THE FOUNDATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY

THE FOUNDATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy

MARVIN FARBER

ALDINETRANSACTION A Division of Transaction Publishers New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.)

ontos verlag Frankfurt (Germany)

CONTENTS I. EDMUND HUSSERL AND THE BACKGROUND OF HIS PHILOSOPHY . A. Psychologism and philosophy in the 1880's, 4. B. The disciple of Brentano, 8. C. Brentano as a precursor of Husserl, 11. D. Husserl's final judgment of Brentano, 13. E. Husserl's development, 15. F. Toward the future, 23.

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II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC . A. The genuine concepts of plurality, unity, and number, 26. B. The symbolic concepts of number and the logical sources of arithmetic, 43. C. Critical reaction and significance, 54.

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HI. EARLY LOGICAL INTERESTS A. Symbolic logic, 61. 1. Critique of Schroder, 61. 2. Husserl's attempt at an intensional logic, 72. 3. Controversy with Voigt, 80. B. Psychological studies in logic, 89. C. First logical survey, 95.

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IV. THE REFUTATION OF PSYCHOLOGISM A. The Prolegomena to Pure Logic, 99. B. Logic as a normative and practical discipline, 103. C. The theoretical basis of normative disciplines, 107. D. Psychologism and its consequences, 109. E. The fundamental principles of logic, 115. F. Psychologism as skeptical relativism, 119. G. The psychologistic prejudices, 128. H. Logic and the principle of diought-economy, 133.

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V. PURE LOGIC 137 A. Husserl's historical antecedents, 137. B. The idea of a pure (formal) logic, 139. C. The critical reaction to the Prolegomena, 147. 1. Some critics of the Prolegomena, 147. 2. Husserl's defense of his position, 153. D. The outcome of the Prolegomena, 156. VI. GERMAN LOGIC AT THE CLOSE OF THE CENTURY 170 A. Fundamental problems of logic, 170. 1. The nature of logic, 170. 2. Logic and metaphysics, 173. 3. Problems of the theory of judgment, 175. B. Phenomenology and psychology, 181. C. The ideal of infinite thought, 184. D. The critique of knowledge, 185. E. The logic and psychology of judgment, 188. F. Marty's logical studies, 189. G. Results of the second logical survey, 193. VII. THE "BREAKTHROUGH" TO PHENOMENOLOGY 196 A. The two editions of die Logical Investigations: two stages of phenomenology, 196. B. Against the misunderstanding of phenomenology, 199. 1. On the significance of the Prolegomena, 201. 2. The appeal to the "things themselves," 202. 3. No Platonic hypostasis, 203. 4. The mathesis

CONTENTS universalis and philosophical logic, 203. 5. The Logical Investigations as achieving a "breakthrough," 204. 6. Ontology and the theory of objects, 205. 7. Relationship to Lotze and Bolzano, 206. 8. Phenomenology not an analysis of word-meanings, 208. 9. Phenomenology not descriptive psychology, 208. 10. The charge of "logicism" and the nature of phenomenological description, 208. C. The nature and role of phenomenological investigations, 211. D. The style of the Logical Investigations, 216. E. The six logical investigations, 218. VIII. EXPRESSION AND MEANING 222 A. The essential distinctions, 224. B. Meaning-endowing acts, 232. C. Thefluctuationof word-meanings and the ideality of the unity of meaning, 237. D. Pure logic and the ideal meanings, 238. E. The phenomenological and ideal content of experiences of meaning, 240. IX. UNIVERSALS AND ABSTRACTION 244 A. General objects and the consciousness of generality, 246. B. The psychological hypostasis of the general, 251. C. Abstraction and attention, 256. D. Abstraction and representation, 266. E. A phenomenological study of Hume's theory of abstraction, 271. F. The distinction of various concepts of abstraction and abstract, 277. X. THE ANALYSIS OF WHOLES AND PARTS 283 A. Independent and dependent objects, 284. 1. Analytic and synthetic propositions, 294. 2. Relative independence and dependence, 296. B. The theory of pure forms of wholes and parts, 297. 1. The concept of foundation (Fundierung) and relevant theorems, 297. 2. Transition to the more important part-relations, 299. 3. Reciprocal and one-sided, mediate and immediate foundation, 299. 4. Definition of portion, factor, physical part, abstractum, concretum, 300. 5. The difference between mediate and immediate parts of a whole, 301. 6. Nearer and more remote parts of a whole, 302. 7. The concepts of whole and part defined by means of the concept of foundation, 304. 8. Sensory forms of unity and wholes, 305. 9. Categorial forms of unity and wholes, 307. 10. The pure formal types of wholes and parts, and the postulate of an a priori theory, 309. 11. On the partition of wholes through the partition of their factors, 309. XI. PURE GRAMMAR AND THE ANALYSIS OF MEANING 313 A. Simple and compound meanings, 314. B. Complexity of meanings and of objects, 314. C. Complexity of meanings and of the concrete act of meaning, 315. D. "Syncategorematic" constituents of complex expressions, 316. E. Independent and dependent meanings: the dependence of sensuous and of expressive word-parts, 317. F. The conception of dependent meanings as founded contents, 318. G. Difficulties of this conception, 319. H. A priori laws in meaning complexes, 321. I. Modifications of meaning which are rooted in the essence of expressions, or of meanings, 322. J. Nonsense and absurdity, 334. K. Complication of meaning and the pure logical-grammatical theory of forms, 326. L. The

CONTENTS avoidance of nonsense and absurdity, and die idea of pure-logical grammar, 328. M. Pure-logical grammar and its philosophic significance, 331. XII. INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCES AND THEIR "CONTENTS" 333 A. Concerning the nature of consciousness, 334. 1. Consciousness as the immanent phenomenological unity of ego-experiences, 334. 2. "Inner" consciousness as inner perception, 338. 3. Acts or intentional experiences, 339. B. Consciousness as intentional experience, 339. 1. Acts as "intentional" experiences, 339. 2. Prevention of terminological misinterpretations, 341. (a) The "mental" or "immanent" object, 341. (b) The act and the relation of consciousness or of the ego to the object, 342. (c) Choice of terminology, 343. 3. Acts as a descriptively founded class of experiences, 344. 4. The question of intentional feelings, 347. 5. Distinction between descriptive and intentional content, 348. 6. Intentional content in the sense of intentional object, 349. 7. Simple and compound, founding and founded acts, 350. 8. The function of attention in complex acts, 350. 9. The distinction of die quality and die matter of an act, 352. 10. The intentional essence and die meaning essence, 353. 11. Critique of the "image theory" and of the doctrine of the "immanent" objects of acts, 354. C. The matter of the act and the presentation at its basis, 356. 1. The relationship between die matter and quality of die act, 356. 2. Matter as a founding act of "mere presentation," 357. 3. The problem of the differentiation of quality-genera, 358. 4. The testimony of direct intuition; perceptual presentation and perception, 359. 5. The case of judgment, 362. 6. "Approbation" or "assent" to die mere presentation of die fact, 363. D. Founding presentations, with particular regard to the dieory of judgment, 365. 1. The ambiguity of die term presentation, 365. 2. Restoration of the principle with a new concept of presentation, 366. 3. The concept of a name; positing and non-positing names, 367. 4. Nominal positing and judgment; whether judgments can become parts of nominal acts, 369. 5. Whedier statements can function as whole names, 371.' 6. The concept of an objectivating act, 373. 7. Qualitative and material differentiation of objectivating acts, 374. 8. Presentation in the sense of an objectivating act and its qualitative modification, 376. 9. Qualitative and imaginative modification, 379. 10. The objectivating act as die primary bearer of die matter, 380. 11. Fundamental dicorems for complex acts, 381. 12. Retrospective view of die earlier interpretations of the principle, 383. E. The most important meanings of die terms presentation and content, 384. 1. "Presentation," 384. 2. "Content of a presentation," 386. XIII. OBJECTIVATING INTENTIONS AND FULFILLMENTS . 388 A. Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, 392. 1. The expression of an act; formulation of the dieme, 392. 2. The expression of a perception ("perceptual judgment"), 394. 3. Perception as an act determining but not containing meaning, 395. 4. The static unity between expressing thoughts and expressed intuition; recognition (Er^ennen), 397. 5. Recognition as an act-character and die "generality of a word," 398. 6. Dynamic

CONTENTS fulfillment and the consciousness of identity, 401. 7. The different character of die intention within and without die unity of fulfillment, 403. 8. Intuitions as intentions needing fulfillment, 405. 9. Disappointment and conflict; die synthesis of distinction, 406. B. Indirect characterization of objectivating intentions through differences of fulfillment-syntheses, 407. 1. The synthesis of recognition as the form of fulfillment characteristic of objectivating acts; subsumption of acts of meaning under objectivating acts, 407. 2. Distinction between signitive and intuitive intentions through peculiarities of fulfillment, 410. (a) Sign, picture, and self-representation, 410. (b) The perceptual and imaginative adumbration of the object, 412. 3. Signitive intentions outside die meaning-function, 414. C. The phenomenology of knowledge-levels, 415. 1. Mere identification and fulfillment, 415. 2. The question concerning the relationship between fulfillment and envisagement, 418. 3. The gradations of indirect fulfillments; indirect presentations, 418. 4. The distinction between indirect presentations and presentations of presentations, 419. 5. Genuine envisagements in every fulfillment; genuine and figurative envisagement, 420. 6. The "fullness" of a presentation, 422. 7. Fullness and "intuitive content," 423. 8. The relationship of weight between intuitive and signitive contents of the same act, 424. 9. Series of increases of fulfillment, 427. 10. Fullness and intentional matter, 428. 11. Representation or apprehension, 430. 12. The relation of an act to its object, 431. 13. Intentional essence and fulfilling sense; cognitive essence, 432. 14. Complete and incomplete intuitions; conformable and objectively complete envisagement; essence, 433. D. Compatibility and incompatibility, 435. 1. The ideal distinction of meanings into possible (real) and impossible (imaginary), 435. 2. Unifiability or compatibility as an ideal relationship, 437. 3. Non-unifiability of contents in general, 438. 4. How conflict also can found unity; relativity of unifiability and conflict, 439. 5. Some axioms, 439. 6. Non-unifiability of concepts as meanings, 440. E. The ideal of adequation; evidence and truth, 441. 1. Introduction: possibility and imagination, 441. 2. The fulfillment-function of perception; die ideal of final fulfillment, 441. 3. Positing acts widi the function of fulfillment; evidence in a loose and in a rigorous sense, 443. 4. Evidence and truth, 444. XIV. SENSIBILITY AND UNDERSTANDING 448 A. Sensuous and categorial intuitions, 448. I. The problem of the fulfillment of categorial meaning-forms, 448. 2. The difference between sensuous and categorial form in die total sphere of objectivating acts, 451. 3. The objective correlates of die categorial forms no "real" factors, 452. 4. The origin of the concept of being and of the remaining categories as not in the domain of inner perception, 453. 5. Enlargement of the concept of intuition; sensuous and categorial intuition, 455. 6. Phenomenological analysis of die distinction between sensuous and categorial perception, 456. 7. Characterization of sense perception as "simple" perception, 457. 8. Characterization of categorial acts as founded acts, 459. 9. Conjunctions and disjunctions, 461. 10. General objects constituted in

CONTENTS general intuitions, 462. B. The a priori laws of genuine and figurative thought, 464. 1. Complication to ever new forms; die pure form-theory of possible intuitions, 464. 2. The relative or functional distinction between matter and form; sensuous concepts and categories, 464. 3. The categorial formation no real transformation of the object, 466. 4. The freedom in die categorial formation of pre-given substance and its limits; die purely categorial laws (laws of "genuine" diought), 467. 5. The new laws of validity of signitive and signitively obscure acts (laws of figurative thought), 470. 6. The pure logical-grammatical laws: their psychological significance and their normative function with respect to inadequate thought, 473. 7. The absurd problem of "die real meaning of the logical," 474. 8. Distinctions confused in die usual contrast of "intuition" and "thought," 476. 9. That not every meaning involves recognition, 478. C. Supplement: outer and inner perception; physical and psychical phenomena, 479. 1. The traditional distinction, 479. 2. Inner and outer perception, and their relation to apperception, 482. 3. The meaning of "appearance," 483. 4. Physical and psychical phenomena; adequate and inadequate perception, 484. 5. The classification of phenomena; Brentano's confusion, 487. XV. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 4S9 A. The phenomenological significance of the Logical Investigations, 489. B. Contributions toward a philosophy of logic, 492. C. The critique of formal logic and die program of transcendental logic, 495. 1. Levels of logical analysis, 495. 2. The principles of logic and die system of forms, 500. 3. The formal apophantic and formal ontology, 501. D. Originanalysis and the constitution of logical forms, 503. XVI. THE TECHNIQUE FOR A PRESUPPOSITIONLESS PHILOSOPHY 511 A. The descriptive analysis oftime-consciousness,511. B. The phenomenological method, 521. 1. The natural attitude and phenomenological reflection, 522. 2. The radicalization of reflection and die constructive program, 528. XVII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHENOMENOLOGY 537 A. The goal of an absolutely founded philosophy, 537. B. Phenomenology and its paradoxes, 543. C. The proper function of phenomenalogical analysis, 560. 1. The interpretation of die given and its analysis, 561. 2. The purely cognitive level of analysis, 563. 3. Phenomenological questions and intermediodological judgments, 565. 4. Some prominent misunderstandings of phenomenology, 566. D. Historical meaning and die approach to philosophy, 569. 1. Mediod as a response to problems, 569. 2. Historical and sedimented meaning, 570. 3. The problem of objective truth, 571. 4. The priority of phenomenology and die cooperation of mediods, 572. INDEX

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