B. Jasani - Role of Satellites in Strengthening Nuclear Security

Chapter 12. Role of Satellites in Strengthening Nuclear Security Bhupendra Jasani Department of War Studies King’s College London UK What is nuclear security? As peaceful applications of nuclear energy were recognised, many countries began to use it for their economic development. Importance of threats against such activities was soon recognised. Thus, nuclear security is defined as security of nuclear materials and facilities as well as security of and from nuclear weapons requiring control of spread of such weapons and nuclear capabilities. Threats from States spreading nuclear weapons and their capabilities was already recognised as early as 1953 when in his speech on “Atoms for Peace”, the former US President, Dwight Eisenhower, stated that “...the United States pledges…to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life”. (Eisenhower, D. (1953) Address by President Eisenhower to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 8 December 1953) More recently, the 2010 Washington and 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summits focused again on nuclear cooperative measures, protection of nuclear materials and related facilities and prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Some of the materials and facilities involved Nuclear research and power reactors and weapons require fissile materials: e.g. U-235 and Pu-239. U-233 is also usable but not employed in practice. Uranium-235 is found in nature in a very small quantity and therefore, not usable directly for making nuclear weapons or explosives. The proportions of various uranium isotopes in nature are U-238 (99.284%), U235 (0.711%) and U-234 (0.0055%). Uranium is extracted from various types of mines and then enriched in enrichment facilities as required. Plutonium-239 does not exist in nature, but has to be produced in a nuclear reactor in which U-238 is bombarded by neutrons from fissioning of U-235 to convert it into Pu-239 according to the following process:

Plutonium-239 is then separated in reprocessing plants. Some of the measures to decrease threats against nuclear activities With the demise of the Soviet Union, managing existing nuclear materials and facilities within the former Soviet territory became priority issues, increasing the need for disarmament and the protection of and the reduction of nuclear materials, weapons and facilities. Moreover, increasing terrorist activities throughout the globe, the possibility of nuclear materials and facilities falling into their hands became a reality. Thus, threat to nuclear security has increased coming from non-State organisations also. In order to deal with these, a number of multilateral measures relevant to nuclear security are in place. However, only measures that have relevance to application of space capabilities are considered. Some of these measures are: 1

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Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities under the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) - (INFCERC/225/Rev.5); the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/1540 (2004), 28 April 2004); the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

Contributions from space capabilities Space capabilities have an important role to play in strengthening nuclear security. This will come mainly from observation and communications satellites. In the following, therefore, areas of the nuclear fuel cycle where space capabilities could be useful are identified. Only a few typical sites are selected as an illustration of the contribution of observation satellites to nuclear security. Three facilities, a plutonium production reactor, a uranium enrichment plant and a nuclear weapons storage facility, are selected for illustration. Furthermore, space capabilities contribute to national and international security by monitoring, for example, the NPT. Some of the facilities that can be usefully observed from space are indicated in Figure 1. Figure 1. Flow chart representing the production of nuclear materials and weapons at various stages in a nuclear fuel cycle.

Observation satellites, with optical and radar sensors, are very useful in monitoring facilities marked in yellow. In the following, images over a plutonium reactor, an enrichment plant and nuclear weapons storage facility are considered as examples. Example 1 – Pakistan’s plutonium production facility at Khushab In an image acquired of Pakistan’s plutonium production facility at Khushab on 4 February 2010 by DigitalGlobe, only the outer perimeter fence was detected. In a more recent image dated 3 March 2013 (see Figure 2), parameter fences around individual facilities within the main complex were also detected. By 1 April 2012, outer perimeter fence was reinforced by anti-aircraft guns (see Figure 3). 2

Example 2. In an image acquired on 3 March 2013 (see below) individual facilities in the complex had security fences also: (1)-first reactor; (2)-heavy water plant; (3)-reactors 2, 3 and 4 site. Source: Google Earth

Figure 3. Outer perimeter fence was reinforced by anti-aircraft guns by 1 April 2012 (see inset). Source: Google Earth

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Example 2. Iran’s enrichment plant at Natanz. In an image acquired on 7 February 2003 only one outer perimeter fence was detected while in an image dated 11 September 2006, a second outer perimeter fence was visible reinforced with antiaircraft guns (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility: In an image acquired by DigitalGlobe on 3 March 2013 reinforcement of the outer perimeter fence by anti-aircraft guns is visible (see inset).

Source: Google Earth

Thus, Natanz facility is not only secured by inner and outer double fences but also by antiaircraft guns. Moreover, the facility itself is underground. Example 3. Possible Pakistani nuclear weapons storage site near Sargodha Air Base.

Possible Pakistani nuclear weapons storage site near the Sargodha Air Base was located in an wide area image acquired from the Google Earth web site (see Figure 4). Figure 4. Possible Pakistani nuclear weapons storage site (2) near Sargodha Air Base (1). Source: DigitaGlobe, Google Earth

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While no further active defences, such as anti-aircraft guns or missiles are detected, the weapons site is protected by perimeter fences and a range of mountains at 1 around it as seen in Figure 5 acquired on 2 February 2004. The storage site area (2) from Figure 4 is enlarged in Figure 5. Figure 5. DigitalGlobe image acquired on 2 February 2004 over Pakistan’s possible nuclear weapons site near Sargodha Air Base. The site active as indicated by the presence of a train (see inset). The site is also surrounded by a range of mountains at (1).

Thus, sensitive nuclear sites have extensive security, including fences, towers and bunkers that are visible in imageries acquired from satellite-based sensors. Contributions from space capabilities to monitor arms control treaties: for example the NPT The other aspect of nuclear security, as indicated by the 2010 Washington and 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summits declarations, is arms control agreements. Monitoring compliance with such agreements is essential for national and international security. Observations from space can play a very crucial role in this process particularly when it is non-intrusive. Clearly we cannot go through all the treaties, as they are several to show to what extent they can be verified by satellites. Only two measures are considered here: the NPT; and a possible fissile

materials cut-off treaty (FMCT). Consider Finland as an example for the verification of its commitments to the NPT’s safeguards agreement. Finland signed the NPT on 1 July 1968. It deposited the instrument of ratification on 5 February 1969 and signed the IAEA safeguards agreement in 1971. It also signed the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement on 22 September 1998. Finland has two operating Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) nuclear power plants, OL1 and OL2, each 860 MWe, on the Olkiluoto island and two more Russian designed Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs), Loviisa 1 and 2 each with 488 MWe. Third unit, the first European PWR (EPR), is under construction in the same complex as the OL1 and OL2. Under the Additional Protocol the signatory has to provide the IAEA considerable details about the facilities such as their locations and facility dimensions. In Figure 6 the locations of these facilities are indicated. 5

Figure 6. Location of Finland’s nuclear power plants. Source: QuickBird - http://maps.google.com/maps

Figure 7 shows the plan of the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant as required by the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Figure 7. plan of the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant.

In Figure 8, the nuclear power plants were imaged by the QuickBird satellite. 6

Figure 8. Satellite image with an over view of Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant complex Source: QuickBird - http://maps.google.com/maps.

Figure 9. This shows the enlarged section of Figure 8 indication the construction of the European built reactor. Source: QuickBird - http://maps.google.com/maps

As can be seen that commercial satellites imagery can provide considerable amount of information for the verification of NPT’s safeguards agreements. It is worth examining briefly a future fissile materials cut-off agreement. Consider a possible fissile materials cut-off agreement (FMCT) According to the UN General Assembly’s resolution 48/75L (of 16 December 1993), there should be negotiations on a cut-off agreement on a "nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for 7

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Such materials are highly enriched U235, Pu-239 and possibly U-233. The latter has not been used as a nuclear explosive so far. In order to illustrate the usefulness of satellite-based imageries, three images, Ikonos-2 (Figure 10a), Landsat (Figure 10b) and synthetic aperture radar (ERS-2) (see Figure 10c) were examined. The Ikonos-2 image with its high spatial resolution enabled one to identify and describe the Canadian Bruce Nuclear Power plant. Figure 10a. Ikonos-2 image taken on 11 November 1999 at 1m resolution; Bruce Nuclear power plant.

Source: SpaceImaging

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Figure 10b. Landsat image with bands 6 as red (120m), 7 as green and 4 as blue (28.5m) over Bruce plants. The band is the thermal band that detects warm water. Source: EOSAT

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Figure 10c. An ERS-2 image over Bruce nuclear Power plant was acquired on 13 Mat 1997; warm water plume can be seen clearly. This is caused by the force of the discharged water into the lake. Source: ESA

Often water from lakes, rivers or sea is used to cool the core of a reactor thereby producing steam to drive the turbine that generates electrical power. There is always excess warm water that is discharged back into the source of water. This is detected by the infrared thermal band of the Landsat sensor and seen as red colour in Figure10b. The discharged water into the water reservoir causes the surface disturbances which can be detected by a radar sensor as in Figure 10. To determine that the disturbance on the water surface is caused by the discharged water from the reactor, the images from Figures 10b and c were corrected to match geometrically and then combined as in Figure 11. It can be seen that the plume in both the images coincided indicating radar images could, be used for the detection of the operating status of a reactor giving an all weather monitoring capability.

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Only the NPT and a possible FMCT were examined. Another very important treaty is the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). While the CTBT is not in force, monitoring this measure using space assets is very important. Not only can this procedure detect a nuclear test but has a potential for detecting preparations for a test. This is extremely important from the point of view of preventing possible further nuclear weapons proliferation. Figure 11. The Landsat 5 optical image combined with the ERS-2 radar image over Bruce nuclear Power plant; warm water plumes coincide in both the images.

Some conclusions Examples considered so far indicated the usefulness of optical and radar sensors on board observation satellites. It was shown that states have adopted extensive security measures around their sensitive nuclear facilities. These consist of active measures in the form of antiaircraft guns and passive strong fences at their nuclear sites. While only observation satellites have been considered because of the accessibility, other spacecraft such as electronic reconnaissance satellites can also be useful in monitoring communications traffic. Role of communications satellites cannot be ignored as they are vital in transmitting security related information from, for example, nuclear facility to a relevant agency. 11

Using multi-spectral and radar sensors on board satellites it is possible to determine the operating status of a reactor and thereby its nature. Regional and international security rests considerably on confidence building measures, peace agreements and arms control and disarmament treaties. One of the most important requirements is adequate independent verification of these measures. This was well illustrated after the Gulf War. In 1991, the UN Security Council established United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify Iraqi activities related to weapon of mass destruction (WMD). From 1 July 1999 to 17 December 1999, UNSCOM was replaced by United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to monitor WMD and missile activities in Iraq using commercial satellite imageries also. Thus, a multinational and an international organisation began to use satellite data as a part of its verification and confidence building tasks. However, soon after the conflict in early April, Iraq Surveillance Group (ISG) was established consisting of some 1,400 inspectors from the coalition partners. This replaced the UNMOVIC. Four months and $400 million later it produced its interim report on 8 October 2004 showing that its conclusions essentially were not different than those drawn by UNMOVIC/IAEA. In spite of this, the UK published “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass DestructionThe Assessment of the British Government” and the US reported in the United Nations on the CWs that led to conflict. Increasing capabilities of civil/commercial satellites and many more states launching and operating their own satellites, their applications on a multilateral basis becomes possible. In 2000 the IAEA established its own satellite data interpretation capabilities, marking the first use of satellite data by the UN. Commercial satellites not only contribute to arms control treaty verification but in other areas of security also. For example, conflict reduction, peace agreements, peace keeping operations and humanitarian assistance. Ultimately it is important to develop an international regime that incorporates the use of such satellites for compliance verification purposes.

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