Iran`s Nuclear Program - The Swiss Global Economics

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Competing Narratives, Hard Choices August 29, 2012

On balance, Iran’s nuclear program is most consistent with? 1. Peaceful purposes 2. Attaining nuclear weapons 3. Other

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Elements of Iran’s nuclear program Program element

Status

Safeguard s

Uranium mining

operating

N

Uranium conversion

operating

Y

Uranium enrichment

operating

Y

Suitable plutonium reactor

constr.

Y

Reprocessing

no

n.a.

Conversion to metal

tested

Y

Casting to weapons shapes

docs.

N

Precisely timed detonators

exper.

N

Explosives arranged to crush sphere

exper.

N

Neutron initiator

materials

N

Missile reentry vehicle for warhead

docs.

N

Weaponization

Iranian Nuclear Facilities

Natanz Enrichment Facility

Fordow Enrichment Facility

The story so far: key moments in the history of Iran’s nuclear program 8/2002: Opposition group reveals Natanz 5/2003: U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 10/2003: Iran-EU3 deal: suspension, Additional Protocol 2004: Partial suspension collapse, renewed deal 2005, January-March: Iran proposes series of measures in EU3 talks, but insists enrichment would continue 2005, June: Ahmadinejad elected Iranian president 2005, August: Iran rejects European incentive package, resumes U conversion at Isfahan 2005, September: IAEA Board finds “non-compliance,” but postpones reporting to Security Council 2005, October: Iran-EU3 talks resume, no progress

The story so far: key moments in the history of Iran’s nuclear program (II) 2006, January: Iran resumes enrichment work 2006, February: IAEA Board refers Iran to Security Council; 1st small cascades begin testing with UF6 at Natanz 2006, March: UNSC statement asks Iran to suspend 2006, June: UNSC resolution requires Iran to suspend 2006, June: P5+1 offer enhanced incentives package, talks with U.S. participation, if Iran suspends (Iran says open to talks, but declines to suspend) 2006, December: Security Council imposes 1st sanctions 2007, March: Security Council imposes add’l sanctions 2007, August: Iran and IAEA agree on “work plan” to resolve outstanding questions – appears to limit opening of new questions

The story so far: key moments in the history of Iran’s nuclear program (III) 2007, December: U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) says Iran stopped nuclear weapon design work in 2003 2008, June: EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana presents updated incentives package, U.S. Undersecretary Burns takes part in talks – no substantive progress 2009, Jan-March: Pres. Obama takes office, offers unconditional talks, sends letter to Khamenei 2009, June: Disputed Iranian presidential election 2009, September: Iran offers package of proposals on various international issues, barely mentions nuclear question 2009, September: Secret Fordow enrichment plant revealed 2009, October: U.S. Undersecretary Burns meets with Iranian negotiators and others in P5+1; negotiators in Vienna reach tentative deal on swap of LEU for TRR fuel

The story so far: key moments in the history of Iran’s nuclear program (IV) 2009, Nov-Dec: After domestic controversy, Iran proposes changes to TRR deal unacceptable to P5+1 2010, February: Iran announces it is enriching to 20%, ostensibly to provide TRR fuel in absence of deal 2010, June: Iran-Brazil-Turkey propose fuel swap deal – U.S. and others reject 2010, June: Additional UNSC sanctions (more U.S. and EU sanctions during 2010 also; Russia agrees no S-300) 2010, Dec.: New Iran P5+1 talks, no substantive progress 2011, May: Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant begins operation 2011, Nov.: Comprehensive IAEA report, including annex on “possible military dimension” 2012, Feb.: IAEA report on additional enrichment capacity, including to 20% at Fordow

Building, slowdown, acceleration, while the impasse goes on…

Source: Institute for Science and International Security

The U.S. narrative • Iran’s “civil” nuclear programs is a figleaf for a weapons program – otherwise no need for enrichment • Iran threatens U.S. and world security – supports terrorism, threatens Israel, sponsors militias that kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, seeks to dominate the Gulf • P5+1 offers are very generous – Iran’s rejection of P5+1 promise of help on civilian nuclear energy makes clear that civil power is not Iran’s real goal • Iran has repeatedly violated its safeguards obligations, continues to conceal its nuclear weapons work • Iran has never been negotiating in good faith, has only “suspended” when it wasn’t technically ready to move forward • Iran is defying the entire international community

The Iranian narrative • Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful, within NPT • Iran was forced into concealment by Western efforts to stymie nuclear supply • Iran needs nuclear power to avoid using up its valuable oil and gas, needs enrichment to fuel reactor if there’s a cutoff of supply – has post-79 experience with supply cutoffs • Iran has given the IAEA transparency far behind what it is obligated to provide, corrected all past issues – only remaining disagreements are over Western fabrications, in areas far beyond the IAEA’s mandate • Iran voluntarily suspended its enrichment and reprocessing activities – got nothing in return • Iran has the same rights as all other NPT members

The Iranian narrative (II) • Iran does not support terrorism; it supports legitimate social movements (Hezbollah, Hamas…) • Iran has not threatened or waged aggressive war against any other state for centuries • Much of the world supports Iran’s legitimate rights • The United States will never accept the very existence of the Islamic Republic – so no value to Iran of nuclear deal • The United States and Israel have waged an unrelenting campaign of threats and intimidation, and have manipulated the IAEA and the Security Council • The EU3 and the P5+1 have never negotiated with Iran in good faith – incentives package proposes to “discuss” benefits for Iran after Iran gives up all its cards

The European narrative • With 2003-2006 suspension, Europe had a major success in showing it can pull together as a team, play a leading international role • While hoping for more active U.S. participation, EU-3 secured U.S. backing for proposals • Iran negotiated in bad faith, simply strung out the talks to get maximum benefit while giving nothing up • Tougher sanctions are essential to get Iran to back down • Issues related to Iran’s other foreign policy behavior are more complex than the United States makes them out to be • Military strikes should be considered, but only as a last-ditch option

The Russian narrative • Iran, while sometimes annoying, is a legitimate player in the international system, with its own rights and interests that have to be addressed – and a legitimate recipient of arms sales and civil nuclear sales • Nuclear cooperation with Iran increases Russia’s ability to influence Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons • Iran should stop enrichment and buy a share in the International Enrichment Center at Angarsk, so that it can take part in the profits of enrichment without gaining any access to the technology • Sanctions are not likely to be effective – the only solution is a real deal that addresses Iran’s interests, as well as those of the United States and others • Unilateral U.S. military action (like Iraq) is unacceptable

The Chinese narrative • All issues between Iran and the West should be resolved through dialogue • The key issue is compliance with the NPT. While China would prefer that their be no enrichment in Iran, if Iran complies with the NPT, all other issues can be addressed through compromise • Sanctions are not likely to be effective; China opposes them • Unilateral U.S. military action (like Iraq) is unacceptable • The real solution is for the United States and Europe to offer Iran strong security guarantees and economic incentives, so it no longer feels it needs nuclear weapons • China, as a major player in the international system, supports nonproliferation, has supported the UN resolutions, and has participated in the P5+1 effort

Key questions for negotiators • What should you demand initially? • What should you be prepared to settle for? • What should you offer – or threaten – to convince the other side to give you some or all of what you want? Can you put together a package of carrots and sticks that’s big enough, and believable enough, to convince the other side? • What issues should you focus on, in what order? – Nuclear issue?

• NPT compliance • Enrichment capability • Transparency/verification

– Issues where there are common interests? • Counter-narcotics • Incidents at sea • Possibly Iraq, Afghanistan

– Terrorism, Israel, human rights, U.S. sanctions and threats…

Facts any policy must cope with • Iran has ~8,000 centrifuges installed at Natanz • 20% enrichment is expanding • Iran has substantial enrichment knowledge – can’t be destroyed or negotiated away • Intense U.S.-Iranian hostility, distrust • U.S. has many issues with Iran – Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, Israel, etc. – going well beyond nuclear issue. And Iran has many issues with the United States – Limits what can be offered for nuclear deal (e.g., diplomatic recognition, security assurances)

• Many other states – Europe, Russia, China, Israel, Gulf states, etc. – also have major interests at stake • Iran has huge reserves of oil and gas – impossible to completely isolate, exclude from world economy

Facts any policy must cope with (II) • Israel, Gulf states have major concerns over growing Iranian power, will push hard for their preferred outcomes • All outcomes will have an impact on nonproliferation regime, credibility of Security Council, and more • Iranian government is sclerotic, factionalized, legitimacychallenged, has immense difficulty making hard choices – Negotiated deal would require giving Iranian advocates of compromise enough to convince Ayatollah Khamenei to say “yes” – No faction can afford to be seen as buckling to foreign pressure – Some factions do not believe compromise would bring any benefit – Iranian government has succeeded in framing issue as “colonial powers trying to take away our God-given right to technology” – makes compromise difficult

• U.S. government also likely to face domestic (and international) difficulties making hard choices

Balancing objectives • U.S. objectives: – No Iranian nuclear weapons – To the extent still practicable, broad and verifiable gap between permitted nuclear activities and a nuclear weapons capability – Addressing – or at least not making worse in a nuclear deal – Iranian behavior on Iraq, terrorism, Israel, etc.

• Iranian objectives: – – – – – – –

Preserving regime, avoiding attack Status and prestige as leader of developing, Islamic worlds Recognition of its regional power and role Economic development Civilian nuclear energy Nuclear weapons option (or more?) Improving relations with Europe, the United States, others

What’s the alternative to a deal? • “BATNA” – Best alternative to a negotiated agreement

• What is the U.S. BATNA? • What is the Iranian BATNA?

BATNA Applied in the Iran Case (Chart from Sebenius and Singh)

On balance, Iran’s nuclear program is most consistent with? 1. Peaceful purposes 2. Attaining nuclear weapons 3. Other

33%

1

33%

2

33%

3