Governance and Citizenship in the EU

1st PhD Symposium on Social Science Research In Greece Hellenic Observatory, European Institute, London School of Economics 21 June 2003

Emmanuel Papazoglou, (BA Athens, MA York, PhD cand. Essex) Paper title: Governance and Citizenship in the EU: Models of Governance and the Place of Citizenship1

Contents: Part 1. European Governance: Political System and Institutional Actors 1.1 Perceptions of European Governance 1.2 Two Types of Governing Institutions in the EU: Power-relations 1.3 Two Types of Governing Institutions in the EU: Functions and Representation 1.4 European Governance and Citizenship

Part 2. The Symbiosis of Two Models of Governance in the EU 1.5 The Shape of the EU Political System: Three Institutional Actors and Two Models of Governance 1.6 The Unitary-Government Model 1.7 The Polycentric-Government Model 1.8 The Place of Citizenship in European

Abstract The present paper addresses issues of democratic governance in the EU. Combining institutional analysis with political theory, it conceives European governance as a polycentric-governance model comprising multiple governance arrangements, two types of governing institutions and multiple civic bodies. Against ‘liberal intergovernmentalist’ and ‘contractual’ approaches, I conceive the present Union constitutional settlement and the domestic democratic institutions practices as inadequate to provide the modes of legitimacy, accountability and representation required for a polycentric-governance model as that of the 1

I am indebted to Richard Bellamy and Philippe Schmitter for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.

1

EU. Alternatively, I propose that strengthening the institutional role of citizenship would constitute an institutional counterweight to the increasingly powerful position of national executive bodies at the national and Union levels. Strengthening citizenship in the EU could be the catalyst for the development of democratic practices at the Union level and not viceversa.

Part 1. European Governance: Political System and Institutional Actors

1.1 Perceptions of European Governance We can identify two broad approaches in the study of European governance. The first approach maintains that European governance encompasses two main types of institutions, namely national governments and European delegations and is divided into two institutional domains-the national and the supranational. Governments play a decisive role by representing the preferences and interests of citizens into interstate negotiations and subsequently, by delegating the appropriate competences and resources to Union institutions to pursue the common objectives. This is the ‘two-levels games’ approach. The second approach maintains that European governance has gradually developed its own systemic properties, which cannot be precluded by means of a constitutional design. Theorists of the second approach stress the reverse/transformative effects of European governance on national states and moreover, assume that national and supranational domains are no longer so clearly separated, but there is an interaction between the institutions and norms of each in the process of European governance. I call this the interactive institutionalism approach. I shall briefly present the main positions of the two approaches. ‘Two-levels games’ approach Representatives of the ‘two-levels games’ approach to European governance are the ‘contractual’ approach (Majone 1996, 2003) and the ‘liberal-intergovernmentalist’ approach (Moravcsik 1998, 2002). According to this approach, the system of European governance is the result of national governments’ choice to transfer powers to independent supranational institutions in order to achieve effective solutions over common problems in the acknowledgement that Union institutions could provide superior solutions than governments individually. One significant feature of the status of Union institutions is that they are politically independent from the will of individual governments or any other collective body. The independence of Union institutions is thought to increase the credibility of the inter-state commitments as well as the credibility of their commitment to serve the aggregate welfare of 2

the EU. This view perceives European governance as a ‘two-level games’ in which national governments hold the discretionary power to establish supranational institutions, assign to them specific functions and devise the appropriate constitutional constraints which will delimit their scope and safeguard their independence. Therefore, the ‘two-level games’ approach conceives Union institutions as a heteronomous system of governance with governments retaining discretionary powers over the supranational governance process and also, as an independent system from electoral commitments and devoted to maximizing the (economic) benefits deriving from common assets (e.g. the single market). ‘Interactive institutionalism’ approach Whereas ‘two-level games’ theorists understood the relation between governments and Union institutions as that between ‘settler’ and ‘trustee’, theorists of the second approach stress the interaction between Union institutions and governments in the context of European governance. Theorists of this approach can be distinguished between two categories. The first category comprises theorists stressing the influence of Union policies on governments’ capacity to pursue policy objectives, such as welfare policies, at the domestic level (Scharpf 1999, 2001, 2002). The second category includes theorists arguing for the formation of common sets of rules within technocratic and epistemic networks of governance (KohlerKoch and Eising 1999) and also, social constructivists arguing for the influence of Union policy-making over domestic norms and rules (Christiansen et al. 1999; Checkel 1999). Drawing on a distinction between ‘government by the people’ and ‘government for the people’, Fritz Scharpf argues that the scope of Union institutions falls within the second type of government. ‘Government for the people’ refers to the capacity of institutions to solve common problems and to pursue common interests on the basis of consensual goals (Scharpf 1999: 11-23). Hence, Union institutions enjoy ‘output’ legitimacy based on their capacity to resolve problems that advance the common welfare of the member states collectively (Scharpf 1999:6-11). But as Scharpf claims, by implementing ‘negative’ market-integration measures Union institutions exert a considerable political impact on national governments’ capacity to pursue the objectives of social protection. This is due to the asymmetry between market-efficiency policies, being Europeanized, and social protection policies, being resolved domestically, but subject to the (fiscal) constraints set by the former (Scharpf 2002: 654-6). Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999) conceive European governance encompassing multiple ‘networks of governance’, which are inclusive of a broad range of actors. They describe ‘network governance’ as a non-hierarchical system of policy negotiations characterized by the variable geometry of participating actors, varying from member 3

governments to public and private, individual and collective actors. The inclusiveness of ‘network governance’ enhances the functional representation of affected actors in the policymaking process and thus, contributes to the legitimacy of both the system and the policies. Networks of governance gradually develop their own systemic properties and become rooted in a fundamental belief system comprising a general set of principles and norms about European decision-making and particular patterns of interaction, rules of behaviour and levels of political actions (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999: 285). This belief system is thought to bridge the heterogeneity of the member states and gain support among political, societal and economic actors. Finally, social constructivists stressing the importance of the interaction between norms political action, emphasize the transformative effects of European integration on member states. In particular, they argue that there is a dynamic interaction of rules, institutions, identities, interests and discourses, which are being transformed in the course of integration (Christiansen et al. 1999). Jeffrey Checkel has advanced a distinct social constructivist position according to which the influence of an international norm is greater when there is a cultural match between that and domestic practice. Once the cultural match is accomplished, ‘exogenous’ norms are reinforced at the domestic level through diffusion mechanisms and social learning process (Checkel 1999:85-91). In sum, the review of studies of European governance and integration in general, reveals two important issues over which the above discussed approaches diverge: firstly, the power-relations between the two types of institutions and secondly, their functions and modes of representation.

1.2 Two Types of Governing Institutions in the EU: Power-relations The two approaches ‘two-levels games’ and ‘interactive’ approaches disagree about the extent to which the functions performed by supranational institutions produce any effects on the functions of ‘majoritarian’ governing institutions, in which case the capacity of the latter to exert unilaterally their powers would be undermined. The first approach holds that representative governments retain their discretionary powers over supranational institutions and thus, it assumes that the latter do not produce any side-effects over the former other than those expected to produce. Governments shape the constitutional design-the ‘European Constitutional Settlement’- in such a way as to exclude the possibility that either individually or collectively they will be outmanoeuvred by supranational delegations. It might be true, the 4

argument goes, that delegations have obtained considerable powers in policy issues such as the single market, competition policy or monetary policy vis-à-vis governments. However, the transfer of powers was the rational choice of the latter. Besides governments retain the discretionary to recall these powers, should they wish to do so, by amending the Treaties. However, there are reasons to cast doubt on the idea that governments enjoy this allpowerful position to exert unilaterally power over supranational delegations. One of the premises of this argument is that governments, by virtue of constitutional design, keep under their control the most powerful positions, such as the European Council, the Council and the prerogative to amend the Treaty as they wish. This is true, and to claim that the Commission is in a position to abuse its powers, given the ECJ judicial review powers, is unrealistic. However, the constitutional design seems ineffective to predict and exclude the potential indirect and side-effects of supranational delegations over representative governments. One such effect could be the incapacity of such institutions to fulfill the tasks for which they were established, namely to create the mutually advantageous ‘background’ conditions that would facilitate the pursuit of national economic interests. This would be the case if monetary management of the ECB fails to achieve price stability in the Euro-zone either due to omissions (e.g. misevaluation of monetary data) or intentionally (e.g. corruption). True, the independence of the ECB-according to the performance-based concept of legitimacydepends on its capacity to provide effective solutions and so, in theory governments can annul the ‘contract’ with the ECB. However, the main point is that the ECB by virtue of its independence can cause considerable economic harm on member states by failing to deliver the goal of price stability (say due to inadequate evaluation of financial information) and thus, to fail to fulfill the rational expectations of governments to maximize their economic gains by delegations. Given the irrevocable character of the monetary changeover and the vital functions of ECB, using the prerogative to dissolve the ‘contract’ would be unrealistic and instead, other solutions may prevail (e.g. replacement of the Executive Council). But if the ECB can cause such a considerable harm, wittingly or by omission, and this possibility cannot be precluded by constitutional design, then governments do not exert the kind of unilateral discretionary powers over the supranational delegations as the ‘two-level games’ approach holds. To be unilaterally powerful vis-à-vis the ECB, governments had to be independent from its harmful

5

effects, which is not the case.2 Indeed, even the wisest constitutional design cannot preclude the possibility that an institutional actor being delegated performance-dependent powers could have reverse effects against the ‘settlers’, in that case the Eurozone member states. Therefore, I think that the power-relation between governments and supranational delegations is not genuinely unilateral in favor of the former, but is better described as asymmetric mutual dependence in similar terms to the (‘Newtonian’) laws of universal gravity holding together a planet to its satellites. We can further trace this asymmetric ‘Newtonian’ mutual dependence of representative governments to supranational delegations if we focus on the effects of market integration measures on governments’ capacity to pursue welfare policies at the domestic level. As Scharpf observes, assigning full competences to the Commission to implement ‘negative integration’ regulations to enhance market efficiency has resulted to the systematic disadvantage of ‘positive integration’ regulations for market-correcting purposes and the protection of welfare states. (Scharpf 1999:54). As he claims, “national welfare states are constitutionally constrained by the ‘supremacy’ of all European rules of economic integration, liberalisation and competitions law. At the same time, they must operate under the fiscal rules of monetary union while their revenue base is eroding as a consequence of tax competition and the need to reduce non-wage labour costs” (Scharpf 2002:65#). In Scharpf’s view, market regulations and fiscal constraints undermine governments’ capacity to respond to their citizens’ needs for welfare policies and as a result, undermine their legitimacy. Of course, this is a matter of perspective and in particular, concerns the question of whether Union policies contain a neo-liberal bias or not.3 In sum, the power-relations between governments and supranational institutions could be described as asymmetric mutual dependence, similar to the gravity holding a planet to its satellites together. Even though governments retain the prerogative to shape the constitutional design as they wish, they are still dependent on the performance of Union institutions and the reverse effects of Union regulations. Hence, without denying the discretionary powers of governments in the course of European integration, we have to recognize that either individually or collectively, they find themselves in an interlocking power-relationship with

2

The incapacity of constitutional design to predict and exclude the harmful effects of incompetence and corruption on the part of European delegations was evident in the case of the Sander Commission. 3 Other theorists oppose the idea of a neo-liberal bias in Union policies. (Moravcsik 2001).

6

other governments and Union institutions. 4 Besides, in spite of governments’ rational expectations to maximize their economic interests in line with their relative bargaining position, neither supranational institutions, nor politico-economic conditions are predictable and dependent variables.

1.3 Two Types of Governing Institutions in the EU: Functions and Representation The focus in this part turns on the plausibility of the proposed dichotomy from the perspective of democratic politics. We can discuss this dichotomy by examining the kind of interests the two types of institutions set to pursue. Clearly, the distinction is between particularistic and common interests. As common perceptions maintain, ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions are premised on a commitment to serve the aggregate welfare/common interests through problem-solving responsibilities and therefore, their mandate need not be derived from an electoral process. In addition, the kind of aggregate welfare they set to pursue rests on the fundamental ‘background conditions’ the achievement of which facilitates the satisfaction of particularistic interests derived from the electoral process. On these assumptions, ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions serve the first-order common interests, which is the prerequisite for the satisfaction of second-order particularistic interests by ‘majoritarian’ institutions. To illustrate the point, price stability is the ‘first-order’ common interest that facilitates, by enhancing economic growth and sustaining sound public finances, the ‘secondorder’ interests of reduced unemployment, higher social protection and so on. Since ‘nonmajoritarian’ institutions do not serve any electoral interests, they can be detached from the political process in order to concentrate effectively on the achievement of the first order interests. However, the dichotomy between ‘majoritarian’ and ‘non-majoritarian’ institutionsand thus, the political independence of the latter- to be cogent has to be premised on a clear differentiation in the scope (electoral commitments vs problem-solving) and accordingly, on a clear differentiation in the modes of representation (common vs particularistic interests) between the two types of institutions. Taking first the difference in the scope of each type of institutions, this rests on a widely accepted view about the division of competences between elected governments and appointed technocrats, which underpins for instance the transfer of monetary management to

4

This is for instance the case with Germany and France, which pressed for the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and currently, face the possibility of being subject to the sanctions under the excessive deficit procedure.

7

a politically independent ECB. According to this view, politicians are unreliable for monetary decisions, since their decisions, depending on their electoral commitments and expectations, have largely a short-term perspective, while a sustainable and growing economy requires a stable environment in the long-term. Hence, instead of an electorally-dependent monetary policy in a time-consistent mode-either by manipulating monetary policy for electoral reasons, or making decisions ad hoc, with regards to the issue at hand- an independent, epistemic monetary management is seen most appropriate. Under this type of policy management, decisions rely upon the analysis of the economic situation and which adapts its instruments-the automatic stabilizers-so as to preserve macroeconomic stability. The difference is thus, between an elections-dependent and an epistemic policy management. The widely accepted division of labour between elected politicians and appointed technocrats reveals an implicit argument about democratic politics: decisions relating to the fundamental conditions of general welfare (e.g. monetary conditions) cannot be subject to electoral purposes and divergent civic preferences but instead, have to be delegated to the elections-‘blind’ and epistemic management of independent regulatory agencies. The design of EMU reflects this sort of argument by depriving governments of the privilege to “manipulate monetary policy in order to absorb the externalities generated by their attempt to reward too many groups within the electorate at the same time”. 5 On the other hand, delegation of monetary powers to the ECB rests on the principle that “the clearer and more narrowly defined [its] mandate, easier it is to monitor the performance of the central bank and to justify the delegation of powers to a non-elected body”.6 But how sustainable is the full division of labour between ‘majoritarian’ and ‘nonmajoritarian’ institutions from the perspective of democratic governance? As the currently widespread views maintain, this is essential for the satisfaction of first and second order interests respectively. However, this distinction overlooks the way in which second order interests inform the content of first order interests. Hence, assuming that price stability and higher social protection are kinds of first and second order interests respectively, then they are inevitably interlinked in the sense that monetary stability has to pave the way for the improvement of social protection. Subsequently, the point is that even if we accept that complying with electoral commitments often endangers the long-term general welfare yet, the common welfare interests entrusted to ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions cannot be unrelated to the expressed civic interests represented by ‘majoritarian’ institutions. It is then fair to say 5 6

Jones E.(2002:163). Issing et al.(2001:139).

8

that both type of institutions far from following separate specialized policy tasks, they in fact work on interdependent and complementary tasks. Hence, to promote the consistency of first and second order interests, ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions while preserving their relative autonomy have to engage in some sort of productive interaction with ‘majoritarian’ institutions in the course of European governance. Therefore, the kind of political independence that underpins the ECB is not that of exercising its powers in a political vacuum, but instead that of providing an independent and informed account of the long-term implications of different pairs of first and second order interests. As regards representation, the argument for a full division of labour between ‘majoritarian’ and ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions, one has to show that the electoral and common interests they respectively represent are clearly distinguished and derived from different processes. Governments normally represent civic interests derived from the electoral process. However, interests derived from an electoral process are conceived as short-term civic preferences the satisfaction of which should not endanger the long-term capacity of polities to sustain high levels of economic growth. Hence, the need to delegate powers to independent delegations such as the ECB. But if the electoral process is inappropriate for providing an account of common interests, then which process/agency informs ‘nonmajoritarian’ institutions about the common interests? This is an acute question regarding the political independence of ‘non-majoritarian’ governing institutions. Many theorists, who relate the effectiveness of the problem-solving capacity of delegations in the pursuit of common interests to their political independence, assume that an account of common interests actually exists (Majone 1996: 56; Scharpf 1999:11). But in the absence of an electoral process and the independence of delegations from party influences, where did this account of common interests come from? The response to this question is rather obvious. Independent delegations serve the account of common interests as defined in the political process and given to them by the governments along with the relevant policy-making powers. If we deny this explanation, we would have to accept that appointed technocrats decide the content of common interests on their own, which would be democratically dangerous. Therefore, the political independence of delegations far from being evidence of any such thing as non-negotiable socially approved common interests, in fact means that political bargaining over fundamental policy decisions (e.g. monetary objectives) has reached an end. Accordingly, European delegations are not representatives of common interests on their own right to the extent that it is the legitimate representatives of civic interests-the 9

elected governments-that assign policy mandates and competences to them. The extent of policy competences and the content of the mandate are valid for as long as political bargaining (and the influence of the scientific paradigm) leaves the content of common interests (e.g. price stability) unchanged. On these assumptions, ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions are not independent from the political process but in contrast, their mandate and policy competences arise out of democratic politics. In sum, the symbiosis of ‘majoritarian’ and ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions should not be examined as the case of two types of governing institutions being separated by a full division of labour. They are not clearly differentiated as regards the scope of policies they pursue (electoral commitments vs problem-solving), nor as regards the kind of interests they represent (electoral vs particularistic). In addition to the asymmetric dependence as regards their power relations, the two types of institutions are inter-dependent as regards the interests and objectives they set to pursue.

1.4 European Governance and Citizenship Common perceptions on European governance pay little attention to citizenship as a competent institutional actor in the governance process. Despite the fact that the distinction between ‘majoritarian’ and ‘non-majoritarian’ governing institutions rests on an appeal to how these institutions relate to citizens yet, this is far from assigning to the institution of citizenship a distinct role in European governance. In the following, I shall discuss some of the reasons explaining the absence of citizenship as a distinct institutional actor in European governance. One explanation rests on the fact that many approaches to European governance are characterized by an institutional dualism according to which governance in the EU is driven primarily by the functions of two types of institutions, namely ‘majoritarian’-national governments and ‘non-majoritarian’-supranational institutions. In this scheme of analysis, citizenship becomes the criterion of distinction. Whereas the former can appeal to the civic bodies they represent, the latter lack any direct relation to the citizenry. National governments represent the interests of the respective national civic bodies whilst, supranational institutions are given the mandate to serve the common interests of Union citizens, being indifferent to particular national interests. On these grounds, citizenship is rather constrained to the role of the source of legitimacy for national governments and also, the source of preferences informing the objectives of governance. Since elected governments are normally the

10

legitimate representatives of civic preferences, the scope of involving citizenship in the process of European governance beyond the state apparatus seems rather marginal. We can trace this sort of argumentation in ‘two-levels games’ approaches. ‘Liberal intergovernmentalism’ and ‘contractual’ approaches to European integration suggest that European governance is an interplay between national governments and supranational delegations, with the first shaping the institutional design of European governance in order to maintain the prerogative of representing the respective national civic bodies and thereby, to retain the privilege of defining and defending the national interests at the Union level. Allowing a direct relation between citizens and supranational delegations (e.g. the Commission) would undermine national governments’ exclusive right to civic representation and moreover, undermine the formers’ capacity to be independent from particular (national) interests. Therefore, European governance is divided in two domains of action, namely the national and supranational domains, with governments and civic bodies occupying the national and governments and supranational delegations occupying the supranational domain. Accordingly, by distinguishing between two domains of governance and dividing institutional competencies respectively, questions of ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU rather fade away. The ‘European Constitutional Settlement’ accounts for this type of two-level governance process in which questions of legitimacy are being dealt with at the national domain, whereas multiple checks and controls operate at the supranational domain constraining the functions of European delegations (Moravcsik 2002:603-6). In addition, whereas ‘majoritarian’ democratic standards apply at the national domain, these standards become inappropriate for judging the efficiency-enhancing functions of supranational delegations (Majone 2003:311-2). This difference in the standards of democratic governance rests on a distinction between two principles of government, namely ‘government-by-the people’ and ‘government-for-the people’, with the first relying on the supply of unmediated expression of civic preferences (‘input-oriented’) and the second, on the supply of common welfare resources (‘output-oriented’) (Scharpf 1999: 6). Under these two principles of government the role of citizenship varies. In the ‘government-by-the people’ principle, government is constrained by the expressed preferences of citizens. The apparatus of the national state constitutes the ‘primary political instrument’ for the expression of civic economic interests, which subsequently underlie national preferences brought into interstate bargaining (Moravcsik 1998:22-25). National governments engage in political bargaining over the national economic interests 11

they represent and the outcome of this negotiation determines the kind of supranational delegations and constitutional constraints that will secure the credibility of joint commitments and the satisfaction of common interests. Hence, governments become the decisive institutional actor linking civic preferences to the policy-objectives of European delegations. In the ‘government-for-the-people’ principle, the independent standing of European delegations depends exclusively on their capacity to provide effective solutions and to maximize the general welfare. They do serve the common interests of citizens, but lack the authority to define them, since these arise out of the interstate bargaining. Clearly, the combination of the two principles of government appears to constrain the institutional role of citizenship within the national domain thereby, giving rise to two sorts of problems. The first problem is the fragmentation of civic interests within national borders and accordingly, the incapacity of the ‘European Constitutional Settlement’ to give voice to cross-national European civic interests when these arise. Indeed, in so far as governments remain the all-powerful institutional actors, civic interests will be fragmented in terms of their national origins. The second problem is the risk of paternalism (Dahl: 1989) in the sense that in the absence of any alternative routes of representation governments, and the elites around them, possess the powerful privilege to define national interests. In addition, given the interlude of interstate bargaining, a gap is created between citizens and European governance realized in the distance between civic preferences and the final policy-objectives of the EU. Apart from the intervention of interstate bargaining, another defect of the representation of civic interests at the supranational level arises from the fact that once defined, this account of first order civic interests is in fact removed from the public debate for the sake of credibility and independence of European delegations. In this light, the idea of European citizens’ common interests suffers from the lack of one fundamental feature, namely the changing character of civic preferences and the practice of continuing debate over public issues, which is so evident in normal democratic life. From this perspective, the principle of ‘government-for-the people’ on which European delegations are premised is seriously challenged, in so far as the kind of general welfare that is pursued falls short of reflecting the changing interests and problems of citizens. In many respects, governments collectively and individually constitute autonomous institutional actor(s) in European governance in the sense that they become to a certain extent relatively autonomous from the will of the citizenry in the course of inter-state bargaining as well as in the implementation of Union policies at the domestic level. However, the features of fragmentation and paternalism in the representation of civic interests at the national 12

domain and also, the formal incapacity of European delegations to respond on their own initiative to changing civic preferences, reveals the limits of identifying the will of citizens with the will of governments. In sum, European governance seen through the lens of ‘twolevels games’ approaches and ‘input’/ ‘output’-oriented concepts of governance can be regarded as an elliptic structure of governance in terms of the marginal role they ascribe on the institution of citizenship. Strengthening the role of citizenship throughout the governing process in the EU is largely a matter of reconfiguring the present constitutional settlement. As Yves Mény points out existing democracies are made up of two pillars, namely the ‘popular’ and ‘constitutional’ pillars. Expanding the constitutional pillar to the detriment of the popular one at both the national and European levels undermines the capacity of citizens to put their problems on the political agenda and thus, contributes to the growing dissatisfaction of citizens with democracy (Mény 2002: 3-8).

Part 2. The Symbiosis of Two Models of Governance in the EU 2.1 The Shape of the EU Political System: Three Institutional Actors and Two Models of Governance In the second part, the task is to theorize on the features of the political system of European governance by extending the analysis to the distinct models of governance that coexist within the EU. Discussion in the first part aimed at highlighting the issues regarding the shape of the political system of European governance, the types of institutional actors involved and the potential role of citizenship. In broad terms, the analysis has shown that conceiving European governance as a process divided in two domains, namely the national and the supranational, we come up with a dichotomized political system with considerable implications for its democratic functioning. In particular, this dichotomy assigns to governments powerful competences in both domains while in contrast, accords European institutions and citizens relatively weak competences and constrains their actions in separate domains. Schematically, giving a triangular form to the shape of the political system of European governance, we would observe that governments are directly linked to the other two institutional actorsEuropean institutions and citizens- but in contrast, the line linking citizens to European

13

institutions has not been clearly drawn yet. Hence, the political system of European governance has the shape of an incomplete triangle.

National Executive Bodies Unitary-Government Polycentric-Governance Model

Model

……………………………… EU delegations

Citizens

Diagram: The Shape of the EU Political System as a Dichotomized and ‘Incomplete Triangle’: Three Institutional Actors and Two Governance Models

The present analysis identifies two models of governance, namely the unitarygovernment and the polycentric-governance models, and three primary types of institutions, namely national executives, Union delegations and citizenship. National executives are competent institutional actors under each of the governance models, while Union delegations and citizenship are only indirectly involved in the unitary-government and polycentricgovernance models respectively. The two models of governance and the roles of institutional actors under each model correspond to the description of the political system of European Union as ‘dichotomized’ and an ‘incomplete triangle’. Below, I shall first try to present some features of the unitary-government model of governance identified with the functions of executive bodies in national democracies. This is not aimed to be an exhaustive analysis of governance within national states. The task is to outline some fundamental features of this model in order to explain the role of national executives as the primary institutional actor both in the internal and external affairs of a national polity. Focusing on the internal and external role of national executives will facilitate the analysis on the powerful institutional position of national executives in the institutional framework of European governance. The features of the unitary-government model will then be contrasted with the features of the political system of European governance.

2.2 The Unitary-Government Model 14

The unitary-government model is used to describe the forms and powers of the executive body as this has been developed with variations in current member states. Governments are regarded as the most powerful institutional actors in the course of European governance both at the national and supranational domains. Therefore, in order to study their role in European governance, we need to focus on some of the most significant norms and principles underpinning the functions both internally and externally. Arendt Lijphart draws a distinction between two models of (state) democracy, namely the ‘Westminster/majoritarian’ model and the ‘consensus’ model, which correspond to two distinct forms of government (Lijphart 1999: 10-21). The form of government corresponding to the ‘Westminster/majoritarian’ democratic model is characterized by a unitary and centralized government, bare majority cabinets, a majoritarian and disproportional system of elections and two-party systems. The ‘consensus model’ in contrast, is conducive to a noncentralized, federal structure of government, a division of powers among central and noncentral governments, coalition cabinets and multi-party systems proportional representation. The unitary-government model, identified with the executive bodies of national democracies, presents the following standard features. First, there is a bottom-up transfer of powers from citizens to executive bodies through regular elections. Second, political parties mediate civic preferences and interests and are recognized as principal actors in the electoral competition for the selection of governing bodies and also, in the (parliamentary) contestation of public policies. The majority rule determines the influence of parties over the formation of governments as well as the character and contestation of public policies. Third, in spite of the differences between centralized or federal structures of governance, there is an institutional hierarchy of executive bodies providing the executive body at the level of the nation state with the highest authority in relation to both the internal and the external affairs of the state. Hence, to simplify the features of the unitary-government model, this model consists in unitary and concrete institutional bodies, the power-relations of which follow a vertical/hierarchical pattern. There is a concrete body of citizens as the ultimate source of legitimate power and also, unitary executive bodies with concrete mandates covering every aspect of public affairs in accordance with their competencies at the regional/ national levels they are responsible. The power-relations between citizens and executive bodies are vertical/ hierarchical in the sense that citizens through the electoral process decide which party will form a government or whether an incumbent government will receive a new mandate. The unitary and vertical/ hierarchical features are characteristic to the unitarygovernment model and accordingly, guide the functions of national governments. At the 15

domestic field, the national government holds the ultimate authority in policy-making on every aspect of public affairs. Although the authority of national executives is normally subject to constitutional checks and balances, such as those in federal or presidential systems still, the popular mandate gives national governments full competences over the whole range of public affairs. In the external affairs, national governments are considered in most international organizations the only legitimate interlocutor and representative of national preferences. Conclusively, nation state executive bodies derive from the civic body through regular elections the ultimate authority to represent and pursue the interests and preferences of citizens at the domestic and international levels subject to the constraints of national constitutions and international treaties. The unitary character and supreme authority of the national executive body characterize unitary-government model of governance. Does European governance conform to the unitary-government model? There is no substantial evidence to suggest that there is a type of executive body in the EU having an authority and concreteness similar to that of national governments. I shall briefly explain why European governance does not conform to the unitary and vertical/ hierarchical features of the unitary-government model. Unitary: European governance is non-unitary, non-uniform in three respects, namely in terms of the institutional bodies it comprises, the scope and functions of governance and the constituent parts it consists in. In some sense, these three reasons are interrelated, but will be presented separately. To start with, the European executive bodies -the European Council and the Council of Ministers-fall short of having the concrete and unitary features of their state counterparts. In addition to the fact that these bodies are not elected by a European electorate these bodies are not unitary in the sense that far from being guided by a civicoriented concrete unifying mandate, these bodies come up with their ‘own’ sets of objectives agreed after negotiations between the participants (e.g. national PMs and Ministers) over divergent national interests and preferences. As regards the scope and functions of European Union, they are not unitary, since they are subject to consecutive amendments expanding the scope of policy coordination in new policy fields and thus, changing the patterns by which powers are dispersed to competent institutional actors. Hence, inserting qualified majority in the Council over particular policy issues alters the ability of particular governments to press for their national interests. In addition, the EU is not uniform, because it consists of particular governance arrangements within which the power-relations between governments and Union delegations varies, as for instance the different patters of power-allocation in the cases of monetary policy and 16

employment policy. In general, the scope and mandate guiding the EU is rather too thin and far from being derived from the expressed will of European citizens, arises out of negotiations between elected representatives on the basis of particular national preferences and interests. Finally, the EU is neither unitary, nor uniform for its constituent parts are constantly increasing. After consecutive phases of enlargement, the EU will shortly include constituent parts covering most of the European nation states. This in turn, has consequences on the functioning of European governance and the character of the policy objectives. Vertical/ hierarchic: The institutional structure of the EU is non-vertical, nonhierarchic in terms of the relations between the civic body and the EU institutions, between EU governing institutions and finally, between EU and member states governing institutions. Indeed, there is no electoral process by which citizens would transfer powers to the European Council or the Council, but instead the legitimacy of the latter comes as a result of the election of individual national executives in the respective state constituencies. Similarly, Union institutions, such as the Commission and the ECB, are accountable to European citizens only by means of their performance in pursuing the joint Union objectives. In addition, it is not clear whether Union institutions are subordinate to the European Council, on similar grounds that regional governing institutions are subordinate to national governments. Union delegations are accountable to the European Council and in some respects to the EP, but by virtue of their distinct scope and functions they are not subordinate to them. Besides, as I argued in 3.3, the discretionary powers of governments should not be regarded as absolute for even the wisest constitutional design cannot preclude the harmful effects of delegations (e.g. pour performance, fraud), nor can they preclude the reverse effects of European policies (e.g. constraints on budgetary policies, re-orientation of segments of domestic public administration). Hence, in the absence of a strong executive body, the EU does not conform to the pyramid institutional structure of a centralized or even a federal state. However, the relevance of the unitary-government model rests on identifying the norms and principles guiding the acts of the two institutional actors of European governance, that is the national executives and citizenship. Hence, by contrasting the unitary-government model with European governance, not only do we make clearer the difference between the state apparatus and supranational governance arrangements, but also, grasp the changing roles of the national executives and citizens within a new institutional framework. Having briefly explained why European governance does not conform to the unitary, uniform, 17

vertical/hierarchic features of the unitary-government model, I shall now turn on the distinct features of its political system.

2.3 The Polycentric-Governance Model Many theorists argue that European governance is not a uniform model of governance, but in fact comprises multiple, variegated and multilevel forms of governance in different policy fields (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Wallace and Wallace 2000; Schmitter 2000; Weale et al. 2000; Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; Nugent and Paterson 2003). European governance is polycentric in three respects: the distinct governance arrangements it comprises; the dispersal of powers among institutional actors; the plurality of civic bodies. Distinct governance arrangements7: Unlike the unitary-government model, European governance consists of multiple governance arrangements covering different policy fields. EMU or environmental governance can be conceived as examples of such distinct governance arrangements. The institutional properties of each arrangement relate to the composition of competent institutional actors, the dispersal of powers among them, the patterns of policy-making (e.g. single policy or coordination) and the use of policy tools (e.g. SGP, open method of coordination). Each governance arrangement is conceived as a political micro-system that allows an in-depth analysis on the particular complexities and tensions arising as a result of the symbiosis of two types of governing institutions. Dispersal of powers among institutional actors: Within each governance arrangement, the dispersal of power among the competent institutions varies. Taking the case of economic governance, we would observe that the equilibrium of powers between Union delegations and intergovernmental bodies depends on the type of policy coordination.8 Hence, under single policy (e.g. competition policy, monetary policy) powers remain mostly with Union delegations, while under close coordination (e.g. budgetary policies) governments retain their powers, but are liable to sanctions in case they fail to keep their commitments. Finally, under weak coordination (e.g. employment policy), governments cooperate on a voluntary basis subject only to peer pressure.

The term ‘governance arrangements’ is borrowed from Philippe Schmitter (2000). For the types of economic policy coordination see Commission Euro Papers (No45: July 2002, p.4) Coordination of economic policies in the EU: a presentation of key features of the main procedures (DG Economic and Financial Affairs). 7 8

18

Plurality of civic bodies: The EU comprises multiple firmly-entrenched national civic bodies. European citizens enjoy the rights of freedom and residence, electoral rights related to the EP and local elections and the rights to appeal to the European institutions and the European Ombudsman. Apart from the evident fact that the Europeans do not form a distinct demos, they do not form a distinct electoral body either. The elections for the EP are held on the basis of separate member state constituencies and in accordance with different electoral systems, which remain the choice of member states.

Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation Moravcsik points out that, “as long as political procedures are consistent with existing national democratic practice and have a prima facie normative justification, I conclude, we cannot draw negative conclusions about the legitimacy of the EU from casual observation of the non-participatory nature of its institutions” (Moravcsik 2002: 622). But the question then, is to what extent domestic democratic institutions and practices are adequate for providing the forms of legitimacy, accountability required in the context of European governance. However, addressing issues of democratic governance in the EU relies on the capacity of national political systems to reconfigure their institutional means so as to catch up with the ongoing governance process in the EU. This in turn depends on the ability (and willingness) of individual governments to facilitate the reconfiguration of institutional processes. But since national executives are the most powerful institutional actors within the EU and the states, depending so much on their willingness to consent on institutional reconfigurations that would in fact decrease their relative autonomy at the European and national political arenas, seems rather optimistic. Therefore, given the polycentric character of the EU and the predominance of the national executives, making European governance more democratic requires institutional means that promote legitimacy, accountability and representation within and above the nation states, which means both through domestic practices as much as through practices at the European level. In other words, even though individually national executives are well-fitted in the domestic democratic settings yet, this is not sufficient when it comes to the acts of intergovernmental bodies nor to the governing process in the EU as a whole. The problem in general is that democratic practices are segmented into each of the member states (Héritier 1999:277), designed for the functions of a unitary-model of government and thus, insufficient to catch up with the complexities of a polycentric-model as that of the EU and to enhance the democratic character of the EU as a whole. In addition, 19

apart from the segmentation of democratic practices, the institutions established at the EU level do not create a satisfactory solution to the challenges of European governance. Institutions, such as the European Parliament and the European political parties, have not so far proved their ability to mediate the vertical relation between citizens and governing institutions and thus, to strengthen the democratic features of distinct governance arrangements as much as of the EU as a whole. To summarize, questions of democracy in the EU cannot be settled by simply having recourse to the domestic democratic practices, nor to the constitutional design of the EU. The legitimacy of the acts of European Council or the Council of Ministers cannot be conceived simply as the sum of the legitimacy of individual governments. Domestic democratic practices and institutions have been premised on the unitary character of both the civic body and the executive body. However, the polycentric character of the EU require forms of legitimacy, accountability and representation that enhance the democratic features of multiple governance arrangements and different types of institutional actors as much as of the EU as a whole. On these assumptions, promoting democracy in the EU requires designating institutions that improve the democratic features both of the governance regime and the European polity (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003:8-13). However, this is not as easy as replicating the present institutional arrangements at the European level, but may require us to invent new patterns by which the vertical transfer of legitimate power from citizens to executive bodies would be possible (Mény 2002: 10-11). Besides, the institutions and ideals that underpin democratic governance have always been responsive to changing circumstances (Hall 2003: 14). Below, I shall attempt an approach to the issues of legitimacy, accountability and representation in the EU. Granting the polycentric character of European governance, I shall outline an approach that aims to assess the role of citizenship as an institution conducive to the purpose of democratic governance. Legitimacy: The role of citizenship in upholding the legitimacy of European governance can be traced in three respects: the status and functions of governing institutions, the norms of public life and the conflicts between policy objectives. In the unitarygovernment model, citizenship is the institution that transfers legitimate power to governing institutions, underpins the norms of public life and gives policy objectives a specific orientation (e.g. welfare policies). In the polycentric-governance model, in the absence of a unitary body of citizens and the as yet, non-consolidated institutions of democratic

20

governance, citizenship can play a constructive role by contributing to the evolution of democratic practices. Status and functions of governing institutions: As noted European governance comprises two basic types of governing institutions, namely ‘majoritarian’/national executives and ‘non-majoritarian’/Union delegations. The status of these two types of institutions corresponds to two distinct principles of governance, the ‘government-by-the people’ and ‘government-for the people’ respectively. Accordingly, while the legitimacy of national governments rests on their ability to act on the expressed preferences of citizens, the legitimacy of Union delegations rests on their capacity to serve effectively the common interests of European citizens. However, distinguishing between ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy does not resolve the ‘legitimacy deficit’ of the EU. This deficit derives from the fact that governments, and not citizens, have become both the agents of legitimacy in the EU (Carter and Scott 1998: 431) and the powerful institutional actors, an arrangement that reverses the crucial distinction between source of legitimacy and executive body. Against this backdrop, the role of citizenship could be seen as an alternative source of legitimate power in the EU that would partially compensate for the paradoxical identification of executive powers and legitimizing functions in the role of governments. Indeed, the acts of the European Council for instance are to some extent ‘self-legitimized’ in the sense that they are premised on the credibility of national leaders’ commitment to keep what has been agreed without serious efforts to involve citizens in the process of Treaty amendments. Although the Convention was launched to redress these ‘hegemonic’ practices on the part of governments, it remains to be seen whether the final outcome will reflect deliberations among the members of the Convention or the results of negotiations at the level of leadership. In the case of the ECB too, its legitimacy seems to rely on a self-assessment in accordance with its own definition of price stability9. Hence, strengthening the role of citizenship in the EU would enhance democratic governance by making clear the distinction between the source of power and the executive bodies. Norms of public life: As social constructivists argue, the implementation of Union policies involves the transfer of norms and rules at the domestic level. The normative content of Union policies and its diffusion at the domestic level challenges the adequacy of the identifications between ‘government-by the people’ and governments and on the other, 9

The ECB defines price stability as annual price increases of less than 2 per cent, according to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area as a whole. (Issing et al. 2001:70-1).

21

‘government-for the people’ and Union delegations. To the degree that the ‘government-bythe people’ principle implies a process of self-determination for a particular body of citizens, then this is undermined by the transposition of ‘external’ norms. Hence, citizens find themselves subject to norms and rules decided beyond the realm of domestic democratic processes. The point is that the normative content of Union policies (e.g. bioethics) should consistently reflect the preferences of Union citizens. Moreover, the domestic mechanisms that complete the cultural match between internal and external norms and facilitate their diffusion through social learning process (Checkel 1999) should be responsive to citizens’ preferences and concerns. Orientations of policy-objectives: European governance is premised on the achievement of some first-order objectives (e.g. single currency and price stability) at the Union level that is expected to facilitate the achievement of second-order objectives (e.g. economic growth and full employment) at the national level. However, the synergy between Union (monetary) policies and national (fiscal) policies does not produce the expected outcomes. As Schrapf argues, Union policies tend to maximize the market-efficiency goal at the expense of governments’ ability to respond to fiscal challenges (Scharpf 2001: 372). Hence, the dispute over the significance of the SGP and the requests to the ECB for a more responsive monetary policy. As a mater of fact, we will often observe conflicts between the first and second order policy objectives pursued by Union delegations and national executives respectively. The balance between the two policy objectives cannot be decided under a tugof-war process between Union delegations and national governments. Instead, the legitimacy of decisions on such issues would be increased if citizens were informed on the link between for instance price stability and employment, and had the competence to voice their views on the economic policy mix. Besides, Union macroeconomic policy priorities to gain social support have to resonate with civic perceptions on social welfare.10 Accountability: John Dunn claims that to expect that political agents will fully comply with citizens’ preferences is an illusion, for in that case it would be citizens and not elected/appointed officials who were ruling. On these grounds, to increase the effectiveness of rules of accountability we have to develop practices of public exposure and additionally, to “draw an even brighter line between the freedom of action that professional political agents As Dyson puts it “the attempt to instrumentalize the Euro-zone solely for the purposes of economic stabilisation and efficiency, by in effect erecting them as a higher good, risks crisis at the level of mass attitudes from perceptions of damage to social cohesion” (Dyson 2000: 214). Similarly, Hodson and Maher argue that credibility of monetary policy will gain stability only if it is linked to other principles of social justice (Hodson and Maher 2002:400-1). 10

22

require in order to act boldly and effectively, and the degree of personal privilege that they can exclusively claim for their actions from the citizens on whose behalf they purport to act”. On these lines, accountability is a matter of retrospective evaluation and is promoted when citizens have information access to political agents’ acts once they have been performed (Dunn 1999: 340-3). Considering these positions in the EU context, we can trace the potential (and limits) of

increasing

accountability

through

the

institution

of

citizenship,

as

an

alternative/complementary means to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Granting the vertical relation of citizens to governing institutions, we would say that this involves a two-way exchange. Whereas citizens transfer powers to national executives- and via the latter to Union delegations- to pursue specific first (aggregate welfare) and second (particular) order interests, the two types of institutions have to provide citizens with an account of their actions in the course of the governance process. Democratic governance requires that the two types of institutions be legitimate not only by virtue of the (popular or Treaty) mandate upon which they act, but moreover, by means of the accountability of their actions to the citizens. National executives are legitimate representatives of national interests and are empowered with relative autonomy in negotiating the Treaties or adopting legislation at the Council. However, governments’ autonomy should be coupled with their duty to give a public account of their acts and to promote the openness of deliberations. Similarly, the ECB privilege to be empowered with political independence should be coupled with a public account on the considerations that led to a particular decision and its anticipated and de facto effects.11 Representation: As I pointed out in 3.3, national preferences and interests once defined at the national level are followed by interstate negotiation, the outcome of which is a final account of common Union interests. Due to the intervention of interstate bargaining, a gap is created between the expressed civic preferences and the final account of common interests. This gap is felt in the low degrees of ‘ownership’ that citizens feel for policy projects such as the EMU. In addition, these ‘common interests’ once entrusted to Union delegations, they are largely removed from public debate for the sake of the political independence of Union delegations and thus, become ‘depoliticized’ issues with the extreme case of monetary policy. therefore, citizens not only are they deprived of any opportunity to

11

The ECB Testimonies before the EP are an example of a practice of accountability.

23

voice their concerns over the final account of common interests, but also, they are deprived of the opportunity to carry on the dialogue over these issues with Union delegations. In the unitary-government model, issues of representation follow some embedded principles and are promoted through the functions of consolidated institutions, such as the political parties. Manin identifies four basic features guiding the relation of representative governments to citizens (Manin 1997: 163-192). First, the mandate of citizens to representatives is by no means imperative, but gives them the partial independence to judge on their own issues of public interest. Second, citizens enjoy freedom of opinion over public matters so that, in addition to their vote, they have the opportunity to bring their opinions to the attention of those who govern. Third, the repeated character of elections ensures that citizens can ex post facto judge the acts of government. In addition, elections given those who govern the incentive to anticipate the future judgment of the electorate on the policies they pursue. Four, measures are adopted only after they have debated in a collective body and supported by a majority. Manin concludes that representative democracy is “a system in which public policies and decisions are made subject to the verdict of the people” (Manin 1997:192). The polycentric-governance model of the EU fails to meet most of the four features ascribing a democratic character to representative government in the unitary-government model. Due to the low visibility of European issues at the domestic level, representative governments enjoy extended autonomy to draw up their positions in the negotiations prior to intergovernmental conferences. The nature of negotiations is such that leadership and elites play a substantial role in defining the national interests. Besides, since European issues do not normally become central cleavages in the electoral process, debating these issues in bodies such as the political parties often comes second in the political agenda. Domestic political parties and parliaments are clearly inadequate in themselves to accomplish the task of representation in relation to EU affairs. This is so because they very much concentrated on the political competition at the domestic level and, also because they lack any institutional incentives to do so. Union delegations generally promote the depoliticization of the issues, while the current Union-level institutions of representation are either only weakly related to their national counterparts (European Parliament, European political parties), or are specialized in functional representation (e.g. Economic and Social Committee). European governance rests on an ‘intergovernmental model’ of political presentation (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999:11-13), according to which the preferences of national citizens are mediated by national parties, national parliaments and national governments before being 24

addressed in the European Council/Council. As I noted in 3.4, this model of representation leads to the fragmentation of civic interests along national lines and thus, fails to accommodate cross-national civic preferences when these arise and also, fails to accommodate a European-wide public debate over the socio-political effects of crucial policy projects, such as the EMU.12 In addition, it often results to the phenomena of paternalism and hegemonism on the part of national executives and elites, to the degree that they enjoy relative autonomy in defining the national interests.

2.4 The Place of Citizenship in European Governance In the concluding section of this chapter, I shall try to recapitulate the argument in support of strengthening the role of citizenship in the EU as regards the issues of legitimacy, accountability and representation. EU operates on the basis of a sophisticated constitutional settlement that devises multiple governance arrangements basically to two types of institutions, national executives and Union delegations. However, this polycentric model of governance and its constitutional arrangement in particular, gives little attention to the popular element of a democracy (Mény 2002: 8). Nevertheless, according citizenship a competent role in European governance would be conducive to the pursuit of democratic governance in the EU. In democratic theory, the body of citizens is regarded as the ultimate source of legitimate power. In the model of polycentric-governance, taking into account the plurality of civic bodies and the absence of consolidated mediating institutions and practices at the Union level, citizens’ role is largely constrained to the national domain. However, there are three fundamental democratic challenges that call us to reconsider the European constitutional design. The first challenge consists in the paradoxical identification of the legitimizing and executive functions and their concentration in national governments. The latter enjoy a powerful position both in domestic and European affairs, which is most evident in their considerable autonomy to define national interests, to negotiate at the European level and to agree collectively on the common interests of European citizens. The concentration of powers in the national executive bodies is not coupled by adequate institutional counterweights in the domestic and the European political domains that would increase the representation of civic preferences, the legitimacy of negotiation and policy outcomes and the accountability of national governments.

12

Tsoukalis L.(2002:84)

25

The increasingly powerful position of governments at the expense of democratic practices both at the domestic and Union domains is often overlooked by ‘liberal intergovernementalists’. True, national governments are the only directly legitimate actors in the EU. But the legitimacy of intergovernmental bodies cannot simply rest on the legitimacy of individual governments. Strengthening citizenship could be the appropriate counterweight to this concentration of powers at the executive bodies. The second challenge concerns the orientations of policy objectives and the normative content of Union policies. As conflicts between governments and Union delegations over policy priorities (e.g. macroeconomic stability vs fiscal expenditure) increase, involving citizens in the public debate would contribute to the informed public support to the Union policies, reduce the gap between citizens and Union delegations and their objectives and allow the expression of the changing civic interests. Greater civic engagement with Union policies would ‘cement’ the Union (Bellamy and Warleigh). Certainly, conceptualizing the role of citizenship in European governing meets many obstacles. The most significant obstacle is perhaps the fact that citizenship is firmly entrenched to, what I called, the unitary-government model of governance.

Hence, to

conceptualize an expanded role for citizenship, we need to by-pass the identification between national identity, national representation and the nation-state and democracy on the other (Closa 1998:433). To be sure, European citizens themselves are still reluctant to perform this role. It is fair to say then, that strengthening citizenship in the EU should be accomplished à petit pas. Initially, we need a ‘cognitive mobilization’ of citizens (Lord 1998:110), a process of “Europeanization at the level of individual” (Carter and Scott:442). In turn, the ‘cognitive mobilization’ at the societal level rests on “a general recognition by the citizens of the member nation-states of the imperative to be governed by more democratic processes than those currently operating within European structures” (Chryssochoou 1998: 101). Nevertheless, strengthening citizenship in the EU by grafting explicitly political rights to the existing economic freedoms (Schmitter 2000: 42) could be the catalyst for the development of genuine democratic practices at the Union level. This might be a better strategy rather than expecting political parties or a common political identity to arise in the EU.

Bibliography

26

-

-

-

-

Bellamy R. and Warleigh A. (2001) (eds) Citizenship and Governance in the European Union (London: Continuum). Bellamy R. and Warleigh A. (2001) “Cementing the Union: The role of European citizenship” in Cerruti F. and Rudolph E. (2001) Bellamy R. and Castiglione D. (2003) “Legitimizing the Euro-‘Polity’ and its ‘Regime’: the Normative turn in EU studies” European Journal Political Theory 2(1) pp.7-35. Carter C. and Scott A. (1998) “Legitimacy and Governance beyond the European Nation State: Conceptualising Governance in the European Union” European Law Journal (Vol.4:4) pp.429-445. Checkel J. (1999) “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe” International Studies Quarterly (43:83-114). Christiansen T. and Jørgensen K.E. and Wiener A. (1999) “The social construction of Europe” JEPP (6:4 Special Issue 1999) pp.528-44. Chryssochoou D. (1998) Democracy in the European Union (London: Tauris). Closa, Carlos (1998) “Supranational citizenship and democracy: normative and empirical dimensions” in Massimo La Torre (ed) European Citizenship: An institutional challenge (The Hague: Kluwer). De la Porte C. and Pochet P. (2001) « Social benchmarking, policy-making and new governance in the EU » Journal of European Social Policy 11(4) pp.291-307. Dyson K. (2002) (ed) European states and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation and Convergence (Oxford: OUP). Dyson K.(2000) The politics of the Euro-zone: Stability or Breakdown? (Oxford: OUP). Héritier A. (1999) “Elements of democratic legitimation in Europe: an alternative perspective” JEPP (6:2 June 1999) pp.269-82. Hodson D. and Maher I. (2001) “The Open-Method as a New Mode of Governance: The case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination” JCMS (Vol.39:4) pp.719-46. Hodson D. and Maher I. (2002) “Economic and monetary union: balancing credibility and legitimacy in an assymetric policy-mix” JEPP (9:3 June 2002) pp.391-407. Issing O., Gaspar V., Angeloni I. and Tristani O.(01) Monetary Policy in the Euro-Area: Strategy and decision-making at the European Central Bank (Cambridge,2001). Jones E.(2002) “Macroeconomic preferences and Europe’s democratic deficit” in A. Verdun (ed) The Euro: European Integration theory and Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford,2002). Kohler-Koch B. and Eising R. (99) “Governance in the European Union: A comparative assessment” in Kohler-Koch B. and Eising R. (99) (eds) The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge). Lijphart A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy (Yale: Yale University Press). Lord C.(1998) Democracy in the European Union (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press). Majone G. (03) “The Politics of Regulation and European regulatory Institutions” in Hayward J., Menon A. (03) (eds) Governing Europe (Oxford: OUP). Majone G. (96)(ed) Regulating Europe (London: Routledge). Manin B. (97) The principles of representative government (Cambridge: CUP) Mény Y. (2002) “De la démocratie en Europe : Old Concepts and New Challenges » JCMS 41 : 1, pp.1-13. Moravcsik A. (01) “Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality” in Nicolaidis K. and Howse R. (eds) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (Oxford: OUP). Moravcsik A. (02) “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union” Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4) pp.603-24. Moravcsik A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (London: UCL Press). Nugent N. and Paterson W. (03) “The Political System of the European Union” in Hayward J. and Menon A (03) (eds). Governing Europe (Oxford: OUP). Scharpf F.W. (01) “Dem Legitimacy under Conditions of regulatory Competition: Why Europe Differs from the United States” in Nicolaidis K. and Howse R. (eds) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (Oxford: OUP). Scharpf F.W. (2002) “The European Social Model: Coping with the challenges of diversity” JCMS Vol.40: 4, pp.645-70. Scharpf F.W.(1999) Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: OUP). Schmitt H. and Thomassen J. (1999) (eds) Political representation and legitimacy in the EU (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Schmitt H. and Thomassen J. (99) (eds) Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

27

-

Schmitter P. (2000) How to Democratize the European Union…and why bother? (Oxford: Rowman&Littlefield). Schmitter P. (2000) “’Participatory Governance’ in the Context of ‘Achieving Sustainable and Innovative Policies in a Multi-Level Context”, European University Institute, Florence 2000. Scott J. and Trubek D.(2002) “Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union” European Law Journal 8:1 pp1-18. Tsoukalis L. “EMU and the dynamics of European integration” in Dosenrode S. (2002). Wallace H. and Wallace W.(2000) (eds) Policy-making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Weale A. et als (00) Environmental Governance in Europe: An Even Closer Ecological Union ? (Oxford: OUP).

28