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• Force planning constructs since the end of the Cold War

• The Quadrennial Defense Review: what’s next? • Opportunity to create new Service visions What is a Force Planning Construct? Guidance on the size (capacity) and shape (mix of capabilities) of U.S. Armed Forces needed for a range of planning scenarios Includes assumptions on the nature of the operating environment, frequency and concurrency of contingency operations, steady-state and surge requirements, force availability, etc. 2

SITUATION:

PEACETIME

ENGAGED IN ONE MRC

MRC #1 OVERSEAS PRESENCE DEMOCRACY PEACEKEEPING FORCES ENGAGED

OVERSEAS PRES.

STRAT LIFT ACTIVE FORCES

ENGAGED IN SECOND MRC

MRC #2

WIN MRC #2 RESERVE FORCES

WIN MRC #1 RESERVE FORCES

POST-CONFLICT STABILITY OPS

PEACEKEEPING

OVERSEAS PRES.

OVERSEAS PRES. DEMOCRACY

OVERSEAS PRES.

HA/DR

STRAT LIFT

STRAT LIFT

STRAT LIFT

NUKE DETER.

NUKE DETER.

NUKE DETER.

ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES

ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES

ACTIVE FORCES

POST-CONFLICT PERIOD

STABILITY OPS

PEACEKEEPING

HA/DR STRAT LIFT NUKE DETER.

FORCES AVAILABLE

RESERVE FORCES

SHIFTING TO TWO MRCS

HA/DR STRAT LIFT NUKE DETER. STRAT LIFT ACTIVE FORCES

RESERVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES

RESERVE FORCES

• Assumed a force that was properly sized for 2 major regional contingencies (MRCs) could also support smaller-scale conventional operations (“lesser included cases”)

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Major QDR Objectives • Preserve the Bottom-Up Review force planning approach, create a rationale for cuts to force structure and personnel • Address requirements to support multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contingencies • Continue capability enhancements to support operations to halt invasions (e.g., improved surveillance and precision strike) Most significant cuts

Army

Navy

Air Force Marine Corps

Active Personnel Reserve Personnel Civilian Personnel

Active Divisions Reserve Personnel Aircraft Carriers (Active/Reserve) Air Wings (Active/Reserve) Amphibious Ready Groups Attack Submarines Surface Combatants Active Fighter Wings Reserve Fighter Wings Reserve Air Defense Squadrons Bombers (Total) Marine Expeditionary Forces

FY1997 Programmed Force 1,450,000 900,000

1997 QDR 1,360,000 835,000

800,000

640,000

FY1997 Programmed Force 10 582,000 11/1 10/1 12 73 128 13 7 10 202 3

1997 QDR 10 530,000 11/1 10/1 12 50 116 12+ 8 4 187 3

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Major Objectives • • • •

Size for homeland defense and smaller-scale contingencies Accept risk in the second of 2 major theater wars Deter forward to prevent conflicts, rather than respond to crises Shift from optimizing for conflicts on the Korean and Arabian Peninsulas to a broader range of scenarios Major Forces (Active/RC)

1-4-2-1 1 Defend the United States; Deter aggression and coercion forward in

4 critical regions;

Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major while preserving the option for decisive 2 conflicts victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and a limited number of smaller-scale 1 Conduct contingency operations

Divisions 10/8 1/1 USA Cavalry Regiments Enhanced Separate Brigades 15 Aircraft carriers 12 Air Wings 10/1 USN Amphib Ready Groups 12 Attack Submarines 55 Surface Combatants 108/8 Fighter Squadrons 46/38 USAF Air Defense Squadrons /4 Bombers (combat-coded) 112 Divisions 3/1 3/1 USMC Air Wings (3 MEFs) Force Service Support 3/1 Groups 5

“Michelin Man” Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping

Homeland Defense Consequence Management

Global Deterrence

• Support wartime requirements • Change the capabilities mix, forces sized about right • Prioritize capabilities for 4 focus areas • Build partner capacity

Interdiction Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping

Stability Operations

War on Terror Irregular Warfare

Train & Equip

Information Operations

Transnational Deterrence

Foreign Internal Defense

Counterinsurgency Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Forward Presence

Regional Deterrence

Information Operations

Conventional Campaign(s)

Stability Ops Reconstruction Consequence Mgmt.

Major Combat WMD Operations Elimination

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• Multiple scenario cases for near-term (next 5 to 7 years) and mid- to long-term (years 7 to 20) planning • Preserved 2 war planning requirement, prioritized capabilities that can rapidly “swing” between theaters • Project power in anti-access/area-denial environments Mid- to Long-Term Scenario Case

Scenario Case

Scenario Case

Major stabilization operation + Deter and defeat a highly capable regional aggressor + Support civil authorities in response to a catastrophic event in U.S. homeland

Deter and defeat regional aggressor #1 + Deter and defeat regional aggressor #2 + Enhanced homeland defense posture

Major stabilization operation + Long-duration deterrence operation in separate theater + Medium-sized counterinsurgency operation + Support civil authorities in homeland

or

or

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• No longer size for large-scale, long-duration stability operations • Asia-Pacific rebalancing • Another nuclear forces cut may be possible Steady-State ‒ Support continuing counterterrorism operations ‒ Sustain other “steady-state” mission demands o

Maintaining a stabilizing global presence

o

Nuclear deterrence

o

Homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities

o

Lesser contingencies

Surge (Illustrative) Theater #1

‒ Combined arms campaign in all domains to defeat acts of aggression +

Theater #2

‒ Deny the objectives of / impose unacceptable costs on an opportunistic aggressor in 2nd region +

Homeland Defense

‒ Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities during consequence management events 8

COCOM Force Requirements

STEADY-STATE OPTEMPO

SURGE OPERATIONS

PHASE 4/5 OPERATIONS

Theater #2 Deny Objectives / Impose Unacceptable Costs on Opportunistic Aggressor Theater #1 Combined Arms Campaign to Defeat Aggression

Presence

Defeat

Homeland Defense

Support to Civil Authorities / Consequence Management

Steady State: Nuclear Deterrence, Support to Counter-Terrorism Operations Air Force Rotation Goal Active 1:3 (1:4 desired) Rotation Policy Reserve 1:5 (AF 1:10 volunteerism) Component

Full Mobilization No force rotation

Rotation Policy 1:2 Active 1:5 Reserve 9

Rotational

Post-surge rotational

Examples

Air superiority fighters, bombers Low-density, high-demand

Examples

Majority of the fighter force Theater mobility

Strategic mobility 10

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Change surge scenarios to enable force structure/end strength cuts (e.g., adopt new operational concepts that emphasize global surveillance and strike, cyber, SOF, “swing” forces, undersea warfare, etc. vice deploying forces to engage in major ground operations)

Increase timing between major warfights

Decrease steady-state and long-term rotational requirements

In other words, “do less with less”

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Post Surge Rotation 1:2 Active 1:5 Reserve

These changes could have profound implications for the Air Force’s AC/RC mix Decrease

New planning scenarios that change Post Surge requirements for Rotational rotational forces Demand Changing COCOM requirements for rotational forces

Supply

A smaller overall force due to budget cuts

Increase

AC/RC mix more AC/RC mix may favor similar to a peacetime forces with greater steady-state mix rotational availability AC/RC mix may favor forces with greater rotational availability 13

Predominately Air and Naval Capabilities Predominately Ground and Expeditionary Capabilities • Expeditionary Crisis Responses

Capability Requirements

• Building Partner Capacity • Sustained Counter-Terrorism Operations

• AirSea Battle in the Western Pacific

• Hybrid Major Contingency

• Global Swing Forces

• Joint Theater Entry Operations

• WMD Elimination Operations

Expeditionary Combat Support, Force Enablers, Force Generation Capabilities, etc.

Range of Defense Planning Scenarios

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“The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in implementing military policy … the strategic concept of the service…a description of how, when, and where the military service expects to protect the nation against some threat to its security.” “Changes in the principal threats to the security of any given nation … must be met by shifts in national policy and corresponding changes in service strategic concepts” — Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, 1954

• Operational domains that are increasingly contested

New visions • Asia-Pacific rebalancing should consider: • Growing need for systems that are survivable, persistent, multi-mission capable, and can operate from access-insensitive areas 15

Future Pacific?

Future Gulf? UK Bases Aviano AB

22x greater than Iraq’s landmass Taiwan Strait Denied Areas

Key Considerations • Increased depth of the battlespace • Close-in bases at risk • Average range to possible target areas > 1,200 nautical miles • Campaigns may be protracted

2,355 nm 1,850 nm

Denied Areas 1,500 nm 1,000 nm

Tehran Andersen AFB Denied Areas

Sea Base 2,400 nm

Northern RAAF Bases

Potential target sets much greater in size, more timesensitive, more mobile, better concealed, better hardened, deeply buried

2,200 nm

Diego Garcia 16

• A future force capable of attacking the full range of targets in contested environments – Greater focus on preparing for potential Asia-Pacific operations • America’s “swing force” that can rapidly deploy to a 2nd theater to deter or spoil opportunistic acts of aggression • A force that takes full advantage of new technologies (unmanned, DE, other) to maintain freedom of action in the air, space, and EM spectrum

Balancing mix of short-and long-range

Creating resilient forward postures

Fully harnessing the robotic revolution

Dominating the EM spectrum 17

• Improve the ability of aircraft carriers to project power ashore and into contested areas • Take advantage of manned and unmanned undersea capabilities that can operate in denied areas • Take advantage of new technologies that could create cost/exchange ratios favorable to the United States • Prepare for operations that may be of long duration

Getting the future carrier air wing right

Harnessing the potential of cyber & DE

Expanding payloads of the submarine fleet

Developing the right PGM magazine 18

Space Assets More Dispersed, Resilient Basing Posture

Air-Breathing, Long-Endurance Communications Relays Aerial Refueling Standoff Strike Platforms

Undersea LandAttack Capacity Penetrating Munitions Standoff Strike Platforms

Carriers with Longer Range Air Wing Capabilities

Next Generation Jammers

Penetrating Bombers

Electronic Warfare Expendables

Penetrating, Carrier-based Multi-Mission UCAV

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• Focus on rapid crisis responses – Not a second land army • Distributed operations in the Pacific and Middle East – Work with allies and partners to establish forward expeditionary operating locations • Joint theater entry ops (different than traditional “forcible entries)

Right-sizing expeditionary lift

Modernizing the STOVL force

Supporting capabilities for distributed ops

Fielding next generation EW capabilities 20

• New approaches and capabilities for imposing costs in the Pacific and Persian Gulf • Focus on preparing for hybrid and counter-WMD operations • Land-based sea control

Land-based longrange strike

Leveraging the indirect approach: SFA, BPC

Land-based sea denial

Air and missile defense

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Early 1990s: End of Cold War >> shift to conventional theater contingency scenarios

2001: 9/11 >> address homeland defense requirements

2002-2013: Iraq, Afghanistan >> major expansion of SOF, CT, unmanned aircraft, building partner capacity, etc.

Today • End of 12 years of war >> no large-scale stability ops • Pacific rebalancing, A2/AD challenges, WMD

proliferation, hybrid conflicts >> time for a new FPC rather than an “update” that sustains the status quo 22

35%

1993 BUR

Today

30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%

Service Shares of the Base Defense Budget

Air Force Navy & Marine Corps Army Defense-Wide

FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14

0%

Does not include funding for overseas contingency operations

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Baseline: No Additional Cuts FY14 President’s Budget (In FY14 Dollars)

Scenario B: Half Sequester Scenario A: Full Sequester

Full Sequester

Half Sequester

FY2014-18

-$260 B

-$56 B

FY2019-23

-$261 B

-$191 B

Two FYDP Total

-$522 B

-$247 B

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Example exercise results for a full sequester scenario

• Accelerated next bomber procurement • Funded new stealthy, multi-mission remotely piloted aircraft • Added precision-guided munitions to help offset force cuts

$150 B

• Invested in airborne directed energy weapons

$100 B $50 B $0 B

-$50 B -$100 B -$150 B -$200 B -$250 B -$300 B -$350 B

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Example exercise results for a full sequester scenario

• Traded military and civilian personnel, contractors, to support modernization

• Reduced near-term readiness FY14-18, fully restored readiness for FY19-23

$150 B

$100 B $50 B $0 B

-$50 B -$100 B -$150 B -$200 B -$250 B -$300 B

• Traded DoD TACAIR for long-range capabilities – Kept Air Force above 1,000 combat-coded fighters • Traded non-survivable RPAs for a new generation of stealthy, multi-mission unmanned vehicles • Reduced strategic and tactical airlift

-$350 B

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