Lecture 13 – more ways to get out of a contract
Short Description
Download Lecture 13 – more ways to get out of a contract...
Description
Econ 522 Economics of Law
Dan Quint Spring 2012 Lecture 13
Logistics
HW3 is online, due next Thursday (Mar 15) First midterm will be returned at end of lecture Second midterm March 26
Cumulative, through end of contract law More weight on more recent material
1
Monday…
Contracts which won’t be enforced
Derogation of public policy
Formation defenses and performance excuses
Incompetence (but not drunkenness) Duress and necessity Impossibility, and determining the efficient bearer of a risk
Today: more ways to get out of a contract, and remedies for breach 2
Discussion question
Old urban legend: A man bought a box of extremely rare and expensive cigars, and insured them against loss or damage. After smoking them, he filed an insurance claim, saying they had been destroyed in 20 separate small fires. The insurance company refused to pay, the man sued and won. But as he was leaving the courtroom, he was arrested on 20 counts of arson.
Serious question: If the intent of a contract is clear, but different from the literal meaning, which should be enforced? 3
Contracts based on bad information
4
Contracts based on faulty information
Four doctrines for invalidating a contract
Fraud
Failure to disclose
Frustration of purpose
Mutual mistake
5
Fraud Fraud: one party was deliberately tricked
source: http://www.wyff4.com/r/29030818/detail.html
6
What if you trick someone by withholding information? Under the civil law, there is a duty to disclose
If you fail to supply information you should have, contract will be voided – failure to disclose
Less so under the common law
Seller has to share information about hidden dangers… …but generally not information that makes a product less valuable without making it dangerous Exception: new products come with “implied warranty of fitness” Another exception: Obde v Schlemeyer
7
Duty to disclose under common law
Under common law, seller required to inform buyer about hidden safety risks, generally not other information But…
Obde v Schlemeyer (1960, Sup Ct of WA) Seller knew building was infested with termites, did not tell buyer Termites should have been exterminated immediately to prevent further damage Court in Obde imposed duty to disclose (awarded damages)
8
Duty to disclose under common law
Under common law, seller required to inform buyer about hidden safety risks, generally not other information But…
Obde v Schlemeyer (1960, Sup Ct of WA) Seller knew building was infested with termites, did not tell buyer Termites should have been exterminated immediately to prevent further damage Court in Obde imposed duty to disclose (awarded damages) Some states require used car dealers to reveal major repairs done, sellers of homes to reveal certain types of defects… 9
What if both parties were misinformed? Frustration of Purpose
Change in circumstance made the original promise pointless
Coronation Cases
“When a contingency makes performance pointless, assign liability to party who can bear risk at least cost” 10
What if both parties were misinformed? Frustration of Purpose
Change in circumstance made the original promise pointless
Mutual Mistake
Mutual mistake about facts
Coronation Cases
“When a contingency makes performance pointless, assign liability to party who can bear risk at least cost”
Circumstances had already changed, but we didn’t know Logger buys land with timber on it, but forest fire had wiped out the timber the week before
Mutual mistake about identity
Disagreement over what was being sold
11
Another principle for allocating risks efficiently: uniting knowledge and control Hadley v Baxendale (miller and shipper)
Hadley knew shipment was time-critical But Baxendale was deciding how to ship crankshaft (boat or train) Party that had information was not the party making decisions
Efficiency generally requires uniting knowledge and control
Contracts that unite knowledge and control are generally efficient, should be upheld Contracts that separate knowledge and control may be inefficient, should more often be set aside 12
Mutual vs. Unilateral Mistake
Mutual mistake: neither party had correct information
Contract neither united nor separated knowledge and control
Unilateral mistake: one party has mistaken information
I know your car is a valuable antique, you think it’s worthless You sell it to me at a low price
Contracts based on unilateral mistake are generally upheld
13
Unilateral mistake
Mutual mistake: neither party had correct information
Contract neither united nor separated knowledge and control
Unilateral mistake: one party has mistaken information
I know your car is a valuable antique, you think it’s worthless You sell it to me at a low price
Contracts based on unilateral mistake are generally upheld
Contracts based on unilateral mistake generally unite knowledge and control And, enforcing them creates an incentive to gather information 14
Unilateral mistake: Laidlaw v Organ (U.S. Supreme Court, 1815) War of 1812: British blockaded port of New Orleans
Price of tobacco fell, since it couldn’t be exported
Organ (tobacco buyer) learned the war was over
Immediately negotiated with Laidlaw firm to buy a bunch of tobacco at the depressed wartime price
Next day, news broke the war had ended, price of tobacco went up, Laidlaw sued
Supreme Court ruled that Organ was not required to communicate his information 15
Uniting knowledge and control
Laidlaw v. Organ established: contracts based on unilateral mistake are generally valid
Agrees with efficiency: these contracts typically unite knowledge and control
What about Obde v. Schlemeyer?
The termites case was based on unilateral mistake Court still upheld contract, but punished seller for hiding information In that case, contract separated knowledge from control
16
Unilateral mistake: productive versus redistributive information Productive information: information that can be used to produce more wealth Redistributive information: information that can be used to redistribute wealth in favor of informed party
Cooter and Ulen
Contracts based on one party’s knowledge of productive information should be enforced… …especially if that knowledge was the result of active investment Contracts based on one party’s knowledge of purely redistributive information, or fortuitously acquired information, should not be enforced 17
Other reasons a contract may not be enforced
18
Vague contract terms
Courts will generally not enforce contract terms that are overly vague Can be thought of as a penalty default
“Punish” the parties by refusing to enforce contract… …so people will be more clear when they write contracts
But some exceptions
Parties may commit to renegotiating the contract “in good faith” under certain contingencies 19
Adhesion (I): “Shrink-wrap” licenses Back when software came on disks or CDs…
Box was wrapped in cellophane Inside, “By unwrapping this box, you agree to the following terms…” “Due to the unscheduled trip to the autowrecking yard the school bus will be out of commission for two weeks. Note by reading this letter out loud you have waived any responsibility on our part in perpetuity throughout the known universe.”
Contract is not binding if one party had no opportunity to review it before agreeing
20
Adhesion (II): What if a party chose not to review the contract?
Source: http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-souls/ 21
Adhesion (II): What if a party chose not to review the contract? British computer game retailer GameStation, on April Fool’s Day, added this to Terms & Conditions customers agreed to before buying online: “By placing an order via this website… you agree to grant us a non-transferable option to claim, for now and for ever more, your immortal soul. Should we wish to exercise this option, you agree to surrender your immortal soul, and any claim you may have on it, within 5 (five) working days of receiving written notification from gamestation.co.uk or one of its duly authorised minions. …If you a) do not believe you have an immortal soul, b) have already given it to another party, or c) do not wish to grant us such a license, please click the link below to nullify this sub-clause and proceed with your transaction.” 22
Adhesion (general)
Contract of Adhesion: standardized “take-it-or-leave-it” contract where terms are not negotiable
“Bogus duress”
Not illegal per se, but might attract “closer scrutiny”
A few state courts have adopted a rule: if I have “reason to believe that the other party would not agree if he knew the contract contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement”
23
What if you signed a contract that was dramatically unfair? Under bargain theory, courts should ask only whether a bargain occurred, not whether it was fair
Hamer v Sidway (drinking and smoking)
But both common and civil law have doctrines for not enforcing overly one-sided contracts
Unconscionability/Lesion “Absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with terms which are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them” When “the sum total of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist” Terms which would “shock the conscience of the court” 24
Unconscionability: Williams v WalkerThomas Furniture (CA Dist Ct, 1965) “Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. …In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.”
25
Unconscionability: Williams v WalkerThomas Furniture (CA Dist Ct, 1965) “Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. …In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.”
26
Unconscionability: Williams v WalkerThomas Furniture (CA Dist Ct, 1965) “Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. …In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.” Not normal monopoly cases but “situational monopolies”
Think of Ploof v Putnam (sailboat in a storm), not Microsoft
27
Remedies for breach of contract
28
Three broad types of remedy for breach of contract Party-designed remedies
Remedies specified in the contract
Court-imposed damages
Court may decide promisee entitled to some level of damages
Specific performance
Forces breaching party to live up to contract
29
Expectation damages
Compensate promisee for the amount he expected to benefit from performance
You agreed to buy an airplane for $350,000 You expected $500,000 of benefit from it Expectation damages: if I breach, I owe you that benefit ($500,000 if you already paid, $150,000 if you didn’t)
“Positive damages”
Make promisee indifferent between performance and breach 30
Reliance damages
Reimburse promisee for cost of any reliance investments made, but not for additional surplus he expected to gain Restore promisee to level of well-being before he signed the contract
You contracted to buy the plane and built a hangar If I breach, I owe you what you spent on the hangar, nothing else
“Negative damages” – undo the negative (harm) that occurred 31
Opportunity cost damages
Give promisee benefit he would have gotten from his next-best option
Make promisee indifferent between breach of the contract that was signed, and performance of best alternative contract You value plane at $500,000 You contract to buy plane from me for $350,000 Someone else was selling similar plane for $400,000 By the time I breach, that plane is no longer available I owe you $100,000 – the benefit you would have gotten from buying the other seller’s plane
32
Example: expectation, reliance, and opportunity cost damages You agree to sell me ticket to Wisconsin-Purdue football game for $50
Expectation damages: you owe me value of game minus $50 If I pay scalper $150, then expectation damages = $100 Reliance damages: maybe 0, or cost of whatever pre-game investments I made
33
Example: expectation, reliance, and opportunity cost damages You agree to sell me ticket to Wisconsin-Purdue football game for $50
Expectation damages: you owe me value of game minus $50 If I pay scalper $150, then expectation damages = $100 Reliance damages: maybe 0, or cost of whatever pre-game investments I made When you agreed to sell me ticket, other tickets available for $70 Opportunity cost damages: $80 (I paid a scalper $150 to get in; I would have been $80 better off if I’d ignored your offer and paid someone else $70) 34
Ranking damages Contract I Sign
Best Alternative
Do Nothing
=
=
=
Breach + Expectation Damages
Breach + Opportunity Cost Damages
Breach + Reliance Damages
Opportunity Cost Damages
Reliance Damages
Expectation Damages
$100
$80
$15 35
Hawkins v McGee (“hairy hand case”)
Hawkins had a scar on his hand McGee promised surgery to “make the hand a hundred percent perfect” Surgery was a disaster, left scar bigger and covered with hair
36
Hawkins v McGee (“hairy hand case”)
+ Opp Cost Damages + Reliance Damages Initial Wealth
Opp Cost Damages
Reliance Damages
+ Expectation Damages
Expectation Damages
$
Hand Hairy Scarred
Next best doctor
100% Perfect 37
Other court-ordered remedies
Restitution
Return money that was already received
Disgorgement
Give up wrongfully-gained profits
38
Other court-ordered remedies
Restitution
Return money that was already received
Disgorgement
Give up wrongfully-gained profits
Specific Performance
Promisor is forced to honor promise Civil law: often ordered instead of money damages Common law: money damages more common; S.P. sometimes used when seller breaches contract to sell a unique good Like injunctive relief
39
Expectation damages vs. specific performance Peevyhouse v Garland Coal and Mining Co (OK Supreme Court, 1962)
Garland contracted to strip-mine coal on Peevyhouse’s farm Contract specified Garland would restore property to original condition; Garland did not Restoration would cost $29,000 But “diminution in value” of farm was only $300 Original jury awarded $5,000 in damages, both parties appealed OK Supreme Court reduced damages to $300 40
Expectation damages vs. specific performance
At first, sounds like a perfect example of efficient breach
Performing last part of contract would cost $29,000 Benefit to Peevyhouses would be $300 Efficient to breach and pay expectation damages, which is what happened
But…
Most coal mining contracts: standard per-acre diminution payment Peevyhouses refused to sign contract unless it specifically promised the restorative work Dissent: Peevyhouses entitled to specific performance (Peevyhouses seemed to value condition of property much more highly than change in market value) 41
Think about Peevyhouse in terms of penalty defaults Contract promised restoration work, didn’t specify remedy if it wasn’t performed Which default rule works better:
Default rule allowing Garland to breach and pay diminution fee? Default rule forcing Garland to perform restoration work?
Ayres and Gertner: default rule should penalize the betterinformed party
Garland routinely signed contracts like these Peevyhouses were doing this for the first time Default rule allows Garland to pay diminution fee: they have no reason to bring it up, Peevyhouses don’t know Default rule forces Garland to do cleanup: if that’s inefficient, they could bring it up during negotiations 42 In this case, specific performance would serve as a penalty default
Party-designed remedies
Remedy for breach could be written directly into contract But common law courts don’t always enforce remedy terms
Liquidated damages – party-specified damages that reasonably approximate actual harm done by breach Penalty damages – damages greater than actual harm done Civil law courts are generally willing to enforce penalty damages But common law courts often do not
43
Penalty Damages
Coal worth $70,000 Garland to pay $25,000 Restoration would cost $30,000 Liquidated damages are $300 Peevyhouses value restoration at $40,000
Peevyhouse v Garland Coal
Peevyhouses only wanted farm strip-mined if it would be restored to original condition after Suppose coal extracted worth $70,000 Garland paid $25,000 for rights to mine it Restoration work would cost $30,000 Diminution of value was $300 So liquidated damages would be $300 Suppose Peevyhouses got $40,000 of disutility from land being left in poor condition
44
Liquidated damages
Coal worth $70,000 Garland to pay $25,000 Restoration would cost $30,000 Liquidated damages are $300 Peevyhouses value restoration at $40,000
Peevyhouses Don’t
Sign
Garland Coal (0, 0) Restore property
(25,000, 15,000)
Don’t, pay damages
(-14,700, 44,700)
If damages limited to liquidated damages…
Peevyhouses shouldn’t believe restorative work will get done So Peevyhouses better off refusing to sign Even though mining and restoring Pareto-dominates 45
Penalty damages
Coal worth $70,000 Garland to pay $25,000 Restoration would cost $30,000 Liquidated damages are $300 Peevyhouses value restoration at $40,000
Peevyhouses Don’t
Sign
Garland Coal (0, 0) Restore property
(25,000, 15,000)
Don’t, pay penalty
(25,000, 5,000)
If penalty clauses in contracts enforceable…
Write contract with $40,000 penalty for leaving land unrestored Now restoration work would get done, so Peevyhouses willing to sign But if courts won’t enforce penalty damages, this won’t work 46
Penalty clauses Whatever you can accomplish with penalty clause, you could also accomplish with performance bonus
I agree to pay $200,000 to get house built, but I want you to pay a $50,000 penalty if it’s late Alternatively: I agree to pay $150,000 for house, plus a $50,000 performance bonus if it’s completed on time Either way, you get $150,000 if house is late, $200,000 if on time Courts generally enforce bonus clauses, so no problem!
47
Penalty clauses Whatever you can accomplish with penalty clause, you could also accomplish with performance bonus
I agree to pay $200,000 to get house built, but I want you to pay a $50,000 penalty if it’s late Alternatively: I agree to pay $150,000 for house, plus a $50,000 performance bonus if it’s completed on time Either way, you get $150,000 if house is late, $200,000 if on time Courts generally enforce bonus clauses, so no problem! Similarly, Peevyhouse example
Peevyhouses get $25,000 for mining rights, $40,000 penalty if land is not restored Equivalently, get $65,000 for mining rights, pay $40,000 bonus if restoration is completed But, if intent of contract is too transparent, still might not be enforced 48
First Midterm
Overall very impressive Mean 85, median 87 Not assigning letter grades till end of semester, but…
A-H
to give a rough idea of how you’re doing, based on distribution of scores on first midterm, 80-90 roughly a B, 65-75 roughly a C
I-P
Q-Z 49
View more...
Comments