- Graduate Institute of International and Development

Evaluating the Impacts and Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions

QUALITATIVE DATA BASE This template is the basis of the qualitative data base on UN targeted sanctions. Please complete all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner, but with sufficient background and documentation for controversial points. The core units of analysis are sanctions episodes.

Attachments: WORD document – Timeline Excel Spreadsheet – UNSC resolutions for Sudan I and II

COUNTRY Sudan I AUTHOR(S) Andrea Charron, Loraine Rickard-Martin, Rico Carisch, Shawna Meister 1. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW On 26 June 1995, three individuals, allegedly aided by the government of Sudan, attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia while he was attending a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). At the time, Ethiopia held the Chair of the OAU – its headquarters is located in Addis Ababa. What is rarely reported is the background tension between Egypt and Sudan stemming from a disagreement over which state has sovereignty over the Halaib region. Egypt maintains that all territory north of the 22nd parallel is under its control and authority since 1956 (when Sudan achieved independence). Sudan disagrees. A day after the assassination attempt, there were several exchanges of fire between Sudanese and Egyptian forces in the Halaib region. Three Sudanese police and military personnel were killed. Sudan reported the incident to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/534), but no action was taken and no reply was offered by the UNSC. (YUN 1995: 411) Ethiopian authorities launched an investigation into the attack. The initial intention of Ethiopia was to deal with the situation through bilateral means. Sudan responded to calls by Ethiopia to cooperate by removing its Minister of International Affairs as well as other officials from Ethiopia, but continued to resist the calls for the extradition of the suspects (SC/6170 (31 January 1996). The findings of the Ethiopian investigations were disclosed at a Ministers’ meeting of the countries members of the Central Organ of the OAU along with a report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt a few months later on 11 September 1995. The resulting statement of the Ministers expressed their “profound shock and indignation at the attempted terrorist assassination attempt” and “consider[ed] that attack as aimed, not only at the President, and not only at the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole” (S/1996/10: Annex para 1). The Government of Sudan was called upon to hand over to Ethiopia the three terrorists who were (according to Ehtiopian officials) sheltering in the Sudan on the basis of the 1964 Extradition Treaty between Ethiopia and the Sudan. (The three individuals were Siraj Muhammad Hussein – who apparently flew to Sudan after the assassination attempt – as well as Mustafa Hamza and Izzat Yasin). Apparently, all who had taken part had reached Ethiopia from Sudan, having previously been brought to Sudan from the Afghan Arab camps in Pakistan. They had entered Ethiopia with Sudanese or Yemeni passports allegedly supplied by Sudan. (See Niblock: 201-202). The OAU’s Secretary General was asked to report back on the progress of the extradition at the next meeting. On 21 December 1995, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and members of the UN Security

Council met at the UN headquarters to discuss Sudan’s compliance with the demands of the OAU. Based on this lack of progress, the Permanent representative of Ethiopia wrote to the President of the Security Council on 9 January 1996, requesting an urgent meeting of the UNSC pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter (S/1996/10).

With Egypt as a new nonpermanent member on the Security Council (beginning 1 January 1996) and with accusations by Ethiopia of little movement by Sudan, the Council adopted resolution 1044 on 31 January 1996 condemning the assassination attempt and violation of Ethiopia’s sovereignty and integrity and called upon Sudan to comply with the requests of the OAU. In addition, the UNSC authorized the SG to send a Special Envoy (Chinmaya R. Gharekhan see S/1996/93) to Sudan to speak to the various authorities and parties. In his report, the Envoy noted that there were differences of opinion between Ethiopia and Sudan on the issue of the ability (or not) of Sudan to extradite the suspects (S/1996/179). Ethiopia maintained that Sudan was refusing, while Sudan maintained it couldn’t extradite individuals it couldn’t find (Sudan had even requested assistance from the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)to locate the suspects (S/1996/179: para 20). Neighbouring Uganda, Egypt, Tunisia and Eritrea all told the Envoy that Sudan was either hosile toward them and/or was known to harbor terrorists. Sudan reported that it was the victim of destabilizing activities encouraged and supported by its neighbours (eg. Uganda was accesued of supplying heavy weaponry to the South of Sudan to aid its fight against North Sudan. See YUN 1996:130.) Diplomatic and travel sanctions were applied a few months later via UNSCR 1054 (1996) followed by the threat of aviation sanctions in August 1996 via UNSCR 1070 (with a built-in 90-day time delay). The latter never came into effect (due to humanitarian concerns) and a sanctions committee was never formed. Why a committee and the usual arms embargo were not mandated is likely due to three reasons. First, Egypt, as a member of the UNSC, was paid deference and its demands for less coercive measures were respected. The US and EU, instead, applied unilateral measures against Sudan. Second, the UNSC’s attention turned to other crises. And third, the UNSC realized that little else could be done – Sudan had, in effect, proven that it no longer harboured the assassins. The diplomatic sanctions lingered and no other resolutions were adopted until shortly after 9/11, when the diplomatic sanctions were officially terminated on 28 September 2001 (UNSCR 1372). The accused assassins were still at large at the time.

(Wikipedia suggests the assassination attempt involved noxious gases and was perpetrated by Egyptian Islamic Jihad. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosni_Mubarak)

2. BEGINNING INCIDENT OR EVENT (of what prompted UNSC action in the first place) The US and the UK had always had concerns about Sudan and its support to terrorist groups. As noted in the 9/11 Commission Report, the support given to these groups by the Sudanese government was well known. In many ways these first sanctions against Sudan are more connected to the 1267/1988 regime against Al Qaeda and the Taliban than they are to the second sanctions regime against Sudan and the crisis in Darfur – (especially resolutions 1556, 1591 and 1672). However, until the attack on the Egyptian President Mubarak, Sudan was the concern of the US rather than of the Security Council. The assassination attempt was described by the 9/11 Commission as a tipping point to wider Security Council involvement in Sudan’s terrorist activities (9/11 Commission 2004:62). The first significant event, therefore, was the assassination attempt against the President of Egypt committed on 26 June 1995. Sudan sent a premptive letter to the Presient of the UNSC dated 13 October 1995 in which it declared :

The Sudan categorically denies any direct or indirect involvement or connivance in a plot in the assassination attempt…. The Government of the Sudan has reaffirmed, as well, that the suspects are not in Sudanese territory and that the Sudan has never allowed its territory to be used as a safe-haven for criminals committing terrorist acts. Moreover, when the Ethiopian allegations were brought to the attention of the Sudan 32 days after the incident on 27 July, the Government of the Sudan duly took all the necessary steps to investigate the matter and has, as well, displayed and expressed every

willingness to cooperate in the matter…. With regard to the suspects mentioned in the incident, the Sudanese authorities concerned observed that the Ethiopian Government was not cooperative as it failed to provide any information or evidence pertaining to the dates and means of entry of suspects into the Sudan. Nevertheless, the Government of the Sudan has thoroughly conducted an investigation but did not receive sufficient evidence to prove the presence of the aforementioned suspects within the Sudanese territory…. The Sudan being fully committed to the prevalence of peace, stability and security in the region and Africa at large, renews its assurances that it will cooperate with all the parties concerned in this matter. (S/1995/872). The Council, however, was not directly involved until the following January of 1996 after the government of Ethiopia called for an emergency meeting of the Council in its capacity as President of the OAU and host country where the assassination attempt took place. The first significant Security Council measure was the adoption of resolution 1044 on 31 January 1996, which condemned international terrorism generally, then specifically by Sudan against Mubarak and called for Sudan to comply with the wishes of the OAU.

3. GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF SANCTIONS (i.e., counter-terrorism (CT), non-proliferation (NP), conflict prevention (CP), human rights (HR), democracy promotion (DP)) The sanctions primary objective was - to coerce Sudan (to convince Sudan to extradite the three suspects to Ethiopia (S/RES/1044: para 4a)) and secondily, to counter-terrorism (and to end Sudan’s support to international terrorism (S/RES/1044: 4b)). The diplomatic sanctions signalled opposition to Sudan’s lack of compliance with the UNSC demands (to extradite the suspects). As well, there is a signalling aspect to the sanctions - the targeted sanctions were an indication of the Council’s thinning patience for Sudan’s terrorist activities and general lack of compliance.

4. IDENTIFICATION OF EPISODES There are 2 santions episodes. Episode 1 begins when the Council passes UNSCR 1044 (1996) on 31 January 1996, which inaugurates the threat phase of the first episode. The episode is defined around the first set of sanctions (the diplomatic and diplomatic-travel sanctions) as presented in UNSCR 1054 (1996). Episode 2 begins with the passage of UNSCR 1070 (1996) on 16 August 1996 applying aviation sanctions restricting the movement of Sudanese aircraft (which never came into effect) and continues until the regime is terminated with UNSCR 1372 (28 September 2001).

5. SANCTIONS TERMINATION? The diplomatic/travel sanctions were officially terminated pursusant to UNSCR 1372, adopted on 28 September 2001, 17 days after 9/11, after Sudan pledged its support to counter-terrorism globally. The draft resolution was sponsored by the nonaligned caucus - Bangladesh, Colombia, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Singapore, Tunisia and Ukraine. (See S/2001/916.) Resolution 1372 noted Sudan’s accession to the relevant international conventions for the elimination of terrorism: i.e. its ratification of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and its signing of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. In light of these developments, the Council decided to terminate the sanctions. However, the termination of the sanctions had long since been divorced from the assassination attempt. Instead, the focus was on the need for Sudan to assist the USspecifically and the rest of the international community generally in the new war on terror and therefore, the termination was a carrot to Sudan’s pledged support. Resolution 1372 was adopted with 14 “Yes” votes, but the US abstained. Speaking after the vote, the US noted that while Sudan had taken steps to apprehend extremists, the suspects of the assassination attempt had not been turned over to the appropriate authorities. Further and on a separate issue, the US noted the enormous suffering of the Sudanese people resulting from a civil war in the Sudan that had lasted 18 years and had caused immense human misery (S/PV.4384: 3). This is perhaps one of the few statement that links this first sanctions regime to the second against Sudan. The US representative, Cunningham, stated: We note with concern, however, that the suspects wanted in connection with the 1995 assassination

attempt on President Mubarak in Addis Ababa were not turned over to the appropriate authorities. This was not satisfactory. However, we believe, as do the Governments of Egypt and Ethiopia, that they are no longer in Sudan. In this regard, we take very seriously the letters sent to the Council by the Governments of Egypt and Ethiopia -- the victims of the incident that led to the Security Council actions on Sudan -- calling for a lifting of Council sanctions anyway. We strongly urge the authorities of all States to continue the effort to bring these suspects to justice. Sudan has recently apprehended extremists within that country whose activities may have contributed to international terrorism. Sudan is also engaged in serious discussions with my Government about ways to combat terrorism. We welcome those steps and expect this cooperation to continue. We expect the Government of Sudan to demonstrate a full commitment to the fight against international terrorism by taking every step to expel terrorists and deny them safe haven. The United States also has continuing concerns about the enormous suffering of the Sudanese people. The civil war in the Sudan has lasted some 18 years and has caused immense human misery. Two million people have died; there have been massive displacements of civilians; human rights continue to be abused; and human beings there continue to be treated as slaves. My Government will continue to demand that the Government of Sudan address these issues while we work to build greater cooperation in the international fight against terrorism. The President named a truly distinguished American, Senator John Danforth, to engage Sudan on these and other issues. In light of these considerations, the United States has abstained on this resolution. (S/PV.4384):3) In summary, the US was still suspicious of Sudan and so it decided to focus on its human rights record having exhausted (for now) support to pursue the the terrorism angle via the Security Council. The aviation sanctions under UNSCR 1070 never came into effect. Concerns for their deleterious humanitarian impact proved too strong. Mustafa Hamza was the leader of the would-be assassinators of Mubarak (and involved in the Al-Gama’a Al – Islamia group). He and many of his accomplices allegedly fled to various neighbouring countries– the exact timing is disputed. What is known is that by 2005 they were in Iran where they were picked up by Iran’s security and extradited as part of Iranian efforts to befriend Egypt. Hamza and others were eventually sentenced to death in Egypt. ( Ethiopia had interviewed 3 of the individuals involved in the planning of the assisnation including the wife of one of the suspects soon after the attack in June 1995. It was based on these interviews that Ethiopia believed that the 3 suspects had fled to Sudan. 11 persons in all were linked to the plot – 5 were reported killed by Ethiopia, 3 were suspected of hiding in Sudan and 3 were in Ethiopian custody. See S/1996/226)).Sudan continued to maintain that it had found no trace of 2 of the suspects and that the presence of the third suspect was unknown, but that Sudna would gladly hand over any of the supsects if located. Sudan continued to write to the President of the UNSC outlining the steps it had taken to comply with the resolutions and to make amends with neighbouring Egypt (See S/1996/153 and S/1996/538). Regardless, the UNSC mentioned on several occasions and in resolution 1054 that it would reexamine Sudan’s compliance (with a view to mandating additional measures). The offer to lift sanctions for compliance was not explicitly made.

6. REFLECTIONS (i.e. distinctive or unique aspects of the sanctions, potential lessons) The Sudan I case study is a good example of the power of nonpermanent members. Egypt was paid deference – the sanctions applied against Sudan were less coercive than those preferred by the US because Egypt was directly impacted by the assassination attempt and because of its desire to minimize the impact of the sanctions against Sudan. No sanctions committee and no arms embargo were established- this is one of the rare cases on both

accounts. Because no sanctions committee was established, it is not listed on the UNSC’s sanctions website and is, therefore, often overlooked. This is not, necessarily, a comment on the effectiveness of the sanctions so much as an anomaly from the usual practice of the UNSC to mandate a sanctions committee and to nearly always apply an arms embargo. This is one of two cases of diplomatic travel sanctions (ie. restricting the travel of Sudanese diplomats in host countries). The other was the case of Libya. It could be potentially very disruptive, but goes against the spirit of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (especially Article 26 which states : Subject to its laws and regulations concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, the receiving State shall ensure to all members of the mission freedom of movement and travel in its territory. Surprisingly, no state seemed to mention this fact – especially Sudan. According to senior US authorities, it is quite common for the US to restrict the travel of certain diplomats at the UN (ie. Notification of travel beyond a cetain radius is required) and so this was not see as out of the ordinary, but rather in-line with US policy that probably woud have applied against the representatives of Sudan and other states regardless of sanctions . China and Russia continued to provide consistent arguments against the use of sanctions as a “panacea” or as a first resort to action. The US didn’t press the UNSC to adopt more coercive measures, but instead deferred to the wishes of Egypt. Instead, the US took unilateral action including coercive sanctions and later, a missile attack against Sudan. Bin Laden, the Embassy Attacks, and Carlos the Jackal are all connected to Sudan (in some cases very loosely), yet they were never linked to the diplomatic/diplomatic travel sanctions against Sudan. As well, the UNSC did not make a formal connection between Sudan’s support to terrorism and to the North-South conflict. This case helped to highlight the issue of international terrorism, but the UNSC did not pursue this angle requiring states to take specific steps to stop it generally.

Questions raised from the research that still require answers: How much was the Egyptian election campaign to the Security Council focused on this particular issue? How much of the intelligence on Osama bin Laden and his activities in Sudan were shared formally with Council members (either P5 or all members) during the sanctions against Sudan? ) Are there any Sudanese Diplomats still at the UN (or other Secretariat officials) that remember the US restrictions on travel in NY as a result of the mandatory diplomatic sanctions?

7. TIMELINE (provide a general timeline for each case, identifying the origins, episodes, and where relevant, the termination of the sanctions)

Attached in an accompanying WORD document.

EPISODES On the following pages we provide a table for each episode you identified. Please complete all fields and analytical categories identified in the template in a concise manner. HOW MANY EPISODES DID YOU IDENTIFY? 2

EPISODE 1 31 January 1996 to 15 August 1996 CONTEXT With Egypt as a new nonpermanent member on the Security Council (beginning 1 January 1996) and with accusations by Ethiopia of little movement by Sudan, the Council adopted resolution 1044 on 31 January 1996 condemning the assassination attempt and violation of Ethiopia’s sovereignty and integrity and called upon Sudan to comply with the requests of the OAU. Diplomatic and diplomatic travel sanctions were applied a few months later via UNSCR 1054 (1996).

UNSC DECISION MAKING Since the initial sanctions imposed by the Security Council were authorized approximately 11 months after the assassination attempt on 26 June 1995, it suggests that the Council was not likely to involve itself until expressly requested by Ethiopia and reinforced by the presence of Egypt on the Council. Rather, the issue of Sudan and state support of terrorism was an issue the US was tackling, but outside of the Council. Therefore, had the OAU (via Ethiopia) not sent a letter requesting action be taken by the Council, it is conceivable that the Council would have left the matter entirely to the OAU or to individual states to pursue. Indeed, the Security Council did not make any official statement (no Presidential statements, resolutions or press releases) regarding the assassination attempt on or shortly after the date of 26 June 1995. Given that Egypt was now a member of the Security Council, a draft resolution was penned in the first month of 1996 and endorsed by all of the African and Asian representatives on the Council save the Republic of Korea. The Council adopted resolution 1044 on 31 January 1996 unanimously. The draft resolution was sponsored by six of the ten non-permanent members including: Botswana, Chile (newly elected), Egypt (newly elected), Guinea-Bissau (newly elected), Honduras and Indonesia (S/1996/69 (31 January 1996). The strong African connection to the resolutions is in keeping with the nature of the crisis and the backing of the OAU. (Germany, Italy, Poland and the Republic of Korea were the other nonpermanent members of the Council in 1996). In adopting the resolution, the Council borrowed heavily from the language of statements released by the OAU. First the Council noted it was “deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of international terrorism in all its forms which endanger or take innocent lives, have a deleterious effect on international relations and jeopardize the security of States” (S/RES/1044: Preamb. para 1) and noted its grave alarm at the “terrorist assassination attempt” on the life of the Egyptian President which also represented an attack on the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia as well as Africa as a whole. The Council also stated that it was convinced that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are involved, was an essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council then commended the efforts of Ethiopia to resolve the issue and welcomed the efforts of the Secretary-General of the OAU (S/RES/1044: paras 3 and 6) and called on Sudan to extradite the three suspects to Ethiopia for trial and to desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuaries to terrorist elements (S/RES/1044: paras 4a and b). Sudan was known to harbour terrorists, having provided shelter to “Carlos the Jackal” (who resided in Sudan between 1992 and 1994)* and Osama bin Laden after 1994 (Niblock, 2000: 200). In 1993, Sudan had been placed on the US’s list of states supporting terrorism.** The Council asked the Secretary-General to consult with the OAU and to report back in sixty-days. The sanctions imposed were weaker than desired of the US and were not active immediately; a 10-day delay was built in to allow Sudan every opportunity to comply with UNSCR 1044.

In April 1996, with insufficient movement on the part of Sudan, resolution 1054 was adopted (with 2 abstentions by China and Russia) to impose diplomatic and diplomatic travel sanctions that were designed to significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all such staff who remained and to take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces (S/RES/1054: para 3). There was also a voluntary call to international organizations not to convene any meetings or conferences in Sudan (S/RES/1054: para 4).It is not clear if the Council had a particular event in mind (eg. football match?) The draft resolution that became UNSCR was sponsored by Botswana, Chile, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau and Honduras (S/1996/293). The majority of the discussions to draft the resolution were « behidn the scenes ». Neither a list of targeted individuals nor a Sanctions Committee was created. The sanctions were to come into effect on 10 May 1996 to give Sudan one last chance to comply and presumably, to put the Sudanese diplomatic corps on notice. Whether the thinking was to allow the diplomatic core to leave voluntarily ahead of the application of the sanctions is merely conjecture. At an informal meeting of the non-aligned members of the Security Council, US permanent representative, Madeleine Albright, apparently “chastised Egypt for the weakness of resolution 1054” (Mideast Mirror, 29 April 1996:18 as reported in Niblock: 206). The US was concerned that by failing to impose more meaningful measures, the Council risked further instability in Africa and the Middle East. However, given that Egypt was closest to the situation, its wishes were paid deference and the US still voted “yes” to the weaker resolution. Uganda also expressed regret that the sanctions did not go far enough – for example, no arms embargo was considered (S/PV.3660: 14). However, Uganada and Sudan had long been at odds. Russia abstained because of its concern that there was a growing trend that sanctions were being used by the Council arbitrarily without clear guidelines outlining their imposition and lifting. (S/PV. 3660: 14 and 15). China abstained for very similar reasons – that sanctions were a last resort and resolution 1054 left the door open for future coercive measures, which China opposed (S.PV.3660:19). The Sudan I sanctions were pre-September 11th at a time when the Council was still defining how it would deal with international terrorism. This was the second case of state-sponsored terrorism (the first involved Libya) and given the nature of the sanctions applied, suggests the specifics of the assassination attempt were not at the critical level to warrant biting measures. Instead, the sanctions served as a launching point for the US to bring the Council on board and apply pressure against Sudan vis-à-vis its wider support to international forms of terrorism and providing safe haven to terrorists like bin Laden and Carlos the Jackal. During 1996, the Council was seized of the Balkans, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Libya, Burundi, Georgia, the Middle East, Somalia, Western Sahara, Angola, Afghanistan, Cuba, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Haiti, mine-clearance operations, Korea, Zaire and the appointment of a new Secretary-General. Sudan was not a priority for the Council. The fact that an arms embargo was never applied (and one of the rare examples of UN sanctions that does not include one) was due to Egypt’s concern about destabilizing relations between the North and South of Sudan; Egypt was adamant, therefore, that an arms embargo not be included as part of the measures imposed. *A Sudanese-French deal was struck and Carlos was transferred to France for trial. Carlos's most daring act involved the kidnapping of eleven oil Ministers at an OPEC meeting in Vienna in December 1975. Three people died in the incident, but Carlos and his group were flown to Algeria and released. At different times, his name was linked to urban guerrilla bands in Japan, Germany, Spain and Ireland, but he was most closely associated with Arab terrorist groups. He was also reportedly protected at various times by East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. See Alan Riding, “Carlos the Terrorist Arrested and Taken to France”, New York Times, April 16, 1994. See Economist Intelligence Unit, “Sudan: Country Report No. 3” (London: EIU, 1995): 13. ** Listed countries are subject to severe U.S. export controls, particularly of dual-use technology, and selling them military equipment is prohibited. Providing foreign aid under the Foreign Assistance Act is also prohibited. Section 6(j) of the 1979 Export Administration Act stipulates that a validated license shall be required for export of controlled items and technology to any country on the list, and that the Secretaries

of Commerce and State must notify the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and both the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Foreign Relations, at least 30 days before issuing any validated license required by this Act. In addition, Section 509(a) of the 1986 omnibus anti-terrorism act (P.L. 99-399) bars export of munitions list items to countries on the terrorism list. See US Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism” at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (Accessed 10 June 2010).

POLITICAL WILL The draft resolutions that became resolutions 1044 and 1054 were sponsored by Botswana, Chile, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau and Honduras with Indonesia lending support to the former (S/1996/69 (31 January 1996) and S/1996/293 (April 26 1996)). This represents five of the ten non-permanent members and two of the four regional groups (Western Europe and Other (2), Eastern Europe (1), Latin America and the Caribbean (2), Africa and Asia (4)). Chile, Egypt and Guinea-Bissau were new to the Council in 1996. The strong African connection to the resolutions is in keeping with the nature of the crisis and the backing of the OAU. As P5 were divided on action to be taken, it took a back seat to the nonpermament members ; the US was pursuing its own, unilateral measures against Sudan and China and Russia were intent of supporting only token measures.On 26 April 1996, the Council adopted resolution 1054 with 13 yes votes and 2 abstentions from China and the Russian Federation (S/1996/293 (26 April 1996)). (Resoluton 1044, in contrast, was passed unanimously) Having reviewed the report of the Secretary-General (S/1996/179 (11 March 1996)) and regretting that Sudan had not yet complied with the demands of the central organ of the OAU or with resolution 1044, the Council determined to act on Chapter VII in order to “eliminate international terrorism and to ensure effective implementation of resolution 1044” (S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996): Preamb. para 11). Contrary to common practice, however, the Council did not create any subsidiary or ad hoc bodies to monitor the sanctions. At an informal meeting with the nonaligned members of the Security Council, US permanent representative, Madeleine Albright, apparently “chastised Egypt for the weakness of the resolution” (Mideast Mirror, 29 April 1996:18 as reported in Niblock: 206). The US was concerned that by failing to impose more meaningful measures, the Council risked further instability in Africa and the Middle East. However, given that Egypt was closest to the situation its wishes were paid deference . The political will measured in terms of votes suggests that there was mixed approval– certainly Russia and China were not enthusiastic about the application of sanctions against Sudan (as mild as they were), hence the abstentions. While the US would likely have supported more coercive sanctions, it was clear they would not be supported by Russia or by China. And as Egypt was a member of the Council and directly affected, it was primarily responsible for setting the tone of measures applied. Egypt was clearly torn by the events. On the one hand they could not let Sudan go unscathed, but on the other, Sudan was an important partner for Egypt. The state that was the most exercised was Ethiopia suggesting that the assassination was not just an attack against the Prime Minister of Egypt, but against Ethiopia and by extension Africa because Ethiopia was the president of the OAU at the time. Ethiopia and Sudan, however, had long been at odds.

PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal) The sanctions were primarily written to coerce Sudan (to extradite suspects to Ethiopia) (S/RES/1044: para 4a) and to end Sudan’s support to international terrorism (S/RES/1044: 4b). However, Sudan maintained it didn’t know the where abouts of all of the assassins but that it would extradite any if located. Given that only diplomatic and diplomatic-travel sanctions were applied (the aviation sanctions never came into effect), “coerce” may be too strong a word to describe the purpose of the sanctions from the point of view of all members of the UNSC – especially the P5, which were divided as to the amount of pressure to place against Sudan. Secondarily, the diplomatic sanctions signalled opposition to state-sponsorship of acts of terrorism and/or harbouring of suspected terrorists as well as the Council’s thinning patience for Sudan’s terrorist activities (Counter-terrorism). Finally, but very importantly, all of the resolutions were an implicit and explicit support of or in solidarity with the OAU and Ethiopia’s (albeit ham-fisted) attempts to extradite the suspects. There

is also an argument to be made that given the fact that the sanctions were of a diplomatic nature and the aviation sanctions never came into effect, that they were all examples of what Margaret Doxey refers to as “gesture” or symbolic sanctions. Indeed, the Ambassador for the Republic of Korea called the diplomatic and travel sanctions outlined in S/RES/1054 “are of a symbolic rather than substantive nature” (S/1996/3660:18).

AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED For Sudan, the sanctions were a signal that patience had worn thin with the US and neighbours like Egypt, Libya and others and that the Security Council was squarely behind OUA (especially Ethiopia’s) attempts to find and try the assassins. The sanctions also signalled to Sudan that its support for terrorism would no longer be tolerated. The particulars of the Mubarak’s assassination attempt were a side issue for the US to the background support Sudan had been known to provide to terrorist groups – especially Bin Laden. Bashir was keen not to encourage the ire of other states. Instead, bin Laden was given notice that he was no longer welcome in Sudan He left on 16 May 1996 for Afghanistan. US pressure against Sudan to stop providing haven to terrorists (9/11 Commission, 2004 : 62) as well as money problems and pressure from Saudi Arabia (including a loss of citizenship for bin Laden) contributed to forcing Osama bin Laden to relocate his terrorist cells from Sudan to Afghanistan. Resolution 1044 was written from a macro to a micro perspective. First the Council deplored the world-wide persistence of acts of international terrorism and the statement by the President of the Security Council expressing their deep concern for international acts of terrorism and then condemned the specific act against the Egyptian President and underlined its support to the efforts of Ethiopia and the OAU to resolve the crisis. Based on these objectives, there were multiple audiences. Second, the Council sent a signal to all states regarding the Council’s stance on international terrorism, which it found deeply disturbing and noted the deleterious effect it has on international peace and security. Note, however, that the Council did not use this opportunity to encourage states to ratify the various instruments against terrorism other than to recall the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents that opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973. The third audience was the OAU. By borrowing extensively from the wording of the OAU letters, the Council signalled its support for the work of the organization. Given that Ethiopia held the Chair of the President of the OAU and was host to President Mubarak, the sanctions were applied to continue to bolster the OAU’s efforts to develop a regional response to terrorism. The fact that the evidence provided by Ethiopia was so poor and unprofessional and yet sanctions were still applied is taken as confirmation of the Council’s desire to support the OAU and suspicion that Sudan was most likely actively supporting international terrorism rather than whole hearted acceptance of the findings. Finally, the fourth and most important audience was Sudan and specifically the leaders of the government. Pressure from the US alone had not dissuaded Sudan from sponsoring terrorism. The assassination attempt against the President of Egypt was an opportunity to bring about wider condemnation of Sudan. And yet, the sanctions are of the sort that Margaret Doxey would refer to as “gesture sanctions”. In April 1996, the P3 (UK, US and France) were far more concerned by reported violations of sanctions against Libya by Libyan-registered aircraft than they were by the situation in Sudan (See S/PRST/1996/18 (18 April 1996 and well as S/23306, S/23307, S/23308, S/23309 and S/23317).

TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures) The first resolution (S/RES/1044(1996)), condemned the assassination attempt, called on Sudan to extradite the terrorists and to desist in engaging in activity that supported international terrorism, but did not impose sanctions. This set the stage for the first set of sanctions applied via resolution 1054 (1996). Resolution 1054 imposed diplomatic sanctions and diplomatic-travel sanctions (ie. Movement of consular staff to be restricted, but not a ban on travel for specific individuals/students/tourists etc.) against Sudan, but with a built in time delay to allow Sudan one last opportunity to comply. On 6 May 1996, failure would result in the following mandatory sanctions: 1) Significant reduc[uction] in the number and the level of the staff at Sudanese

diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain; 2) Restrict[ions]on the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces (S/RES/1054 (1996): para 3a and b). In addition, the Council called upon all international and regional organizations not to convene any conference in Sudan representing a voluntary sanction. Timelines were built into each episode of sanctions to afford Sudan the opportunity to respond. On the one hand, the time delay suggests that the Council was not wholly convinced by the evidence provided by Ethiopia – the reports were badly written and full of circumstantial and conflicting evidence. (In many letters to UNSC, Ethiopia stated it could not disclose some of the evidence for national security reasons). If the Council was convinced, it is far more likely they would have applied the sanctions without delay and/or imposed more biting sanctions as was the case with Libya’s state-sponsorship of terrorism in 1992 (the 748 regime). On the other, the time delay may have been in anticipation of the desire to apply more coercive measures ensuring that Sudan was given every opportunity to respond before they were applied. (This is similar to the warnings given to Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait prior to the US-led enforcement mission in 1990.) The fact that an arms embargo was never applied (and one of the rare examples of UN sanctions that do not include one) was due to Egypt’s concern about destabilizing relations between the North and South of Sudan; Egypt was adamant, therefore, that an arms embargo not be included as part of the measures imposed. The EU and US already had arms embargoes in place– more information on the discussions behind why an arms embargo was not included as part of the measures is needed. It may be the Council was concerned an arms embargo would further destabilize Sudan (fighting a civil war and in conflict with nearly all of its neighbours) and/or that they would be totally ineffective. These are guesses only. More inforamtion is needed.

COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant) The UN sanctions were in support of OAU efforts to coerce Sudan into handing over the suspects specifically and to end Sudan’s support to international terrorism generally (although emphasis was always on the former). Ethiopian authorities launched an investigation into the attack. The initial intention of Ethiopia was to deal with the situation through bilateral means. Sudan responded to calls by Ethiopia to cooperate by removing its Minister of International Affairs as well as a few other officials from Ethiopia, but continued to resist the calls for the extradition of the suspects (SC/6170 (31 January 1996)). The findings of the Ethiopian investigations were disclosed at a Ministers’ meeting of the countries members of the Central Organ of the OAU along with a report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt a few months later on 11 September 1995. The resulting statement of the Ministers expressed their “profound shock and indignation at the attempted terrorist assassination attempt” and “consider[ed] that attack as aimed, not only at the President, and not only at the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole” (S/1996/10: Annex 1, para 1). The Government of Sudan was called upon to hand over to Ethiopia the three terrorists (S/1996/10: para. 3a and b) who were sheltering in the Sudan on the basis of the 1964 Extradition Treaty between Ethiopia and the Sudan and underlined the grave danger posed by terrorism, including state-sponsored terrorism. The OAU’s Secretary General was asked to report back on the progress of the extradition at the next meeting.

On 18 and 19 December 1995, an ordinary meeting at the ministerial level of the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was held at Addis Ababa to discuss a number of issues including a progress report of the investigation of the assassination attempt and resulting Sudanese response. A group statement was issued at the conclusion of the meeting on 19 December 1995. In the statement, it was decided that having reviewed the Secretary General’s progress report since September 1995 and statements by the heads of delegation of Ethiopia, Egypt and the Sudan, the Central Organ of the OAU concluded that no progress toward the extradition of

the assassins had been made. On 21, December 1995, The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and members of the Security Council met at the UN headquarters to discuss Sudan’s compliance with the demands of the OAU. Based on this lack of progress, the Permanent representative of Ethiopia wrote to the President of the Security Council on 9 January 1996, requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter (S/1996/10). The Ethiopian investigation revealed that eleven men were involved in the planning and/or execution of the assassination attempt. All were Egyptian nationals and members of Jamaah al-Islamiyah (known to be given safe haven in Sudan) (Niblock 2001: 201). The OAU, however, had not applied sanctions against Sudan but did request that the Security Council impose such measures – Ethiopia was of the opinion that only measures applied by the Security Council would induce compliance by Sudan. (The OAU was not unified in their condemnation of Sudan and so sanctions were never likely to be approved – many African states were also enemies of Egypt as well) . The OAU’s condemnation of Sudan separates the issue of the ongoing Sudanese civil war with the issue of international terrorism even though negotiations were ongoing by many African states to end the hostilities. There was little if any involvement by the Arab League. The particular situation as it related to the assassination attempt was seen as clearly within the purview of Ethiopia (and by extension, the OAU) and UN Security Council. Sudan and its support to terrorism overall, however, was clearly the concern of the US but unilaterally and outside of the Council. In contrast, the Arab League was very involved in lobbying the UNSC to end sanctions against Libya. The SG sent his envoy Chinamaya R. Gharekhan to interview various parties between 18 February and 2 March 996. The final report confirmed that Ethiopia and Sudan disagreed with Sudan’s level of compliance adn that neighbouring states were quick to point to Sudan as an agressive neighbour who was known to harbour terrorists. (S/1996/179). No UN mission was authorized in connection with the assassination attempt.

INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures, Regional organization measures) US President Clinton signed an Executive Order against Sudan, but not until 1997 after resolution 1054 and 1070 were adopted. Unlike the tepid UN measures, Executive Order 13067 (US Government, Federal Directives, Vol. 62, No. 214, Wednesday, November 5, 1997) blocked Sudanese Government property and prohibited transactions with Sudan. In the directive, President Clinton justified the measures by stating: that the policies and actions of the Government of Sudan, including continued support for international terrorism; ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring governments; and the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat (US Government, Federal Directives, Vol. 62, No. 214, Wednesday, November 5, 1997: pg. 1) These reasons, however, were above and beyond and separate from the more narrow focus of the Council. An EU arms embargo was first imposed in 1994. The embargo covered weapons designed to kill and their ammunition, weapon platforms, non-weapon platforms and ancillary equipment. The embargo also covers spare parts, repairs, maintenance and transfer of military technology. Contracts entered into force prior to the date of entry into force of the embargo were not affected.. (94/165/CFSP: Council Decision of 15 March 1994 on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the imposition of an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment on Sudan) This embargo was modified in January 2004 due to the ongoing civil war in Sudan. The European Union decided to strengthen the arms embargo with Common Position 2004/31/CFSP and Council Regulation (EC) No 131/2004). The EU also voiced some concern about possible links to international terrorism from the Sudanese government. In mid- 1994, Illich Ramirez, or ‘Carlos’ or ‘The Jackal’, was extradited to France where he was

put on trial. Following accusations about Sudanese involvement in the 1996 attempt to assassinate the Egyptian President Mubarak, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions, but not an arms embargo, meaning that between 1996 and 2001 there were various UN and EU sanctions in place against Sudan. The UN sanctions were removed in 2001, but the EU arms embargo remained (Kreutz 2005 :33) The sanctions against Sudan were in stark contrast to the more biting measures applied against Libya beginning in 1992 via UNSC resolution 748 (arms, travel and financial sanctions for Libya’s sponsorship of terrorism and the downing of two international flights).

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions, tribunals, referral to ICC) N/A Ethiopia (representing OAU) was to try and prosecute the suspects if they were extradited. IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement) The diplomatic and diplomatic-travel sanctions pursuant to resolution 1054 were not widely adhered to and as no sanctions committee was formed, there was no body charged with monitoring their implementation. Instead, member states were called upon to report to the Secretary General on measures taken within 60 days on the steps taken to give effect to the mandatory diplomatic sanctions and for the Secretary-General to report in 60 days on the steps taken by Sudan. However, by 1998, only sixty-six replies had been recorded. (There were 63 as of 14 November 1996) (S/1996/940). In many cases, the states simply replied that as they had no Sudanese representation in their countries no action was required or they stated that the appropriate actions had been taken (for example, China) (S/1996/531). Not surprisingly Egypt (S/1996/534), Ethiopia (S/1996/440), the US (S/1996/530 and 1048. Not in the SG’s reports, the numbering is confused. Eg. US is 530 not 531) and the UK (S/1996/387) complied fully expelling diplomats and restricting their movement (As reported in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 200): 123). For example, the US notified Sudanese diplomats and staff assigned to the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations that they were required to notify the United States Government 48 hours in advance of any travel outside a 25-mile radius from Columbus Circle in Manhattan (As reported in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 200): 123). However, this was common practice by the US of states of concern (for national security reasons) and so not necessarily prompted by the sanctions. The implementation of the sanctions, was tepid genearlly speaking. The US put considerable pressure on Sudanese diplomats at the UN; China in contrast merely stated that « the Government of China has implemented the relevant provisions of the said resolution”. (S/1996/531).

DIRECT IMPACTS Given the limited nature of diplomatic sanctions, the direct impacts of the diplomatic sanctions were minimal (to the extent there was an impact, it was limited) to Sudanese representatives in select member states that applied the measures – most notably in the US). The impacts were negligible for the Sudanese generally – it may have taken longer for Sudanese in foreign contries to access consular services (although this is conjecture). The stigma, however, of the sanctions may have been considerable – especially for Sudanese officials inconvenienced by the travel restrictions. But this needs to be confirmed with Sudanese consular staff (which is proving very difficult as Sudanese officials are very guarded about any interviews). There were no bans on student visas to the US, there were no restrictions on trade (other than those pursued unilaterally by some states like the US) and the economy does not seem to have been affected. In fact, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the country profile for Sudan suggests the annual growth rate increased since the imposition of UN sanctions (Economist Intelligence Unit, Sudan: Country Profile, 1998/99 (London: EUI, 1999):38). Further, the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that the Sudanese economy grew 23.5 percent from 1996 to 1999 when UN sanctions were applied (Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports: Sudan, (August, 2000):22) suggesting the sanctions had little economic impact, which considering the sanctions were mainly of the diplomatic sort, is in keeping with the intentions of the Council to put pressure on the Sudanese government without damaging the economy.

In 1994, Madeleine Albright, then the US ambassador to the UN, visited Khartoum, and warned President al-Bashir that Sudan faced further international isolation unless it took immediate steps to improve its human rights record. She also accused the Government of blocking food relief shipments to southern Sudan, and indicated that Sudan would remain on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. (Sudan was first listed 12 August 1993 and remains listed.) However, Sudan knew it had the backing of China and Russia and so it mainly ignored the measures. This support created tension between the US, China and Russia as all had different ideas about the measures that should be adopted against Sudan.

INDIRECT IMPACTS The indirect impact was the spotlight that was shone on Sudan’s activities separate from the assassination attempt. Behind the scenes discussions with Libya and the US convinced Sudan to end support to Osama bin Laden and to allow terrorists to use Sudan as a safe haven. Just as Carlos the Jackal (S/1996/940: para. 12) had been expelled, so too was Osama bin Laden in 1996 – most likely because of the widening condemnation of Sudan via the application of sanctions (S/1996/940: para 14). But it is likely that these discussions would have taken place regardless of the sanctions against Sudan – for the US, bin Laden and others were the real concern and not the assination attempt against Mubarek. According to Sudanese expert, Kerim Ousman (Interview with Dr. Kerim Ousman, Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Politics and Economics, June 15, 2010), it was highly likely that, at the time, a terrorist group that had found refuge in Sudan was bent on destabilizing the Egyptian regime. Many members of the Muslim Brotherhood, to which Ayman al Zawahiri (Ayman al Zawahiri (Egyptian born) is Osama bin Laden’s second in command and was responsible for merging the Egyptian Islamic Jihad into alQaeda) belongs, for example, were jailed, tortured and executed by the Egyptian government. And it is highly likely the Sudanese secret service would have been aware if not involved in the plot. This seems to have been the working assumption of many on the Council that, despite the poor quality of the Ethiopian investigations, the chances were very great that the attack was launched from Sudan and likely with assistance from at least the secret service section of the Sudanese government. Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan remained strained, but that was not necessarily solely becuase of the assassination attempt against Mubarak – there is a history of animosity between these 2 countries resulting from border disputes. Sudan and Egypt continued to work on joint projects during the life of the UN sanctions. Eg. : • The Coastal Egypt-Sudan Highway. • The Aswan-Wadi-Halfa-Dongola Highway. • Developing and restructuring railroads to facilitate the movement of individuals and commodities. • Extending the electricity grid to north Sudan. • Cooperating in the area of water resources and reviving the Jonglei Canal project. • Clearing the southern part of the River Nile. • Developing Sudan's irrigation and sewage network. Trade was not unduly impacted.

EVASION Evasion does not appear to have been difficult since there is scant evidence of implementation of the diplomatic sanctions aside from US and its allies. Not much is know about the individual impacts of the travel sanctions against Sudanese representatives. No doubt, for those at UN HQ, it was an inconvenience as the US required advanced notification of travel and restrictions beyond 25 miles (which could impact the daily commute for some diplomats to and from UN HQ), but this was not necessarily a new policy. It is also not known if individual Sudanese dignatories asked their host countries to remain rather than being sent back to Sudan as a result of the diplomatic sanctions/diplomatic-travel sanctions. Reporting rates of member state countries were poor and gave the bare minimum information. It is highly likely that many

states simply did not restrict Sudanese digantaries in their travels in foreign countries. And as the assassination attempt of Mubarak was quickly forgotten in most of the world, it is likely any stigma associated with Sudan for that particular crisis was also soon forgotten in the Western world.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES Unexpectedly, relations between Egypt and Sudan were not unduly impacted by the incident. Egypt lobbied the Security Council to soften the sanctions applied against Sudan given the longstanding relationship between the two. Some businesses may have curtailed travel/business with Sudan as a result, but it is far more likely this had already happned as a result of the more coercive US sanctions.

INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQSEQUENCES

Direct Impacts

Intended Consequences

Unintended Consequences

No impact on Sudanese economy (inconvenience for diplomatic core, but depended on the host country).

Assassins never extradited

OAU efforts supported Indirect Impacts

Spotlight on Sudan’s support to terrorism generally

Egypt/Sudan relations strengthened (S/1996/538)

EFFECTIVENESS Overall, the application of sanctions were a nod to the work of the OAU, but the suspects were never extradited, which means the main raison d’être of the sanctions was not achieved. On the one hand, sanctions achieved two of the three objectives namely for Sudan to renounce international terrorism (which was achieved eventually) (and so the counter-terrorism objective of the sanctions was achieved) and to signal support to the OAU (which was also achieved.) On the other, the suspects remained at large and the incident of the assassination was a side-issue to the background negotiations and pressure largely placed on Sudan by the US. Therefore, the first objective, to coerce Sudan to extradite the suspects, was not achieved. (However, it is likely there were no suspects to extradite.) Nevertheless, the sanctions were effective if only because they created the conditions for formal attention on the terrorist activities of Sudan by the Security Council even if separate and apart from the assassination attempt. This then created the space for the US and other states to negotiate with Sudan a change in policy regarding support to international terrorism while satisfying domestic audiences that something needed to be “done” with Sudan. The sanctions, however, were not associated or connected to the human rights record of Sudan and only very loosely to the civil war by the US and not until Episode 2.

EPISODE 2: 16 August 1996 – 28 September 2001 CONTEXT Four months after the diplomatic sanctions were applied and despairing at the lack of compliance by Sudan with regard to the extradition of the suspects, the Council adopted resolution 1070 (1996). On 16 August 1996 the Council threatened the application of aviation sanctions (with a built-in 90-day time delay to decide on the date of entry into force). All States were required to deny aircraft permission to take off from, land in, or overfly their

territories if the aircraft is registered in Sudan, or owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of Sudan Airways or by any undertaking, wherever located or organized, which is substantially owned or controlled by Sudan Airways, or owned, leased or operated by the Government or public authorities of Sudan, or by an undertaking, wherever located or organized, which is substantially owned or controlled by the Government orpublic authorities of Sudan. The latter never came into effect and a sanctions committee was never formed. The diplomatic sanctions lingered and no other resolutions were adopted until shortly after 9/11, when the diplomatic sanctions were officially terminated on 28 September 2001 (UNSCR 1372). The accused assassins were still at large at the time.

UNSC DECISION MAKING Roughly four months after the adoption of resolution 1054 on 16 August of 1996, with no movement on the part of Sudan and with the suspects still at large, the Security Council adopted resolution 1070 with 13 yes votes and 2 abstentions from China and the Russian Federation (The draft resolution was sponsored by Botswana, Egypt and Guinea-Bissau (S/1996/664). The resolution introduced new aviation sanctions. The Council would decide on a date of entry of force (90) days later if Sudan failed to comply. (“Further decides that it shall, 90 days after the date of adoption of this resolution, determine the date of entry into force of the provisions set out in paragraph 3 above and all aspects of the modalities of its implementation, unless the Council decides before then, on the basis of a report presented by the Secretary-General, on the compliance of Sudan with the demand in paragraph 1 above “ para 4.) Prior to the adoption of the resolution, the representative for Sudan spoke to the Council reminding them that: Sudan renews its strong condemnation of the tragic terrorist attempt on the life of the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, and firmly believes that those who participated in this terrorist crime must be brought to justice and punished. Sudan expressed its full readiness to cooperate with all parties to bring the suspects to justice, and took tangible steps in this respect even before the subject was brought before the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which discussed the question before it was brought to the Security Council (S/PV.3690 (16 August 1996): 3). Further, the representative reminded the Council that it was Sudan that provided Ethiopia with the landing card of the third suspect (who landed in Khartoum immediately after the assassination attempt) and that Sudan has continued to cooperate drawing the Council’s attention to the fact that another of the suspects, Mustafa Hamza, was hiding in Afghanistan and was corroborating with Afghan authorities (S/1996/513). The representative of Sudan pleaded: “What is asked of Sudan now? How can you give what you do not have? To request Sudan to extradite suspects it does not have is like asking it to try to square the circle, and is unjustified - unless the objective is to find an excuse to impose unjust sanctions.” (S/PV.3690: 3). After outlining what Sudan had done to improve relations with Ethiopia and Egypt, the representative then accused its third neighbour, Uganda, of supporting an insurgency movement in the south of Sudan since 1984 (S/PV.3690: 6). The representative then discussed Eritrea and stated: “Eritrea is a poison dagger; it is truly a wound festering on our eastern borders; it poses dangers that threaten to spread throughout the Horn of Africa” (S/PV.3690: 6) to discredit Ethiopia. While the UK and US made statements that they were not satisfied with the efforts Sudanto extradite the suspects , the Russian Federation stated that although it resolutely resists international terrorism, it strongly objects to the unsound practice of imposing sanctions on the basis of vague, and therefore hard-to-meet demands, without clearly formulated criteria and conditions for their imposition and lifting (S/PV.3690: 10). Further, Russia stated that “the rash use of the sanctions instrument [was] not only destructive for the people of Sudan and the countries of the region, but creat[ed] a precedent which could do real damage to the Security Council’s authority by giving the impression that the Council [was] not able to draw conclusions from past lessons.” (S/PV.3690: 10). Indonesia expressed its concern about the extent of the detrimental effects on the innocent civilian population and impact negatively on the economy and is counter to the philosophy of sanctions as non-punitive. China reaffirmed its position on sanctions stating they were not a panacea and that the tightening of sanctions, by introducing a proposed aviation sanction, would not solve the problem, but rather aggravate it. After the vote, Egypt stated the reasons for not applying more coercive measures :

We in Egypt consider our country a natural extension of Sudan and Sudan an extension of Egypt. Whatever touches the people of Sudan touches the people of Egypt, and vice versa. Egypt is very eager for the Sudanese Government to turn on to the right path so that the Sudanese people will enjoy prosperity and good relations with all their neighbours, especially with us in Egypt. We are confident that the deep-going ties that link our peoples in the north and south of the Nile valley, and which have been enhanced during the course of history, will, God willing, forever continue to grow stronger, like the waters of the Nile, the life-line of Sudan and Egypt (S/PV.3690:15). Resolution 1070 created aviation sanctions requiring states to deny aircraft permission to take off from, land in or overfly their territories if the aircraft were owned by Sudan Airways or the Sudanese government or by an undertaking that was owned or controlled by these two entities (S/RES/1070: para 3). The aviation sanctions were to come into effect on a date decided by the Council but the deicison would not be made until ninety (90) days later to allow for a report on Sudan’s compliance by the UN Secretary-General. The aviation sanctions never came into effect even though the suspects had yet to be surrendered because of the efforts of the Sudanese Government to highlight the likely humanitarian effects of such an embargo on the people of Sudan. International charities were reporting the possibility of similar humanitarian consequences (Economist Intelligence Unit, Sudan: Country Report, No. 4 (London: EIU, 1996): 15) as was the Secretary-General (S/1996/940 (November 14, 1996) should the aviation ban come into effect. The Council delayed the decision to choose a date of imposition for the aviation embargo for a month and then never revisited the date issue. (An interview with insiders is needed to understand why the date issue was dropped. I suspect it is because more pressing issues emerged and because it became quite clear that the suspects really were not in Sudan and so the UNSC could not justify the imposition of additional measures to achieve the impossible). Further attempts at strengthening the sanctions were abandoned. Instead, unilateral measures taken largely by the US in the form of cruise missile strikes in August 1998 against a pharmaceutical factory (In the end, it was determined that the factory was no more than it claimed – a factory producing medicines for Sudan.) and support to Sudan’s political opposition groups were adopted (US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with Sudanese opposition leader John Garang- leader of the SPLM/A. Another Security Council resolution was not passed on Sudan until 2001 when the sanctions were terminated by resolution 1372 adopted 28 September 2001 a few weeks after 9/11. The draft resolutions was sponsored by the nonaligned caucus - Bangladesh, Colombia, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Singapore, Tunisia and Ukraine. See S/2001/916. The Council noted the steps that Sudan had taken to comply with the Council’s demands noting especially Sudan’s recent accession to various international conventions on the suppression of terrorism (S/RES/1372 (2001): Preamb. para. 6) and then proceeded to formally terminate the sanctions outlined in resolutions 1054 acting under Chapter VII. The resolution was adopted with 14 yes votes and 1 abstention by the US. Speaking after the vote, the US noted that while Sudan had taken steps to apprehend extremists, the suspects of the assassination attempt had not been turned over to the appropriate authorities. Further and on a separate issue, the US noted the enormous suffering of the Sudanese people resulting from a civil war in the Sudan that had lasted 18 years and had caused immense human misery (S/PV.4384: 3). This is perhaps the only statement that links this first sanctions regime to the second against Sudan.

POLITICAL WILL During 1996, the Council was seized of the Balkans, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Libya, Burundi, Georgia, the Middle East, Somalia, Western Sahara, Angola, Afghanistan, Cuba, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Haiti, mine-clearance operations, Korea, Zaire and the appointment of a new Secretary-General. Sudan was “competing” with much higher priorities on the Council’s agenda.

Resolution 1070 was adopted roughly three months later on 16 August 1996. It was drafted by Botswana, Egypt and Guinea-Bissau (S/1996/664). China and Russia abstained. (While not noted in the resolution, bin Laden had recently left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996 roughly three weeks after the diplomatic and diplomatic-travel sanctions were applied. The timing suggests that the possiblity of aviation sanctions may have been a factor in the decision of bin Laden to relocate – certainly, it would complicate his ability to travel easily. However, more likely, bin Laden had no choice – the US, Saudi Arabia and Sudan were very clear bin Laden had to leave.)

The Council was divided on the nature of the type of sanctions to be applied given Sudan’s continued noncompliance with resolutions 1044 and 1054. Sudan was required to extradite the 3 suspects named by Ethiopia and denounce support to terrorism generally. The US was clearly hoping that the aviation sanctions would be more coercive than had been the diplomatic/travel sanctions. Sudan was certainly not in favour of more measures. It reminded the Council that the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter establish the legal framework for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, including the OAU. Yet it found that the States parties to the current dispute have resorted directly to the United Nations in order for it to adopt measures to condemn and punish Sudan. The Arab League was concerned about the damaging humanitarian effects of aviation sanctions (having Iraq as a “model”.) Ethiopia still wanted an arms embargo to be applied. The fact that an arms embargo was never applied (and one of the rare examples of UN sanctions that do not include one) was due to Egypt’s concern about destabilizing relations between the North and South of Sudan; Egypt was adamant, therefore, that an arms embargo not be included as part of the measures imposed.

The language of some Council members was damning of Sudan’s lack of “compliance”. (especially some of the nonpermanent members from Africa). Russia maintained that convincing evidence about the involvement of Khartoum in the assassination attempt and in the whereabouts of the suspects has not been given to the Security Council or to the Secretary-General (S/1996/3660: 14). Certainly Russia and China were not enthusiastic about the application of sanctions against Sudan (as mild as they were), hence the abstentions. While the US would likely have supported more coercive sanctions, it agreed to the 90-day grace period “to give the Sudanese a chance to abandon their attempt to defy the will of the Security Council and the norms of international decency” (S/1996/3690: 9-10). In contrast, Russia decried : “the rash use of the sanctions instrument is not only destructive for the people of Sudan and the countries of the region, but creates a precedent which could do real damage to the Security Council’s authority by giving the impression that the Council is not able to draw conclusions from past lessons” (S/1996/3690: 10). China stated that it does: “not consider sanctions a panacea because sanctions, or the tightening of sanctions, cannot solve a problem; they may, on the contrary, further aggravate the problem. Restrictions on Sudan Airways constitute an escalation in the sanctions regime on the Sudan” (S/1996/3660:12). Even Egypt noted that it was concerned for the people of Sudan stating: “Egypt finds it unacceptable to be behind anything that affects the interests of the Sudanese people, adds to its economic suffering in its daily life or harms its territorial integrity” (S/PV.3660: 15). As Egypt was a member of the Council and directly affected, it was primarily responsible for setting the tone of measures applied. Egypt was clearly torn by the events. On the one hand they could not let Sudan go unscathed, but on the other, Sudan was an important partner for Egypt. The state that was the most exercised was Ethiopia suggesting that the assassination was not just an attack against the Prime Minister of Egypt, but against Ethiopia and by extension Africa because Ethiopia was the president of the OAU at the time. Ethiopia and Sudan, however, had long been at odds. It was clear that aviation sanctions were at the limit of what 3 members would allow. The President of the Council received many letters with conflicting advice on and about Sudan (S/1996/197, S/1996/201, letters dated 14 and 15 March 1996, respectively, from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1996/226, S/1996/246, S/1996/255 and S/1996/311, letters dated 28 March, 4 April, 8 April and 22 April 1996, respectively, from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1996/271, letter dated 11 April 1996 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1996/254 and S/1996/264, letters dated 8 April and 11 April 1996, respectively, from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1996/288, letter dated 15 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1996/294, letter dated 12 April 1996 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Central African Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.) But the letters didn’t seem to change the minds of those on the Council – Russia, China and Egypt would not support more coercive measures and the US did not push the issue.

PURPOSE(S) (coerce, constrain, signal) The principal purpose of the resolution to potentially adopt aviation sanctions were to coerce and constrain (return suspects in assassination attempt AND end Sudan’s support to international terrorism) and to signal support for the OAU. (Support is not one of the criteria, but I think an important goal in this case). Why aviation sanctions were contemplated is not clear. It was likely the next most coercive measure besides limiting the trade in petroleum (which after the expereince of Iraq was not an option). But this needs to be confirmed. There is an argument to be made that given that the aviation sanctions never came into effect, it was an example of what Margaret Doxey refers to as “gesture” sanctions. Sudan was fairly confident that China and Russia would not allow the aviation sanctions to come to fruition.

AUDIENCE[S] SIGNALLED Resolution 1070 (1996) was really a threat of sanctions as it had a built in 90-day delay to decide on a date of future entry into force. Given the number of caveats, Sudan and much of the world must have suspected it was highly unlikely the measures would come into force – especially given the world’s concern with the aviation sanctions against Iraq and the FRY at the time. The signals set via resolution 1070 therefore, were muted by this fact. The sanctions are of the sort that Margaret Doxey would refer to as “gesture sanctions”. In August 1996, the P3 (UK, US and France) were far more concerned by reported violations of sanctions against Libya by Libyanregistered aircraft than they were by the situation in Sudan. For Sudan, the aviation confirmed the lack of unanimity on the Council – on the one hand, it was clear the US still condemned Sudan’s support to terrorism, but the US didn’t seem particularly concerned about the status of the suspects. On the other hand, it was clear that Russia, China and Egypt would prevent very coercive measures from being applied against it. Therefore, there was very little incentive to cooperate. And given that Sudan maintained that it had no idea of the whereabouts of the assassins, it was not in a position to do more (bin Laden and the Jackal were no longer in Sudan) beyond outlining its pledge to stop the support to terrorism and accede to international treaties. By adopting resolution 1070, the Council was also sending a signal to all states regarding the Council’s stance on international terrorism, which it found deeply disturbing and noted the deleterious effect it has on international peace and security. However, at the time of adoption, only 48 states had written to the SG outlining the steps to put into force resolution 1054 and many of them stated they did not have any Sudanese representation in their state and so no measures need be adopted. (S/1996/541/Add.1). Note, however, that the Council did not use this opportunity to encourage states to ratify the various instruments against terrorism other than to recall the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents that opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973.

Another audience was the OAU. By borrowing extensively from the wording of the OAU letters, the Council signalled its support for the work of the organization. Given that Ethiopia held the Chair of the President of the OAU and was host to President Mubarak, the sanctions were applied to continue to bolster the OAU’s efforts to develop a regional response to terrorism. The fact that the evidence provided by Ethiopia was so poor and unprofessional and yet sanctions were still applied is taken as confirmation of the Council’s desire to support the OAU and suspicion that Sudan was most likely actively supporting international terrorism rather than whole hearted acceptance of the findings. This signal had not changed from the previous resolutions.

TYPE OF TARGETED SANCTIONS (the design of the measures) The Council, pursuant to Chapter VII, decided that all States shall deny aircraft permission to take off from, land in, or overfly their territories if the aircraft is registered in Sudan, or owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of Sudan Airways or by any undertaking, wherever located or organized, which is substantially owned or controlled by Sudan Airways, or owned, leased or operated by the Government or public authorities of Sudan, or by an undertaking, wherever located or organized, which is substantially owned or controlled by the

Government or public authorities of Sudan. However, there was a built in delay of 90 days to determine the date of entry into force of the provisions of the aviation sanctions and all aspects of the modalities of its implementation unless a report by the SecretaryGeneral convinced the Council of compliance by Sudan.

COORDINATION WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM AND RELATED MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES (with other UN Agencies, SRSGs, and UN Peacekeeping forces, if applicable and with IAEA and multi-party talks, if relevant) As the sanctions never came into effect, there was no need for coordination. The OAU continued to demand for the extradition of the suspects, but to no avail. It is likely the secret services of the US, Egypt, Israel and others were tracking their whereabouts. In the end, it was Iran that alleged turned over the suspects to Egypt in 2005 (There continue to be conflicting reports).

INTERACTION WITH OTHER SANCTIONS REGIMES (Unilateral measures, Regional organization measures) As the aviation sanctions never came into effect, there was no need for coordination with other (US/EU sanctions. (Include any relevant updated information regarding those sanctions

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Use of force, covert actions, tribunals, referral to ICC) Not directly applicable, although the US launched a missile attack against a pharmaceuticals factory in Khartoum on 20 August 1998 in response to the US Embassy bombings. (The Embassy bombings were linked to local members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri ). In the end, it was determined that the factory was no more than it claimed – a factory producing medicines for Sudan. The US compensated Sudan.

IMPLEMENTATION (assessing monitoring and enforcement) Aviation sanctions were neither imposed by the Security Council nor implemented by Member Statesadn teh diplomatic sanctions simply languished. Depite calls by the SG to have member states update him on the latest measures, only a handful of states sent one word letters to the effect that « measures remain in place ». Time delays are usually adopted for two contrasting reasons. The first is to ensure more time for facts and information to come to light on levels of compliance by the target. The second reason is in anticipation of the desire to apply more coercive measures ensuring the target has opportunity to respond before they are applied. In the case of Sudan, it is clearly the former that is the reason for the delays. A second reason unique to Sudan may be that the Council was not wholly convinced by the evidence provided by Ethiopia. If it had, it is far more likely they would have applied the sanctions without delay and/or imposed more biting sanctions as was the case with Libya’s state-sponsorship of terrorism in 1992 (the 748 regime).

DIRECT IMPACTS The aviation sanctions never came into effect so thedirect impact was minimal except perhaps for the signal it sent to Sudan that it had come within an inch of potentially very coercive sanctions (this may have helped to persuade Sudan to ensure bin Laden left the country). In terms of impact on trade, it was the US unilateral sanctions against Sudan that had the greatest impact. Table 1: US trade losses owing to US economic sanctions in effect in 2000 (millions of US dollars (Table is from Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Barbara Oegg Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd(Washington DC: PIIE, 2007): 208.

Calculated reduction in US trade with Sudan on account of US sanctions

Actual US trade with Sudan for 1999

Two-way trade

Exports

Imports

Two-way trade

Exports

Imports

9

9

0

-26

-6

-19

Table 2: All partner trade losses owing to US economic sanctions in effect in 2000 (millions of US dollars) (Table is from Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Barbara Oegg Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd (Washington DC: PIIE, 2007): 209.)

Actual all partner trade with Sudan for 1999

Calculated reduction in all partner trade with Sudan on account of US sanctions

Two-way trade

Exports

Imports

Two-way trade

Exports

Imports

9

9

0

-14

-6

-9

The Economist Intelligence Unit reported that the Sudanese economy grew 23.5 percent from 1996 to 1999 when UN sanctions were applied (Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports: Sudan, (August, 2000):22) suggesting the sanctions had little economic impact, which considering the sanctions were mainly of the diplomatic sort, is in keeping with the intentions of the Council to put pressure on the Sudanese government without damaging the economy.

INDIRECT IMPACTS Prior to the application of the aviation sanctions, which likely would have had been very coercive, the Security Council sent an assessment team to evaluate their impact. In the resulting document dated 20 February 1997, it was concluded that the consequences would be too devastating because it would hinder the evacuation of the critically ill, restrict the import of medicines and vaccines and food (UNDHA, Note from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs Concerning the Possible Humanitarian Impact of the International Flight Ban Decided in Security Council Resolution 1070 (1996) (20 February 1997): 2, and 16). There were also concerns that it might jeopardize “Operation Life Line”, which had been established to send food aid to the south of Sudan to prevent famine (Ibid: 4-7). (A similar preassessment was carried out before sanctions were placed against Sierra Leone and the DRC.)

Cortright and Lopez also suggest that an indirect consequence of the sanctions may have been to create a split between the powerful Islamic National Front of Sudan and the country’s military leaders (The Sanctions Decade 2000: 126). This, however, may have had more to do with the ongoing civil war with the South than with the weak UN sanctions. According to Sudanese expert, Kerim Ousman (Interview with Dr. Kerim Ousman, Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Politics and Economics, June 15, 2010) it was highly likely that several terrorists had found refuge in Sudan who were bent on destabilizing the Egyptian regime. Many members of the Muslim Brotherhood, to which Ayman al Zawahiri (Ayman al Zawahiri (Egyptian born) is Osama bin Laden’s second in command and was responsible for merging the Egyptian Islamic Jihad into al-Qaeda) belongs, for example, were jailed, tortured and executed by the Egyptian government. And it is highly likely the Sudanese secret service would have been aware if not involved in the plot against Mubarak. This seems to have been the working assumption of many on the Council that, despite the poor quality of the information provided by the

Ethiopian investigations, the chances were great that the attack was launched from Sudan in some form and likely with assistance from at least the secret service section of the Sudanese government.

EVASION There was little to evade as the aviation sanctions never came into effect.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES Perhaps the most significant unintended consequence of the threat of avaiation sanctions was the push it MAY have provided to Sudan to justify its decision to expel Bin Laden. Bin Laden found safe haven and refuge in Afghanistan that allowed al Qaeda to rebuild and train recruits resulting in 9/11 attacks. It is unlikely that the UN sanctions alone were that significant (espeically as bin Laden left shortly after the first episode of sanctions), however, the constant pressure placed on Sudan by the US via its unilateral measures and the potential threat of UN aviation sanctions may have played a role in convincing Sudan that it had to do more to denounce its support to terrorism. (Totally separate and apart from the UN sanctions, the isolation of Afghanistan resulting from the insular Taliban, there were few limitations on Bin Laden’s activities in Afghanistan. As Sudan is the largest African country with powerful neighbours and a government that does interact with them (especially Egypt and Libya), bin Laden may have been more constrained in his activities while in Sudan. In Afghanistan, he was left relatively unhindered.) US sanctions apparently caused concern in some business circles because it cut off the world’s largest supply of Gum Arabic - a derivative of the acacia tree - and an important ingredient in various products ranging from soda and candy to pharmaceuticals. Gum arabic is also used in the newspaper and magazine printing process, allowing ink to better stick to the paper while keeping it from smearing, as well as protecting the printing plates from oxidation. Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Mexico also export gum arabic, but Sudan is by far the largest exporter. The result of the lobbying efforts was an exemption placed on gum arabic allowing companies to apply for a license which permits them to import gum arabic from Sudan. (See http://www1.american.edu/ted/gumarab.htm) But this is related to US not UN sanctions and is not widely reported – it requires further research. There is no data on the effects of the threats of UN sanctions (the aviation sanctions… it may be that this dissuaded businesses from setting up shop in Sudan, but it is difficult to measure “might have beens”.

INTEGRATING IMPACTS AND CONSEQUENCES (if implemented) Intended Consequences Direct Impacts

-

Potentially great economic impacts

Indirect Impacts

-

Might jeopardize food supplies

Unintended Consequences -

signaled to Sudan the P5 continued to be divided

-

Sudan and Egypt forged closer ties

-

Bin Laden set up in Afghanistan

-

EFFECTIVENESS The aviation sanctions were never implemented so they were clearly not « effective ». However, the threat of aviation sanctions (and it is surprising China and Russia even agreed to a threat of aviation sanctions) must have made Sudan sit up and taken notice. Overall, the application of sanctions were a nod to the work of the OAU, but the suspects were never extradited,

which means the main raison d’être of the sanctions (to coerce Sudan) was not achieved. On the one hand, sanctions achieved two of the three objectives namely for Sudan to renounce international terrorism (counter-terrorism - which was achieved) and to signal support to the OAU (which was also achieved.) On the other, the suspects remained at large and the incident of the assassination was a side-issue to the background negotiations and pressure largely placed on Sudan by the US. Most importantly, the language of the resolutions start to signal the Council’s general concern for the destabilizing effects of terrorism. The sanctions applied were targeted and very weak and did not include the traditional arms embargo. Given that there was a background civil war and nearly all other UN sanctions regimes have been subject to one, it is notable that Sudan I was not subject to an embargo. As well, the lack of sanctions committee meant that monitoring of the sanctions was minimal. Nevertheless, the sanctions were partially effective if only because they created the conditions for formal attention on the terrorist activities of Sudan by the Security Council even if separate and apart from the assassination attempt. This then created the space for the US and other states to negotiate with Sudan a change in policy regarding support to international terrorism while satisfying domestic audiences that something needed to be “done” with Sudan. The sanctions, however, were not associated or connected to the human rights record of Sudan and only very loosely to the civil war by the US. The episodes span six years in which time Sudan turned from international pariah to an important partner of the US against international terrorism – especially in its refusal to provide shelter to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. This transformation, however, is separate from the sanctions applied by the Security Council and has much more to do with the individual pressure exerted against the Sudan by the US first and foremost and by neighbouring states like Libya. As well, the Council’s sanctions never referred to any particular groups of terrorists other than the suspected assassins and “international terrorism” (especially state-sponsored forms) generally. The sanctions were anaemic by all accounts – no Committee was ever struck, there was disagreement amongst the P5 as to how to deal with Sudan and the enthusiasm and support for the sanctions diminished with each episode.

Osama bin Laden While not directly related to the sanctions against Sudan, the movements of bin Laden are integral to the decision of the Council to finally terminate sanctions in 2001. It needs to be stressed that little urgency was given by the international community to Al Qaeda and bin Laden at that time. The first media reports were released at this time, largely because US embassy bombings of 1998 and then preparations for Y2K (Shift from 1999 to 2000 – especially what would happen to the billions of computer and computer-run machines around the world and the potential resulting chaos that could exploited by terrorists). Among intelligence and counter-terrorism experts bin Laden was an emerging but still very poorly understood factor. In 1991, bin Laden moved to Sudan, invited by Sudanese political leader, Hassan al-Turabi. In exchange for helping Turabi in an ongoing war against African Christian separatists in the South of Sudan, bin Laden was provided with a base for business and jihad operations (9/11 Commission : 57). From Sudan, bin Laden grew his terrorist network – tentacles extended from this base to the rest of the world including to Bosnia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Africa, Iraq, and the US (9/11 Commission : 58). A Sudanese military officer is reported to have sold bin Laden a cylinder (of what would turn out to be ‘bogus’) uranium (9/11 Commission : 58). Bin Laden left Sudan 19 May 1996 for Afghanistan just days after the first round of diplomatic sanctions and travel sanctions were imposed. Sudan had become a “doubtful haven” (9/11 Commission : 58). By the second round of sanctions banning Sudanese aircrafts from taking off, landing or overflying the territory of any state 16 August 1996, bin Laden had already left Sudan. Whether causally or coincidentally connected to the departure of bin Laden, the aviation sanctions never came into force. Instead, the weak diplomatic and travel sanctions remained in place until shortly after 9/11 terminating on 28 September 2001 pursuant to

resolution 1372 at which time Sudan had pledged its support to the US to aid it in the global fight against terrorism. Bin Laden was eventually killed by US special forces on 1 May 2011. He was found in a military compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

From the US Embassy in Khartoum, an assessment of US-Sudan relations: Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the U.S. in June 1967, following the outbreak of the ArabIsraeli War. Relations improved after July 1971, when the Sudanese Communist Party attempted to overthrow President Nimeiri, and Nimeiri suspected Soviet involvement. U.S. assistance for resettlement of refugees following the 1972 peace settlement with the south added further improved relations. On March 1, 1973, Palestinian terrorists of the "Black September" organization murdered U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission Curtis G. Moore in Khartoum. Sudanese officials arrested the terrorists and tried them on murder charges. In June 1974, however, they were released to the custody of the Egyptian Government. The U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan was withdrawn in protest. Although the U.S. Ambassador returned to Khartoum in November, relations with the Sudan remained static until early 1976, when President Nimeiri mediated the release of 10 American hostages being held by Eritrean insurgents in rebel strongholds in northern Ethiopia. In 1976, the U.S. decided to resume economic assistance to Sudan. In late 1985, there was a reduction in staff at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum because of the presence in Khartoum of a large contingent of Libyan terrorists. In April 1986, relations with Sudan deteriorated when the U.S. bombed Tripoli, Libya. A U.S. Embassy employee was shot on April 16, 1986. Immediately following this incident, all non-essential personnel and all dependents left for six months. At this time, Sudan was the single largest recipient of U.S. development and military assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. However, official U.S. development assistance was suspended in 1989 in the wake of the military coup against the elected government, which brought to power the National Islamist Front led by General Bashir. U.S. relations with Sudan were further strained in the 1990s. Sudan backed Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait and provided sanctuary and assistance to Islamic terrorist groups. In the early and mid-1990s, Carlos the Jackal, Osama bin Laden, Abu Nidal, and other terrorist leaders resided in Khartoum. Sudan’s role in the radical Pan-Arab Islamic Conference represented a matter of great concern to the security of American officials and dependents in Khartoum, resulting in several draw downs and/or evacuations of U.S. personnel from Khartoum in the early-mid 1990s. Sudan’s Islamist links with international terrorist organizations represented a special matter of concern for the U.S. Government, leading to Sudan's 1993 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and a suspension of U.S. Embassy operations in Khartoum in 1996. In October 1997, the U.S. imposed comprehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against the Sudan. In August 1998, in the wake of the East Africa embassy bombings, the U.S. launched cruise missile strikes against Khartoum. The last U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan, Ambassador Tim Carney, departed post prior to this event and no new ambassador has been designated since. The U.S. Embassy is headed by a Charge d’Affaires. The Embassy continues to re-evaluate its posture in Sudan, particularly in the wake of the January 1, 2008, killings of a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) employee and his Sudanese driver in Khartoum. The U.S. and Sudan entered into a bilateral dialogue on counterterrorism in May 2000. Sudan has provided concrete cooperation against international terrorism since the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes on New York and Washington. However, although Sudan publicly supported the international coalition actions against the al Qaida network and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the government criticized the U.S. strikes in that country and opposed a widening of the effort against international terrorism to other countries. Sudan remains on the state sponsors of terrorism list. In response to the Government of Sudan’s continued complicity in unabated violence occurring in Darfur, President Bush imposed new economic sanctions on Sudan in May 2007. The sanctions

blocked assets of Sudanese citizens implicated in Darfur violence, and also sanctioned additional companies owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan. Sanctions continue to underscore U.S. efforts to end the suffering of the millions of Sudanese affected by the crisis in Darfur. Despite policy differences the U.S. has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to the Sudan throughout the last quarter century. The U.S. was a major donor in the March 1989 "Operation Lifeline Sudan," which delivered 100,000 metric tons of food into both government and SPLA-held areas of the Sudan, thus averting widespread starvation. In 1991, the U.S. made major donations to alleviate food shortages caused by a two-year drought. In a similar drought in 2000-01, the U.S. and the international community responded to avert mass starvation in the Sudan. In 2001 the Bush administration named a presidential envoy for peace in the Sudan to explore what role the U.S. could play in ending Sudan's civil war and enhancing the delivery of humanitarian aid. Andrew Natsios and subsequently Ambassador Richard Williamson served as presidential envoys to Sudan during the Bush administration. On March 18, 2009 President Obama announced the appointment of Major General (Ret.) J. Scott Gration as the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan. On October 19, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, accompanied by Special Envoy Gration and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, announced the Obama administration’s new Sudan strategy. U.S. strategy in Sudan is comprised of three core principles: 1) Achieving a definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur; 2) Implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other; and 3) Ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists. (US Embassy in Khartoum at http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html)

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL In the following box you may add background or reference material that is too generic for inclusion elsewhere in the template.

Sudan Country Background Civil wars and military regimes have dominated Sudan since its independence from the UK in 1956. The major civil wars have been between the dominant Arab, Muslim north (and seat of government) and the non-Muslim, non-Arab south of the country. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was finally reached in January 2005.1 The latest armed conflict beginning in 2003 pits the capital Khartoum against the western region of Darfur and has resulted in the indictment of the President and key officials to the International Criminal Court (ICC) .

Sudan was subject to another military coup in 1989 called the “Salvation Revolution”. The coup was carried out by the Islamist-oriented military leadership headed by General Umar al-Bashir and conceived by a civilian Islamist movement headed by Dr. Hasan al-Turabi. After the coup, Dr. Turabi2 led the main Islamist party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), during the brief parliamentary period. Bashir served as president of the Revolutionary Command Committee before becoming the President of Sudan in 1993 and head of the National Congress Party (NCP). Bashir was the non1

The CPA established a new Government of National Unity and an interim Government of Southern Sudan and called for wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and security arrangements between the two parties. The historic agreement provides for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops from southern Sudan, and the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. It also stipulated that by the end of the fourth year of an interim period there would be elections at all levels, including for national and southern Sudan president, state governors, and national, southern Sudan, and state legislatures. 2 Dr. Turabi was educated at Khartoum, Oxford and the Sorbonne. He was a founding member of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. He fled to Libya when General Gaafar Numeiri took power in 1969. He reconciled with President Numeiri in 1979 and was appointed Minister of Justice promoting Shari’a law. In 1985 he founded the National Islamic Front (INF).

secular political force for Sudan while Turabi was the decidedly secular force. Bashir dissolved the military junta which brought him to power and appointed himself civilian president in a move designed to establish Islamic government in Africa's largest country as stable and civilian-based. Opposition groups and the Command Committee, therefore, were disbanded in order to concentrate power in the hands of Bashir. Al- Turabi, however, continued to shape government policies pursuing Islamic fundamentalism. Afghan-Arabs, who had fought the Sovietbacked regime in Afghanistan, were thus invited to settle in Sudan in the 1990s. As well, Palestinian Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Egyptian Jamaah al–Islamiyah, the Algerian Front Islamique du Salut, the Tunisian al Handah Party and Osama bin Laden found shelter in Sudan. (In addition, the non-Islamic terrorist, Carlos the Jackal, lived in Sudan between 1992-1994.) Sudan became the coordinating point for an international Islamist movement that culminated in the convening of three Popular Arab and Islamic Conferences (PAICs). Al-Turabi saw them as a vehicle for restructuring world order replacing Western-dominated UN structure (and challenging the Organisation of Islamic Conference) by a new, Islamist one.

The radicalization of Sudan throughout the 1990s meant relations with Sudan’s neighbours were strained – especially with Egypt, who suspected Sudan of harbouring Egyptian Islamist groups (especially Islamic Jihad and Jamaah al-Islamiyah), bent on attacking President Mubarak’s rule. Libya also accused Sudan of supporting Libyan Islamists who attacked government personnel in the east of Libya. Saudi Arabia resented Sudan’s criticism of it, particularly its hosting US troops during the Gulf War. Furthermore, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda were battling incursions into their territory by opposition elements that found refuge in Sudan (and vice-versa). As a result, Sudan was placed on the US government’s list of states supporting terrorism in 1993 and subject to a US missile attack in 1998 against a pharmaceutical factory suspected of producing chemical weapons and with links to al-Qaeda. (No chemicals were discovered.) The EU suspended development aid to Sudan in 1990 and imposed an arms embargo in 1994 in response to Sudan’s human rights record.3

In the mid-1990s after Bashir’s re-election as President in 1996, Turabi and Bashir broke their alliance. Turabi, as Speaker of the Assembly, had been successful in convincing Bashir to allow opposition parties to register. When Turabi introduced a bill in Parliament to curb the President’s powers, Bashir dissolved Parliament, declared a state of emergency and ejected Turabi. Turabi formed and headed an opposition group called the Popular Congress Party (CPC) and signed an agreement with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which seeks independence for the South of Sudan. Turabi has since been arrested, jailed and released on numerous occasions on suspicion of conspiracy against Bashir and for his calls for Bashir to surrender to the ICC. The latest round of Presidential and Parliamentary elections was held in April 2010. Bashir’s NPC won 306 of the possible 450 seats in Parliament. The SPLM/A won 99.4 The legitimacy of Bashir’s win is questioned. On 12 July 2010, the ICC issued a second arrest warrant for al-Bashir for the crime of genocide and has asked the Security Council to do more to enforce it.

Nonpermanent Security Council members for 1996: Botswana, Chile, Egypt, Germany, GuineaBissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Poland, and Republic of Korea.

3

See Clara Portela, European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why do they Work?, (London: Routledge, 2010): 67. 4 This summary is taken from several assessments of Sudan. See Tim Niblock, “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya and Sudan. (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001): 199-202; Jane Boulden (ed) Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations (New York NY: Palgrave, 2003): 185-214.; CIA Factbook; European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation; US Department of State, UN website and various news reports.

Experts Interviewed Dr. Kerim Ousman, Professor, Department of Political Science and Economics, Royal Military College Mr. Rico Carish, UN Panel of Expert Ms. Loraine Rickard-Martin, former UN Secretariat policy officer, Political Affairs Sudanese Embassy to Canada Works Cited Note: all UN documents can be found on the UN’s bibliographic information system “UNBISNET” at http://unbisnet.un.org/. Select either bibliographic records or voting records. For Security Council resolutions, type in S/RES/ and the number of the resolution; for verbatim records of Security Council meetings, type in S/PV. and the meeting number; for committee and panel reports to the Security Council, type in S/ and number; for General Assembly resolutions, type in A/RES/ and number of the resolution. Jane Boulden (ed) Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations (New York NY: Palgrave, 2003). Cortright, D. and Lopez, G.A. (eds) (1995) Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a PostCold War World? Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Cortright, D., Lopez, G.A., with Conroy, R.W., Dashti-Gibson, J. and Wagler, J. (2000) The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher. Cortright, D., and Lopez, G. A. (eds) (2002a) Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Ltd. Cortright,D., Lopez, G.A., with Gerber, L. (2002b) Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher. Margaret Doxey (1970) ‘Economic sanctions in the international enforcement process’, Ph.D. diss., University of London. Margaret Doxey. (1987) International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives, London: Macmillan Press. Farrall, J.M. (2007) United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nada Merub, “Sudan”, 1995 Human Rights Development Yearbook. (1996). Tim Niblock, “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya and Sudan. (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). Clara Portela, European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why do they Work? (London: Routledge, 2010). Dianne E. Rennack, CRS Report to Congress “Sudan, Economic Sanctions” (11 October 2005). http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/55628.pdf

H. A. Siddiq, “Economic sanctions and trade diversions in Sudan,” Working Paper, 2009

US Embassy in Khartoum at http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html) Yearbook of the United Nations 1995 (Vol. 49) Elizabeth Flynn-Connors (ed) (New York, 1997). Yearbook of the United Nations 1996 (Vol. 50) Elizabeth Flynn-Connors (ed) (New York, 1998).

On Terrorism Boulden, J. (2007) ‘Terrorism’, in T.G. Weiss and S. Daws (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, London: Oxford University Press. Boulden, J. and Weiss, T. G. (eds) (2004) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11th, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Chamberlain, K. (1983) ‘Collective suspension of air services with states which harbour hijackers’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 32(3): 616-632. de Jonge Oudraat, C. (2004) ‘The role of the Security Council’, in J. Boulden and T.G. Weiss (eds) Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11th, 151-72; Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Luck, E.C. (2004) ‘Tackling Terrorism’, in D. Malone, D. (ed.) The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 62; New York: WW. Norton. US

Department of State ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’ Online. (accessed 17 November 2010).

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