Executive was selected by Election Committee while the latter was formed by social groups and organizations which were dominated by businessmen. Therefore, candidates need to seek political support from the business sector for running CE election. This probably undermined the CE’s capacity in balancing interests between the business and labour classes, to a certain extent. Although Macao’s economy enjoyed substantial growth since the handover and the MSAR government did not encounter problem of resources competition from the public, the government would face substantial pressure from groups and organizations when the economy is down turned. However, the formal and informal political dynamics limited the authorities suppressing irregularities and balancing interests of different parties. As a result, governance crisis may probably be the consequence. Furthermore, informal politics does not enhance but corrupt the democratization 120

Personal interview with Ng, 29 July 2005. Personal interview with Jeremy Lei, 28 October 2005. 122 For a discussion of Macao labour policy, please see Choi Hang-keung, “The Migrant Workers Program in Singapore: What are the Lessons for Macau?” in Renli Ziyuan Kaifa Yu Zhengce Baozhang, (Human Resource Development and Policy Protection), (Macao: Centre of Macau Studies, University of Macao, 2005), pp.141-162. 123 One local reporter told the author that the authorities revealed their anxiety to the political penetration of gamblers into the Legislative Assembly. Personnel chat with the report, 26 April 2005. 121

of Macao. Social organizations do not possess encouragement for mass participation in regular way. They are merely the political capital of actors for their negotiation aiming at their political interests, and mobilization machinery in public elections. To the fact that more and more social organizations have being formed, this phenomenon does not imply the incline of mass participation in Macao polity. Most of these organizations were set up by actors who have already been in the political sphere. These actors paid for the inauguration and operations of organization. In return, they could have political support in the selection of Election Committee members as well as the Legislative Assembly indirect elections. Besides, social groups and organizations became agencies mobilizing public support as well as conducting vote-buying activities for these actors in the Legislative Assembly direct elections. Yet, informal politics in Macao distorted mass participation to irregularities with money politics. This phenomenon is the marketization of informal politics, as indicated by Dittmer. Social groups and organizations are agencies serving political elite who would pay for their election activities. It is noteworthy that when marketization of informal politics pinned in Macao society, democratic participation would be distorted by money politics. Iu Veng-ion, an Election Committee member for the Chief Executive, indicated his worry that further democratization of Macao would put forward vote buying in elections.124 Therefore, the extension of social groups politics in Macao may not trigger to the incline of mass participation but the corruption of it. Conclusion The 2004 Chief Executive election and 2005 Legislative Assembly elections mark the dynamics of formal and informal politics in the MSAR. Formal institutions facilitate political space for the development of informal politics. The election system of Chief Executive as well as the Legislative Assembly indirect election encouraged the development of social groups politics in Macao. More and more groups were formed by political actors for their participation in elections. However, instead of having open competition among candidates, social groups would bargain and negotiate among themselves, and determined representatives in the Election Committee as well as indirectly-elected legislators in the black box. The negotiation and bargain among groups and organizations marks the political culture of Macao that aiming to political harmony and avoiding confrontation. Although the 2005 Legislative Assembly direct election possessed fierce competition and enormous mass participation, the rivalry turned out to rampant vote buying activities. Social groups politics triggered to the marketization of political participation. The government could not and incapable to halting irregularities in elections. To the fact that informal 124

Personal interview with Iu Weng-ion, 21 January 2005.

politics smooth the Chief Executive Edmund Ho’s ruling in the MSAR, the dynamics of formal and informal politics is corroding governability of MSAR government and corrupting democratic betterment of Macao with money politics.