20th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Sydney 3 – 9

20th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Sydney 3 – 9 July 2005 Specialized Themes 21: Models of the Welfare State Formation in the Global Context

Hans-Jürgen Puhle

Welfare State Proliferation: Models, Mixes, and Transcontinental Learning Processes

[This is a draft version. Comments are welcome]

Hans-Jürgen Puhle Fb. Gesellschaftswissenschaften Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main e-mail: [email protected]

20th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Sydney 3 – 9 July 2005 Specialized Themes 21: Models of the Welfare State Formation in the Global Context

Welfare State Proliferation: Models, Mixes, and Transcontinental Learning Processes

Hans-Jürgen Puhle Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main

Introduction The modern welfare state (or ‘Sozialstaat’, i.e. the various types and sets of welfare regimes, or regimes of social provision) seems to be a European invention ot the 19th and 20th centuries. It has, however, proliferated through most of the world, as a principle and a model, and in many parts also as an objective and a goal to be pursued in real politics. Hence it would be the third of Europe’s great export products in modern times to the rest of the world, after the two ‘classics’: the modern nation state and capitalist industrialization. Some authors, like T.H. Marshall, have, at least in principle, seen the welfare state as a progressive stage, a new quality of the nation state which has followed and complemented the earlier types and stages: the Rechtsstaat (state of rule of law), the Verfassungsstaat (constitutional state) and the democratic state, basically under the pressures established by the consequences of industrialization. It would, however, be problematic to see the process of the proliferation of ‘welfare stateness’ (or in German: Sozialstaatlichkeit) from Europe to the rest of the world as the only, or always the dominant, process, or as a one way street. Reality has been more complicated, we have to differentiate, and above all we have to account for the limitations, and the traps of an unreconstructed ‘export product’, ‘European pattern’ or ‘Europeanization’ hypothesis. It begins with what we mean by ‘Europe’: We know, on the one hand, that there is no monolithic, or uniform European model or trajectory, but there are many. And on the other hand it could be argued that, at least during the second half of the 20th century, in many parts of the world the features of ‘Americanization’ (meaning ‘North Americanization’) have been more influential than those of ‘Europeanization’, down to the technological and economic characteristics of ‘neoliberal’ globalization in the information society, and also when it comes 2

to the patterns of reforming and reshaping the crisis-ridden systems of many established welfare regimes. So what do we mean when we say that the proliferation of the welfare state started out from Europe?

In what follows it will be argued that (1) the models and patterns which proliferated have been North Atlantic (or Euro-American) patterns which were basically framed by European constellations and trajectories due to the fact that the European colonies in North America could, in many areas, be considered to be extensions of the respective European societies and to consist of ‘social material common to the Western world’ (L. Hartz). These patterns and trajectories have been differently accentuated and mixed in every European or North American society, but they have had a number of significant characteristics in common which constitute the ‘Western syndrome’ from which alone the various forms of modern liberal democracy and welfare stateness (or welfare regimes) could emerge. Both, modern demoracy and the welfare state are ‘Western’ concepts, because the West, for a long time, has been the pioneer in modernization and, in many important ways, more advanced on its path into the ‘modern world’, but these concepts have become universalized because they were attractive, irresistible and without alternative for most of the rest of the world. Despite all the debates on ‘Asian values’ and the like, even in the most ‘non-Western’ parts of Asia we can hear demands voiced for self determination, autonomy and participation, legal and institutional reliability, habeas corpus, physical and social security, demands which in modern times have been first recognized as the norms of rule of law and of liberal democracy in the West.

The patterns of the various welfare regimes, however, have been different in different societies of the North Atlantic complex. My hypothesis here is that (2) these patterns do not completely, but to a great extent depend on the different trajectories of these societies into modernity which were rather clearcut and distinct in the beginning, but have tended to being less different from one another during the 20th century. We can find more and more mixes, similarities, eventually convergencies, and the systems have, despite all their remaining differences, become more alike than they used to be. (3) It will have to be examined what this has meant for the processes of proliferation of the instruments and mechanisms of welfare regimes to the rest of the word.

Finally I shall try to (4) sort out and distinguish the various (and overlapping) contemporary processes and developments in welfare state proliferation characterized, at the same time, by 3

globalization and fragmentation: more globalized exchange, communication and learning processes, on the one hand, and the formation of regional or sectoral clusters, on the other. And (5) we have to account for some of the constellations of what might be called their overall embeddedness.

1. Three waves of discourse

The history of welfare state formation and welfare state change has, from the beginnings, been a history of transcontinental communication and learning processes. This refers to all three waves of their development we can so far distinguish: The first was the wave of the formation and expansion of the European welfare states, and of the principles of welfare stateness, from the last quarter of the 19th century down to the 1920s. The second was characterized by the reactions of the established welfare regimes to the great depression and the formation of new ones in North America and some more advanced countries of the South (e.g. Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand) since the 1930s.

The more recent third wave since the 1970s launched a period of restructuring and recasting the mechanisms of the existing welfare states (mostly implying some retrenchment) under the combined pressures of a new type of crisis (‘stagflation’), the dominance of more liberal, if not neo-liberal therapies, and a more globalized context defined by more globalized markets, increased transnational exchange and a debate about the limitations of stateness and state functions. These pressures and conditions have also framed the processes of overhauling and reinventing the systems of social provision in countries which have, from 1989 on, transited from communist regimes to more democracy (however defective) and to market economies, as well as those of laying the basic ground for civic interaction and stateness in some of the poorest and least developed countries.

The transcontinental learning processes have a long tradition, particularly around the Atlantic where it all began what has been called the ‘modern world’. The Atlantic system has always implied, at some critical junctures more than at others, processes of transatlantic learning, though mostly not among equals: at certain points, some had to learn more than others, and for a long time some could afford to learn less. These features later could be generalized. One important difference, however, between the three waves characterized above has been that during the first two communication about the advantages and the limits of the different and 4

often divergent models of welfare policies (not to forget those at the level of local government) and welfare state formation was generally confined to the North Atlantic involving basically the various European countries, the United States and Canada (some exceptions in the South notwithstanding, like Uruguay, Australia, or New Zealand), whereas the exchange of the last decades has really become global in the sense that everybody has been trying to learn from the models and experience of everybody else. On the whole, however, the different trajectories of the various countries, of modernization and development in general, and of welfare state formation more in particular, do still seem to matter a great deal. 2. Different trajectories of ‘Western’ development around the Atlantic

The different welfare regimes of the West to a large extent have been products of the different trajectories of their respective countries on their way into the modern world. At the core these trajectories have been European. The various European societies have followed different paths into modernity all of which have, however, been part of an overarching European pattern consisting of three basic elements: 1. the common background of the cultural mix and the economic, social and institutional constellations of premodern times down to the 15th century; 2. the different trajectories of modernization of the European societies since the beginning of modern state building the characteristic elements of which can be expressed in terms of the distinct mixes of factors out of three different sets whose presence, in a way, constitutes the 'unity' of a 'European' pattern of modernization, and which we might, for short, label as (the processes of): bureaucratization, industrialization and democratization; and 3. a number of tendencies towards more convergence and a greater similarity between the different European and Western societies in the 20th century which have modified and eroded some of the characteristic features of the earlier trajectories. Just some brief comments on these three points.

ad 1: Europe is a product of history and a construct. I basically define it in terms of the Occident which in the beginning was catholic and where, in contrast to the orthodox East, we can find more competition, more checks and balances, pluricephal, bi-polar and tendentially pluralistic organization: Emperor and kings v. the Pope, kings v. estates, parliaments and communes, catholics v. protestants, etc. It combined Greek, Hellenistic and Roman legacies, judaeo-christian traditions, Germanic and other Nordic heritage, and from its center in the 5

empire of the Francs and the Nordic countries it integrated first the Western Slavs, the Baltics and the Hungarians about thousand years ago, later other parts of what had remained the periphery, in Southern Italy, on the Iberian peninsula and on the Balcans, much later even in Russia when the country began to westernize. Its core territories in premodern times were characterized by the dualism between 'spiritual' and 'temporal' (or: civil) power and administration, by feudal institutions of the 'European' type (Hintze) and by the emerging European opportunity structures which were framed by the interactions between 'centers' and 'peripheries' (Rokkan) and have much contributed to the comparative advantages of the European processes of early state building, no matter of which type (Ertman). They have framed patterns which had enough time to take roots. They have also contributed to the various constellations that became conducive to the revolutionary process of modernization from the 16th century on: to the emergence of modern capitalism, the building of colonial empires, renaissance, humanism and the invention of modern science, reformation and counter-reformation, modern political and economic theory, particularly in Britain, the enlightenment and the advance of secularization.

ad 2: We can find a common denominator of 'European' modernization in the fact that in all particular cases factors from all the three relevant sets have been present: from bureaucratization, industrialization and democratization, all three of which have as much contributed to frame the modern states, their institutions, legal systems, their economies and a functional minimum of national integration, as they have contributed to the emergence of modern nationalism, imperialism, socialism, organized capitalism or corporatism. What, however, constitutes the distinct national (or in some cases even regional, like in Catalonia) trajectories are the different mixes, in quantity, quality and over time, between the various factors out of the three sets. Bureaucratization includes the different modes and stages of state building, and democratization, in a larger sense, also refers to the dimensions of representation (including the local level), parliamentary control, accountability, organized pluralism (incl. the civil society level), and the Rechtsstaat (rule of law).

In a simplified and schematic way the most important differences can be characterized as follows: In Great Britain where the leading actor was an autonomous bourgeoisie, the dominant factor of modernization has been capitalist industrialization which, in its turn, triggered processes of democratization, whereas bureaucratization set in later, during the

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second half of the 19th century, in order to cope with some of the social consequences of industrialization.

On the continent where the bourgeoisies were much weaker, it all began the other way round, with bureaucratization and bureaucratic absolutism mostly also characterized by authoritarianism, militarism and mercantilism. But here the French revolution makes a great difference: Hence, in France the hegemonic pattern of modernization has been a mix out of bureaucratization and democratization, whereas industrialization set in later and, for a long time, did not exercise a significant influence over the institutions and their interactions. In Prussia and other German territories there was no successful revolution, and the bureaucratic state usually was even more interventionist and authoritarian. So here the dominant factor in modernization became a mix out of bureaucratization and industrialization, whereas democratization remained weaker and more deficient until after World War II.

These three might be considered as the basic types. We also can find modifications and mixes: The path of Spain into modernity grosso modo has been similar to the French, but here the legacy of the revolution and civil society traditions and networks (at least in the center) have been much weaker than in France so that democratization was contained and authoritarian tendencies could survive for long. In addition, we have to account for the strong cleavages and antagonisms between the underdeveloped center and the overdeveloped periphery which usually forced the bureaucratic elites of the center either to opt for alliances with the capitalist bourgeoisies of the periphery or for pactos with the various groups of the retrograde rural oligarchy of the center, or to try to compromise between the two.

The case of the United States has been similar to the British in that the factors of bureaucratization came late. There is, however, an important difference: In the U.S. the elements of democratization have had a stronger weight and impact than in Britain from the beginning on, and her further trajectory has been strongly influenced by federalism and federal structures (as one way to cope with ‘bigness’) and by the requirements and consequences of the ‘New Nation’ (immigration, mobility, ethnicity, the constitution and its institutions as vehicles of integration, etc.). - The more important the factors of democratization were, in general, the more institutional, participatory and consensus mechanisms (like a concept of citizenship) could be used in the processes of nation building (which in Europe have functioned more along exclusionary lines). All the tendencies and 7

mixes described have, of course, been much less static and clearcut than they appear in this simplified typology, and they would need more modification and nuance.

ad 3: It must be emphasized that the different national (or regional) developmental types and trajectories have been particularly characteristic for the beginnings and for the first stages of the respective processes of modernization. Later on we can find more similarities and even clearcut tendencies towards more convergence, particularly in the 20th century (in addition to a growing influence of what has been called ‚Americanization‘): On the one hand, this has been a process of compensation by which the formerly weaker and recessive factors out of the three different sets (bureaucratization, industrialization and democratization), due to pertinent challenges and pressures, have become stronger and made up for what had been lacking: So in Germany parliamentary democracy has been finally established, in Britain the civil service and other bureaucracies, in France the instruments of coordination between economic interests and the state, Spain has industrialized and finally even democratized, and in the United States state interventionism has become an everyday phenomenon.

On the other hand, we can also find a number of additional overall 'European' features and trends of development, in the economy and in social organization, in education, urbanization and in family structures, in the proliferation and in sectoral patterns of bureaucratic and legalistic regulation (cf. Kaelble), and, above all, in the two complementary trends towards universalizing participation, on the one hand, and discipline (what G. Oestreich has called ‚Sozialdisziplinierung‘), on the other, at the same time, visible, e.g., in the introduction of women suffrage and the progressive income tax in a number of countries around 1920. In addition, labor markets and labor relations were increasingly regulated in cooperation between private collective actors and the state, and the mechanisms and institutions of the welfare state were further extended. In the beginning of the second half of the 20 th century one could find relatively similar systems of bureaucratic interventionist and welfare states with more or less explicit Keynesian instruments and corporatist arrangements in many countries, still differently accentuated but more similar than before.

We can find similar tendencies towards more convergency in the field of social provision and welfare stateness, even at two different stages the constellations of which point into different directions: The first stage, down to the 1970s and 80s, has been characterized by the continuous and often incremental extension of the systems in which the different philosophies 8

of their beginnings became increasingly mixed and combined with others, e.g. with regard to social security in the various combinations of factors stemming from both the Versicherungsprinzip (income and contribution related pensions) and the Versorgungsprinzip (egalitarian tax-financed citizens’ pensions). At the more recent second stage we can find almost everywhere more concern and more discussion about the limits of the bureaucratic welfare state and the possible and viable scenarios of its reform, reconstruction and shrinking. This forms part of a secular change in politics and policies the importance of which cannot be exaggerated: For more than a century it had been taken for granted, at least in the more developed world, that ‘progress’ was intimately connected with more and better organization, regulation and state intervention. Since the 1970s and 80s this credo of the ‘social democratic’ century has been increasingly questioned, and ‘progress’ has been much more associated with strategies of deregulation, de-statization, privatization and less (instead of more) organization (see also the papers presented by Andersson and Zimmermann).

3. Developmental trajectories and welfare regimes

My third point is that, on the one hand, it have been these European and Western patterns and constellations of development which have produced and shaped the basic concepts of modern welfare stateness. On the other hand, the different paths and trajectories of the various countries on their way into the ’modern world’ have essentially contributed to framing the particular forms and modes of the various systems of social provision or welfare regimes, in addition to the more general socioeconomic constellations like the scope and mode of industrial growth, the strength of the labor movement or the churches, the alternatives of class coalitions and the degree of organization of the interests and groups within the respective society.

(1) The combination of the essentials of European and Western modernization, the factors from the three sets of bureaucratization, industrialization and democratization, has exceptionally favored the rise of the concepts of modern welfare stateness: It was the particular impact of massive and intensive industrialization, and particularly its social and demographic consequences (mass migration to the industrial centers, uprootedness, housing and health problems, education, etc.) which placed ‘the social question’ on the ‘urgent’ side of the political agenda. On the other hand, the institutions and agencies created by the processes of bureaucratization and state building, at least on the European continent, provided efficient 9

instruments fit for implementing the necessary policies relevant to the problems of the ‘social question’.

These policies go, to be clear about that, far beyond the hard core of social security, health insurance and welfare assistance benefits and also comprise, e.g., tax, trade and tariff policies, the policies concerning the labor market, education and immigration, and all other policies affecting the relationship between individuals and families, the market and the state. This does not only apply to the beginnings we are discussing at this point. It also has a general importance, particularly in periods of structural change like the present. Comparative research of the last decades has demonstrated that the more we compare, the more we need a broader, more comprehensive notion of social (or welfare) policy in order to account for the broad variety of the different mixes, and the mechanisms of functional substitution, of the particular welfare regimes, and their embeddedness in the relevant other regimes and policies. How could we meaningfully compare social security and welfare payments, e.g. in the United States and in Germany without referring to the different mechanisms of the two tax (and incentive) systems involved? Here substantial conceptual work remains to be done. As they emerged, from the mid-19th century on, the various social policies and welfare regimes have usually been built and implemented by the states, and at the level of the state. They could, however, also be authored by the municipal governments, particularly in the big cities, provided that there was a tradition of strong and autonomous local government with the necessary budget and bureaucratic or organizational expertise (like in Germany, or, in a different way, in Britain).

Finally, it have been the processes of democratization of the European and Western societies which have enabled the concept of the modern welfare state to rise and go beyond absolutist, authoritarian and discretionary welfare policies from above as well as private charities and ’Armenpflege’. The core of the modern welfare state, the encompassing recognition of the social rights and respective claims of the citizens, in analogy to property rights in the market and the right to participate in politics, would not have been conceptualized without the secular demands for the recognition of individual and civil rights, for rule of law and democracy in Europe and North America in the 19th and 20th centuries. It could be said that this concept which has found its most comprehensive and explicit form in the notion of ‘social citizenship’ along the lines of T.H. Marshall, de facto began its career long avant la lettre in a series of 10

partial recognitions already inherent (though contre coeur) in the Bismarckian reforms in Germany.

(2) We also have to account for the differences: It usually have been the dominant factors of the respective mixes which (later processes of making up for the weaker factors notwithstanding) have also shaped the characteristic constellations and the ‘Gestalt’ of the mechanisms of the various welfare states, e.g.: bureaucratization and industrialization in Prussia/Germany, bureaucratization and democratization in France, industrialization and democratization in Great Britain, etc. So different types of welfare stateness emerged, along the lines of Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s typology (to take the most influential one of the 1990s, after the ‘classics’ like Wilensky, Titmuss, Flora-Heidenheimer, which has inspired many others, e.g. Leibfried, Castles-Mitchell, Siaroff, Ferrera, Bonoli, Korpi-Palme) a conservative type on the European continent, a liberal type in the Anglo-Saxon countries and an egalitarian or ‘social democratic’ type in Scandinavia (not to speak of the many real mixes).

- The liberal Anglo-Saxon type of social provision at a low level, in cases of need and with high eligibility requirements corresponded to the primacy of the market, the principle of individual responsibility, capitalist work ethics and a belated process of bureaucratization. - The conservative continental-European type of differentiated, income and contributionrelated individual (but also family related) claims at a higher level with moderate eligibility requirements and an inbuilt factor of subsidiarity corresponded to the corporatist and bureaucratic traditions of the respective societies, in some cases also to the belatedness of democratization. - The ‘social democratic’ Scandinavian type finally, of more egalitarian, universalistic claims (derived from citizenship) at a high level with lower eligibility requirements corresponded to a society characterized by early individualization and democratization, a high degree of social homogeneity and a belated industrialization.

Within the liberal variant, for countries like the U.S. it might be added that weaker traditions of stateness, mostly due to the lack of absolutist traditions, and the dynamism of an expanding society of immigrants for a long time have tended to favor the emergence of a more decentralized, and less regulating ‘welfare society’ (Gräser) over the classical mechanisms of the welfare state the creation of which, in fact, was impeded and slown down by the strength and the expanded activities of the robust societal agents. The welfare state, no matter at which 11

level (union, state, city), here remained somewhat belated, uncomprehensive and (until today) ‘incomplete’ in terms of the current European models. Marcus Gräser in his recent work (2004) has convincingly demonstrated that this belatedness of American welfare state building, and the inability to ‘learn’ from the more advanced European welfare states, has essentially been due to the fact that functions of the welfare state, up to a point and with certain weaknesses, limitations and asymmetries, until the 1930s were fulfilled by the early professionalized private agents of the ‘welfare society’. In a way, early democratization (at all levels) and the organization of civil society from the grass roots have been conditions for the weakness and belatedness in terms of welfare stateness. Given all these variations within Europe and the ‘West’, the latecomers in modernization at the ‘periphery’, when they thought of implementing the mechanisms of the welfare state, did not find a uniform ‘Western’ model but many different models. And the later they began to build the welfare state the greater and more varied became the offer because also the latecomers of the ‘center’ (like the U.S.) were gradually speeding up, usually learnt from the pioneers, mixed and added to the options of choice. Often the models which were debated and considered came from cases which were considered to be ‘nearer’ on historical grounds (in terms of colonial tradition or hegemonic dependency), but mostly even these were changed and mixed with others in order to adapt to domestic problems.

Around 1900 the American experts (e.g. from Chicago) mostly envied the Germans for their enlightened and sophisticated welfare bureaucrats and institutions, studied their work, but could not ‘learn’ much, because there would not have been any room for such bureaucrats in the machines and populist politics of the American cities (cf. Gräser). At the same time, in modernizing Japan, after the disappointment over the British poor laws, the German model was studied to the extent that in 1896 a Japanese equivalent to the Verein für Socialpolitik was founded. Although this association soon became a conceptual clearing house, influential think tank and a focus for the transcontinental transfer of welfare concepts, the political and social priorities of Japan were too different from those of Germany and other European countries to allow for too much copying and ‘imitation’ (cf. Schwentker). And one of the most modern welfare states of the interwar period, Uruguay, due to its booming traditional export economy and wealth, could afford to pick the details of its social and welfare legislation from the most advanced and most expensive programmes from all over Europe and even improve them (cf. Puhle). 12

Many monographic and comparative studies in welfare state formation have demonstrated that it was basically the general idea of the welfare state (in the sense of a ‘regulative Idee’) which has proliferated from Europe throughout the world, but that even the more systematic details of its implementation have usually followed the needs and constellations within the respective non-European countries, however much the various European models were discussed and their elements tested, as it occurred, e.g., in the United States and in Japan around 1900.

4. The present: global communication and regional and sectoral clusters

The present tendencies in the proliferation and mixture of the models and systems of welfare regimes at the first glance seem to be confusing. They are characterized by a high potential for global communication and information in ‘real time’ (under the conditions of the information society), on the one hand, and the formation of regional clusters corresponding to the different levels and statuses of development, on the other. The political elites and the experts of different countries seem to exchange ideas and to communicate with one another more than before, due to their higher mobility, exchangeability, internationalization and to the increased requirements of coordination in the cases of regional integration (like the European ‘Social Union’). But the outcome so far has been rather selective. We still can find gradualistic tendencies towards more convergence, but also focussed speeding and compression in time, and abrupt turns and leaps, eventually leaving out and jumping over what would have been whole intermediary stages according to earlier comparative wisdom. This is a case of what we might call ‘leapfrogging’, a phenomenon which has become more widespread in many fields of politics and policies lately (cf. Gunther/Diamandouros/Puhle).

Unbounded communication and leapfrogging may also contribute to further blur the lines between the ‘Western’ understanding of the welfare state as an additional quality of modern liberal democracy granting social rights to its participating citizens, and a more technocratic view (inherent in most worldwide comparative statistics which have enough problems in trying to make the relevant indicators really comparable) considering welfare regimes as the regulating sectors of social provision in any given society no matter what kind of a political regime or social system it has. In order to be able to make broad comparisons and to come to a comprehensive classification of the problems at hand, it may eventually be useful to follow 13

the second approach, as much of the literature does. But we should never forget the ‘system embeddedness’ and the difference in the overall quality of life it might imply, independently of the extent and quality of the social services in a narrower technical sense.

Simplifying and not accounting for processes exclusively inspired by non-European and nonWestern patterns and models (if there are any), the present developments within the mainstream of welfare regime proliferation may be tentatively classified under five headings:

First, we have the poorest, least developed and least integrated countries, above all in parts of Africa and of Asia which have not had much of a chance to directly implement even the most minimalist services of what would be worth to be called social provision. In many cases this has been due to the lack of stability and of previous state building, to the defects of stateness and of the developmental strategies and capacities of the state. A sufficient degree of functioning stateness is a fundamental and irreplaceable prerequisite not only of democracy (or any other political regime, for that matter) but also of a welfare regime because only a sufficiently functioning state can secure the basic legal and institutional guarantees of both, the additional merits of civic organization and mobilization or international assistance notwithstanding.

At the other end of the scale we find, second, the most developed and comprehensive bureaucratic welfare states of Europe, some of them with a long tradition of more than a century. Under the pressures of the last crises since the 1970s and due to substantial demographic and technological changes, these welfare regimes have, to different degrees, reached the limits of their effectiveness, efficiency and fundability so that their reform and reconstruction is unavoidably on the political agenda. Reconstruction here basically means retrenchment: privatization, decentralization and cuts in net benefits and services, particularly with regard to welfare programmes, unemployment insurance and the search for the adequate incentives for a new relationship between ‘welfare’ (‘as we know it’) and ‘workfare’. Welfare retrenchment, however, does not just mean less of the old variety, it means a different quality of the welfare regime, eventually a new one.

Third, we have the peculiar case of the United States: Here, interestingly enough, the mechanisms of the welfare regime and the networks of social provision have functioned more like a variety of combined patchworks, and they have been less developed and less 14

comprehensive than in Europe when the need for reconstruction set in. The most conspicuous desideratum is comprehensive health insurance. Consequently, the American welfare regime is presently being reconstructed, reduced and extended at the same time: extended, incrementally and slowly enough, in the health sector, and reconstructed particularly in the field of welfare programmes, not only by reducing services and benefits, but also by increasing public investment in the preconditions and prerequisites of workfare programmes conducive to creating new jobs. It is an ambitious set of projects which have inspired many followers in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe and in Latin America. But it is also highly problematic because of its direct dependence on the business cycle, i.e. on growth: Once the boom stops most of the programmes do not work any longer or become too expensive.

Fourth, we find a heterogeneous group of less developed countries with older traditions of welfare regimes (democratic or authoritarian) which more often than not have elaborated codes of social legislation (mostly along the lines of European models) looking almost perfect on paper. Their only problem is that, due to clientelism, corruption, institutional and systemic inefficiency, there often is no or only little chance for the citizens or the members of the system to realize and secure the claims which have been guaranteed theoretically. In some countries a number of improvements within the lines of the respective systems were already on their way when, often under the pressures of the international donor institutions, the demands for a complete reconstruction and system change were presented, which usually did not make things easier. This has been the case, e.g., in many countries of Latin America after the transitions from authoritarian regimes and redemocratization since the 1980s, and tendentially, at a higher level, also in Southern Europe. In most Latin American cases the previous public or state-operated systems of social provision have been abolished, during the last twenty years, in favor of new decentralized private or public/private ‘social safety nets’ (SSN), first in 1986 in Bolivia (at the same time as in Ghana).

Due to their role as pioneers in implementation, these reforms, particularly of the social security systems (the problems of social assistance and unemployment insurance have only been addressed in a handful of more developed countries, particularly of the Cono Sur) have become much discussed models for a new worldwide trend of social security reforms in a number of countries in other parts of the world, including the ‘First World’ and Eastern Europe. This is a good example for a kind of circular odyssey of the models and patterns of 15

welfare regimes in various subsequent processes of transcontinental exchange. - As Carmelo Mesa-Lago has shown in his comparative assessments of structural reform of social security in Latin America, the Latin American experience itself has been rather heterogeneous. The reformers have followed different paths and patterns, combined different elements from different North American, Canadian or European models, and thus eventually created new mixtures of their own which have acquired some fame for being original or even ‘autochthonous’. The outcome has been mixed at best, and the more problematic the more the authors followed neoliberal textbooks (e.g. shrinking of overall coverage, underfunding, risks of the capital markets, strong bias against lower income strata, part time workers, women, etc.).

Fifth, we have the particular cases of the countries which have transited from communism and experienced drastic transformations of their political, economic and social systems including the systems of social provision. Here the previous comprehensive, encompassing and monolithic state-directed welfare regimes of ‘real socialism’ which were basically operated through the state-owned or collectivized plants and workshops or the compulsory labor unions (and which in China, e.g., only covered the urban population), have been dismantled in favor of a variety of new experiments and alternatives which could be centralized or decentralized, public or private or mixed (public/private) or cooperative. The post-communist countries could choose from (and they have discussed) the same menus of models and experiences as did the Western countries when they addressed the needs for reconstruction and overhauling their welfare systems. Once the barreer of the ‘systems divide’ had fallen, the processes of transcontinental communication and learning have become really universal. The difference between the various choices of what could be done and would be politically feasible in the long run has become more functional at a global scale, the divide between democratic and authoritarian systems notwithstanding. The preferences of the relevant political elites and experts usually tend to reflect (again) the particular developmental status and trajectory of a country and society. It is, e.g., important whether we are dealing with a more developed postcommunist country which may even have become democratic, like in Central Europe (cf. the paper presented by Bela Tomka on the more developed East Central European syndrome), or with a less developed country which may also still be not so democratic or outright authoritarian, like China.

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The Chinese development here is particularly interesting because, at least conceptually, a new welfare regime (or new welfare regimes) has (have) to be built from scratch under conditions of secular economic and social change and upheaval and the (partly self-inflicted) pressures of globalization, a decisive urban/rural cleavage and drastic regional divergencies. The relationship between the state, the party and the economy has to be substantially redefined, even the notions of public goods and public policies have to be introduced as meaningful categories, and basic standards of social provision have to be established which could address the different needs and priorities in different parts of the country. So far there have been many experiments with a mixed outcome, from significant improvements to depravation and pauperization. The new social security systems, e.g., usually have followed the lines of a public/private mix, require private supplemental insurance, are chronically underfunded, dependent on economic performance, and have not reached most of the rural population. Health and unemployment insurance still seem to be in a trial-and-error test phase. What is important, however, is that in this wide-open process of building a complete new welfare regime all available ideas and models, or just partial elements of them, have been discussed and eventually tested, be they from Europe, North or Latin America, Australia, New Zealand, Poland, Russia, or Japan. Welfare state proliferation has become more fragmented and more global at the same time.

5. Overall embeddedness

Finally, some caveats seem to be in order (which otherwise might require a paper of its own). Some of them have also received the attention of our colleagues on this panel (cf. particularly Zimmermann, Andersson, Whiteside). The patterns and paths of welfare state building, welfare state reform and welfare retrenchment, and the particular types of welfare regimes and systems have not only been decisively influenced by the constellations of the macrodevelopmental trajectories of the respective societies. They have also been shaped, at all stages, by a number of factors and constellations, micro and macro, of what could be called embeddedness into context. Welfare regimes should always be considered as ‘embedded welfare regimes’. Let me briefly emphasize just three of these constellations:

First, welfare regimes are always embedded in a particular context of existing social organization at a given stage of its historical development (which is, of course, dependent on many other factors and forms part of the respective society’s particular developmental 17

trajectory), and this context is defined economically as well as culturally. With regard to the mechanisms of social provision the most important factors here are the existing household and family structures. Their format, size, density, cohesion and division of labor, on the one hand, shape the social systems, and indirectly indicate the areas where external intervention or assistance may be needed with priority. On the other hand, the existing family structures usually function as a mark of orientation for the programmes and systems of public social policy which thus tend to stabilize, preserve and reproduce the previous societal constellations and show a conservative or traditional bias.

Second, we have to account for the basic demographic and economic parameters of a society at a given stage which determine the room for manoeuvre of any kind of public social policies, particularly the feasibility of the various policies of redistribution. The most important factors here are the rate of economic growth, income distribution, tax rates, the economic potential and strength of the state, of the local authorities and of the private sector, and the rates of demographic and migratory growth in order to determine the relations between the different generations. Without considering these parameters we cannot meaningfully address such important issues as the (often ideologized) ‘pact between generations’, old age poverty, the social and cultural consequences of migration, the problems of the ‘megacities’, or the ‘erosion’ of family structures.

Third, we should not forget that there seems to be an important difference, with regard to the broader context, between the first two waves of welfare state building, rebuilding and proliferating, and the last wave which began in the 1970s. The older welfare regimes which have been conceived and framed since the last quarter of the 19th century or, outside Europe mostly, after the great depression of the 1930s, have essentially operated within the contexts of their respective nation states. The state was their principal frame of reference, the national accounts defined the room for manoeuvre. The degree of organization of the various interests and groups, the strength of the labor movements and the churches, the potential class coalitions, they all could be measured and assessed within the borders of the nation state. And political elites and coalitions could take it for granted that their politics and policies with regard to social provision would make an impact, more or less as planned, no matter (at least not much) what happened beyond the lines of the state.

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As there has not yet been much supranational integration of social policies, in many fields this still appears to continue to be so. The difference, however, is that since the last quarter of the 20th century, in the context of a more globalized economy, an increased number of transnational actors, a decreased potential for state regulation and continuous transcontinental learning processes at all levels, additional parameters and additional actors (and not just models or academic experts) from outside the compound of the nation state have to be taken into account and matter more than before. Particulary from the point of view of the less developed and ‘weaker’ countries, issues which so far, in most cases, have been exclusively defined in national terms, like: social stratification, poverty, social cohesion, solidarity, or the respective building of structures and institutions, have increasingly acquired an additional international and supranational dimension (even if we may still be far from John Keane’s ‘global civil society’). So it may not come as too much of a surprise if future comparative studies of welfare regimes and welfare state proliferation, in addition to using a broader notion of social policy or welfare in order to account for the various dimensions of its embeddedness, will also have to address the issue of transnational welfare regimes and give it a more prominent place than this paper has done.

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Hans-Jürgen Puhle is Professor of Political Science, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main. Numerous publications in the fields of comparative social and political history of Europe and the Americas, problems of modernization, comparative politics, state functions in welfare capitalism, political parties, pressure groups and social movements, nationalism and regionalism, regime change and transitions to democracy.

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