Part 3. From Federal-State Partnership to

From Federal-State Partnership to Advocacy Coalition: The Institutionalized Organization of Government Support for the Arts in the U.S. Gordon E. Shockley Presented at: 14th Annual State Politics and Policy Conference Indiana University – Bloomington May 2014

Abstract Our paper offers a possible explanation for the continued operation and ultimate survival of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and direct government support for the arts in the 1990s: political institutionalization. The thesis of our paper is that during the 1990s an “advocacy coalition” (see Sabatier, 1993) consisting of the NEA and the state art agencies (SAAs) emerged from the institutional environment of American cooperative federalism (e.g., Elazar, 1964) and “marble-cake” intergovernmental relations (e.g., Grodzins, 1993). The advocacy coalition of the NEA and the SAAs formed around a deeply shared and embedded belief in the appropriateness of government support for the arts in the U.S. and the necessity of the federal-state partnership in its provision. Drawing on Meyer’s General Institutional Model for organizational analysis (Meyer, 1994) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Advocacy Coalition Framework for policy analysis (JenkinsSmith & Sabatier, 1994; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), we develop the Institutionalized Political Organization (IPO) model to demonstrate how the emergence of the NEA-SAA advocacy coalition had the primary consequence of institutionalizing government support for the arts in the U.S. Thus, our proposed paper suggests that the political institutionalization of government support for the arts in the U.S. provided a resilient and stable political environment that shielded the NEA from congressional threats and enabled American arts policy to continue to operate in and ultimately survive the 1990s.

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Introduction By all accounts, the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) should not have survived the 1990s. For much of its twenty-five years of existence, the NEA, which is the main federal agency providing direct support for the arts in the U.S., existed in a relatively stable and unthreatening political environment. Scholarly consensus characterizes the NEA’s political environment through the 1970s and 1980s as a relatively stable and predictable subgovernment as the federal agency was comfortably ensconced in the proverbial iron triangle (DiMaggio, 2000, p. 52; Mulcahy, 1988; Wyszomirski, 1988, p. 19; 1995c, p. 47). However, when the Culture Wars erupted in 1989 over a pair of controversial art exhibits associated with the NEA, a “negative policy window” (see Wyszomirski, 1997) opened for the agency. Wyszomirski, who with good reason is considered the leading scholar on the political dimensions of the NEA in the 1980s and 1990s, argues in a trio of articles that the NEA’s political environment in the 1990s degenerated into a volatile and unpredictable issue network1 (Wyszomirski, 1995b, 1995c) as its policy community became “fragmented and truncated” (Wyszomirski, 1995c). According to Wyszomirski, therefore, the NEA’s political environment was extremely unpredictable and unstable, leaving the agency vulnerable to political attack. The Republican Revolution in the congressional elections of November 1994 seemed poised to exploit the NEA’s vulnerability and launch a final, fatal political attack on the agency. The new Republican majority in the House of Representatives was intent on eliminating the NEA along with several other agencies as part of the Contract With America: “The ‘termination blues’ [were] an integral part of the hymnal for the Republican ‘Contract With America’” (deLeon, 1997, p. 2197). According to Bimber (1998), three categories of federal agencies were targeted: (1) “the symbolic budget trophy” agencies, like the Office of Technology Assessment; (2) “those with significant budgets,” like the Department of Energy; and (3) “those whose missions conflicted with the new conservatism brought to Congress by the class of 1994,” like the National Endowment for the Arts (pp. 204-206). A section of a pivotal House budget resolution from 1995 entitled “Terminate Funding for the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities” reads as follows:

1

See Heclo (1978).

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Under this proposal, Federal funding for the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities would be eliminated. Federal funding for the arts and humanities is not affordable in a time of fiscal stringency, especially when programs addressing central Federal concerns are not fully funded. In addition, many arts and humanities programs benefit predominantly higher-income people, who could pay higher admission or ticket prices. Finally, there is serious philosophical debate about whether financing artistic creation is an appropriate government activity in the first place. (Concurrent Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1996 (Function 500: Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services), 1995) Yet, despite the NEA’s unpredictable and unstable political environment and truncated and fragmented policy community, as well as the earnest intentions of the new Republican majority in the 104th Congress, the NEA was not eliminated. The 104th Congress did manage to reduce the NEA’s appropriation for fiscal year 1996 almost 40 percent and kept it at that level for the remainder of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the NEA survived. In fact, for fiscal years 2001 and 2002, Congress actually has modestly increased the agency’s appropriation, perhaps signaling the end of the NEA’s woes. So the question that inevitably arises is: How did the NEA survive the 1990s? The purpose of this paper is to develop one possible, though admittedly partial, explanation for the NEA’s survival: the institutionalized organization of government support for the arts. The thesis of this paper is that by the 1990s an advocacy coalition consisting of the NEA and the fifty state arts agencies2 (SAAs) emerged from the institutional environment of American cooperative federalism and “marble-cake” intergovernmental relations. In his two influential essays “State Expansion and Organizational Fields” (1983) and “Decentralization of Arts Funding from the Federal Government to the States” (1991), DiMaggio demonstrates the interdependencies and changing relationships between the NEA and the SAAs. Expanding on DiMaggio’s two essays, this paper argues that the federal-state partnership between the NEA and the SAAs that DiMaggio observed in the 1980s became an “advocacy coalition,” which Sabatier (1993) defines as: People from a variety positions (elected agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system—that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions—and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time (p. 25). The advocacy coalition of the NEA and the SAAs formed around a deeply shared and embedded belief in the appropriateness of government support for the arts in the U.S. and the necessity of

For the purposes of this paper, the term “SAAs” includes the six jurisdictional arts agencies for U.S. territories such as Guam and Puerto Rico. 2

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federal-state partnership in it provision. This NEA-SAA advocacy coalition, however, did not arise ex nihilo; rather, an institutional environment of American cooperative federalism (e.g., Elazar, 1964) and “marble-cake” intergovernmental relations (e.g., Grodzins, 1993) nurtured its development. Building on Wyszomirski’s characterization of the NEA’s political environmental as fragmented, truncated, unpredictable, and unstable, this paper suggests that the NEA-SAA advocacy coalition provided a cohesive and reliable political environment that could resist efforts in Congress to eliminate the agency. In short, we argue that the emergence of the NEA-SAA advocacy coalition represents the institutionalization of government support for the arts in the U.S. In addition to this introduction and a conclusion, we have organized this paper in three main parts. In the first, an integrated theory of “institutionalized political organization” is developed. The integrated theory of institutionalized political organization represents an explicit attempt to meld General Institutional Model (Meyer, 1994), which is part of the new institutionalism in organizational analysis, and the public policy-oriented Advocacy Coalition Framework (see generally Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Four distinct stages in the processes of institutionalized political organization are identified in Part 1: American federalism, intergovernmental relations, federal-state partnerships, and advocacy coalitions. The remainder of the paper is structured around these stages. The first two stages, i.e., American federalism and intergovernmental relations, are examined in the Part 2. In Part 3, the federal-state partnership and advocacy coalition for government support for the arts are discussed. In particular, two eras will be examined: 1966 to 1974, during which the federal-state partnership was forged, and 1989 to 1997, during which the advocacy coalition emerged. Wyszomirski’s characterization of the NEA’s political environment in the 1990s as an issue network and fragmented and truncated policy network is also explored in this part. The conclusion returns to the question of how the NEA survived the 1990s and links the institutionalization of the federal-state partnership to the agency’s survival.

Part 1. An Integrated Theory of Institutionalized Political Organization An integrated theory of institutionalized political organization (IPO) is developed in three sections. In the first two sections the General Institutional Model (Meyer, 1994) and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (see generally Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Sabatier & JenkinsSmith, 1993) are reviewed in that order. In the third section of Part 1, the integrated theory of IPO is developed from the General Institutional Model and ACF. We identify four distinct stages in IPO: American federalism, intergovernmental relations, federal-state partnership, and advocacy DRAFT

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coalition. The remainder of the paper is structured around the four stages of IPO in relation to U.S. government support for the arts.

1.1 Institutionalist Analysis of Organizations 1.1.1 Institutional Environments Institutionalist analysis of organizations3 is a body of theory that is primarily used to explore interactions between organizations, be they commercial, nonprofit, or governmental organizations, and institutional environments, which can be defined “as including the rules and belief systems as well as the relational networks that arise in the broader societal context” (Scott, 1983a, p. 14). “The visible structures and routines that make up organizations are direct reflections and effects of rules and structures built into (or institutionalized within) wider environments” (Scott & Meyer, 1994, p. 2). Further, there are “three classes of elements useful for assessing organizational environments: network, cultural, and historical elements” and “three levels of environments: interorganizational field, societal, and world-system contexts” (Scott, 1983b, p. 163). Institutionalist organizational analysis, however, is not merely descriptive; it has strong cognitive and normative undercurrents as well. Scott, for example, argues that “the essence of an institutional perspective resides in focusing on the cognitive and normative frameworks that provide meaning and stability to social life” (Scott, 1994a, p. 81). In their foundational work “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony” (1977/1991), Meyer and Rowen summarize the normative concerns of institutionalist organizational analysis as institutional legitimacy and organizational survival: Organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society. Organizations that do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures. (p. 41) Institutionalist analysis of organizations comes in many forms. Scott (1983a) observes: “Shared belief systems and relational frameworks come together in complex and shifting ways” (p. 15). One important strain of new institutionalist research focuses on institutionalization as the independent variable: “A substantial number of studies have examined institutional factors in intermediate environments that influence the structure or activities of organizations” (Scott, 1994a, p. 85). Or, as Scott and Meyer (1994) phrase it, “The environmental patterns that create and change organizations can be described as rationalized and rationalizing” (p. 3). 3

Also commonly known as “new institutionalism in organizational analysis” (see Powell & DiMaggio, 1991)

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Meyer (1994) devised a General Institutional Model that captures this line of institutional analysis of organizations (see Figure 1). Figure 1: Elements of a General Institutional Model (Meyer, 1994) 4. Origins of Environmental Rationalization

3. Dimensions of the Rationalized Environment

2. Mechanisms Influencing Organizing Situations

1. Institutionalized Organization Structure

Working backward, Meyer’s model operates according to the following enumerated steps: 1. Institutionalized Organization Structure: “There is the extant set of organizations, with their identities, structures, and activity patterns;” 2. Mechanisms Influencing Organizing Situations: “Clear causal connections can be found linking organizational identities, structures, and activity routines to institutionalized elements in the environment” 3. Dimensions of the Rationalized Environment: “Development or change in the rules or ideologies describing or prescribing proper organizational practice lead organizations to develop or change isomorphically—or to arise, in a given domain, in the first place”; and 4. Origins of Environmental Rationalization: “Macro-sociological processes prominently affect or control development of the rationalized environment of organizing.” (pp. 33-35) One limitation of Meyer’s General Institutional Model, however, is its uni-directionality: only institutional environments affect organizations. An appropriate supplement to Meyer’s model may be Giddens’ (1984) “duality of structure” in which “the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize…Structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling” (p. 25). In other words, not only does an institutional environment affect an organization within its sphere of influence, but an organization will also affect the institutional environment in which it is embedded. 1.1.2 Organizational Fields The unit of analysis implied not only in the first step of Meyer’s General Institutional Model (“Institutionalized Organization Structure”) but in most forms of institutionalist organizational analysis is the organizational field. An organizational field consists of the “sets of organizations that together accomplish some task in which a researcher is interested,” much like an “industry” (DiMaggio, 1983, p. 148). In fact, the preferred, though not the only, unit of analysis in institutionalist analysis is indeed the organizational field: “Neoinstitutionalists view institutionalization as occurring at the sectoral or societal levels, and consequently interorganizational in locus” (DiMaggio, 1991, p. 14). Similarly, Scott (1994b) favors the DRAFT

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organizational field : “The application of institutional arguments to organizations occurs, in my view, most appropriately and powerfully neither at the level of the entire society not at the level of the individual organization but at the level of the organizational field” (pp. 70-71). In fact, one of DiMaggio’s first examples of an organizational field is the National Endowment for the Arts and the state arts agencies. 1.1.3 Institutional Isomorphism Institutional isomorphism is another important element of institutionalist organizational analysis. Institutional isomorphism, which is “the tendency for organizations to take on the formal and substantive attributes of organizations with which they interact and upon which they depend” (DiMaggio, 1983, p. 158), is invoked in the third step of in Meyer’s General Institutional Model (“Dimensions of the Rationalized Environment”): “Development or change in the rules or ideologies…lead organizations to develop or change isomorphically” (emphasis added). Institutional isomorphism is the specific mechanism by which institutional environments influence organizational fields. Through the operation of institutional isomorphism, organizations in a given institutional environment will typically behave in a predictable and orderly way. First, organizations “incorporate elements which are legitimated externally, not necessarily efficient ones.” Second, “they employ ceremonial assessment criteria to define the value of structural elements.” And third, the “dependence of externally fixed institutions reduces turbulence and maintains stability” in organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 49). Moreover, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three varieties of isomorphic activity: (1) coercive isomorphism, which results from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism, which results from the standard response to uncertainty of imitating organizations in an organizational field that are successful; and (3) normative isomorphism, which results from shared beliefs and community norms, such as those that stem from professionalization (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b).

1.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework Pure, unassisted institutionalist analysis of organizations is difficult to apply in policy analysis4 (to be fair, Meyer names his model the General Institutional Model). Its main impediment

Many new institutionalist scholars explicitly differentiate institutionalism in organizational analysis from the “new institutionalisms” in political science and economics. They also doubt that any rapprochement is possible (see, for example, DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a; Meyer, 1994). The integrated theory of institutionalized political organization 4

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is the lack of any explicit or even implicit political dimension component in organizational analysis, which, as March and Olsen (1984) demonstrated nearly two decades ago, is necessary for balanced political or public policy analysis. In order to redress this limitation of institutionalist organizational analysis, we enlist Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (JenkinsSmith & Sabatier, 1994; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) and seek to integrate ACF with institutionalist analysis of organizations. In its essence, ACF is a theory of gradual, incremental policy change over a long period of time through the interaction of advocacy coalitions. Sabatier summarizes ACF as follows: I have concluded that the most useful means of aggregating actors in order to understand policy change over fairly long periods of time is by ‘advocacy coalitions.’ These are people from a variety of positions (elected agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system—that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions—and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time. (Sabatier, 1993, p. 25) Four premises underlie Sabatier’s summarization above: time, policy subsystems, intergovernmental relations, and belief systems (Sabatier, 1993, p. 16). First, the time frame of policy analysis must be a decade or more. Second, the policy subsystem, which consists of the “interaction of actors from different institutions who follow and seek to influence governmental decisions in a policy area,” is the proper level of analysis for an advocacy coalition. Third, ACF emphasizes the “intergovernmental dimension of policy subsystems.” Lastly, belief systems, not interests, are the causal agent: “public policies (or programs) can be conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems.” Briefly, ACF contends that the long-term interaction of advocacy coalitions formed around a belief system within an intergovernmental policy subsystem produce incremental, gradual policy change over a long period of time (see Figure 2).

developed in this paper obviously assumes otherwise and is consistent with a growing, perhaps even established, tradition of political institutional analysis.

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Figure 2: The Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 18)

RELATIVELY STABLE PARAMETERS 1. Basic attributes of the problem area (good) 2. Basic distribution of natural resources 3. Fundamental sociocultural values and social structure 4. Basic constitutional structure (rules)

POLICY SUBSYSTEM Constraints and

Coalition A a. Policy beliefs b. Resources

Policy Brokers

Coalition B a. Policy beliefs b. Resources

Resources of Strategy A1 re guidance instruments

Subsystem

Strategy B1 re guidance instruments

Actors EXTERNAL (SYSTEM) EVENTS

Decisions by Sovereigns

1. Changes in socioeconomic conditions 2. Changes in systemic governing collation 3. Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems

Agency resources and General Policy Orientation

Policy Outputs

Policy Impacts

The fourth premise (i.e., “public policies (or programs) can be conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems”) requires further elaboration. “Within the subsystem,” Jenkins-Smith (1994) maintains, “the ACF assumes that actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from various governmental and private organizations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert” (p. 180). The belief system around which an advocacy coalition forms is hierarchically arranged in three levels. At the top is the deep core that consists of “basic ontological and normative beliefs, such as the perceived nature of humans or the relative valuation of individual freedom or social equality, which operate across virtually all policy domains” (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 180). The next level is the policy core that is “a coalition’s basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or subsystem” (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 180). At the lowest level are the secondary beliefs:

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A large set of narrower beliefs concerning the seriousness of the problem or the relative importance of various causal factors in specific locales, policy preferences regarding desirable regulations or budgetary allocations, the design of specific institutions, and the evaluations of various actors’ performance (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 181). This three-level, hierarchical belief system lies at the heart of each advocacy coalition. ACF generates at least eleven hypotheses for testing policy change over long periods of time. For the purposes of integrating ACF with institutionalist organizational analysis, only three are of interest for the purposes of this paper: 1. Hypothesis 1: “On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or more” (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 184; Sabatier, 1993, p. 27). 2. Hypothesis 2: “Actors within a an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to policy core but less so on secondary aspects” (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 184; Sabatier, 1993, p. 31). 3. Hypothesis 3: “An actor or coalition will give up secondary aspects of a belief system before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core” (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 184; Sabatier, 1993, p. 33).

1.3 An Integrated Theory of Institutionalized Political Organization In this final section of Part 1 we attempt to integrate ACF and institutionalist organizational analysis. The result of our integration is the Institutionalized Political Organization model. Our integration seeks to preserve the basic institutional environment-organizational field framework of institutionalist analysis described above while at the same time explicitly incorporating the political and policy dimensions, thus ameliorating the main limitation of institutionalist analysis and making it more appropriate for political analysis.5 ACF introduces to new institutionalism three kinds of greater political specificity. First, ACF at once refines the institutionalist level of analysis into a political unit of analysis and maintains the same level of analysis by moving from organizational fields to policy subsystems. In other words, policy subsystems are distinctly political group actors that occupy the same level of analysis as new institutionalist organizational fields. Sabatier’s definition of a policy subsystem as the “interaction of It should be noted that ACF itself is not a complete model. Although ACF is a robust theoretical apparatus for policy analysis, it suffers from at least one weakness that institutionalist organizational analysis might address: namely, the creation and maintenance of advocacy coalitions. Schlager (1995), for example, attempts to ameliorate this weakness of ACF with the Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Design framework (e.g., see E. Ostrom, 1999) as well as Moe’s theory of structural choice. Similarly, Sato (1999) augments ACF with Policy Process Analysis in order to provide “details of how coalitions evolve and how they actually translate their beliefs into governmental behaviors are examined” (p. 28). One of the benefits of integrating ACF with institutionalist analysis of organizations might also be providing an explanation of how advocacy coalitions are created and maintained: namely, through the influence of institutional environments. 5

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actors from different institutions who follow and seek to influence governmental decisions in a policy area” corresponds with DiMaggio’s original formulation of organizational fields as “sets of organizations that together accomplish some task in which a researcher is interested.” Policy subsystems, however, are distinctly political actors in that they can be conceptualized to have their own internal and external political economies (see Wamsley, 1985). Policy subsystems are also explicitly concerned with public policy, or what Rainey and Milward (1983) call the “primacy of the program”: “In governmental processes in the United States, the most important focus of activity is frequently not a specific public organizations but a complex network of organizations and other entities whose activities are often centered on a particular public ‘program’” (p. 140). In other words, ACF policy subsystems maintain the same level of group actors as new institutionalism while recognizing the political intentions of their actions. The second political dimension ACF introduces into institutionalist organizational analysis is intergovernmental relations. Intergovernmental relations allows for greater specificity in the kinds of interaction between group actors. Kenis and Schneider (1991) observe, Policies are formulated to an increasing degree in informal political infrastructures outside conventional channels such as legislative, executive and administrative organizations. Contemporary policy processes emerge from complex actor constellations and resource interdependencies, and decisions are often made in a highly decentralized and informal matter. (p. 27) The ACF emphasis on intergovernmental relations reduces the possible scope of new institutionalist analysis by limiting the analysis to interaction between policy-making actors. The third political dimension ACF introduces is an exclusive focus on public policy. Specifically, ACF incorporates accommodates the normative basis of policy subsystems in general and advocacy coalitions in particular. Milward and Wamley (1984) observe that a policy subsystem’s “normative structure gives meaning to the action of the members of the subsystem/network and the use to which the tools are put” (p. 13), which sounds very similar to the cognitive and normative dimensions of institutionalist organizational analysis. Moreover, they assert, the paramount value in a policy subsystem’s normative structure is survival: “Self-perpetuation of the policy subsystem is the most consistently shared goal of the participants. If authority and funding of its correlated programs or its functional autonomy are threatened, this will tend to enhance consensus” (p. 16). These three political dimensions introduced by ACF, we argue, transform institutionalist organizational analysis into a framework for policy analysis, specifically, into our integrated Institutionalized Political Organization (IPO) model.

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Figure 3: Elements of the Institutionalized Political Organization (IPO) model 1. American Federalism

2. Intergovernmental Relations

3. Federal-State Partnership

4. Advocacy Coalition

Belief System Deep Core | Policy Core | Secondary Beliefs

1. 2. 3. 4.

Origins of Environmental Rationalization  American Federalism Dimensions of the Rationalized Environment  Intergovernmental Relations Mechanisms Influencing Organizing Situations  Federal-State Partnership Institutionalized Organization Structure  Advocacy Coalition We present the IPO model in Figure 3. The model is explicitly structured around Meyer’s

General Institutional Model (Figure 1 above) and incorporates ACF terminology into each boxprocess caption. Three annotations are appropriate. First, the cascading process boxes of Figure 3 indicate a general-specific, hierarchical relationship between the components. Second, the box containing the “Belief System” makes explicit the normative, creedal component of the model. Third, Figure 3 shows that the overtly political elements of IPO model supplant the more general elements of Meyer’s General Institutional Model. And the process works forward this time. The IPO model depicted in Figure structures the remainder of this paper in order to explore the institutionalized organization of government support for the arts in the U.S.

Part 2. Institutional Environment of Federal-State Programs In Part 2, we present the application of the first two steps of IPO. Together Step 1 (“Federalism”) and Step 2 (“Intergovernmental Relations”) of IPO constitute the institutional environment surrounding not only government support for the arts in the U.S. but also federal-state programs in general. The institutional environment therefore originates in American federalism, which in turn gives rise to “complex” and “interdependent” web of federal and state relationships categorically called “intergovernmental relations” (generally see O'Toole Jr., 1985).

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2.1 American cooperative federalism On its face, the American federalist political system6 does not seem to be designed for cooperative relations between the national and state governments. In Federalist No. 51, James Madison conceived of American federalism as a “compound republic” in which state power was subdivided so as to provide a check on its concentration: “In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.” Nevertheless, a tradition of “cooperative federalism” between the national and state governments has emerged in the U.S. in which positive and mutually beneficial relationships between federal and state actors could form. In operation, it requires a willingness both to cooperate across government lines and to exercise restraint and forbearance in the interests of the entire nation” (Leach, 1970, pp. 1-2). Grodzins (1993) and Elazar (1964; 1966) have been instrumental in articulating the American tradition of cooperative federalism. Cooperative federalism, according to Elazar (1966), is “an intricate framework of cooperative relationships that preserve their structural integrity while tying all levels of government together functionally in the common task of serving the American people” (p. 2). The tension in American federalism between shared rule and self-rule might be considered the distinguishing feature of American federalism (Watts, 1998). The Framers intentionally built the tension into the U.S. Constitution: “Hamilton and Madison recognized that a proper federal system involves concurrent jurisdiction on the part of a limited national government and limited state governments that independently exercise concurrent jurisdiction with reference to individuals” (V. Ostrom, 1991, pp. 90-91). There is a growing body of literature that argues that the tension has been alleviated, if not resolved, through cooperative federalism. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), for example, define cooperative federalism as follows: The principle of cooperative federalism is to prefer the most decentralized structure of government capable of internalizing all economic externalities, subject to the constitutional constraint that all central government policies are agreed to unanimously by the elected representatives from each of the lower-tiered governments” (p. 48) The tradition of cooperative federalism may have its origins in the nineteenth century. Elazar (1964) argues that cooperative federalism was the most common modal relationship between the national and state governments in the 19th century: “Federalism in the United States, in practice if Watts (1998) observes that there are at least three substantially different meanings of the concept of “federalism”: federalism as a normative concept, federal political systems, and federations. In this paper, federalism means federal political systems: “The term federal political systems, distinct from federalism or federations, is the descriptive term referring to the genus of political organization that is marked by the combination of shared rule and self-rule” (p. 120). 6

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not in theory, has traditionally been cooperative, so that virtually all the activities of government in the nineteenth century were shared activities, involving federal, state, and local governments in their planning, financing, and execution” (p. 249). Zimmerman (2001) delineates five tenets of cooperative federalism (p. 20): 1. “Each plane of government possesses certain autonomous powers that may be exercised cooperatively, with such cooperation initiated by either plane. 2. “One place of government does not coerce the other place of government. 3. “The roles of Congress in terms of national-state relations are facilitating and leadership ones. 4. “Congress uses its power to regulate interstate commerce to assist states by prohibiting use of such commerce in violation of state laws. 5. “Cooperation is negotiated.” Similarly, the cooperative component of Rich’s “transformed federalism” in the context of American health care “recognizes the interdependence of two levels of government, the necessary sharing of functions, the need for the revenue of both levels, and it further recognizes the leverage one level can exert on the other” (Rich, 2002). In short, as Elazar (1966) puts it, cooperative federalism is “an intricate framework of cooperative relationships that preserve their structural integrity while tying all levels of government together functionally in the common task of serving the American people” (p. 2).

2.2 Marble-cake intergovernmental relations Grodzin devised the metaphor of “marble-cake” federalism to describe the national-state intergovernmental relations that arise from cooperative federalism. Grodzin (1993) writes, “The American form of government is often symbolized by a three-layer cake. A far more accurate image is the rainbow or marble cake, characterized by an inseparable mingling of differently colored ingredients, the colors appearing in vertical and diagonal strands and unexpected whirls” (p. 57). Marble-cake federalism may have a role in increasing state governmental powers: “[‘Marble-cake federalism’] in state-national intergovernmental relations suggests that national policymakers may play a role in determining state and local public sector capacity” (Bohte & Meier, 2000, p. 41). Marble-cake federalism might best be characterized as the incarnation of cooperative federalism in the real world of national-state intergovernmental relations. Perhaps marble-cake federalism is more appropriately called “marble-cake intergovernmental relations.” Cooperative federalism has provided the structure in which “marble-cake” intergovernmental relations could develop. The notion of marble-cake intergovernmental relations

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is primarily distinguished by a high degree of interdependence between the national and state governments. Hall (1989) writes, The states and the federal government—participate in a wide sharing of functions. This theory of shared governance has moved American federalism out of the age of ‘layer cake federalism’ and into the age of ‘marble cake federalism.’ The various governments share—at least partially—in the decisions regarding governmental actions as well as cooperating in the implementation of public policies (p. 27). The cooperative spirit in marble-cake intergovernmental relations are at odds with Walker’s (19801981) “dysfunctional federalism”: “The prime symptom of this deepening dysfunctionalism is the continuing tendency to ‘intergovernmentalize’ seemingly everything that becomes a public issue-and, increasingly, everything becomes a public issues [sic]” (p. 1194). In marble-cake intergovernmental relations the “tendency to ‘intergovernmentalize’ seemingly everything” is a sign of functional health, not dysfunctional malaise. When the national government seeks to implement a program, American federalism creates what Stoker calls the “implementation paradox.” Stoker (1991) writes, “It can be argued that the implementation process is a paradox if reluctant partners dilute the authority of federal officials and, thereby, diminish the ability of national government to achieve its ends” (p. 15). As a result, he continues, “a diffuse distribution of authority complicates the development and implementation of national policy and implies that cooperation among numerous centers of authority is often the key to effectiveness” (p. 18). In the intergovernmental context of ACF, Ellison (1998) describes this as the “autonomy-policy fragmentation continuum”. Ellison defines autonomy as “the struggle to build jurisdictional control over substantive policy areas by members of a coalition” (p. 42); and, according to Ellison, policy fragmentation “occurs when responsibilities for the delivery of public goods and services are shared by agencies from different governments, and also when legislatures give agencies disparate goals” (p. 42). But Stoker’s paradox only holds true if on the federal and state governmental actors in a governmental program truly are “reluctant partners” with a high degree of policy fragmentation. If the spirit of cooperation instead of reluctance predominates, however, then it follows that the paradox dissolves. Beer’s concept of the intergovernmental lobby (see Beer, 1976, 1977, 1978) implies that modern intergovernmental relations are more appropriately characterized as a positive feedback loop. Premised on Anton’s (1989) notion that government actors are not “passive instruments” (p. 33), Beer (1977) characterizes the “intergovernmental lobby” as “the governors, mayors, county supervisors, city managers, and other officeholders, usually elective, who exercise general

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responsibilities in state and local governments…” and who attempt to influence national government policy (p. 11).7 In fact, Beer (1976) argues, the positive feedback loop has driven the growth in the size of government. “In intergovernmental relations, the flow of power was not unidirectional, but complex and interactive” (pp. 163-164). DiMaggio (1983) makes a similar point from the sociological perspective: “As the bureaucratization of organizations was stimulated by the growth of the modern economy, so the ‘structuration’ of relations among organizations is promoted by the expansion of the modern state” (p. 150). The intergovernmental lobby grew with the general increase in the post-WWII powers of the state. The intergovernmental lobby most likely is so successful because of its advantage in gaining access to national policy makers in the same policy arena. O’Toole (1985) suggests that the intergovernmental lobby arose under Johnson’s “creative federalism” (see immediately below) as the interests in national governmental programs multiplied: “Those concerned with specific intergovernmental programs, whether on environmental pollution or juvenile delinquency, increasingly looked to Washington as they tried to influence legislation and implementing regulations, to monitor the actions of the federal agency involved, and to maintain contact with other interested parties” (p. 11). Then, on top of state actors’ interests, their ‘public official status’” (Cammisa, 1995, p. 23) allowed them greater access to national policy makers. Their persistence no doubt also helped: “Coalition and alliance building is a way of life for the government interest groups, specially on maters of important legislation or funding” (Haider, 1974, p. 233). The intergovernmental lobby thus facilitated a vibrant cooperative federalism and effective marble-cake intergovernmental relations to emerge from the American federalist system during the last four decades.

2.2.1 The Johnson Administration’s Great Society programs The Johnson Administration’s Great Society programs were typically designed under the assumption that government had not only the capacity but also the responsibility to intervene in social relations. “Johnson,” O’Toole writes, “proposed a ‘creative federalism that would signify multiple new national commitments to assist states, localities, and private individuals and organizations in their efforts to solve many of the domestic difficulties afflicting society” (p. 10). Further, as Lowi (1979) notes, “The mark of the new liberalism was its assumption that the instruments of government provided the means for conscious inducement of social change” (p. 42). Anton’s (1989) “benefit coalition,” in which “any association of individuals, often representing other individuals, who mobilize to develop, support, and implement government benefit programs,” is similar to Beer’s lobby (p. 32). 7

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Governmental intervention usually took the form of social programs providing services: “The main thrust of the Great Society was expressed in programs providing, not money, not regulation, but specialized services delivered by technically trained people for the benefit of defined categories of persons. This services strategy arose from the new professionalism” (Beer, 1977, p. 13). Conlan (1998c) summarizes the major growth in the power of the state during the late 1960s as follows: “The number of new federal grant programs—especially narrow and often unpredictable programs—nearly tripled between 1960 and 1968, from 132 to 379” (p. 6). “The federal government,” Conlan summarizes, “became more involved in virtually all existing fields of government activity…In addition, new public functions were established” (p. 5). The intergovernmental lobby fully developed under the Johnson Administration’s Great Society programs. The intergovernmental lobby grew from the national government’s increased reliance on the state government for the implementation of national programs: “As the federal government in the Great Society period extended its responsibilities by means of state and local governments, it also became dependent on them for the successful discharge of these responsibilities” (Beer, 1976, p. 163). Thus state governments’ “heightened the concern and increased the contacts” (Beer, 1976, p. 163) with the national government motivated the development of the intergovernmental lobby. Conlan (1998c) observes: Then in the 1960s the intergovernmental system began to evolve at an accelerated pace. The ensuing changes in the scope, content, and structure of federal assistance programs not only made the system far more complex, but also upset the temporary balance of intergovernmental power that had been achieved. Sweeping changes were ushered in by the Great Society. (p. 5) Not surprisingly, as the national government became more dependent on the state government for implementation, the state governments became more dependent on the national government for resources. “State and local governments’ financial dependence on federal funding increased by 35 percent. Federal aid increased from 17 percent of state and local own-source revenues in 1960 to 23 percent in 1970” (Conlan, 1998c, p. 6). Marble-cake intergovernmental relations under the Johnson Administration were incarnate in the complex interdependencies between U.S. national and state governments. 2.2.2 Federalism in the 1990s Of course it should be emphasized that national-state interdependencies in intergovernmental relations should not be construed as a diminution of the national government’s

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power. During the 1990s the federal government was still immensely powerful. Derthick (2001) notes that “the trend in this most important area of government activity [i.e., intergovernmental relations] is toward centralization…Major steps have been taken toward nationalization of income support programs.” The centralization of power, however, has not been accompanied by growth of the state as it was under the Johnson Administration. “The past fifteen years have reversed many of these trends [in growth in federal government activity and influence, increasing centralization of activities, and rising proportions of federal budget spending on grants to state and local governments]” (Cole, Stenberg, & Weissert, 1996, pp. 38-39). Nonetheless, the national government remains staggeringly powerful. State governments nevertheless increased their powers in the 1990s. The Republican Revolution in November 1994 was by most measures an important event in intergovernmental relations. For example, By an impressively wide margin, the most important event affecting intergovernmental relations in this period, as evaluated by the total group of respondents, was the 1994 elections where the Republican party won control of both Houses of Congress and thirty governorships (Cole et al., 1996, p. 31). The intergovernmental lobby found two new tactics of influence: “First, they secured the passage of legislation that forced Congress to take account of their interests [i.e., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)]. Second, they relied on “relationships between individual governors and congressmen [i.e., Republican governors and the Republican majority in Congress] in order to advance their goals in particular policy areas” (Dinan, 1997, p. 136). For its part, the 104th Congress: “Conservatives in the fourth phase have tried to decrease both federal spending and the ‘strings’ attached to such spending” (Cammisa, 1995, p. 6). The 104th Congress offered the states great promise. The promise for intergovernmental relations in the 104th Congress was greater than the reality. “The budget resolution passed by the House on May 18, 1995, would have launched a true ‘devolution revolution’ if I had been fully implemented. Instead, it represented the high-water mark of reforms in the 104th Congress” (Conlan, 1998a, p. 238). The result, as Conlan (1998b) observes, was that devolution of authority and resources to state government has been evolutionary, not revolutionary: devolution has truly been a “halting and gradual experiments in devolving functions from the federal government to state and local governments” (Conlan, 1998b, p. 292). Although the 104th Congress hardly spurred the fabled “devolution revolution,” it did enable state governments to grow still further in power and influence.

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Part 3. From Federal-State Partnership to Advocacy Coalition In Part 3 we present the application of Steps 3 and 4 of IPO to government support for the arts in the U.S. In Part 2 we developed the institutional environment of IPO (Steps 1 and 2). The main themes of Part 2 were cooperative federalism, the growth of the power of the states, and the parity of the power of states and the intergovernmental lobby vis-à-vis the national government. In Part 3, these elements of the institutional environment components are used to explain the emergence of a federal-state advocacy coalition for government support of the arts in the U.S.

3.1 Federal-State Partnership, 1966-1974 3.1.1 The National Endowment for the Arts In 1965 Congress established the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) by passing the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities (NFAH). Support for the arts before (and after) 1965 was decidedly private in nature. But a national governmental program to promote excellence in the arts was consistent with the spirit of public policy during the Johnson’s Great Society initiatives. “The theme from the Kennedy years of the quest for excellence in American civilization, subsequently adopted by Johnson’s Great Society, was perhaps the most persuasive argument of all [for passing the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities]” (Larson, 1983, p. 193).8 As in most Great Society programs, the implementation of NFAH would rely on a federal-state partnership. Roger Stevens, the NEA’s first chairman and one of only a handful of individuals responsible for setting up and implementing NFAH, “pushed for ‘grassroots’ support in the enabling legislation, which included state arts council provisions as part of a "definite program of assistance for the arts” (Mark, 1991, p. 49). Chairman Stevens got his wish. The federal-state partnership in government support for the arts in the U.S. formed very much in the spirit of American cooperative federalism and marble-cake intergovernmental relations. Horowitz (1986) writes that the federal-state partnership was “being done through a very broad range of programs and done not as a partnership in the sense of formal contract, but as a sharing of responsibilities and a set of working relationships between the several levels of government” (p. 1). From the beginning, the national program for government support of the arts would be decentralized to the states: “it is through the NEA/SAA [i.e., federal-state] partnership in the Basic State Grants that the states are enabled to reach all congressional districts, including those the NEA 8

Also see Cummings, Jr. (1982; 1991) for further insight into the early NEA.

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does not” (Love, 1991, p. 218). The introduction to a manual on the federal-state partnership for the arts reads as follows: Our system of state governments, though cumbersome and antiquated in many respects, creates an unexpected framework of diversity for the distribution of arts patronage. The diffusion of this patronage through a series of local, autonomous authorities throughout the country provides a way of resisting and counteracting any trend to an ‘official establishment’ culture controlled by a single authority or source of funds. (Adams, 1966, p. ix) Thus, the system of government support for the arts in the U.S. by design would be cooperative and marble-caked. 3.1.1.1 Grants and implementation

More specifically, the implementation of federal-state partnership was structured as a block grant program with the purpose of stimulating the vast majority of the fifty states and (at that time) four U.S. territories to establish state arts agencies (SAAs). Urice (1992) observes that “virtually all the literature on the formative stages of state arts agencies cites the essential role and stimulus of the federal government” (p. 21). Indeed, Netzer in his seminal work The Subsidized Muse (1978) asserts: “With a few exceptions, these state arts councils resulted not from an autonomous rise of interest in patronizing the arts on the part of state governments but from the availability of NEA funds for that purpose” (p. 90). Stein (1984) describes the generic federal-state implementation process in evolutionary terms: “I conceive of implementation in a federal system as a multi-staged process that occurs over an extended period of time (i.e., the life of the grant). During this time effects form one stage structure or restructure successive steps in the implementation process” (p. 141). Stein identifies four specific steps in the implementation process: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Utilization/participation in the federal aid system Allocation of aid monies to recipients Donor-recipient negotiations Feedback to the legislative process (i.e., policy reformulation)

In sum, Stein conceives of the federal-state implementation process as laced with financial incentives—in a word, grants. The use of the grant is one of the most powerful government tools available to the federal government for the implementation of national programs on a state and local level. The basic economic theory of grants “commodifies” them and gives the federal government monopoly powers: “In essence, the economic theory of grants conceptualizes state and local governments and DRAFT

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the citizens within them as consumers whose consumption the national government seeks to influence by manipulating their income and the process that pay for public goods” (Chubb, 1985, p. 997). The federal government’s monopoly on national grants, therefore, is a source of power in intergovernmental relations. The federal-state partnership between the NEA and the state arts agencies (SAAs) was laden with financial incentives. According to the guidelines of the Federal-State Partnership Program, State Arts Agencies are eligible to receive assistance under established guideline for any of the Endowment’s 12 major programs. However, the Endowment’s Federal-State Partnership Program specifically reflects the national interest in the very existence of effective State Arts Agencies which play an important part in strengthening the cultural life of the nation. This program recognizes that the Federal and State interests in cultural development are intertwined, and that cooperation between the National Endowment and State Arts Agencies strengthens the help each can provide their mutual constituencies.” (NCA, 1975, p. 1) NEA grants were therefore the sine qua non for the creation of most SAAs; SAAs were “creatures of the NEA” (see DiMaggio, 1991).

Figure 4: A General Model for State Participation in Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs (Hofferbert & Urice, 1985, p. 313) State Institutional Attributes

State Sociopolitical Contexts

Federal Stimulus

State Level of Policy Participation Institutional Attributes

State Policy Norms

Hofferbert and Urice’s conception of the NEA-SAA partnership and the “federal stimulus” is depicted in Figure 4. Most SAAs did not exist before the availability of the NEA grants: “Most

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legislatures, however, required further justification for state arts patronage. Two reasons ultimately proved persuasive: free federal money and urban economic relief” (Svenson, 1982, p. 197). Many SAAs were created only to be eligible to receive such grants: “In some states, however, arts councils began as little more than skeletal structures set up to qualify for federal grants” (Arian, 1989, p. 99). Hofferbert and Urice (1985) observe, While simultaneous creation cannot be totally disproved, it is highly unlikely that movement toward state arts funding, through specifically identified and designated agencies, would have spread universally in so short a time without incentive offered through NEA programs (p. 312). A milestone year in the program was 1974 because “it was the first year, when all 50 states as well as the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands had an arts agency in operation for the full year” (Simmons, 1978, p. 1). As a consequence, the federal-state partnership between the NEA and the SAAs was widely hailed a success. As Mulcahy (1988) observes, If there is one great success story emerging from these [set of eight, pre-1989] hearings, it is the partnership forged by the Arts Endowment with the ‘little NEAs’ in the states and localities. The mutually beneficial nature of this relationship—politically and administratively—was cited repeatedly. So, too, was the value of the state programs in spreading the benefits of the arts to diverse constituents. Fostering the growth of state arts agencies may have been the NEA’s single most important achievement. It gave the arts a strong local visibility and elicited state governments’ permanent commitment. (p. 79) The federal-state partnership in government support for the arts might have been the quintessential Johnson Administration program. 3.1.1.2 Constituency-building

Constituency-building under Nancy Hanks, the NEA’s second chair (1968–1977), was a deliberate augmentation of the federal-state partnership that at once sought to maintain the partnership while garnering support from other sectors. The tenure of Hanks was “marked by the maturation of each of the components of the potential arts-policy triangle, as well as by the enhancement of presidential support for the new agency and its programs” (Wyszomirski, 1988, p. 19). The NEA operated according to a “logic of constituency formation” in which the agency worked to build a national constituency to support its efforts to garner larger appropriations from Congress” (DiMaggio, 2000, p. 52). Wyszomirski (1995a) identifies five “axioms” of national arts policy under Hanks’ leadership (p. 72):

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Growing public interest and financial support; Increasingly positive political regard with low visibility; Largely unchallenged artistic control of the grant decision making process; Recurrent pattern of awards gave the appearance of entitlements; and Reliance on federal validation and legitimation of art world trends.

To build these constituencies, the NEA used the same instruments and levers as they did to nurture the federal-state partnership. “But in terms of pure political clout, the grant money the agency dispenses has helped it build allies in communities across the nation…The availability of federal subsidies explains why it draws Republican support not only from moderates, but also many conservatives, especially in the Senate” (Freedman, 1997 p. 626). One of the salutary effects of the NEA’s constituency-building was “the creation of a vertical network of public and private art agencies from Washington to local communities” (DiMaggio, 1983, p. 151). Figure 5: Cultural Subgovernment (The Arts Policy Making Triangle) (Mulcahy, 1988, p. 62) National Endowment for the Arts (also National Endowment for the Humanities and Institute for Museum Services

State and Local Arts Agencies, Cultural Institutions and Arts Service Organizations

Agencies

Interest Groups

Congressional Subcommittees House Select/Postsecondary Education Subcommittees Senate education, Arts, and Humanities Subcommittee House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee

Another salutary effect of the Hanks-driven constituency-building was the NEA becoming comfortably ensconced in an “old iron triangle.” In addition to the NEA and the relevant authorizing and appropriations congressional subcommittees occupying two angles, “interest groups” such as state and local arts agencies and arts service organizations occupied the final vertex (Mulcahy, 1988). Consequently, for the first two decades of its existence, NEA management of direct government support for the arts was a “relatively simple distributive policy sub-government focused on increasing financial resources for the NEA and, through it, to the arts constituency” DRAFT

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(Wyszomirski, 1995c, p. 47). Figure 5 illustrates this “cultural subgovernment.” In short, the Hanks’ gains for the NEA were impressive: When Nancy Hanks took office in October 1969, the NEA was a small, threatened, drifting agency teetering on the brink of its initial survival threshold. By the time she resigned with years later, the NEA had become institutionalized and could claim both programmatic and political successes. (Wyszomirski, 1996, p. 122) An irony of the federal government’s use of grants, however, is that they have stimulated a concomitant increase in the power and influence of the states. Not all of the increase in national power came at the expense of states’ rights. The national government mandates compliance with some of its objectives, but more often it relies on inducements to achieve its ends. These inducements or incentives generally take the form of financial assistance that is made available to governments to pursue national goals. (Hanson, 1999, p. 39) Largely because of what Beam and Conlan (2002) call the “high automaticity”9 of grants, the more the national government relied on grants more as incentives, the better state governments were able to negotiate and bargain with the federal government. Ingram (1977) characterizes “implementation as bargaining.” “The result is a process of implementation that is a complex succession of bids and counterbids between the state and federal levels during which the initial aims of each are substantially modified” (p. 502). Eventually, the market power of state governments increased and they came away from negotiations with better deals from the national government. Beer (1977) observes: “In time the intergovernmental lobby acquitted sufficient political influence to initiate demands more closely reflecting its members’ political interests. A major demand was fewer federal strings on more federal money” (p. 12). The increase in state powers, however, has not been so much been the diminution of national power as the increase in the powers of all levels of government. As Hanson (1999) writes, The use of incentives to bring about compliance by states with national objectives has generated a concomitant expansion of state powers. All levels of government have become more active in the twentieth century, not just the national government. (p. 39)

“Automaticity measures the extent to which a tool utilizes an existing administrative structure (e.g. the market system or the tax system) to produce its effect rather than having to create its own special administrative apparatus. From the point of view of the granting government, grants rank fairly high in terms of automaticity since they essentially involve relying on the administrative systems of other entities to carry out particular functions (e.g. provision of education, social services, highway construction, policing” (Beam & Conlan, 2002) 9

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DiMaggio warned of the double-edged sword of the NEA’s constituency building nearly twenty years ago: “The constituencies they encourage may turn into lobbying groups that support them in times of crisis, or Frankensteins [sic] that level greater and greater demands” (DiMaggio, 1983, p. 155). For a time it looked like the SAAs may have been Frankensteins. By 1975, the state challenged the Endowment vigorously, demanding more influence in developing guidelines for the funds they re-granted, more influence in developing guidelines, and symbolic acceptance as partners, rather than subordinates, in the policy process” (DiMaggio, 1991, p. 219). Platt Jr. (1988) identifies three reasons for the SAAs’ success relative to the NEA in growing their appropriations in the 1980s (Platt Jr., 1988p. 99): (1) SAA leadership; (2) citizen-based advocacy coalition: and (3) governor leadership and interest. Moreover, the SAAs were peeved because of their subordinate status: “Rather the relationship was one of grantor to grantee and not a partnership working toward common goals. Feeling the need to have greater independent voice, the state established the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies (NASAA) to assert their positions and to provide services to individual states” (Urice, 1992, p. 22).

3.2 Advocacy Coalition, 1989-1997 3.2.1 From subgovernment to advocacy coalition “A community of interest in cultural policy,” Dwyer and Frankel (2003) observe in their report Policy Partners: Making the Case for State Investments in Culture, “has emerged in the past five to eight years at the national level” (p. 3). After approximately three decades of the NEA’s grantmaking and constituency-building, the federal-state partnership in government support for the arts became an advocacy coalition for government support for the arts in the 1990s as part “community of interest” at the national level. The major thesis of this paper is that, in the spirit of cooperative federalism and marble-cake intergovernmental relations, the NEA and the SAAs formed around the strong normative position that government should support the arts. Thus the SAAs transformed from being one part of subgovernment constructed around the NEA to taking center stage with the NEA advocating government support for the arts. Table 1 demonstrates the shifts that accompany a change from subgovernment to advocacy coalition.

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Table 1: Comparison of the Subsystem and Advocacy Coalition Frameworks (Davis & Davis, 1988, p. 4) Dominant Subsystem

Advocacy Coalition

Source of Change

Subsystem participants

Participants

Federal agencies, clientele groups and congressional committees

Policy Orientation

Distribution of government largess

Policy Conflict Coalition

Minimal Only 1 coalition win which there is agreement

Major changes result from: a) socio-economic conditions b) outputs from policy coalitions with other interests c) national or system wide governing coalition Agencies and government officials from local, state and national levels, interest groups, researchers and media representatives Variety of organizations which range from preservation to development Considerable Two or more coalitions each having members from different organizations who share similar beliefs

3.2.2 Belief System Advocacy coalitions form around a belief system that consists of a deep core, policy core, and secondary beliefs. “Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core,” which are the “fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving normative axioms of deep core” (Sabatier, 1993). Most subsystems and networks feature a normative structure that “gives meaning to the action of the members of the subsystem/network and the use to which the tools are put” (Milward & Wamley, 1984). Even more, as Wyszomirski (1999) finds, “in the process of value articulation, a policy community is invented (or re-invented) and a policy system is forged that institutionalizes this value consensus and uses it to legitimize policy purposes, to operationalize issue definitions, to implement programs, and to channel policy politics” (p. 26). The main distinction of advocacy coalitions, however, is that the belief system is the very reason for its existence. The emergence of a consensual belief system is not exactly commonplace but it does happen. For example, intergovernmental consensus on economic development in after the mid-1970s: “Sometime after the mid-1970s there emerged on the state and local scene an intense preoccupation with economic development that has been marked by a level of consensus and expectation unusual in American politics” (Eisinger, 1988, p. 3). It also happened with the NEA, the SAAs, and the federal-state partnership in government support for the arts in the U.S. in the 1990s.

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Both the NEA and the SAAs have always acknowledged the necessity of the others. On the one hand, “the NEA needs the SAAs’ knowledge of local and regional issues and their decentralized issues system for making grants”; on the other hand, “the state arts agencies need their Basic State Grants and, looking especially at the projections for 1992 and beyond, they need the NEA’s assistance in persuading state legislatures of the importance of public arts funding” (Love, 1991, p. 218). The NEA’s recognition of the SAAs is present in its enabling legislation, as explored above. The SAAs’ recognition of the necessity of the NEA can be traced back to 1981 in a pivotal document entitled Public Arts Agencies: Toward National Public Policy: The underlying premise of this report is that a comprehensive national public policy for the support for the arts is essential to the continued development of private support at all levels, and that the active and purposeful development of such a policy should be carried out through joint planning between a strong federal arts agency and its affiliated state, regional, and local arts agencies. (See Backas, 1981, p. 3) Joint planning and common interests have always linked the NEA and the SAAs in the federal-state partnership from the beginning. In the 1990s, however, that relationship intensified. Nancy Hanks, NEA chair in the middle third of the 1990s says in her memoirs (2000), “it pleased me that the NEA, arts service organizations, and lobbyists were working in solidarity to promote the value of arts in communities and to increase the Endowment's budget” (p. 160). Ironically, the federal-state partnership did not begin the 1990s auspiciously. “During the Congressional re-authorisation hearings of 1990, one of the strategies to undermine the leadership of the NEA and to curtail its activities was a proposal by Republicans in Congress, which was initially supported by the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies [NASAA; the main advocacy organization for SAAs], for a 60 per cent devolution of arts funding to the states” (recounted in van den Bosch, 1997, p. 314).10 However, by the mid-1990s, Hanks observes, “We [the NEA, the SAAs, the NASAA, et al.] were all promoting the same message, and turf wars had radically diminished” (p. 161). It is true that “the role of state and jurisdictional arts agencies is to forever make the case for the value of funding for the arts and a direct connection to the policies of state government” (Mankin, Cohn, Perry, & Cayer, 2001, p. 9). The difference in the 1990s was that the very idea of government support for the arts was being questioned. For example, a 1995 House budget resolution read: “there is serious philosophical debate about whether financing artistic creation is an It should be noted that this legislation failed, but in 1993 the percentage passed-through to the states did increase from 20 to 27.5 percent, then ultimately to nearly 40 percent toward the end of the decade. 10

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appropriate government activity in the first place” (Concurrent Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1996 (Function 500: Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services), 1995). Robert Lynch, the CEO of America for the Arts, which is the main advocacy organization for local arts, wrote with urgency in 1992: “Although local responses are necessary, they are not enough: there is a crucial need now for federal, state, and local government arts funding policies to be philosophically linked” (Lynch, 1992). NASAA prominently inserted the belief in national and state government support for the arts in its grassroots advocacy guide (see Birch, 2000). The NEA and the SAAs formed an advocacy coalition around the central normative position that government at all levels should support the arts in the U.S. “Rather than agency clientele, the state arts agencies sought to become policy partners with the NEA (with NASAA service as their collective representative). State arts agencies called for such a recast relationship to be reflected both in policy planning and programmatic structure at the NEA (Wyszomirski & Sharamitaro, 2002, p. 12).

Figure 6: NEA Appropriations and Basic State Grants (Source: 2001 NASAA Handbook)

$200,000,000 $150,000,000

NEA Appropriations*

$100,000,000

Basic State Grants*/ Plan (1997-present)

$50,000,000

1999

1996

1993

1990

1987

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

$0

Elazar (1966) argued, “It is possible to chart the scope of those concerns [states interests in nationwide political concerns] and to treat its impact on state-federal political relations generally, in regard to groups of states and in regard to individual states, by considering [seven points],” one of which is “the essential distribution of authority and power between the federal government and the states” (pp. 23-24). In the federal-state partnership in government support for the arts, the distribution of fiscal authority shifted in the 1990s. For example, NEA grants to the SAAs increased from 20 percent when the agency was founded to nearly 40 percent today. Figure 6 demonstrates that NEA grants to the SAAs remained fairly constant even as the NEA’s own appropriation was

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reduced almost 40 percent in fiscal year 1996. Moreover, Figure 7 shows that the resources of the SAAs increased dramatically in the 1990s relative to the NEA as state legislatures were far more benevolent to the SAAs than Congress was to the NEA. This “inversion” of the NEA-SAA historic relationship (Wyszomirski, 2002, p. 188) prompted Mulcahy (2002) to call for a revision in cultural policy in the U.S.:11 My overall finding is that the revision in the relative resources of agencies at the national and subnational levels of government for funding of the arts requires a reconfiguration of policymaking roles and responsibilities. In particular, the programmatic elements of a national cultural policy need to be assumed largely at the subnational levels. (p. 67) Although several SAAs have recently been targeted for severe budget reductions (none have been eliminated so far), the inversion of the NEA-SAA federal-state partnership remains a fact. Figure 7: NEA and SAA Appropriations (Source: 2001 NASAA Handbook)

Appropriation

500000000

SAA Appropriations (incl. line items)

400000000 300000000 200000000

SAA Appropriations (excl. line items)

100000000

NEA Appropriations*

19 66 19 70 19 74 19 78 19 82 19 86 19 90 19 94 19 98

0

Fiscal Year

The advocacy coalition between the NEA and the SAAs formalized with the federal-state “partnership agreements” that were a major component of the NEA’s restructuring in fiscal year 1996. “During the consequent institutional reorganization, NEA administrators deployed the term ‘partnership’ to describe a variety of new relationships and projects necessitated by the economic and political pressures the Endowment faced” (George, 1997). Michael McLaughlin (NEA staff member) was quoted on December 6, 1995:

11

In light of recent struggles of the SAAs, I did recently hear Mulcahy wish to retract portions of this article.

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I think it’s positive that our relationships with States Arts Agencies are now going to be partnership agreements instead of hands-off grants, because they’ll b negotiated almost like cooperative agreements. So, it will be clearer what the states are responsible for with Federal money.” (George, 1997, p. 24)

Conclusion Our main thesis in this paper is that the federal-state partnership in government support for the arts in the U.S. transformed into a NEA-SAA advocacy coalition for government support for the arts in the U.S. We applied our Institutionalized Political Organization (IPO) model, which we developed from Meyer’s General Institutional Model and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Advocacy Coalition Framework, to demonstrate that the political organization of government support for the arts in the U.S. had become institutionalized in the 1990s. The federal-state partnership managed by the NEA in the late 1960s and 1970s became an advocacy coalition formed around the belief in the appropriateness of government support for the arts in the 1990s. The advocacy coalition, however, emerged from the factors in the institutional environment: namely, cooperative federalism and marble-cake intergovernmental relations. The institutionalized political organization of government support for the arts helped to save the NEA. It provided a reliable and stable ballast on which the NEA could lean to demonstrate its continued utility in American culture, thus helping the federal agency to survive the 1990s.

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